On 19 December 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2717 to end its 24-year-old peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The resolution outlines a comprehensive disengagement plan for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), comprising three phases to gradually transfer responsibilities from MONUSCO to the Government of the DRC by December 2024.1 The UNSC decision was prompted by the DRC’s earlier request for the Mission's withdrawal. As the UN's longest-standing peacekeeping mission with a robust mandate faces a turbulent exit, it is crucial to ask what its critical failings were and what the UN can learn from them.

MONUSCO in DRC

MONUSCO commenced its peacekeeping mandate in the DRC, aiming to stabilise the nation torn by internal conflicts and political instability. Established in July 2010 by UNSC Resolution 1925, MONUSCO succeeded an earlier mission known as MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), initiated in 1999.2 This peacekeeping operation in the DRC became one of the longest-standing and most extensive UN missions globally, involving multifaceted objectives encompassing security, political stability, protection of civilians, and promoting human rights and development.

In its initial years, MONUSCO deployed approximately 20,000 troops and played a crucial role in reducing the presence of foreign rebels in the DRC. Over its two-and-a-half-decade presence in the DRC, MONUSCO navigated complex challenges marked by internal strife, armed rebellions, regional tensions, and humanitarian crises. Within a few years after its establishment, MONUSCO achieved significant milestones, including disarming Congolese ex-combatants, repatriating foreign combatants, facilitating the return of Congolese refugees, and releasing children from armed groups.3  

However, despite concerted efforts, MONUSCO faced persistent hurdles in achieving its mandates due to intricate and protracted nature of the conflicts, resource limitations, and political complexities. One of the contentious facets within the MONUSCO was establishing the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in 2013, an offensive military unit operating within the peacekeeping framework.4 The core objective of the FIB centred on curbing the expansion of armed groups, neutralising their impact and disarming them, thereby enhancing state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC to facilitate stabilisation efforts.
The induction of the FIB into MONUSCO initially sparked hope for change. With joint efforts between the FIB and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), there was an anticipation of fostering peace and stability in the volatile eastern region. However, despite the FIB's presence for over a decade, the DRC security situation has seen limited improvement, falling short of expectations.5

DRC has suffered immeasurable losses, with an estimated 6 million lives lost in the last two decades.6 It also faces the largest internal displacement crisis in Africa, with ongoing violence forcing 5.8 million people—over half of them women—to flee their homes. Since June 2022, over 600,000 people have been displaced due to escalating violence.7 In 2023, approximately 10 million people in the DRC required aid amid the turmoil.8 This dire situation fuelled widespread resentment against MONUSCO, prompting calls, including from the DRC president, for its withdrawal.9

Anti-MONUSCO Protests and Attacks against Peacekeepers

Since July 2022, DRC has seen a series of protests against MONUSCO. Attacks on UN peacekeepers surged, with over a dozen peacekeepers killed in one of the deadliest assaults against peacekeepers in recent history.10 More than 50 protesters died demanding the UN's withdrawal, blaming its inability to control rebel groups causing lethal attacks in the east.11 In November 2022, civilians targeted a UN peacekeeping convoy in eastern Congo, highlighting ongoing tensions. Also, a UN helicopter was attacked on 5 February, further underscoring the challenging situation faced by the mission in the region.12

Protests against MONUSCO in the DRC are not new. For instance, in 2019, following the ADF's atrocities in North Kivu, which MONUSCO could not prevent, large-scale protests against the UN mission erupted. However, this recent series of protests stands out due to its scale and the level of violence involved. Moreover, political elites also joined in criticising MONUSCO, intensifying pressure on the UN mission in the DRC. The International Peace Institute's 2022 report highlights increased disinformation about MONUSCO in the DRC, worsening negative sentiments towards the mission.13 Similarly, a recent survey revealed that nearly 45 per cent of Congolese want MONUSCO to leave the country immediately.14 This poses significant concerns regarding the future of peacekeeping missions in the continent.

Future of UN Peacekeeping in Africa

Africa has hosted the highest number of UN peacekeeping missions, accounting for nearly 47 per cent of all missions worldwide. The continent has been historically plagued by conflicts, civil wars, and humanitarian crises, making peacekeeping missions essential for regional and global stability. Despite many setbacks, UN missions helped end insurgencies, support elections and build peace in many African countries. However, growing resentments against UN missions raise serious concerns about the peacekeeping missions' effectiveness and long-term impact in the continent.

The protests and premature withdrawal of troops indicate the crisis confronting UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Since 1948, more than 4,300 UN personnel have lost their lives in peacekeeping missions, with over 1,000 falling victim to targeted attacks, predominantly in Africa.15 Since 2013, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and the DRC have witnessed the highest number of attacks against peacekeepers.16

The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is by far the most dangerous mission for peacekeepers, with 310 fatalities resulting from malicious acts from 2013 to 2023.17 The Security Council terminated the mission in June 2023, and peacekeepers exited the country without achieving their mandate. The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) also encountered opposition from political elites and exited without fulfilling its mandate.18

This peacekeeping crisis revolves around two main issues: first, concern about the erosion of core UN peacekeeping principles, leading to peacekeepers becoming parties in the conflicts they aim to resolve. Second, the missions' limited operational effectiveness, especially combating non-traditional threats like terrorism. These issues were evident in CAR, DRC and Mali, where peacekeepers were tasked with peace enforcement mandates. Further, most peace operations lack the necessary resources and training for counter-terrorism tasks. Peacekeepers, typically underfunded and undertrained, lack the specialised equipment, skills, and intelligence essential for effective counter-terrorism efforts. Hence, it becomes crucial for peacekeeping to adapt and evolve to address the challenges of the present era effectively.

MONUSCO's closure marks the end of a significant era for large-scale UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. Its exit signifies a reduced UN presence on the continent compared to previous years. This situation might lead host governments to seek other security partners, including private military companies. For instance, Mali and the CAR extended invitations to the Wagner Group to operate within their countries.19 Likewise, in 2022, the DRC also opted for the involvement of private military contractors to intensify operations in the eastern regions.20

These instances collectively suggest a bleak outlook for the future of UN peacekeeping in Africa, highlighting the urgent need for a comprehensive restructuring of the UN's approach in the region. India recently proposed the establishment of clear, realistic mandates for peacekeeping and effective communication strategies involving local stakeholders. As the increased robustness of mandates has proven ineffective, there is a need to explore alternative solutions.21 As a significant Troop Contributing Country (TCC), India emphasises fostering trust and cooperation between mission leadership and host states to address acts against peacekeepers. India's proactive initiatives, mainly promoting accountability for crimes against peacekeepers, underscore essential areas requiring improvement.22

In light of the persisting challenges that extensive stabilisation missions face in achieving lasting peace in Africa, there is a growing rationale for the UN to consider shifting towards more traditional and narrowly focused peacekeeping missions. It would also enable the UN to maintain a clearer and more distinct role as a neutral mediator in conflicts, thereby rebuilding trust among the host governments and the local populations. This recalibration could lead to a more targeted and efficient use of resources and personnel.

• 1. “Security Council Resolution 2717 (2023) on Extension of the Mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)”, United Nations, 19 December 2023.
• 2. “Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010) on Extension of the Mandate of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)”, United Nations, 28 May 2010.
• 3. "Programme Evaluation of Performance and Achievement of Results: United Nations Peacekeeping Activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services", United Nations, 12 March 2012.
• 4. “Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013) on Extension of the Mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)”, United Nations, 28 March 2013.
• 5. "Despite Peacekeeping Mission’s Efforts, Security Situation Worsening in Democratic Republic of Congo, Special Representative Tells Security Council", United Nations, 9 December 2022.
• 6. "10 million People in Democratic Republic of Congo Urgently Need Aid Amidst Increased Violence", Oxfam International, 5 April 2023.
• 7. “Democratic Republic of Congo 2022”, Amnesty International Report 2022/23.
• 8. "10 million People in Democratic Republic of Congo Urgently Need Aid Amidst Increased Violence", no. 6.
• 9. "DR Congo President Tshisekedi Seeks Withdrawal of UN Peacekeepers this year", Al Jazeera, 21 September 2023.
• 10. "DR Congo: Over a Dozen UN Peacekeepers Killed in Worst Attack on 'Blue Helmets' in Recent History", United Nations, 26 July 2022.
• 11. "Over 40 Killed in East Congo after Crackdown on Anti-UN Protest", Reuters, 1 September 2023.
• 12. “Secretary-General Strongly Condemns Deadly Attack on Peacekeepers in Democratic Republic of Congo”, United Nations, 6 February 2023.
• 13. "Disinformation against UN Peacekeeping Operations", International Peace Institute, November 2022.
• 14. "Is the UN Overstaying its Welcome in the Democratic Republic of Congo?", IPIS Briefing, October/November 2022.
• 15. "As Crimes against Peacekeepers Increase, How to Find Accountability", IPI Global Observatory, 4 May 2023.
• 16. "As Crimes against Peacekeepers Increase, How to Find Accountability", IPI Global Observatory, 4 May 2023.
• 17. “Mali: UN Convoy Concludes Treacherous 350 kilometre Journey”, United Nations, 8 November 2023.
• 18. “Exit of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)”, Africa Trends, 2021.
• 19. "Russia's Influence in the Central African Republic", International Crisis Group, 3 December 2021.
• 20. "DRC Horatiu Potra Boosts his Private Military Contingent in Goma", Africa Intelligence, 26 June 2023.
• 21. “Statement by Ambassador Ruchira Kamboj in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations”, Permanent Mission of India to the UN, 21 February 2023.
• 22. "EAM’s Keynote Address at Launch of Group of Friends on UNSCR 2589: Accountability for Crimes against Peacekeepers", Permanent Mission of India to the UN, August 2021.

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Summary

The subterranean infrastructure developed by Hamas, popularly known as the ‘Gaza Metro’ consists of tunnels, command and control centres, living spaces, stores and contingency fighting positions. The infrastructure is the pivot of Hamas’s irregular warfare strategy and allows it to undertake both offensive and defensive operations and has been assessed as one of its centres of gravity. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has been aware of the infrastructure but has possibly been surprised by the scale and sophistication achieved by Hamas in tunnel construction. The IDF’s technologies and doctrinal concepts are being tested every day in the ongoing war and will have a number of lessons for the Indian Army.  

Hamas has developed a complex subterranean infrastructure consisting of tunnels, command and control centres, living accommodation, stores and contingency fighting positions. The tunnels also have designated spaces for rocket-assembly lines, explosive stores, and warhead fabrication workshops.1 This infrastructure is famously known as the ‘Gaza Metro’.  The Metro is reinforced by concrete and other building material and protected by blast doors, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and booby traps.

The tunnels have been in use since at least the early 1980s, and members of various Palestinian insurgent organisations have been known to use them since the first Intifada, beginning in 1987.2 In the aftermath of the 2021 Israel–Hamas conflict, Hamas leader, Yahya Sinwar claimed that Hamas has 500 kilometres of tunnel system and that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has damaged only 5 per cent of it.3 There is no way to verify Sinwar’s claim but is indicative of the magnitude of challenge the IDF faces in the ongoing war.

Tunnel warfare is not new and dates to the ancient times. Jews used them against Romans in Judea in the first century.4 In the more recent times, the tunnels have been used in the battles of the Vimy Ridge, Messines and Somme of World War I, by the Viet Congs in Vietnam and in Mariupol, Bakhmut, and Soledar during the ongoing war in Ukraine.5

The Brief delves into the multifaced dimensions of the Gaza Metro and seeks to flag its origins, development, and the strategic implications on the ongoing war. It also focusses on the IDF's concerted efforts in developing technologies and deploying specialised forces to detect and dismantle this clandestine infrastructure.

Gaza Metro is more than a just any military infrastructure. It is the centre of gravity (COG) of Hamas’s military wing.6 The Brief also attempts to analyse various aspects of operational significance of Gaza Metro using certain facets of the theoretical construct of COG advanced by Colonel John A. Warden of the US Air Force, Professor Joe Strange and Colonel Richard Iron, and Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II, retired US Army officer.

History of Gaza Metro

The tunnels in Gaza predate Hamas. It is believed that they have been in use since the early 1980s7 after the city of Rafah was divided by the new border recognised in the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.8 It was initially used by the divided families to communicate among themselves and by smugglers to transport goods. Hamas was raised in 1987 and soon it realised the military importance of the tunnels. It began digging tunnels in the mid-1990s, when Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was granted some degree of self-rule in Gaza by Israel. The group began tunnelling in earnest since 2005, when Israel withdrew from Gaza, and later when Hamas assumed power in 2006 election.9  

Among the early success of Hamas, using the tunnels, was abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit and killing of soldiers Hanan Barak and Pavel Slutzker in a cross-border raid on 25 June 2006. Later Israel freed 1,027 Palestinian prisoners in return for Shalit’s release in October 2011.10

As per the reports, the tunnels in 1990s were approximately one meter wide and smugglers used winch motors to haul goods along the sandy tunnel floors in hollowed-out petrol barrels.11 Hamas has since gained considerable expertise in tunnelling and construction of underground infrastructure which has advanced security features, sewage disposal and air-conditioning systems, etc.  

Hamas and Gaza Metro

The Gaza Strip has an approximate area of 365 square kilometres. If Yahya Sinwar’s claim of 2021 of Hamas having built 500 kilometres of tunnel system is true, then it would be equivalent of having 10 parallel north to south tunnel systems and eight parallel interconnecting tunnels running east to west.12 The Gaza Metro is so designed that there may be dozens of shafts leading to a tunnel at depths of between 20 and 80 meters. As per some accounts, the density of tunnels is so high that some crisscross at different depths.13 To create a subterranean system of this magnitude requires a dedicated organisation, high level of technological expertise, and resources in terms of trained manpower, equipment and money.

Israeli officials have reported that Mohammad Sinwar, the brother of Yahya Sinwar, is heading the tunnel building project.14 Gaza has been under land, sea and air blockade by Israel and Egypt since 2007 and it was not expected to possess capability or resources to dig such an infrastructure. It was appreciated that Hamas has employed diggers using basic tools, used basic electrical fittings, and diverted concrete meant for civilian and humanitarian purposes towards tunnel building project. However, two of the tunnel systems discovered during the ongoing war, viz. near al Shifa Hospital and other close to the Erez crossing belies this assessment. The details of these tunnels have been discussed later in the Brief. 

During its operation in the house of Yahya Sinwar in Khan Yunis, the IDF collected significant amount of Hamas intelligence including Hamas’s report of financial transactions that gives details of more than a million dollars spent to construct tunnels in 2022.15  

Tunnel under al-Shifa Hospital

In the second week of November 2023, IDF’s 162nd Division was operating in Hamas’s “security quarter” of Gaza City, adjacent to al-Shifa Hospital. The troops of Givati Infantry Brigade reportedly found intelligence materials, weapons manufacturing plants, anti-tank missile launch positions and tunnels.16

On 17 November, the IDF located one of the shafts which led to the entrance of a bigger tunnel. This tunnel led to a blast door leading to a complex which had multiple rooms and one of them “was a spacious bedroom with two large beds and a large modern air conditioning unit, a kitchenette, a bathroom, and other facilities, as well as extensive plumbing and electrical wiring to enable all of the infrastructure”.17 The tunnel shaft leading to the main tunnel was approximately 2 metres high, lined with stones and concrete. The complex under the hospital was reportedly being used by Hamas as a command and control centre.18  

Tunnel near Erez Crossing

The IDF reported on 17 December that it had discovered largest tunnel ever—four kilometre long and 50 metres deep—near the Erez crossing. The tunnel reinforced with concrete had electrical fitments and was wide enough to allow a vehicle to pass through. The IDF also released a video of Mohammad Sinwar driving a car through a tunnel. In another video released by the IDF, Hamas fighters were seen using a large drill. In the tunnel near the Erez crossing, the IDF reportedly found “unspecified digging machines” not reported earlier.19 One section of the tunnel was approximately 400 metres from the Israeli border. 

The IDF has informed that the Combat Engineering Corps’ elite Yahaom unit and Gaza Division’s Northern Brigade used “advanced intelligence and technological means” to uncover the tunnel network.20

Operational Employment of Subterranean Infrastructure

The infrastructure is the pivot of Hamas’s irregular warfare strategy and allows it to undertake both offensive and defensive operations. It offers Hamas asymmetric advantage, negating some of the technological advantages available to the IDF. The fact that Hamas has constructed the subterranean system under one of the world’s densest urban locations complicates the matter further for IDF.   

The system is designed to withstand IDF’s aerial and ground bombardment. The design and construction enable Hamas to locate its leadership, combat units, headquarters, command and control centres, weapons and supplies inside the complex. It also enables various military echelons to move freely between various prepared contingency positions. Hamas has located power generation and air-conditioning systems, plumbing and sewage disposal arrangements and food supplies within the infrastructure. This is helping its fighters to better withstand the siege laid by the IDF in the ongoing war. The tunnels also allow the fighters to escape the combat zone when they are decisively surrounded by the IDF, as was the case in battle near the al-Shifa Hospital.   

Hamas fighters are using tunnels to undertake offensive operations by infiltrating behind IDF positions and launching surprise attacks using snipers, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and other weapon systems. It enables small teams to appear undetected behind IDF lines, strike and withdraw.  

It is also assessed that Hamas has booby trapped the tunnels and will initiate the devices causing the tunnels to collapse over the advancing IDF troops.

Gaza Metro as Centre of Gravity

Clausewitz originated the concept of attacking the enemy’s centre of grav­ity which he described as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our ener­gies should be directed.”21 A fighting force can have multiple centres of gravity and each centre will have an effect of some kind on the others. Hamas too has multiple centres22 and some analysts have described Gaza Metro as one of them.23  

Warden’s Five-Ring Model

Warden has conceptualised “Five-Ring Model” related to COG, of which infrastructure is the third critical ring. The infrastructure relates to enemy's transportation system—that moves civil and military goods and services in the combat zone. Gaza Metro is essential to move troops, warlike stores, command instructions and intelligence around the battlefield and if the IDF can disrupt the movement, Hamas will have lesser ability to resist it. Although Warden agrees with Clausewitz’s description of COG as “the hub of all power and movement”, he goes further to describe it as “that point where the enemy is most vulnerable and the point where an attack will have the best chance of being decisive”.24 Warden’s first ring and the “most critical” ring is the command ring, which refers to the leadership and communication resources.25 It is assessed that Hamas’s leadership,26 including Yahya Sinwar, leader of the Hamas movement within the Gaza Strip, Mohammed Deif, commander-in-chief of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and Marwan Issa, the deputy commander are hiding in the subterranean complex.

Neutralisation of Hamas leadership is likely to have a decisive impact on the outcome of war. It is also expected that Hamas leadership would have constructed multiple safe hideouts inside the subterranean infrastructure, from where they can direct their subordinate commanders and units. It is also likely that only the most trusted Hamas members would be aware of these locations. It would require sustained intelligence operations by Israel to generate actionable intelligence. However, once the Hamas leadership is cordoned inside the tunnels, they would be extremely vulnerable to IDF operations.

For the moment, the IDF is unaware of the exact location of the leadership and is destroying as much of this subterranean complex, as is possible to cause “strategic paralysis—by destroying one or more of the outer strategic rings or centers of gravity”27 —the infrastructure ring—the Gaza Metro.     

Strange and Iron’s Theory

The Strange and Iron’s theory is helpful to identify the location of COG and the impact of operations against it.  The theory aligns with the J.J. Graham’s translation of On War, published in 1874 which postulates that: “As a centre of gravity is always situated where the greatest mass of matter is collected, and as a shock against the centre of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect, and further, as the most effective blow is struck with the centre of gravity of the power used, so it is also in war.”28

Hamas is cognizant of the incredible capability and resources of Mossad and Shin Bet to generate actionable intelligence and doctrinal, technological, and material superiority of the IDF to undertake combat operations. To counter Israel’s operational superiority, Hamas relies on low-tech solution in the form of subterranean infrastructure. The nature of infrastructure provides Hamas inherent physical protection, ease of movement and concealment to command and control elements and, combat, and logistic units.

The Gaza Strip is one of the densest urban locations anywhere in the world. Tunnels in conjunction with urban infrastructure helps to create extremely potent defensive localities and killing grounds. The IDF hopes to find the leadership and fighters of the al-Qassam Brigades inside the Gaza Metro.

Hamas has claimed that Gaza Metro is spread over 500 kilometres. Hamas is expected to dissipate its forces all along the Metro to avoid presenting a concentrated target to the IDF. However, once located, and fixed, the IDF will be able to neutralise Hamas forces with relative ease inside the tunnel system.

The Strange and Iron’s theory also introduces a model of COG analysis with three additional sub-concepts29 :

• Critical Capabilities (CC):  CC is the primary ability of the COG within a given context.
• Critical Requirements (CR): CR relate to conditions, resources and means essential for the COG to achieve its CC.
• Critical Vulnerabilities (CV): CV refers to those CRs or components that are vulnerable to neutralisation in a way that will contribute to a COG failing to achieve its CC.

In the context of Gaza Metro, the subterranean nature of the infrastructure reinforced with concrete and other building material and further hardened using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and booby traps are the CCs. The camouflage and concealment arrangement to prevent detection of tunnels are the CRs while entry and exit points, ventilation and sewage arrangements, and communication infrastructure to enable command of Hamas fighters are the CVs.   

Echevarria’s Theory

Echevarria postulates COG is identified to achieve total collapse of the enemy—which is considered both as an effect and an objective.30 He further elaborates on the construct to suggest that the COG helps in identifying “way”—course of action—within an “ends-ways-means” construct to achieve annihilation of the enemy.31

This aspect may not be true when fighting an ideologically motivated and radical organisation like Hamas. It is possible that the IDF may identify and destroy Hamas’s tunnel system and thereby achieve destruction of Hamas’s military leadership and fighting units, however, in all probability the organisation will survive and grow, perhaps even more radical. “Terrorist groups are known to survive the loss of their leaders and members. It is quite likely that even if Israel destroys Hamas’s military wing, the idea of Hamas may survive.”32

IDF’s Tunnel Warfare Capability

Development of Technological Capabilities

The IDF has been aware of Hamas’s underground infrastructure and has been working towards new technologies and doctrinal concepts. When the first tunnel was discovered, the IDF established a laboratory, manned by engineers, physicists, geologists and intelligence operatives under the Gaza Division. The laboratory employed innovative soil research techniques, including scanning and decoding signals, and developed new detection techniques.   In 2018, a review of then IDF’s underground combat capability was undertaken and a new training manual was published.33

The Israeli scientists and engineers have developed several new innovations, most of them are classified. The IDF’s specialised units have been equipped with special conical penetrators, drills, robotic systems that can inject special ‘emulsions’ either to seal or destroy the tunnels.34 IDF also makes innovative use of technologies such as ground and aerial sensors, ground penetrating radars, geophones, fibre optics, microphones, special drilling equipment and others.  

The Israeli scientists have developed radio and navigation equipment which can work underground, night vision devices that work in complete darkness and remote and wire-controlled robots that can see and map tunnels without risking the lives of the soldiers. The IDF has training simulators to train soldiers in near realistic situations. Israel has also developed variety of explosives and ground penetrating munitions, like the GBU-28 which can penetrate 20 feet of concrete or 100 feet of earth.35  

Israel, over the years, has used satellite imageries, aerostat cameras and radars to map the tunnel system. These assets cannot reveal the layout of the tunnels but have been used to monitor location where cement-mixture trucks have halted over the years. The general area around these locations are possible entrances of the tunnels and may be probed using low-frequency, earth-penetrating radars, or basic probes.36   

US and Israel have also been collaborating to develop newer technologies. Since 2016, Congress has appropriated US$ 320 million towards the project.37

IDF’s Special Units

Fighting enemy inside subterranean system requires specialised units. The Gazan tunnels were first discovered during the first Intifada and the IDF recognised the need to raise specialised units. It raised ‘Yahalom’, specialist commandos from Israel's Combat Engineering Corps. Yahalom specialises in discovering, clearing, and destroying tunnels and has the “Yael” Company to undertake engineering reconnaissance, “Sayfan” to neutralise the threat of non-conventional weapons (weapons of mass destruction). In addition, there are two explosive ordinance disposal units, and “Samur”, which specialises in tunnel warfare.38

The IDF has a specialised canine unit, “Oketz”, whose dogs are trained in special tasks such as attack, search and rescue, explosive detection, and weapon location.39 In addition, police and intelligence services too have specialist units—“like Sayeret Matkal, the Yamam, and others—who share best practices for dealing with terrorists and combatants underground.”40

IDF’s Subterranean Operations

The IDF’s doctrine of subterranean warfare has evolved with the development of newer technologies to counter Hamas’s underground infrastructure, which too has become increasingly sophisticated and more potent with the passage of time.

Hamas fighters have advantage in narrow, dark, collapsible tunnels with which they are familiar. The IDF protocol demands that soldiers do not enter the underground structures unless it has been cleared of Hamas presence.41 It uses many of the newly developed technologies including tracker robots and explosives to map and clear the tunnels.  

During the ongoing war, Hamas prisoners have also provided intelligence about the tunnels. These prisoners do not have the complete picture of the Gaza Strip but have excellent knowledge of the underground system under their villages and localities.42

Namer Establishes Cordon     

Israel has one of the world’s best protected armoured vehicles, 70-ton Namer, to assist in tunnel demolition. It is armed with active defence system to intercept incoming rockets and missiles and machine guns to fight enemy on ground. The vehicle is equipped with cameras which allows the crew to operate in the safe environment from within the vehicle. The IDF employs Namer to provide protection by establishing a security cordon around the combat engineers who undertake the task of demolishing underground infrastructure.43      

Having secured the area of operation, the IDF maps the structure either by using ‘exploding gel’ or other technologies. Thereafter, it has an option of either demolish the underground infrastructure using explosives or flood it with sea water.

IDF uses ‘Exploding Gel’ to Map Underground Infrastructure

The ‘exploding gel’ is used to map the underground structure. Having located the entrance to the tunnels, the army engineers fill the passage with ‘exploding gel’ and fire it using detonators. The smoke travels the passage way and is used to map the underground infrastructure and also cause casualties to anyone inside the tunnels. The composition of the gel is classified and is brought in trucks because the scale in which it is used is huge. Several tons of gel are required every few hundred metres.44

The tunnel system runs for hundreds of kilometres. It is unclear how cost and resource effective this technology is.

IDF Deploys Pumps to Flood the Tunnels

The IDF maintains a tunnel flooding plan. In the middle of November 2023, it deployed five very large capacity pumps, approximately three kilometres north of Al-Shati refugee camp. Each of these pumps is reported to have capacity to draw thousands of cubic meters of water per hour from the Mediterranean Sea and flood the tunnels within weeks.45 On 12 December, The Wall Street Journal reported “Israel’s military has begun pumping seawater into Hamas’s vast complex of tunnels in Gaza.”46

It is still unclear how effective this tactic will be to achieve its intended objective of demolishing the underground infrastructure. The plan, however, has a downside since it is likely to contaminate Gaza’s fresh water supply.47

Conclusion

Hamas has expended a large percentage of its resources—money, material, and man-hours —to develop the subterranean infrastructure as a counter to technological and resource superiority of the IDF. It is the pivot around which Hamas’s defensive and offensive operations are planned and executed. The IDF, on the other hand, has been working to develop newer and more effective counters, however, there are yet to achieve the desired result. The ongoing Israel–Hamas war will bring out several new lessons of interest to Indian Army.

The concept of COG originally advanced by Clausewitz applied to conventional wars fought by regular armies. The world today faces challenge from religious and ideologically motivated non-state actors and the concept does not provide adequate explanation when planning operations against such organisations. This aspect requires greater deliberation.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Edward Luttwak, “What Israel Will Face in Gaza”, UnHerd, 17 October 2023.
• 2. Jacob Knutson, “What to Know About Hamas' Tunnel System Beneath Gaza”, Axios, 19 October 2023.
• 3. Tzvi Joffre, “Hamas's Sinwar: We Have 500 km of Tunnels in Gaza, Only 5% Were Damaged”, The Jerusalem Post, 27 May 2021. 
• 4. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Hamas’s Asymmetric Advantage: What Does It Mean to Defeat a Terrorist Group?”, Foreign Affairs, 22 November 2023.
• 5. John Spencer, “Underground Nightmare: Hamas Tunnels and the Wicked Problem Facing the IDF”, Modern War Institute, 17 October 2023.
• 6. “ “What's the Endgame of an Israeli Ground Assault in Gaza?”, NPR, 17 October 2023.
• 7. Jeremy M. Sharp, “The Egypt-Gaza Border and its Effect on Israeli-Egyptian Relations”, CSR Report for Congress, 1 February 2008.
• 8. Jacob Knutson, “What to Know About Hamas' Tunnel System Beneath Gaza”, no. 2.
• 9. “The Hamas Tunnel City Beneath Gaza - A Hidden Frontline for Israel”, The Jerusalem Post, 27 October 2023.
• 10. Raoul Wootliff and Stuart Wine, “Hamas Airs Video of Captive Gilad Shalit, Hours After Releasing Photo”, The Times of Israel, 30 December 2015.
• 11. “The Hamas Tunnel City Beneath Gaza - A Hidden Frontline for Israel”, no. 9.
• 12. Tzvi Joffre, “Hamas's Sinwar: We Have 500 km of Tunnels in Gaza, Only 5% Were Damaged”, no. 3.
• 13. Marco Hernandez and Josh Holder, “The Tunnels of Gaza”, The New York Times, 10 November 2023.
• 14. Dov Lieber, “Israeli Military Reveals Tunnel It Says Hamas Built for Large-Scale Attack”, The Wall Street Journal, 17 December 2023.
• 15. Yonah Jeremy Bob, “IDF Turns Yahya Sinwar’s Home to Dust in Gaza's Khan Yunis”, The Jerusalem Post, 22 December 2023.
• 16. Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian, “IDF says the 162nd Division is operating in Hamas’s “security quarter” of Gaza City…”, X (formerly Twitter), 9 November 2023.
• 17. Yonah Jeremy Bob, “'Post' Joins Israeli Forces in Hamas's Gaza Tunnel Underworld”, The Jerusalem Post, 22 November 2023.
• 18. “Watch: Israeli Army Displays Hamas Tunnel Under Gaza Hospital”, NDTV, 23 November 2023.
• 19. Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson and Nicholas Carl, “Iran Update, December 17, 2023”, Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 17 December 2023.
• 20. Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian, “IDF says the 162nd Division is operating in Hamas’s “security quarter” of Gaza City…”, no. 16.
• 21. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited/translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976, pp. 595–596.
• 22. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has described civilians in Gaza, the center of gravity. See Phil Stewart, “Civilians are 'Center of Gravity' in Gaza War: US Defense Secretary”, Reuters, 3 December 2023.
• 23. “What's the Endgame of an Israeli Ground Assault in Gaza?”, NPR, no. 6.  
• 24. John A. Warden, The Air Campaign (revised edn), Excel Press, Lincoln, 2000.
• 25. John A. Warden, “The Enemy as a System”, Airpower Journal,Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 40–55, 1995.
• 26.  Lina Alshawabkeh, “Hamas: Who are the Group's Most Prominent Leaders?”, BBC News, 17 October 2023.
• 27. John A. Warden, “The Enemy as a System”, Airpower Journal, no. 25, p. 50.
• 28. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by J.J. Graham, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, London, 1908, Volume I, Book Six, p. 354.
• 29. Eystein L. Meyer, “The Centre of Gravity Concept: contemporary Theories, Comparison, and Implications”, Defence Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 332–333, 2022.
• 30. Antulio Echevarria II,Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine– again!, Carlisle, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, pp. 12–13.
• 31. Ibid., p. 15.
• 32. Daniel R. DePetris, “Israel’s Gaza Problem”, RUSI, 1 November 2023.
• 33. Arie Egozi, “Israelis Test Classified Tunnel Tech To Stymie Terrorists; US Watches”, Breaking Defense, 13 August 2019.
• 34. Ibid.
• 35. John Spencer, “Underground Nightmare: Hamas Tunnels and the Wicked Problem Facing the IDF”, Modern War Institute, 17 October 2023.
• 36. Edward Luttwak, “What Israel Will Face in Gaza”, no. 1.
• 37. Michael Biesecker and Sarah El Deeb, “Hamas Practiced in Plain Sight, Posting Video of Mock Attack Weeks Before Border Breach”, AP, 14 October 2023.
• 38. “This is the IDF’s Plan to Combat Hamas Terror Tunnels”, The Israel Defence Forces, 27 November 2016.
• 39. Sneha Swaminathan, “Israeli Canine Unit 'Oketz' Helped Rescue 200 lives, Neutralise 10 Hamas Terrorists”, WION, 15 October 2023.
• 40. John Spencer, “Underground Nightmare: Hamas Tunnels and the Wicked Problem Facing the IDF”, no. 35.
• 41. “Ex-IDF Deputy Chief: Soldiers Won’t Enter the Tunnels, Will Turn them into Hamas Death Traps Without Going In”, The Times of Israel, 3 November 2023.
• 42. With Mapping Robots and Blast Gel, Israel Wages War on Hamas Tunnels”, The Jerusalem Post, 16 November 2023.
• 43. Edward Luttwak, “What Israel Will Face in Gaza”, no. 1.
• 44. “With Mapping Robots and Blast Gel, Israel Wages War on Hamas Tunnels”, no. 42.
• 45. Nancy A. Youssef, Warren P. Strobel and Gordon Lubold, “Israel Weighs Plan to Flood Gaza Tunnels With Seawater”, The Wall Street Journal, 4 December 2023.
• 46. Nancy A. Youssef, Carrie Keller-Lynn, Michael R. Gordon and Dov Lieber, “Israel Begins Pumping Seawater Into Hamas’s Gaza Tunnels”, The Wall Street Journal, 12 December 2023.
• 47. In 2015, Egypt had flooded 10 tunnels dug beneath the Gaza–Egypt border. See  “Steinitz: 'Egypt Floods Hamas Tunnels, in part due to Israel's Request'”, The Jerusalem Post, 6 February 2016.

Japan has had a busy diplomatic year. It had to adapt its foreign policy on account of the structural challenge posed by China and was also called upon to display dexterity as a gamut of old and new territorial and ideological conflicts reignited in West Asia and Eastern Europe. Japan’s neighbourhood underwent milestone shifts that required deft tending by Tokyo. The infusion of defence-oriented language into its rhetoric had to take into account reactions across all of Asia and the world. Further, due to an internal political reshuffle, Japan has had two foreign ministers, giving rise to the unusual phenomenon (in Japan) of a prime minister explicitly staking a claim to make a personal impact on foreign policy. Given these trends, Japan’s diplomacy in 2023 marks a significant inflection point.

Rapprochement with the Global South

The first key trend noticeable in Japan’s foreign policy in 2023 has been its ardent embrace of the Global South concept. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida chose the occasion of his visit to New Delhi in March to announce his new plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.1 This plan gave importance to South and South-East Asia as well as Africa as key regions for Japan’s strategic engagement. Kishida’s invitation to India and Indonesia, two leading Global South nations, to the G-7 summit in Hiroshima, as well as his interactions with Global South leaders during the G-20 summit in New Delhi,2 spoke about Japan’s sincerity in putting its rhetoric into practice.

Kishida was ably assisted in this enterprise by Foreign Ministers Yoshimasa Hayashi and (post-September) Yoko Kamikawa. Both Hayashi and Kamikawa used their visits to Global South countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to reinforce Japan’s commitment to convey their concerns to the industrialised Global North. Even the Imperial family was roped into the role of de facto ambassadors of Japan’s message. Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako visited Indonesia in June, Crown Prince Fumihito (the Emperor’s brother) and Crown Princess Kiko visited Vietnam in September, while Princess Kako’s (daughter of the Crown Prince) successful visit to Peru in November compensated for the lack of visits by Kishida to the region.

Neighbourhood Diplomacy

Developments in the neighbourhood added new dimensions to Japan’s diplomatic calendar. The inauguration of a new President of the Republic of Korea, Yoon Suk-Yeol, in December 2022 augured a sea-change in that country’s blind-spot towards Japan. Yoon surprised many among his own countrymen by seeking out an engagement with Kishida in March. The engagement followed a long freeze in bilateral ties after the previous South Korean administration of Moon Jae-in allowed a Supreme Court judgement on Japan’s historical atrocities in the peninsula to affect bilateral security and political cooperation in 2018. Since that first meeting in March, Yoon and Kishida met each other seven times over the next nine months,3 a frequency rare in the annals of diplomacy.

During Kishida’s visit to Seoul in May, Yoon went further than any other South Korean leader in de-emphasising issues of history, wholeheartedly echoed by Kishida. The rapid improvement in ties resulted in some tangible benefits. The ROK did not oppose Japan’s release of seawater used in the clean-up of the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor in August. Yoon and Kishida, in association with President Joseph Biden, agreed to resume joint military and security cooperation against the actions of North Korea and China.4

China itself proved to be the elephant in the room in 2023, particularly in the latter half of the year as Japan embarked on the wastewater discharge from the Fukushima Daiichi plant. It not only insisted on opposing the United Nations specialised agencies’ stance on the safety of the discharged water, but also embarked on an unprecedented campaign against Japanese citizens, mobilising crowds to vandalise the Japanese Embassy and a Japanese school, pre-emptively banning seafood and other exports from Japan, and encouraging a unique prank-call campaign against Japanese domestic entities.5

Japan also showed willingness to escalate matters by joining with the US and the Netherlands to restrict Chinese access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing technology in October.6 Japan widened its sanctions list in December to include Chinese government labs engaged in nuclear research as a protest against the latter’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal.7 Nevertheless, the two sides did resume informal military talks,8 and Kishida met President Xi Jinping on the side lines of the APEC Summit in November to discuss bilateral issues.9

Emphasising Defence Ties

Another discernible trend in Japan’s diplomacy in 2023 was the uptick in mentions of defence and security issues in its engagements with relevant countries. Kishida’s visit to New Delhi in March saw him engaging Prime Minister Narendra Modi on issues of defence technology cooperation. Kishida’s public commitment later in the summer to reconsider Japan’s strict curbs on export of lethal defence technology in the teeth of opposition from pacifist quarters of the Japanese political sphere saw him using his visit to Ukraine as an opportunity to shake up established norms. His subsequent visits to North Africa and South-East Asia, as well as those of his deputies to Europe, the US and West Asia have shown a consistent throughline under which Japan has committed to work cooperatively with partners and like-minded countries to ensure not only maritime security, but, as part of its comprehensive national power, economic, energy and technology security as well.

One of the most distinctive advances under this overarching theme has been the introduction of the Official Security Assistance (OSA) program10 as a complement to its Official Development Assistance. With an initial budget of 450 million Japanese yen, the OSA is intended to provide non-lethal security assistance to key countries. The first recipients, Fiji, Malaysia, the Philippines and Bangladesh, are indicative of Japan’s areas of interest, and Tokyo has shown its openness to considering an expansion of the program to a global scale in partnership with other net security providers in their respective regions. The fact that the Philippines is presently embroiled in a stand-off against China in the Second Thomas Shoal indicates Japan’s strategic choice in ensuring smaller countries are capable of pushing back against Chinese maritime aggression.

Enhancement of the Prime Minister’s Role

The year 2023 also marked the year when Japan’s diplomacy underwent an institutional reworking in terms of who ‘does’ foreign policy. In essence, this change turned the Japanese prime minister into the key effector of policies, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being placed in a secretarial role.

Evidence of this could best be found in the announcement of the replacement of Yoshimasa Hayashi as the nation’s chief diplomat while Hayashi was on a trip to Ukraine, and the rapid substitution of Yoko Kamikawa—with no significant prior experience of foreign affairs, to the position. Kishida’s desire to take a greater role in foreign affairs came from a press conference he delivered in the wake of the reshuffle of his cabinet in September. He noted that while “[m]inisters have an important role to play…summit diplomacy is a big component as well. I myself intend to play a major role in such summit diplomacy.”11

As observers of Japan’s political arena know well, Japanese prime ministers tend not to be primarily aggressive salesmen of their country abroad, choosing to focus instead on leaving behind domestic legacies. Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda is the epitomical example. A former bureaucrat, he was central to the engineering of the ambitious industrial policies that caused what we now know as Japan’s high-speed economic growth era, from 1960 to 1973. Some prime ministers, to be sure, have been outward-looking in terms of their legacy-building: Shigeru Yoshida, father of the Yoshida Doctrine espousing close security ties with US in lieu of a focus on economic growth at home, and Shinzo Abe, come to mind. However, none so far have staked quite such an overt claim to diplomatic primacy as Kishida.

It is widely speculated, to some extent justly, that Kishida’s low domestic support ratings, due largely to internal policy failures such as the talk of new taxes to increase defence spending and the failure to completely repudiate the Liberal Democratic Party’s cosy ties with the controversial Unification Church, may have led him to seek diplomatic successes. However, this remains a double-edged sword. Should his key initiatives, such as the OSA or outreach to the Global South, sour, he will be doubly blamed for frittering away valuable policy space to pursue arcane objectives abroad. As such, Kishida’s ensuing moves in this sphere bear observation.

Conclusion

It is interesting to note that Japan, despite its long-standing image as a staid, reactive power, stands at a diplomatic crossroads of increasing significance at the end of 2023. Which road it takes in 2024 is not easy to predict, but there are certain significant mileposts which could signal the direction. One crucial milepost will be how Japan manages its ties with the Global South, especially with India. Another crucial marker will be the success (or failure) of its new policy of studied neutrality in West Asia, which will indicate whether it is prepared to deviate from the Western world’s script should its interests be seriously affected. Third, and finally, it would be interesting to see whether Prime Minister Kishida continues to expand his role in diplomacy, and to what extent he can claim the space to do so before encountering significant bureaucratic pushback.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio (New Plan for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 20 March 2023.
• 2. “G20 New Delhi Summit (Summary)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 10 September 2023.
• 3. Haye-ah Lee, “Yoon, Kishida Voice Hope for Closer Cooperation Between S. Korea, Japan”, Yonhap News Agency, 17 November 2023.
• 4. “Fact Sheet: The Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David”, The White House, 18 August 2023.
• 5. Shin Kawashima, “Chinese Propaganda and Fukushima Treated Water Issue”, The Diplomat, 5 November 2023.
• 6. Henry Ridgwell, “Japan Imposes Microchip Export Ban, Angering China”, Voice of America, 27 July 2023.
• 7. Jiji Press, “Japan Adds Chinese N-Institute to WMD Concern List”, The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, 6 December 2023.
• 8. Yukio Tajima, “Japanese, Chinese Defense Officers Revive Exchanges After 4 years”, Nikkei Asia, 18 July 2023.
• 9. “Japan-China Summit Meeting”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 16 November 2023.
• 10. “Official Security Assistance (OSA)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 13 November 2023.
• 11. Ko Koga, “Kishida Finding His Inner Machiavelli? Behind the Latest Cabinet Shakeup”, Nippon.com, 8 November 2023.

The relationship between India and Africa is based on historical ties forged during colonialism and apartheid. However, due to a wave of liberalisation and privatisation in the 1990s, India’s involvement in Africa shifted significantly. Despite active engagement for more than 70 years, India’s long-term strategy for expanding its relations with Africa lacked clarity and wherewithal. As a result, India has also been unable to capitalise on its enormous historical goodwill in the region. However, it may change as ideological and political issues are taking a backseat. Also, rising economic and security ties have recently given the partnership a fresh start. However, given the unprecedented opportunity to engage with African countries to address their security concerns and thus strengthen relations, it is observed that initiatives to this end are insufficient. What else can be done to make the engagements more meaningful and worthwhile? Can the defence diplomacy factor be one of the strategies for strengthening bilateral security cooperation? Can the bilateral engagement move to other military arenas beyond UN Peacekeeping Operations? Can the Indian military contribute more to the African countries’ capacity-building? Can India think of establishing a military base beyond the maritime domain? Can India capitalise on Africa in its effort of ‘Atmanirbharta’ to ‘Bharatnirbharta’?

This article attempts to answer these questions by focusing on the need for India and Africa to strengthen their relationships at all levels, particularly in defence and military diplomacy.