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Summary

Muizzu's foreign policy choices, encompassing the bolstering of ties with China, the imposition of deadlines for Indian troop withdrawal, and the diversification of economic partnerships, signify a noteworthy shift in the geopolitical orientation of the Maldives. These changes present new challenges in the evolving dynamics of India–Maldives relations and the broader geopolitical landscape in the Indian Ocean.

Introduction

Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu visited China from 8 to 12 January 2024. This visit garnered significant attention, as it was his first state visit to any country since taking office. He also became the first foreign dignitary to visit China in 2024. Prior to President Muizzu's visit, Maldivian Vice President, Hussain Mohamed Latheef visited China in December 2023, where he participated in the China-sponsored China-Indian Ocean Region Forum on Development Cooperation (CIORF) in Kunming.

Prior to visiting China, Muizzu had visited Turkey and the UAE. However, his visit to China marked a departure from tradition, as all previous Maldivian presidents had visited India after assuming office. Muizzu's decision to break this precedent underscored the shifting dynamics in the Maldives' foreign relations.

Some reports however suggest that the Maldivian government verbally proposed a visit to New Delhi by Muizzu in November, but no progress has been made so far.1 India–Maldives relations became strained after Muizzu reiterated his call for the withdrawal of Indian troops after winning the presidential elections.

In the presidential elections held in the Maldives in September 2023, Mohamed Muizzu emerged victorious, defeating Mohamed Solih of the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP). Muizzu had launched his electoral campaign on the platform of ‘India Out’, aligning himself with his ally, former Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen. Both were perceived as being pro-China. Muizzu served in Yameen's cabinet during his presidency from 2013 to 2018. During this period, they facilitated extensive Chinese involvement in the Maldives through infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Before the China visit, Muizzu severed ties with his coalition partner, Abdulla Yameen, whose support played a crucial role in Muizzu's ascent to power.2 Muizzu had contested the presidential election as a proxy for Yameen, who was in jail on money laundering charges. Despite expectations that Muizzu would, upon assuming power, lift the charges against Yameen and secure his release, Yameen remains in house arrest. Yameen has since broken alliance with Muizzu and formed his own political party, further complicating the political landscape in the Maldives.

The strained relations with India and Muizzu's pro-China stance have drawn attention to the evolving geopolitical dynamics in the Indian Ocean Region. The visit was closely watched, considering Muizzu's pro-China reputation and the shift away from the ‘India First’ policy of the previous government.

China–Maldives Bilateral Relationship

China views the Maldives as a crucial country in neighbourhood diplomacy due to its strategic location in the Indian Ocean. The diplomatic relations between China and Maldives were established on 14 October 1972. The visit of President Xi Jinping to Maldives in September 2014 marked a significant milestone. During this visit, both sides signed an agreement to build a "future-oriented, all-round friendly and cooperative partnership".

China and the Maldives have experienced a steadily growing trade relationship in recent years. In 2022, the trade volume between the two nations reached US$ 451.35 million, marking a 10.1 per cent year-on-year increase.3 Out of this, China's exports constituted US$ 451.29 million against US$ 60,000 of exports from Maldives. The Maldives primarily exports seafood and fishery products to China, while China exports machinery and construction material to the island nation. Chinese enterprises have accelerated investments in various sectors, including tourism, fishery, transportation and energy.

Maldives joined the BRI programme initiated by President Xi Jinping in 2013. Under this programme, various infrastructure development projects have been carried out. Key projects include the construction of the China–Maldives Friendship Bridge, expansion of an international airport and various housing initiatives.

The China–Maldives Friendship Bridge, spanning 2 kilometres and considered a landmark project of the BRI, connects the capital, Male, with the neighbouring island of Hulhumale. President Muizzu has hailed it as the most iconic and transformative project in the country. China claims that BRI projects address the Maldives' socio-economic development needs, improving living standards and well-being.

Maldives' economy is highly dependent on tourism. China was its largest source of foreign tourists for a decade before the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2019, the number of Chinese tourists reached 2,84,000, constituting 16.7 per cent of the total foreign tourist arrivals. In February 2023, both countries implemented a mutual visa-free policy.4

Maldives is rich in marine resources, with seafood as a significant export commodity. The new government wants to reduce dependence on tourism, diversify exports, enhance human capital development and promote clean energy.

India–Maldives Bilateral Ties Come Under Strain

India and Maldives have historically enjoyed friendly bilateral ties, with the Maldives playing a crucial role in India's 'SAGAR' and 'Neighbourhood First Policy'. India is also a major contributor to the Maldivian economy through tourism. However, under President Muizzu, there seems to be a shift in Maldives' foreign policy. He has also distanced himself from his former mentor President Yameen.

President Muizzu has raised concerns about small number of Indian soldiers in Maldives, framing their humanitarian activities as a threat to Maldivian sovereignty.5 He has expressed intentions to reduce dependency on India across various sectors. He has decided not to renew the hydrographic survey initiative. This shift has strained the traditionally close ties between the two nations.

Some analysts believe that Prime Minister Modi visited Lakshadweep on 3 January 2024 in response to the hostile behaviour of President Muizzu.6 During his visit, he urged Indians to consider the island chain as an alternative tourist destination. Lakshadweep, strategically located with tourism potential, could also enhance India's surveillance capabilities in the Indian Ocean.

Modi emphasised the significance of Lakshadweep in India's development strategy, aiming to elevate its profile on the international tourism map. This move aligns with efforts to diversify tourism options and reduce dependence on popular destinations like the Maldives. Modi's visit aimed at establishing Lakshadweep as a key player in the global tourism industry, showcasing India's commitment to its development for both domestic and international tourists.

Through social media posts and retweets by Indian Embassies, Modi's visit strategically positioned Lakshadweep as an alternative tourist destination. This initiative not only targets Indian tourists but also aims to attract visitors from Europe and the Middle East. Modi's emphasis on Lakshadweep's economic potential can have economic impact on the Maldives' tourism-related revenues.

India–Maldives Diplomatic Row

The visit of Modi to Lakshadweep was followed by a significant diplomatic rift between India and Maldives. It was triggered by derogatory remarks of the three junior ministers in the Muizzu administration who openly criticised Prime Minister Modi and Indians on social media.7 This led to a widespread backlash in India and the initiation of a ‘Boycott Maldives’ campaign, endorsed by Indian celebrities, posing a potential threat to the Maldives' vital tourism industry.

India, being the largest tourist market for the Maldives in 2023 with 2,09,198 arrivals, followed by Russia and China, plays a crucial role in the Maldives' tourism sector. The controversy prompted a large number of Indian tourists to cancel their plans. In response to the disparaging remarks against the Prime Minister, Muizzu suspended the three deputy ministers, aiming to address concerns raised by India and acknowledging the potential economic impact on tourism.

The Maldives Association of Tourism Industry (MATI) condemned the derogatory comments and emphasised India's significant contribution to the Maldives' tourism industry. Foreign Minister Moosa Zameer who was accompanying President Muizzu on the China trip, clarified that the remarks made by the ministers did not reflect the official position of the Maldivian government.8

The Indian government summoned the Maldivian ambassador to convey its concerns, and the Indian envoy met with the Maldivian foreign ministry, indicating diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions. These diplomatic measures taken by both countries also indicated a desire to maintain a constructive relationship despite the recent strains.

Key Highlights of Muizzu's Visit to China

Muizzu spent the first two days of his visit in Fujian. Muizzu and First Lady Sajidha Mohamed visited the Xiamen Free Trade Zone in Fujian province, exploring economic opportunities and cooperation. Courtesy calls were made by senior officials of China Communications Construction Company Limited (CCCC) and Hunan Construction Investment Group (HCIG). Meetings with leaders of Fujian Province focused on enhancing cooperation in cultural, tourism, city-to-city, and fisheries sectors.

Muizzu, while addressing the ‘Invest Maldives’ forum in Fuzhou, urged China to regain its position as the top tourist contributor to the Maldives. Acknowledging China's significant role in pre-COVID tourism, Muizzu stated that his strategy would be to attract more Chinese tourists. He outlined plans to diversify the tourism sector, including initiatives such as a top-tier hospitality school and exploring sports, medical and cultural tourism.

Muizzu held talks with President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of People in Beijing on 10 January 2024. The discussions resulted in the signing of 20 key agreements across various sectors, including tourism cooperation, disaster risk reduction, the blue economy, and digital economy investments. The talks elevated the bilateral ties to a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership, emphasising mutual cooperation in economic, trade, investment and strategic areas.9

Muizzu expressed support for China's Belt and Road initiative. Notably, Muizzu acknowledged China's willingness to discuss potentially eased repayment terms for loans to the Maldives. The signing of an action plan for the China–Maldives comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership was to further solidify their commitment to collaboration in Belt and Road construction, disaster management, economy and technology, infrastructure, people's livelihoods, green development, and the blue and digital economies.10

China also committed to providing grant assistance to the Maldives, although the specific amount remains undisclosed. Agreements reached during the talks covered initiatives such as a social housing project on Fushidhiggaru Falhu, fisheries product processing factories, and comprehensive redevelopment projects for Male’ and Villimale’ Roads. The signing of a US$ 50 million project to develop an integrated tourism zone on the Indian Ocean Island was also reported.

Muizzu's visit included a tour of the Chinese Communist Party Museum, where he familiarised himself with Chinese culture and historical moments. Muizzu hailed BRI projects as the most significant infrastructure projects in Maldivian history. He termed China as one of the "closest allies and developmental partners of Maldives". The upgrade in ties and commitment to exploring more partnerships under the BRI signify a proactive approach to intensify bilateral relationship.

Maldives had previously signed its Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China in 2017. It was the Maldives’ first bilateral FTA with any country. Muizzu stated that this bilateral FTA would be swiftly implemented to “boost” bilateral trade and investments, particularly by increasing the export of fish products to China.

Beijing is the largest bilateral creditor to the Maldives, owing China US$ 1.37 billion, constituting around 20 per cent of its public debt. Chinese firms have invested an additional US$ 1.37 billion in the Maldives since its decision to join the BRI in 2014. However, the World Bank cautioned against overreliance on China, citing potential risks of sovereign exposure and a lack of domestic investment opportunities.

China interestingly expressed firm support for the Maldives in safeguarding national sovereignty, independence and national dignity, offering to exchange governance experience. President Xi expressed support for increased direct flights between China and the Maldives which could benefit the Maldives' travel and tourism sector. In an interview with China's CGTN, Muizzu emphasised that China respects Maldives' sovereignty, and the relationship is built on mutual respect, and denied any interference in internal affairs.

President Muizzu concluded his trip by meeting Chinese Premier Li Qiang and other senior officials on 11 January 2024 before returning to Male. He reiterated the Maldivian government's commitment to providing complete cooperation to China in advancing the numerous agreements forged for collaboration across various sectors.11

Chinese View on Muizzu's Visit

In Chinese media such as the Global Times, which is generally considered the mouthpiece of the Chinese government, the relationship is portrayed as mutually beneficial, emphasising equal treatment and cooperation between large and small nations. It also suggests that India should keep in view that the geo-politics of the region has changed.

The Global Times asserts that the visit by Muizzu signifies the mutual importance that China and the Maldives place on their relationship, aiming to establish collaborative agreements in politics, economy, culture and green development. The publication justifies Muizzu's departure from tradition. It emphasises the Maldives' independent sovereign status and Muizzu’s statement that the country does not wish to be entangled in geopolitical struggles.

It criticises Indian and Western media for misinterpretation, accusing them of viewing the Maldives solely through the lens of China–India competition and neglecting the nation's sovereignty and legitimate interests.12 The Global Times underscores Muizzu's clear stance that the Maldives intends to cooperate with various countries without exclusive alignment.

The publication also blames India for adopting a domineering stance towards neighbouring countries and praises Chinese diplomacy for adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, treating sovereign nations equally, respecting their autonomy, and avoiding interference in internal affairs. It highlights the cooperation between China and the Maldives through projects like the BRI, focusing on national development and livelihoods.

Assurances are extended to India regarding Muizzu's visit, with an emphasis that it poses no threat. The publication suggests that India should acknowledge the changing geopolitical landscape and respect the Maldives' sovereignty. It underscores that China's technical expertise is beneficial for the Maldives.13

The Global Times suggests that India respect the Maldivian government's decisions, particularly concerning state visits by the President. It asserts the Maldives' right to determine its state visits without undue influence from other countries, urging India to abide by the Maldivian government's wishes.

It suggests India to respect the sovereignty and independence of the Maldives, stressing the government's right to decide on military presence and foreign relations.14 The Global Times emphasises that China's BRI cooperation with the Maldives is a symbiotic relationship and urges India to adopt a more open-minded approach. It claims that China's cooperation with South Asian countries is not a ‘zero-sum game’.

Attempt to Pivot Away from India

Muizzu, who ascended to power championing the ‘India Out’ campaign, has intensified efforts to distance the Maldives from India following his return from China. Emphasising the Maldives' independence, Muizzu stated that the nation is "not in the backyard" of any country.15 He took a subtle dig at former President Mohamed Solih, suggesting his close ties with India. Muizzu's emphasis on the expansive Indian Ocean and the Maldives' territorial claims within it signals a clear intention to shift away from India.16

In a bid to reduce dependence on India, Muizzu has pledged to diversify the Maldives' reliance on various sectors. Currently, the Maldives heavily relies on India as its primary supplier of essential commodities, with New Delhi providing a special annual quota for items such as eggs, potatoes, sugar, dal, rice, wheat flour, stone aggregates, and river sand, which are exempt from restrictions.

Muizzu wants to diversify sources for essential commodities such as rice, sugar and flour. He has negotiated a trade deal with Turkey, marking a significant step in diversifying essential commodity sources. A shipment has already been ordered from Turkey. Muizzu is also exploring new economic partnerships.

Muizzu has articulated the government's intention to stop “importing low-quality medicine”, opting instead to procure directly from the original manufacturers. As part of the diversification strategy, Muizzu aims to transition medicine imports from India to sourcing them from Europe and the United States.17

Conclusion

The decision by President Muizzu to prioritise destinations other than India for inaugural foreign visit marks a notable departure and signals a shift in diplomatic priorities. This shift is exemplified by the government's apparent antagonism towards India, as evidenced by its decision not to renew the hydrographic pact with the Indian Navy and its call for the withdrawal of Indian troops by mid-March—an approach aligned with Muizzu's ‘India Out’ campaign.

Muizzu's warm exchanges with Chinese officials suggest a strategic pivot towards stronger ties with Beijing. Both nations have formalised agreements, including the Action Plan for a China–Maldives Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership. Furthermore, economic ties between China and the Maldives have strengthened, with China emerging as the second-largest trading partner in 2022. The visit has also heightened the possibility of resuming Belt and Road projects, and there are indications of potential implementation of the China–Maldives Free Trade Agreement.

The emerging contours of Maldivian foreign policy under President Muizzu underscore a departure from the longstanding ‘India First’ policy towards a more pro-China stance. Emphasising a "pro-Maldives" approach, Muizzu contends that this is not a competitive stance but rather an effort to foster positive relations with major powers, including India and China.

Muizzu's foreign policy choices, encompassing the bolstering of ties with China, the imposition of deadlines for Indian troop withdrawal, and the diversification of economic partnerships, signify a noteworthy shift in the geopolitical orientation of the Maldives. These changes present new challenges in the evolving dynamics of India–Maldives relations and the broader geopolitical landscape in the Indian Ocean.

The region is witnessing a new geopolitical dynamic, characterised by the growing influence of China and the enduring cultural, historical and geographic ties between India and the Maldives. Simultaneously, the establishment of a US embassy in Malé raises the prospect of the Maldives becoming a potential focal point in the US's Indo-Pacific security agenda, further adding complexity to the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Male Proposed Visit to New Delhi by President Muizzu”, Moneycontrol, 9 January 2024.  
• 2. Mimrah Abdul Ghafoor, “Rift Between Muizzu and Yameen Injects Fresh Tensions Into Maldives’ Politics”, The Diplomat, 12 December 2023; R.K. Radhakrishnan, “Maldives Power Play: Muizzu Consolidates Control, Leaving Yameen in Exile”, Frontline, 8 January 2024.
• 3. “Chart of the Day: China-Maldives Economic Cooperation”, CGTN, 7 January 2024.  
• 4. Fathmath Udhma, “Agreement on Visa-free Travel to China Takes Effect”, Raajje Maldives, 18 February 2023.
• 5. “Maldives New President Asks India to Withdraw its Military”, Reuters, 19 November 2023.
• 6. Dhairya Maheshwari, “Modi Sends Out 'Strong Message' to Maldives Through Lakshadweep Visit”, Sputnik India, 6 January 2024.
• 7. Neha Banka, “India-Maldives Relations: Why PM Modi’s Lakshadweep Visit has the Maldives’ Social Media and Govt Officials Up In Arms Against India”, The Indian Express, 9 January 2024.
• 8. “India, Maldives Summon Envoys; Israel Walks Into the Spat Praising Lakshadweep’s ‘Enchanting Allure’”, The Hindu, 8 January 2024.
• 9. “The Maldives and China Hold Official Talks”, Press Release, The President’s Office, Republic of Maldives, 10 January 2024.
• 10. “Maldives, China Sign 20 Agreements After Muizzu-Xi Meeting Amid Diplomatic Row with India”, The Hindu, 11 January 2024.
• 11. Mariyath Mohamed, “President Muizzu Meets Chinese Premier Li Qiang”, The Edition, 11 January 2024.  
• 12. “What Does Maldivian President Visit’s Break With Tradition Signify?: Global Times Editorial”, Global Times, 6 January 2024.  
• 13. Victor Gao, “Why India Misreads Maldivian Leader’s China Visit”, Global Times, 9 January 2024.
• 14. Zhang Xiaoyu, “Maldives’ Withdrawal Request An Exercise of Sovereignty”, Global Times, 20 November 2023.
• 15. “After China Visit, Muizzu Says Maldives 'Not in Backyard' of Any Country”, The Wire, 14 January 2024.  
• 16. Ibrahim, “President Muizzu Asserts Independence: ‘We Might Be Small, But That Doesn’t Give You the License to Bully Us’”, Dhi Daily, 13 January 2024.
• 17. Mizna Mohamed, “Maldives to Move Away from India-based Imports Like Staples & Medicine”, The Press, 13 January 2024.

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Summary

In the aftermath of the most horrific attacks against the Jewish people since the Holocaust, as Israeli PM Netanyahu himself characterised the 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks, Israel launched a blistering campaign to annihilate the Hamas threat. Israel’s response has in turn raised fears of a major regional war breaking out across many fronts, involving various state and non-state actors.

Introduction

The recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) interim ruling on possible genocide in Gaza came as a mixed bag for both the contending sides—Israel and Palestinians—who are still heavily engaged in a war that has been gradually expanding across other West Asian theatres in its fourth month. While Israel will be relieved that the ICJ fell short of making a call for a ceasefire,1 it would be upset by the legal and moral implications of the court’s assertion that there was sufficient ground for a genocide case to be pursued and over its insistence that Israel address the mounting humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already rejected the court case as “outrageous”, a “vile attempt” to deny Israel the right to defend itself, and an instance of “discrimination against the Jewish state”.2 Conversely, Palestinians may not have got the ruling in favour of an immediate ceasefire per se, but the verdict may help their demand for prisoner exchange and thereby a humanitarian ceasefire.

7 October Attacks: ‘Most Horrific Attack against Jews since Holocaust’

The present conflict erupted almost four months ago in the early morning hours of 7 October 2023. Already deemed as “the bloodiest single day” in modern Israeli history,3 it began with thousands of armed Hamas terrorists launching several incursions from Gaza into Israel through the air (using hang gliders), land and sea. They tore down large parts of the Gaza security fence (in about 30 places) using tractors4 , RPGs and explosives, as well as fired about 5,000 rockets into Israel.

They even disabled Israel’s robotic machine guns and took control of major Israeli motorways, penetrating as deep as 25 km into Israeli territory.5 Throughout this early morning foray, Hamas militants faced little to no resistance from a mostly absent Israeli border force. Explosions were heard across the country—from Ashkelon to Tel Aviv and even as far as Jerusalem. Hamas forces even managed to kill a total of 1,139 Israelis and foreign nationals,6 including 764 civilians and audaciously took away 248 Israeli hostages back to Gaza. According to a New York Times report, Israeli Army was simply “undermanned” and “out of position” during the Hamas 7 October attacks.7 In the words of Prime Minister Netanyahu, “Hamas perpetrated the most horrific atrocities against the Jewish people since the Holocaust and advanced to repeat these atrocities again and again and again”.8

Later that day, Hamas forces conducted massacres at several kibbutzim where Israeli civilians resided and at an outdoor dance music festival. Over 260 innocent attendees were killed at the psychedelic trance open-air Supernova Sukket Gathering music festival near the Reim kibbutz.9 It became the deadliest concert attack ever and the worst Israeli civilian massacre in its history.

This was followed by reports on 12 October 2023 that up to 40 babies were slaughtered by Hamas. Even US President Joe Biden expressed horror at the beheading of children by Hamas. However, later a White House spokesperson clarified that US officials and the president could not confirm such reports independently.10 For its part, Hamas has plainly rejected all charges of rape and children’s beheadings.

Hamas Strike Out of the Fear of ‘Abraham Accords’

In addition to the audacity and savagery of the attacks by Hamas, Israel was taken unawares by the level of sophistication, preparation and coordination shown by Hamas in conducting the 7 October 2023 attacks, which it calls ‘Al Aqsa Flood’ (Toofan Al Aqsa).11 Although Hamas declared in its 1988 charter that “there is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad”12 for the past 16 years, Hamas never grew as a full-fledged, well-trained and well-equipped militia—like Hezbollah or ISIS have been—and so it was never taken as an existential threat by Israel the way it is seen today. Thus, the staging of the 7 October multi-pronged attacks, which we now hear might have taken up to two years of planning and training, took Israel and global security experts by complete surprise.13

Hamas officials have since revealed several objectives behind their 7 October 2023 attacks.14 Some of them are:

1. Avenging settler violence in West Bank and Jerusalem that has grown over the last two years became a trigger for the terror attacks. About 247 Palestinians have reportedly been killed in West Bank by Israelis in 2022, and about 320 have died since 7 October 2023;
2. Taking major action against repeated and increasing clashes in the Al-Aqsa mosque compound;
3. Reversing Arab–Israeli normalisation (particularly under Abraham Accords) that in recent years extinguished from public view the Palestinian cause as Arab leaders lined up to forge trade, even political ties with Israel;
4. Among other objectives, Hamas leadership said it wanted to get more Israeli hostages so as to then secure the release of Palestinian prisoners languishing in Israeli jails for a long time.

Israel’s Bombardment: ‘More Destructive than Dresden!’

Hamas’ terrorist attacks drew massive and unprecedented punitive response from Israeli forces. Without condoning the ensuing violence, it must be understood here that Israel cannot survive in a hostile neighbourhood unless it maintains unquestionable and unassailable military superiority over its adversaries at all times. Israel’s military actions can also not be judged as per the military standards of other states, least of all Western secular democracies, because Israel was founded as a safe haven and homeland for the Jewish people, which have over the centuries suffered some of the most heinous and systematic genocides in human history, including the Holocaust from 1941–45 during World War II.

Therefore, the State of Israel was established to provide the persecuted community vital protection and an existential security and this issue thus gains primacy over the relative freedoms and rights of other communities in the vicinity that are hostile towards it. If Israel fails in providing its Jewish citizenry effective security, then the relatively small-sized state faces an immediate existential threat.

Thus, Hamas’ unprecedented terrorist attack unleashed Israel’s immediate punitive reaction—a relentless bombardment of Gaza that has over the months now destroyed about 70 per cent of the buildings in the besieged Palestinian enclave, according to the Government Media Office in Gaza. After the first two months itself, the Israeli offensive is said to have destroyed more than the razing of Syria’s Aleppo between 2012 and 2016, Ukraine’s Mariupol, or, proportionally, the Allied bombing of Germany in World War II.15 It reportedly killed more civilians than the United States-led coalition did in its three-year campaign against the ISIS group.16

Between 1942 and 1945, the Allies attacked 51 major German cities and towns, destroying about 40–50 per cent of their urban areas. Robert Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago told Financial Times:

“Dresden, Hamburg, Cologne—some of the world’s heaviest-ever bombings are remembered by their places names … Gaza will also go down as a place name denoting one of the heaviest conventional bombing campaigns.”17

Similarly, US Senator Bernie Sanders has said:

“If I used the word Dresden, Germany, to you, you think about the horrific destruction during World War II of the city. What is going on in Gaza now in three months is worse than what took place in Dresden over a two-year period. This is a catastrophe …”18

The campaign group Amnesty International has also criticised Israel’s use of heavy munitions, claiming it used earth-shaking 2,000lb GBU-31 bombs, which are four times bigger than the 500lb bombs that were typically the largest ordnance used by allied forces in the battle for the Iraqi city of Mosul a decade ago. Thus, as of 22 January, over 26,000 people (25,105 Palestinian and 1,410 Israeli) have been killed in the Israel–Hamas war, including 83 journalists (76 Palestinian, 4 Israeli and 3 Lebanese) and over 136 UNRWA aid workers.

In an interview to The Wall Street Journal, PM Netanyahu defended the campaign saying that Israel’s actions and objectives are justified in that they seek to destroy Hamas, demilitarise Gaza and deradicalise the whole of Palestinian society.19

Israel’s Ground Offensive in Gaza

Almost a week after the initial attack on Israel, on 13 October, the IDF issued an evacuation order for Palestinian communities north of the Wadi Gaza, giving them 24 hours to leave for the south of the country. Then on 27 October, the IDF launched its long expected large-scale ground offensive into northern Gaza, leading to bloody urban warfare between Hamas and IDF with civilians caught in the crossfire.

After international alarm, a Qatari-brokered humanitarian pause began on 24 November, as active fighting in the Gaza Strip ceased and some of the Israeli and foreign hostages were released by Hamas in exchange for the release of some of the Palestinian political prisoners held by Israel. However, the truce expired in the morning on 1 December 2023, as both Israel and Hamas blamed each other for failing to agree on an extension. Since then, Israeli PM has stated Gaza war will not end soon but continue for months.

By early December, tens of thousands of people displaced by the fighting were finally moving towards south of Gaza. They packed into the border city of Rafah, in the far south of the strip. Muwasi, a nearby patch of coastline that Israel declared a safe zone, became the new place for refuge.

However, unconfirmed reports now suggest that thousands of Palestinians have started returning to the north of the Gaza Strip after the withdrawal of some Israeli forces from the area. The Israeli military said earlier that it was withdrawing thousands of forces from the Gaza Strip, in the first significant troop pullback. Some of the five brigades withdrawn will prepare for a potential second front against the Lebanese Hezbollah resistance movement.

Hezbollah, Iran and the Seven-Front Escalation

In its initial stages at least, the conflict was mainly concentrated around Gaza. However, the risk has since escalated to other regions as well. In fact, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant has already claimed that his country is fighting a multi-front war, which will last several months. He even named the seven fronts as Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Judea and Samarra (West Bank), Iraq, Yemen and Iran.

Out of these, the front with Hezbollah became active from the day of Hamas’ brutal terrorist raids. In fact, Hezbollah had declared its support and praise for Hamas’ attack on Israel in the morning of 7 October 2023 itself and fired rockets and artillery shells at Israeli positions in the disputed Shebaa Farms a day later. These led to continuing and still ongoing clashes at several parts of the Israel–Lebanon border, Syria and the occupied Golan Heights and forced approximately 96,000 people on the Israeli side of the Lebanese border to leave their homes, while in Lebanon, more than 50,000 individuals have been displaced.

At the cusp of the New Year, news came that the US carrier battle group USS Gerald Ford, which had stationed itself in the Eastern Mediterranean, to keep Hezbollah in check in north of Israel, was leaving the region and returning to its base in Pennsylvania. No reason was given for this sudden withdrawal of the battle group. For its part, Israel also decided to move its forces from northern Gaza to north of the country in order to take on the Hezbollah rocket attacks, which increased over time.

In fact, Hezbollah’s actions became more aggressive since the killing of Hamas’ second-in-command leader Salah Al Arouri in Beirut in a drone attack in Beirut around the turn of the new year. Stepping up his bellicose rhetoric, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah then stated: “We will not use the phrase ‘at the right place, at the right time’ in our response. In fact, the response shall come immediately and inevitably.”

Thereafter, Hezbollah has increased the ferocity of its rocket barrage and turned down US and French proposal for ceasefire with Israel. It has repeatedly targeted Israel’s Meron Air Base, even as new Lebanese groups, such Jamah Islamiyyah, have joined it in targeting Israeli positions.

The US–Israeli front against Iran has also become increasingly restive since the new year. About 90 people were killed in blasts near the grave of former IRGC General Qassem Soleimani in Kerman on 3 January, reportedly the worst terror attack in the Islamic Republic’s history.20 Although US and Israel denied any involvement in the attacks and ISIS accepted responsibility, Iranian president Ebrahim Raeisi still blamed the act on the “grudge Zionists hold against Qassem Soleimani”.21

This attack had come on the heels of a massive funeral of senior Revolutionary Guards commander Brig Gen Sayyed Razi Mousavi held in Tehran late in December, after he was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Syria, media reports said. Then on 20 January 2024, an intelligence officer of the IRGC Quds Force in Damascus, Brigadier General Sadegh Omidzadeh, along with four other IRGC officers, were reportedly killed in an Israeli airstrike. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, an Israeli missile strike targeted a four-story building in the Mezzeh district. The attack resulted in the death of 13 individuals, including five Iranians.

The US-led Naval Campaign against Houthis

Since 12 January 2024, the United States and the United Kingdom, with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands, have launched a series of airstrikes against Ansar Allah (commonly known as Houthi movement) in Yemen to stop Houthis from attacking ships in the Red Sea. The Houthis have been justifying their attacks by claiming they are in support of the people of Gaza facing the Israeli onslaught.

While the Houthis initially claimed to target only commercial ships bound for Israeli ports or with some link to Israel, it is alleged they soon began indiscriminately targeting vessels, attempting attacks on ships with no discernible Israeli ties.

By 21 December 2023, the Israeli port of Eilat saw an 85 per cent drop in activity due to Houthi action.22 Before the Houthi attack on the freighter Maersk Hangzhou on 30 December 2023, the US had already shot down a total of 24 Houthi missiles and drones and deployed naval ships to protect Red Sea lanes, but had not engaged directly with the Houthis.

On 3 January 2024, the United States and a group of countries issued an ultimatum to the Houthis to stop their activities. The first wave of strikes commenced around 2:30am (Yemen time) on 12 January. During this first wave of strikes, over 60 targets in 16 separate locations were hit by more than 100 missiles. Approximately 30 to 60 minutes later, a second wave struck dozens more targets in 12 additional locations using over 50 missiles.

According to Lt Gen Douglas Sims, the initial strikes on 12 January successfully achieved their objective of damaging the Houthis' ability to launch complex drone and missile attacks similar to the one they conducted on 10 January. However, President Biden had acknowledged by 18 January that the strikes did not stop Houthis from continuing to attack shipping, but said that efforts to stop them would continue.23

Meanwhile, Indian ships have also been busy rescuing many of the ships in and around the Red Sea. It is reported that Captain Avinash Rawat, the master of MV Marlin Luanda, on 27 January 2024 thanked the Indian Navy for its help in stamping out the fire on his ship following a missile strike by the Houthis in the Gulf of Eden.24 In the previous week, INS Visakhapatnam intercepted a cargo vessel carrying 22 crew members, including nine Indians, shortly after the Marshall Island-flagged ship faced a drone strike in the Gulf of Aden.25 Earlier on 5 January 2024, the Indian Navy successfully prevented the hijacking of the Liberian-flagged vessel MV Lila Norfolk in the North Arabian Sea, rescuing all crew members.26

Hostage Deal, Two-month ‘Ceasefire’ or Rapid Escalation?

Following the ICJ interim ruling, efforts towards an early and peaceful resolution of the crisis have picked up pace. The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office on 28 January 2024 confirmed that a four-way meeting between the US, Israel, Qatar and Egypt took place in Paris to discuss a potential deal to free all Israeli hostages held by Hamas in exchange for a two-month ceasefire. Despite significant gaps in the position of the parties, it was said progress was being made and the talks were characterised as being “constructive”.27

However, the fog of war could not be thicker with news from Lebanon contradicting these welcome developments spoke of growing rumours—based on an LBCI report—that Netanyahu was preparing for a full-blown war against Hezbollah in Lebanon soon.28

As the escalating crisis soon enters its fourth month, there are still more uncertainties over the course of this ongoing Israeli–Arab confrontation. For instance, the present uncertainty facing the fate of the Netanyahu government from within Israel’s political system may cause greater confusion and instability for the highly fraught West Asian region.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Jeremy Sharon, “ICJ Tells Israel to ‘Prevent Genocide’ in Gaza, Rejects Ordering Immediate Ceasefire”, The Times of Israel, 26 January 2024.
• 2. Shrishti Jha, “Netanyahu Calls World Court Order in Genocide Case Against Israel ‘Outrageous’”, India Today, 26 January 2024.
• 3. Gabriel Levin, “How Does Israel's Last Invasion of Gaza Compare to Now?”, Voice of America, 17 October 2024.
• 4. Shira Silkoff, “Gaza Fence Was Not Designed to Prevent Mass Assault On Its Own, Builder Said in 2018”, The Times of Israel, 19 October 2023.
• 5. Talmiz Ahmad, “How Israel-Hamas War Will Change West Asia’s Political Landscape”, Frontline, 10 October 2023.
• 6. “Israel Social Security Data Reveals True Picture of Oct 7 Deaths”, France 24, 15 December 2023.
• 7. “Where Was the Israel Military When Hamas Attacked”, The New York Times, 3 January 2024.
• 8. “Israeli PM Netanyahu Dismisses Genocide Charges Against Israel, Calling It Outrageous”, The Times of India, 27 January 2023.
• 9. David Browne, Nancy Dillon and Kory Grow, “They Wanted to Dance in Peace and they got Slaughtered”, Rolling Stone, 15 October, 2023.
• 10. Peter Alexander, Summer Concepcion and Megan Lebowitz, “White House Clarifies Biden's Claim He Saw Photos of Terrorists Beheading Children in Israel-Hamas War”, NBC News, 11 October 2023.
• 11. Mahesh Sachdeva, “Toofan Al-Aqsa Jolts West Asian Geostrategic Architecture”, The Hindu, 9 October 2023.
• 12.  and Devorah Margolin, “An Interview with Devorah Margolin on Hamas”, International Centre for Counter Terrorism, 8 November 2023.
• 13. Gloria Sicilia Lozano, “Guard Down: Deconstructing the 7 October Policy, Defence and Intelligence Failure”, Real Instituto Alcano, 16 November 2023.
• 14. Joe Macaron, “Why Did Hamas Attack Now and What is Next?”, Al Jazeera, 11 October 2023.
• 15. Julia Frankel, “Israel’s Military Campaign in Gaza Seen As Among the Most Destructive in Recent History, Experts Say”, Associated Press, 12 January 2024.
• 16. “Gaza Daily Deaths Exceed All Other Major Conflicts in 21st Century: Oxfam”, Al Jazeera, 11 January 2024.
• 17. John Paul Rathbone, “Military Briefing: The Israeli Bombs Raining on Gaza”, Financial Times, 6 December 2023.
• 18. Lauren Sforza, “Sanders Says Gaza ‘Is Worse Than’ What Happened in Dresden During WWII”, The Hill, 14 January 2024.
• 19. “Benjamin Netanyahu: Our Three Prerequisites for Peace”, The Wall Street Journal, 25 December 2023.
• 20. “Terror in Iran: On the Blasts in Iran’s Kerman and the Impact”, The Hindu, 5 January 2024.
• 21. “Terrorist Bombings Rooted in Zionist Grudge Against Gen. Soleimani: Raeisi”, Press TV, 5 January 2024.
• 22. Ari Rabinovitch, “Israel's Eilat Port Sees 85% Drop in Activity Amid Red Sea Houthi Attacks”, Reuters, 21 December 2023.
• 23. “US Says ‘Not at War’ with Houthis; Biden Admits Strikes Not Halting Attacks”, Al Jazeera, 19 January 2024.
• 24. “Houthi Attack: Marlin Luanda Captain Thanks Indian Navy for Helping Douse Fire”, Hindustan Times, 28 January 2024.
• 25. “Indian Navy Ship INS Visakhapatnam Comes To Rescue Missile Struck Oil Tanker”, MI News Network, 29 January 2024.
• 26. Manjeet Negi, “'Pirates Got Scared...': Woman Navy Officer Explains How Hijacked Ship Was Rescued”, India Today, 18 January 2024.
• 27. Lazar Barman, “Israel Says Paris Talks on Hostage Deal Were ‘Constructive,’ Will Continue This Week”, Australian Jewish News, 29 January 2024.
• 28. “Israel to Declare War Reports Spark Panic in Lebanon as Hezbollah Says ‘Fully Prepared’”, News 18, 28 January 2024.

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Summary

New and disruptive technologies are making wars extremely complex. Drones play a crucial role in ISR operations, as well as in coordinating and directing punitive strikes. Russia and Ukraine have been using drone technology to gain an upper hand in a dynamic battlefield.

The Russia–Ukraine War has witnessed a significant surge in the use of drones for surveillance and strikes. The unmanned systems have also transcended the aerial domain and have witnessed operational employment in marine and land warfare. Russia inducted unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in January/February 2023 and Ukraine used uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs), marine drones, for launching attack on Sevastopol harbour in October 2022.

The United States and Israel are the pioneers in the development and employment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), informally known as drones.1 In addition, China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey have also contributed significantly in this field. UAVs were widely used in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and are quickly becoming an important part of inventory of most armed forces.

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War conclusively established the importance of UAVs in a conventional battlefield. In the first 15 minutes of the war, Azerbaijani drones destroyed close to 50 per cent of Armenian Air Defence (AD) systems and 40 per cent of its artillery. The Azerbaijani forces equipped with Israeli Harop and Orbiter Loitering Munitions (LMs) and Turkish Bayraktars, combined sensors with precision strikes, destroying even the active AD systems.2 Having achieved near control of the sky, the Azerbaijani UAVs targeted Armenian ground forces with impunity.  

The evolution of drone warfare is taking place literally on the fly and drones stand poised to shape the contours of all future wars. The Brief places in context the multifaceted role being played by drones in the Russia–Ukraine War and the impact of unmanned systems on the future of warfare.

Firsts in Drone Warfare

The year 2022 saw several firsts in the employment of drones, among them was the first recorded ‘unmanned’ aerial combat and first known case of fighter jet going down to a kamikaze drone (Shahed-136).

Ukraine released a 16-second clip of two UAVs engaging each other in combat for the first time in the history of warfare. The footage shows Ukrainian UAV tasked for observation and control of artillery fire is approached by a Russian quadcopter that manoeuvres around it before deliberately crashing onto it. In the clip, the blades of the Russian quadcopter rupture and it crashes on the ground.3  

The year 2022 also saw first recorded case of a loss of fighter jet because of hit by shrapnel from an exploding drone. It is reported that a Ukrainian MiG-29 shot down a Geran-2 (or Shahed-136) and when the drone exploded, apparently the MiG-29 was hit by the shrapnel from the exploding Geran-2 and crashed when the pilot lost control of the aircraft.4

Russia–Ukraine War does not have the distinction of use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for the first time in combat. In 2021, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) described the 11-day conflict in Gaza as the world’s first “AI war”, citing its use of AI to identify rocket launch pads and deploy drone swarms.5 However, it has been reported that both Russia and Ukraine are making extensive use of AI for target identification, facial recognition, data fusion, and signal communication to enhance effectiveness of combat operations. AI is also being used in drone operations.

Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation on 26 July 2023 stated that the Ukrainian armed forces have deployed

“1700 drones to the frontline to support Ukrainian counteroffensive. Among them are strike and reconnaissance copters. These drones are equipped with AI that will help to effectively recognize and then destroy Russian targets.”6

The way in which Russian and Ukrainian forces have exploited AI to enhance operational capabilities of the drones is of interest to armed forces around the world; for the moment, there is limited information in this regard. 

Drones for ISR Operations and Targeting 

Drones play a crucial role in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, providing armed forces and intelligence agencies with enhanced capabilities for information gathering, situational awareness and decision making. The unmanned systems can be equipped with high-resolution cameras and sensors to generate real-time information of the target area. They can gather information about the activities and movement of the target and changes in terrain configuration. Drones can track targets over extended period and generate comprehensive and actionable intelligence. Drones equipped with special payloads can undertake electronic warfare (EW) and signal intelligence (SIGINT) tasks. 

Both Russia and Ukraine are effectively using UAVs for ISR and targeting operations. By October 2022, on any typical day, Ukrainian forces would fly a UAV over Russian position, and by late evening, generate close to 3,500 photos, which would then be analysed after downloading on a computer. After target analysis and firming up on a target, which could be a Russian command and control centre or a vehicle, etc., a confirmatory recce would be undertaken to avoid waste of precious resource—artillery ammunition.

The UAV operator after confirming the presence of the target by undertaking a repeat flyover would then coordinate/direct the artillery fire using tablets and portable internet terminal of the Starlink system.7 As early as October 2022, Ukrainian forces were successfully landing a direct hit on a target using three rounds of US supplied M777 howitzer.8 Other weapon systems such as the Excalibur GPS-guided artillery shells and the US HIMARS rocket systems when guided by UAVs became even more potent in neutralising Russian targets.

Drone Attacks at Sea

On 29 October 2022, seven uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) attacked Sevastopol harbour, hitting a frigate and a mine sweeper. The attack by canoe-sized marine drones was an innovative concept and the impact of the attack exceeded the physical destruction caused to the Russian navy.9 Each of these boats mounted an electro-optical/infrared periscope and a Starlink satellite communications antenna which enabled transmission of multiple video feeds and helped in piloting over long distances.10  

Some of the leading analysts have opined the attack as start of a new age in naval warfare, even though it is not the first time that USVs have been used to attack enemy ships in warlike situations.

On 22 March 2023, Ukrainian forces raided the Sevastopol Harbour a second time. This time, USVs were used in conjunction with UAVs,11 an ingenious employment of emerging and disruptive technology. The Russian Navy though was prepared and the raid did not produce the desired results. The Ukrainian USVs were destroyed by Russian defensive fire and at least one was caught in the harbour’s floating boom defences. Despite failure of the raid, it had a major impact to induce caution in Russian Navy. 

On 17 July 2023, Ukrainian USVs targeted the Kerch Bridge, linking Crimean Peninsula to mainland Russia. One bridge segment was destroyed, and another was dislocated by more than 30 inches.12 War-time destruction of bridges has always been difficult operation.  Employment of UAVs and USVs perhaps may provide an answer to this vexed military problem.

The novelty of Ukrainian operations lies in the use of off-the-shelf, non-military grade equipment to maximum effect and bridge the asymmetry in the capabilities with the Russian forces. The attacks are also significant because they leverage modern communication system, viz. Starlink and are symbolic of a ‘swarm’ attack, even though they do not quite fulfil the nuances of the terminology.

H I Sutton, in his article of 31 August 2023 has charted the course of development of Ukrainian USVs, which has already witnessed two generations of development.13 Sutton notes first generation of Ukrainian USVs were initially reported in September 2022 and were employed to spectacular use in raid on Sevastopol in October 2022. These USVs were of varying designs as they were manufactured by different agencies, viz. GUR (Defense Intelligence of Ukraine), Ukrainian Navy and even crowd-funded private enterprises.

Thereafter, there was rapid enhancement of capabilities with Magura, which stands for Maritime Autonomous Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus family of USVs reportedly having range of 450 nautical miles (833 kilometres), top speed of 42 knots and payload of 320 kilograms. The ‘Sea Baby’ family of USVs are equipped with 860 kilograms of explosives and were used to damage the Kerch Bridge on 17 August 2023. 

On 24 August 2023, appreciating the importance of USVs, President Zelensky recognised the 385th Separate Brigade of the Ukrainian Navy which uses a range of ‘Special-Purpose Naval Unmanned Systems’, another first in terms of raising a special unit of USVs, in the annals of drone warfare.

Unmanned Ground Vehicles

The first half of 2023 saw interesting developments on the frontlines of the battlefields when both Russia and Ukraine began testing and deploying Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) in operations. Russian armed forces began by employing remotely controlled old tanks loaded with explosives against Ukrainian infantry and defences. Around the time they were also working on “higher-tech, self-driving options such as the Marker UGV, which has demonstrated AI and machine learning capabilities and has been able to traverse through controlled environments without an operator.”14 Four Russian Marker UGVs were reportedly deployed for operations in Eastern Donbas in January 2023.15 Marker is a three-ton modular system which can mount grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, anti-tank guided missiles and electronic warfare equipment.16  

Ukraine began receiving UGVs around the same time. Germany and Estonia promised delivery of 14 THeMIS UGVs configured for casualty evacuation.17 Parallelly, many small-scale enterprises, innovators and engineers were working with experimental technologies to carry anti-tank mines, remotely operated machine guns and even 20 mm canons. These experimental technologies are relatively inexpensive and a prototype can cost less than US$ 1000.

Drones Transforming Warfare

War has an enduring nature, but warfare or the ‘way war is made’ is dependent on number of factors, not the least on technology. New and disruptive technologies are making wars extremely complex and dynamic and will dominate all future battlefield. They help generate huge volumes of data, identify new threats and vulnerabilities and the latest generation of weapon systems and platforms are extremely precise and lethal. The new generation of sensors, satellites, and radars in conjunction with AI are shortening the decision-making cycle and increasing the operational tempo of wars in unimaginable ways.

Where do the drones fit in this changing character of warfare? Are they a revolutionary concept? The unmanned systems have been used in wars since centuries ago. USVs, packed with explosives or fire, have been used in the age of sailboats to target ships at sea and in harbour.18 UAVs date back to World War I, even though they were never deployed in combat. The British pilots used drones for target practice during World War II and during Cold War the US Navy had helicopter drones to drop torpedoes on Russian submarines.19

In this context, the unmanned systems are neither new, nor a revolutionary concept. However, inexpensive platforms and their ability to harness the limitless possibilities of AI will enable drones to transform warfare. During the GWOT, the US Predator and Reaper drones entered the lexicon of common man. They are large military grade aircraft and very expensive. The ongoing Russia–Ukraine War is witnessing a different dimension of drones. There is a surge of small, inexpensive, off-the-shelf and even recreational drones in the battlefield, in all three domains—land, sea and air. 

Fifth and fourth generation aircrafts cost millions of dollars and very few countries can maintain a fleet of these aircrafts. In comparison, drones are inexpensive and expendable, yet an extremely potent tool of warfare. They can perform a wide variety of tasks, from ISR, to directing artillery fire, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operational tasks, and many more. In addition, the unmanned systems have an advantage of providing persistent presence and reducing risk to the crew.

Employment of small, inexpensive drones that are freely available has democratised warfare. They are no longer a monopoly of developed nations. The innovative use of unmanned systems, limited only by human imagination, is bridging asymmetry with advanced militaries and between state and non-state actors. UGSs for example may be employed as landmines or even ‘suicide bombers’. Small UGVs packed with explosives can infiltrate enemy defences, crash into defences, explode under enemy tanks and guns.

In the aerial domain, 2022 was the year of quadcopters. Chinese DJI Mavic quadcopter was widely used by both the sides for ISR. Early 2023 saw the emergence of the first person view (FPV) drones and later in the year they were being employed in an unprecedented and astounding scale—with Russians reportedly employing hundreds of thousands every month.20 According to some studies, the average life of drones in battlefield in August 2023 was three months and Ukraine was reportedly replacing them at the rate of five to ten thousand per month.21

The battlefields in Ukraine are flooded with UAVs constantly monitoring the evolving situation. The battlefield transparency when combined with AI-assisted targeting systems are resulting in near instantaneous destruction of targets. Russia and Ukraine have deployed UAV-fed and AI-backed integrated battlefield management systems which have increased transparency to a level wherein a column of tanks or troops on the move are being located in three to five minutes and hit in the next three minutes. The survivability on the move is less than ten minutes.22 As AI technology matures and countries develop and acquire swarm drone capabilities, there are fears that drones have the potential to become weapons of mass destruction.23  

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Samuel Bendett describes drone as a programmable unmanned device that can fly, move on surface and on/under water. It can manage its actions in the target environment using its payload or can be controlled using commands from a human operator, or from onboard artificial intelligence (AI) or AI located on another device. Bendett goes further to suggest “any guided projectile, a space satellite, and even a radio exchange simulator based on ChatGPT technology (although in this case all actions take place in the virtual reality) are sort of drones as well.” See Samuel Bendett, “THREAD on the Perception of Combat UAVs and FPV-type Drones…”, X (formerly Twitter), 15 August 2023.
• 2. Captain Karl Flynn, “Make Every Marine a Drone Killer”,US Naval Institute, November 2023, Vol. 149/11/1,449.
• 3. Gareth Jennings, “Ukraine Conflict: ‘Drones' Engage in First Recorded Unmanned Aerial Combat”, Janes, 14 October 2022.
• 4.   Tanmay Kadam, “Ukraine Confirms 1st Known Case of Fighter Jet Going Down to a Kamikaze Drone; EurAsian Times’ Assessment Hits Bulls Eye!”, The EurAsian Times, 14 October 2022.
• 5. “Israel Quietly Embeds AI Systems in Deadly Military Operations”, The Economic Times, 16 July 2023.
• 6. Mykhailo Fedorov, Sending 1700 Drones to the Frontline…”, X (formerly Twitter), 26 July 2023.
• 7. Kurt Vinion, “How Elon Musk's Starlink Became Invaluable to Ukraine's War Effort”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 20 October 2022.
• 8. Sam Skove, “Near The Front, Ukraine's Drone Pilots Wage a Modern War on a Shoestring Budget”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 31 October 2022.
• 9. H I Sutton, “Why Ukraine’s Remarkable Attack on Sevastopol Will Go Down in History”, Naval News, 17 November 2022.
• 10. Sébastien Roblin, “Robot Kamikaze Boats Blew Up Russia’s Bridge to Crimea. Again.”, Popular Mechanics,17 July 2023.
• 11. H I Sutton, “Ukraine's New Maritime Drone Revealed”, Covert Shores, 22 March 2023.
• 12. Marc Santora, Neil MacFarquhar and Haley Willis, “Explosions Damage Crimea Bridge as Russia Blames Ukraine for Attack”, The New York Times,17 July 2023.
• 13. H I Sutton, “World’s First Specialized Explosive Naval Drone Unit Formed in Ukraine”, Naval News, 31 August 2023.
• 14. “Ground Vehicles are the New Frontier in Ukraine's Drone War”, US News, 13 July 2023.
• 15. Ellie Cook, “How Russia's 'Marker' Combat Robots Could Impact Ukraine War”, Newsweek, 18 January 2023.
• 16.   Zachary Kallenbornand and Marcel Plichta, “Release the Robot Hounds: Providing Unmanned Ground Vehicles to Ukraine”, CSIS, 3 April 2023.
• 17. “Germany in Collaboration with Estonia to Deliver 14 THeMIS Robots to Ukraine”,Army Recognition, 19 December 2022.
• 18. Uncrewed surface vessels to strike a fleet, whether at sea or in the safety of a naval base or a sheltering inlet, are a long-established choice in naval warfare. In the age of sail boats small, uncrewed vessels packed with explosives—or fire—were released against surface combatants to damage, disable or, in the most successful case, sink them. See Alessio Patalano,  “Ukraine’s Drone Raid on Russian Naval Base was Tactically Innovative But Not Revolutionary”, ASPI, 10 November 2022.
• 19. James Packard and Eli Kintisch, “How Drones Are Transforming Warfare”, Scripps News, 18 July 2022.
• 20. There are reports to suggest that Ukraine manufactures 50,000 FPVs per month, while Russia potentially manufactures up to 300K FPVs monthly. See “Ukrainian Claims that the Country Manufactures…”, X (formerly Twitter), 30 November 2023.
• 21. Scott Simon, “How the Use of Drones in Ukraine Has Changed War As We Know It”, NPR, 5 August 2023.
• 22. Steven Feldstein, “AI in War: Can Advanced Military Technologies be Tamed Before It’s Too Late?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11 January 2024.
• 23. David Hambling, “What Are Drone Swarms and Why Does Every Military Suddenly Want One?”, Forbes, 1 March 2021.

External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s two-day visit to Iran on 14–15 January 2024 is a crucially timed diplomatic engagement. First, it came in the context of a deteriorating regional security environment owing to the ongoing Hamas–Israel war, the ISIS-claimed terrorist attacks in Iran and the maritime security crisis created by the Houthi targeting of commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden spilling into the Arabian Sea. Second, it brought into renewed focus India’s partnership with Iran on Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Another mega-connectivity project, India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, was announced on the side-lines of the G20 summit held in New Delhi last year.

Rising Maritime Security Concerns 

Over the last four decades, Iran has successfully leveraged its ideology of revolutionary Islamism to mobilise the so-called ‘axis of resistance’, a region-wide network of state and non-state actors who share Iran’s ideological and geopolitical goal of countering the US regional presence and Israel. These include the Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis and Syria. In recent years, Tehran has used its influence over these actors to pushback against US threats and pressure, showing that insecurity for Iran is equivalent to insecurity for the region.

After Hamas attacks invited severe Israeli military response in Gaza, Iranian-backed forces have sought to engage Israel on multiple fronts underscoring that any hostile action against any of Iran’s allies risks snowballing into a wider regional war. Hezbollah, operating out of southern Lebanon, has fired thousands of rockets into northern Israel, and Israeli warplanes have been hitting Hezbollah military sites to push them away from the border. Houthis have launched more than 100 drone and missile strikes aimed at targeting Israeli-linked commercial shipping in the Red Sea and beyond.

On 24 December 2023, MV Chem Pluto, a Liberia-flagged, Japanese-owned and Netherlands-operated chemical tanker, with 21 Indian crew on board, was struck with a drone in the Indian Ocean 200 nautical miles (370 km) off the coast of Veraval in the Indian state of Gujarat. The vessel was heading from Saudi Arabia to India, and was allegedly affiliated to Israel.1   Indian Coast Guard offshore patrol vessel ICGC Vikram was the first to arrive at the scene and escorted the damaged vessel to Mumbai port.

Subsequently, the Indian Navy deployed Task Force Groups comprising destroyers and frigates, long-range maritime patrol aircraft and RPAs/drones, substantially enhancing maritime surveillance and domain awareness efforts in the central/north Arabian Sea. Together with the Indian Coast Guard, it also enhanced surveillance in the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Notably, India has not joined Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational security mission under the aegis of Combined Maritime Forces’ Task Force 153, which was announced on 18 December 2023 by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin during a visit to Bahrain. In November 2023, India had elevated to full-membership of the CMF, one year after it joined as ‘Associated Partner’.2 Still, India like several prominent members of the CMF, such as France, Italy, Spain, Saudi Arabia and Spain, has preferred to complement the US-led mission, avoiding a direct association in the context of Hamas–Israel war, and United States’ ‘unconditional backing’ of Israel.3

Jaishankar’s visit came two days after the US and Britain launched military strikes on 30 locations in Yemen. During a televised joint press conference with his Iranian counterpart Hossein Abdollahian, Jaishankar offered condolences over terrorist attacks in Kerman. At the same time, the minister stressed India’s “uncompromising position against terrorism in all forms and manifestations”, indirectly alluding to Hamas and possibly Houthis.4 Further, not only did Jaishankar deny Tehran the satisfaction of a public condemnation of Israel’s war in Gaza, he called for addressing the “humanitarian crisis” in Gaza and went on to urge “all parties to avoid escalatory and provocative actions and facilitate movement towards dialogue and diplomacy”.5 The visit underscored that India’s principled position of non-intervention in West Asia’s conflicts should not be confused with passivity, especially when Indian interests are at stake.

A Growing Connectivity Partnership

In the joint press statement, Jaishankar noted that regional connectivity remains a “critical pillar” of India–Iran relations and is expanding into new geographies. Emphasising on India’s commitment to Chabahar project, he called for establishing a “sustainable and long-term roadmap” for India’s continued involvement and the need to monitor its progress under the direct supervision of the political leadership.6

The Union Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways Sarbananda Sonowal visited Chabahar in August 2023 to review the progress and hand over six mobile harbour cranes (MHC) to the port operator Indian Ports Global Chabahar Free Trade Zone (IPGCFTZ). Tehran and New Delhi have made rapid progress in finalising a 10-year pact for India’s operations at the port.7 Earlier in 2021, India changed its plans to erect four new rail mounted quay cranes (RMQCs) or ship-to-shore cranes at Chabahar as no crane maker showed interest in India's tender due to US sanctions on Iran. However, India was able to deliver two tranches of MHCs of 100 tonnes capacity each manufactured by Italy’s Italgru S.r.l in January and March that year.8 Due to significant improvements in the cargo-handling capacity of the port, Indian operations at the port were declared commercially viable in 2023, paving the way for serious discussion reaching a long-term contract.9

Over the last two years, INSTC has gained momentum as a ‘sanctions-free’ route for Russia’s trade with India and Iran. Also, Iran’s full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at the end of the 23rd summit of the SCO Council of Heads of States virtually hosted by New Delhi has had a positive impact on India and Iran’s joint efforts to encourage Central Asian countries to use Chabahar for their trade with India. The first meeting of the India–Central Asia Joint Working Group (JWG) was held in Mumbai in April last year. Iranian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Economic Diplomacy Mahdi Safari proposed to hold the next round in Tehran.10

In parallel to the INSTC, India and Iran have found convergence in developing transit and transportation potential of Armenia in the Caucasus. Following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has been insistent on opening of the so-called Zangezur Corridor to link with its exclave in Nakhichevan via Armenia’s Syunik province bordering Iran. Armenia and Iran have opposed Baku’s irredentist claims over internationally recognised territory of Armenia, and have been courting Indian involvement in the Persian Gulf-Black Sea international transport corridor, as an additional route for India to reach Europe.

Analysts see the new corridor as a tool of ‘soft balancing’ the growing cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan in the Caucasus.11 The first India–Armenia–Iran trilateral consultations were held in Yerevan in April 2023, where senior officials from the three countries discussed the INSTC, trade, connectivity and culture, and agreed to “continue consultations” in the format.12

To sum up, Jaishankar’s visit is a timely reminder that India’s partnership stands on its own, and Indian interests demand more rather than less engagement with Tehran. As India deepens cooperation with the United States and allies in West Asia, it is determined to maintain its long-standing independent vision of the region.  

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Dharmesh Thakkar, “'Israel-Affiliated' Vessel With 21 Indians Comes Under Suspected Drone Attack Off Porbandar Coast; First Visuals Surface”, The Free Press Journal, 23 December 2023.
• 2. “Raksha Mantri & US Secretary of Defence Discuss Wide Range of Defence & Strategic Issues during Bilateral Talks in New Delhi”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India,10 November 2023.
• 3. “Blinken in Israel: We will always have your back”, Politico, 10 December 2023.
• 4. “Joint Press Statement by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 15 January 2024.
• 5. Ibid.
• 6. Ibid.
• 7. “Shri Sarbananda Sonowal Visits Chabahar Port in Iran to Review Work Progress”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, 20 August 2022.
• 8. P. Manoi, “Sanctions Affect Tender, Chabahar Port Crane Tender Finds No Takers Due to Sanctions”, The Hindu Businessline,20 June 2023.
• 9. Abhishek Law, “Our Operations in Chabahar are Now Commercially Viable: Sarbananda Sonowal”, The Hindu Businessline, 3 July 2023.
• 10. “Joint Statement of the First Meeting of the India-Central Asia Joint Working Group (JWG) on Chabahar”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 14 April 2023.
• 11. Vali Kaleji, “New Trilateral Cooperation for Iran, Armenia and India in the South Caucasus: From ‘Soft Balancing’ to Regional Transit Balance”, The Jamestown Foundation, 21 June 2023.
• 12. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India-Iran-Armenia Launch Trilateral to Create Corridor to Russia & Europe”, The Economic Times, 22 April 2023.