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| China’s Response Towards QUAD in the Indo-Pacific: A Paradoxical Strategy? | July-August 2023 | Tayyaba Jaffery, Muhammad Shoaib Pervez |
In response to China’s phenomenal rise in the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its allies have institutionalized the QUAD. This article seeks to critique the novel construct of ‘Harmonious Realism’ and argues that the Chinese strategy for an Indo-Pacific regional order is paradoxical in nature. This paradox entails dichotomy between China’s rhetoric and practices in its institutional, strategic and economic aspects which can be empirically corroborated by the way China relates to ASEAN, its effort to seek an alternate model of security, and ensure economic interconnectivity through the BRI—all of which is counter-intuitive to China’s rhetoric of peaceful co-existence. |
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| Russia-Pakistan Relations and the ‘China Factor’- Implications for India | July-August 2023 | Shubhrajeet Konwer |
As the Russia-Ukraine war enters a phase of attrition, Moscow is increasingly turning to the Global South for diplomatic support and ways to replenish its depleted resources. Likewise, given Pakistan’s grave economic situation and food crisis, the country is anxiously turning to Russia with open arms. This article examines the upward trajectory of relations between Moscow and Islamabad and analyses its implications for India. The article contends that although bilateral relations between Russia and Pakistan have their own dynamics, this confluence of interests takes on a completely new dimension when aligned with China. The war in Ukraine and the fluid global order have certainly complicated the geopolitical calculus in South Asia, and consequent reshuffling of positions may eventually push New Delhi away from Moscow. |
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| The Irreligious, Inauthentic Narrative of ‘Ghazwa-e-Hind’ | August 18, 2023 | Adil Rasheed |
SummaryThe article seeks to expose and discredit the false narrative of ‘Ghazwa-e-Hind’ against the Indian state as bandied about by violent transnational non-state actors and Pakistan-backed cross-border terror groups. It is a meaningless slogan linked to a patently immoral and irreligious war against humanity. In recent times, violent extremists and terrorists have become the greatest threat to the very religions and communities they claim to defend. They frequently violate the values of their avowed faiths with the self-same contempt and abuse that they direct towards the hapless victims of their physical violence. True religious scholarship therefore has the task to stand up against the wanton manipulations and distortions done to religions by the narratives of extremist movements and terrorist groups. For instance, there are strict instructions in Sunni Islamic traditions against future speculation in all matters related to the esoteric (‘batiniyya’) and the unseen (‘ghaib’).1 Even while interpreting the divine verses of the Quran, Islamic scholarship makes its summations by concluding with the term ‘Allahul Aalam’ (transl. ‘God Alone Knows the Truth’), which implies that the explanation of the scholar is a personal interpretation and opinion (which is thereby subject to error), as the true meaning of a Quranic verse or passage is best known to God alone.2 In spite of such strict provisions, irreligious transnational terrorist groups purposely dabble in obscure eschatological literature and dovetail carefully crafted strategic narratives into the theological exegeses to legitimise extremist and violent agenda. Thus, we find inauthentic end-time terms such as ‘Ghazwatul Hind’ (in Arabic language)/ ‘Ghazwa-e-Hind’ (in Urdu), etc. being raked up to radicalise morally dissonant minds. The use of the phrase ‘Ghazwatul Hind’ by so-called jihadist groups is particularly perfidious, as the phrase is not mentioned anywhere in the Quran, which Muslims regard as the only infallible revelation from Allah.3 It is also not deemed ‘Saheeh’ (authentic) in any major Sunni Hadeeth compilation and finds no mention in Shia Hadeeth literature as well.4 Still, the use of the term ‘Ghazwa-e-Hind’ has become so popular in South Asia that it has assumed a kind of permissiveness in the religious discourse of the times. Ghazwatul Hind: A Fabricated Misnomer?‘Ghazwatul Hind’ only became part of the Muslim theological discourse in recent times. Indian Islamic scholar Ghulam Rasool Dehlvi believes it is a wrongly worded Pakistani concoction, in that the word ‘Ghazwa’ (which in Arabic language literally means a ‘foray’ or a ‘charge’) is only used in Islamic theological literature with regards to campaigns personally led by the Prophet.5 Even the campaign that the Prophet sent or despatched under another general or official appointed by him was called Sariyah, and not Ghazwa.6 After the passing away of the Prophet, all military campaigns in Muslim history were called Ma’rka, even when such expeditions were led or despatched by the Righteous Caliphs (Khulafa-i-Rashideen), who were the Prophet’s closest companions. Therefore, the question arises as to how come a supposed end-time prophecy, which speaks of a warlike campaign against the region of ‘Hind’, can be called ‘Ghazwa’, when the word is only used for Prophet-led campaigns. This has raised suspicions that the Ghazwatul Hind reference in Hadeeth literature is a possible fabrication.7 Some Muslim scholars have even suggested that these set of Ahadeeth were likely fabricated during the campaign of Muhammad bin Qasim against India, which was contemporaneous to the period of collection of Hadeeth literature under the Umayyad rulers. Still, thanks to the probity of the Muhaddithun (hadeeth compilers) of the Sihah Sitta (the Authentic Six), the reference never got the seal of authenticity (Saheeh) in their collections. According to Maulana Waris Mazhari of the Darul Uloom Deoband seminary in Uttar Pradesh, had the Ghazwa-e-Hind narrative been true, it would have been narrated by many companions of the Prophet and cited in multiple collections of the Hadith “considering the merits or rewards of the Ghazwa-e-Hind that it talks about.”8 Given that only one companion of the Prophet reported it, Maulana Waris Mazhari claims that “it is possible that this Hadith report is not genuine and that it might have been manufactured in the period of the Umayyad Caliphs to suit and justify their own political purposes and expansionist designs.”9 Even Maulana Mufti Mushtaq Tijarvi of Jamaat-e-Islami India has affirmed that the Ghazwa-i-Hind Hadith is not genuine at all and perhaps a fabrication intended to justify Muhammad bin Qasim's invasion of India in the 7th century CE.10 Ghazwatul Hind not in Quran, nor Deemed ‘Saheeh’ (Authentic) HadeethTo better understand the presence of ‘Ghazwatul Hind’ references in a Hadeeth compilation, albeit not rated as ‘authentic’, requires a basic understanding of the process by which the Prophet’s sayings were authenticated. After the Quran, the most respected religious texts in Islam are the Hadeeth compilations. Muslims believe that Quran contains Allah’s own infallible and eternal words, whereas Hadeeth literature contains the personal speeches and deeds (Sunnah) of Prophet Muhammad, who according to Islam was a human Messenger of God (Rasulullah), but not God.11 Unlike the Quran, Hadeeth literature can be subject to enquiry and scrutiny as the collected sayings of the Prophet were not compiled by him, but by succeeding generation of Muslim scholars, who began the work more than a century after the Prophet’s death. These Muslim scholars who collected the sayings and actions of the Prophet are called ‘Muhaddithun’ and they mostly wrote down oral narrations of Prophetic sayings from people of their times, who claimed to have memorised not only the text of the Hadeeth (‘matn’) but also the chain of narrators (‘sanad’) from whom they received the speeches. The preceding generations (tabi’een) from whom the Prophetic tradition had been transmitted to them was also verified by the compilers through various ways.12 The ‘Muhaddithun’ are said to have taken great care in ascertaining the authenticity of the Hadeeth text, as they validated through various means every link in the preceding chain of narrators, in addition to determining the personal character and moral rectitude of all the people in the narrative chain after the Prophet and his companions. This was done to ensure that no vaguely recollected, false, interpolated or fabricated Hadeeth text is included by the Muhaddith in his compilation.13 In fact, every Hadeeth text that claimed to be a saying from the Prophet was graded under different categories according to the compiler’s judgment regarding its authenticity. These Hadeeth texts are thus categorised in Hadeeth compilations as either saheeh (authentic), hasan (fulfilling conditions of acceptability, yet not deemed as authentic) or d’aeef (literally ‘weak’, as they fail to meet conditions of acceptability). There were also other, more subtle classifications that are not mentioned here for the sake of brevity.14 Furthermore, only compilations of Six Hadeeth collectors were finally deemed to be authentic in Sunni Islam, known as the Sihah Sitta, as described earlier. Interestingly, even these six authentic compilations have been graded in order of authenticity through a consensus among scholars. In our case, the only compilation out of the Sihah Sitta (the Authentic Six) that contains hadeeth quotations related to Ghazwatul Hind is generally graded fifth in the order of authenticity out of the six volumes, and is called Sunan al-Sughra, compiled by Imam al-Nasa’i (d. 303 AH, 915 CE). Within this volume of Hadeeth, there are only three hadeeth quotations related to Ghazwatul Hind, out of which two are graded as ‘daeef’ (literally ‘weak’, as they fail to meet conditions of acceptability) and one as ‘hasan’ (or ‘fair’, with qualified acceptability). Even here, none of the ‘Ghazwatul Hind’ Hadeeth quotations have received the grade of ‘Saheeh’ (authentic) by the respected compiler Imam Nisai.15 It is important to note that even the one Hadeeth that has been rated as ‘hasan’ (‘fair’) by Imam Nisai, has been critiqued by many Islamic scholars over the ages, with one of the most recent being a scholar of Pakistan origin, Javed Ghamdi, who has provided copious historical evidence to prove unreliability of at least two narrators listed in the chain of this particular Hadeeth (namely Asad ibn Musa and Baqiyah).16 End-Time Prophecy Relates to Eesa ibn Maryam (Jesus) and the Anti-ChristThe only ‘hasan’ (fair) Hadeeth in the Sihah Sitta (Authentic Six), which is ascribed to the Prophet (pbuh) as regards Ghazwatul Hind is translated below:
Many Islamic scholars link the above-mentioned reference to campaign on Hind to Eesa ibn Maryam’s (Jesus, son of Mary) Islamic war against the anti-Christ during the end-times. It should be noted here that Eesa or Jesus is considered both a Prophet and Maseeh (Christ) in Islam, though not a son of God. In some eschatological Hadeeth texts, ‘Eesa ibn Maryam’ (or Jesus son of Mary) has been prophesized to return to earth before end-times to free the world from the global domination of the evil ‘Dajjal’ (or anti-Christ). Thus one interpretation of the above hadeeth links Ghazwatul Hind with Jesus’ campaign after his Second Coming. According to the interpretation, Jesus would lead an army to capture the western hemisphere on his ‘Second Coming’, while another contingent fights in the east in the so-called ‘Ghazwatul-Hind’ campaign.18 Thus, even if one were to give the hadeeth of ‘Ghazwatul-Hind’ some credence, it can only be in its juxtaposition to the aforementioned prophesized end-time events, when the whole world is occupied by the forces of Dajjal (anti-Christ) being fought and defeated by Jesus. As such, a so-called prophesized scenario does not exist in present times, and as ‘Hind’ is currently not under the occupation of Dajjal’s supposed global empire, the use of Ghazwatul Hind in the current geopolitical context seems both ridiculous and irrelevant. Therefore, this Hadeeth and its interpretation cannot be applied to the present times, as most contemporaneous terrorist organizations in the region do, be it Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad or even elements in the Pakistan military establishment. Meanwhile, some religious scholars interpret the above Hadeeth differently and do not agree upon linking the supposed Ghazwatul Hind prophecy with Jesus’ second coming and believe the stated events shall happen much before the supposed coming of Jesus as a Muslim king. Many Pakistan-based ideologues seek to imply that the time and place for the prophecy is the present 21st century CE and the word ‘Hind’ actually refers to the Republic of India. However, they fail to provide any evidence to prove their specious assertion. Meanwhile, some Indian Islamic scholars like Mufti Sajid Qasmi from Dar ul-Uloom Deoband suggest that the Ghazwatul Hind prophecy came true following the raids of Muhammad bin Qasim and Mahmud Ghazni and that is why Ghazwatul Hind will not happen in the future.19 Much of the speculation regarding the above Hadeeth is derived from apocryphal Hadeeth volumes of Imam Ahmad’s Musnad and Naim ibn Hammad’s Kitab Al-Fitan and these books are not part of the ‘Sihah Sitta’ (the Authentic Six) collection of Sunni Islam.20 Curiously, some transnational jihadist groups include several countries in the region of ‘Hind’ in their interpretation of this dubious eschatological reference. In May 2014, the then Al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a video of Burmese Mufti Abuzar Azzam discussing Ghazwa-e-Hind. He argued that the region of ‘Hind’ not only covers India but also includes Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Kashmir, Burma, and Bangladesh; and explained that the so-called jihad in Pakistan was part of his group’s Ghazwa-e-Hind.21 Similarly, the Uyghur jihadi group Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) released a video in April 2014 proclaiming jihad against China as necessary for the fulfilment of the Prophet's purported Ghazwa-e-Hind prophecy.22 To these groups, Hind does not just relate to India, but more specifically to Pakistan and China as well. Thus, Ghazwatul Hind appears simply to be a speculative eschatological red herring, meant to beguile and mislead young minds by violent extremist and terrorist groups. It is a meaningless slogan linked to a patently immoral and irreligious war against humanity. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Counter Terrorism | Islamic Terrorism | system/files/thumb_image/2015/lightning-t.jpg | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| India–Bangladesh Trade Settlement in Indian Rupee | August 18, 2023 | Anand Kumar |
SummaryThe initiative aimed at facilitating bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh through the use of Indian rupees initially, and subsequently Bangladeshi Taka, is set to benefit both countries. The integration of the INR into trade transactions enables Bangladesh to minimise currency-related expenses and capitalise on the stability and potential advantages offered by the rupee's exchange rate dynamics. India–Bangladesh relations have strengthened since January 2009, following the assumption of power by the Sheikh Hasina government. Presently, both nations share an unprecedented level of mutual trust. This dynamic has yielded not only improved political relationship but also economic progress. Trade and commerce have flourished, fostering prosperity for both populations. Bangladesh, which exported goods valued at a mere US$ 498.42 million in 2011–12, has now increased its exports to US$ 1990 million in 2021–22.1 Similarly, Indian exports to Bangladesh have also increased from US$ 4743.30 million in 2011–12 to US$ 13690.00 million in 2021–22. Interestingly, the disruptive impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global trade and commerce has engendered a closer bond between these neighbouring countries. Both parties deftly seized the crisis as an opportunity, opting to transport goods via railway. This innovative approach not only curtailed transportation costs but also streamlined business processes. Moreover, it ensured the timely availability of essential commodities to the Bangladeshi populace and sustained local industries. Nonetheless, the subsequent deceleration of the global economy has uniquely affected the Bangladeshi economy. Presently, the nation confronts a crisis stemming from dwindling foreign exchange reserves. With India and Bangladesh agreeing to settle the payments for their international trade partly in Indian rupee, it can reduce pressure on Bangladeshi dollar reserves. Shift in Global Currency DynamicsThe dominance of the dollar has gradually declined over the last few decades as the role of the US in global trade has diminished. At the turn of the century, the dollar accounted for more than 70 per cent of global reserves. According to IMF data, this share declined to 65.46 per cent in 2016 and further to 59.02 per cent in 2023.2 The move accelerated after the United States aggressively raised policy rates to control a record surge in inflation caused by the prolonged pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine conflict. This monetary tightening in the US prompted investors to withdraw their funds from Asian economies, triggering currency depreciation in most of these economies. Sharp currency depreciation typically leads to higher inflationary pressures due to increased import prices for food and energy. It also worsens the current account balance and can result in countries facing difficulties in paying for essential imports or servicing external debts. Bangladesh is currently grappling with such a situation, with its currency having depreciated by 25 per cent since last year. The dollar accounted for nearly 90 per cent of global foreign exchange transactions in 2022, making it the most traded currency. All members of the Asian Clearing Union, including South Asian countries, Iran and Myanmar, have reached a consensus on 6 July 2023 to settle trade in local currencies, such as the rupee, to reduce dependence on the US dollar and the euro.3 China is actively participating in this movement due to its dominant position in global trade and its status as the world's second-largest economy. In 2022, China was the largest trading partner for 61 countries in terms of combined imports and exports. In contrast, the US held this position for 30 countries. In the wake of sanctions on Russia, China has pushed to conduct more trade using the yuan with the objective to reduce its reliance on the dollar.4 During a state visit to Beijing in April 2023, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva reportedly called for reduced reliance on the US dollar in global trade. Malaysia's Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim also suggested the establishment of an "Asian Monetary Fund" to reduce dependence on the US dollar during a recent visit to China. At the ASEAN finance ministers and central banks meeting in Indonesia in March 2023, policymakers discussed the concept of reducing their reliance on the US dollar, Japanese yen, and euro, and instead transitioning to settlements in local currencies. As countries seek alternatives to the US dollar and negotiate bilateral trade settlements, this shift is reflected in the declining share of the dollar in global foreign exchange reserves. According to the International Monetary Fund, the global foreign exchange reserves stood at US$ 11.96 trillion at the end of 2022, with the US dollar's share at 58.36 per cent, marking a 26-year low. India's foreign currency assets (FCA) totalled US$ 514 billion on 7 April 2023, with approximately 40 per cent estimated to be non-dollar assets. This suggests that around US$ 310 billion of India's foreign currency assets are denominated in US dollars.5 Indian Initiative to Elevate Rupee as a Global CurrencyIn July 2022, India embarked on a significant initiative by allowing foreign trade settlements in INR. This move was facilitated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), reflecting a strategic shift towards international trade conducted in the Indian rupee. In March 2023, India announced that the RBI had granted permission to banks from 18 countries to establish special rupee nostro accounts, enabling them to execute transactions in Indian rupees. The prominent countries included in this list are Sri Lanka, Israel, Russia, Germany, Singapore, the UK, and recently, Bangladesh. The decision to broaden the list of eligible countries aligns with India's vision to elevate the status of the rupee as a global currency. The RBI has established a mechanism to facilitate international trade settlements in INR. The initiation of trade settlements with Bangladesh in the rupee signifies a positive stride in this direction. Expanding the utilisation of the rupee in trade transactions is poised to contribute to India's aspiration of positioning its currency as a potential reserve currency, alongside established reserve currencies such as the US dollar, the euro, the Chinese renminbi, the Japanese yen, and the British pound sterling. India–Bangladesh Bilateral TradeIndia is the second-largest import source for Bangladesh, trailing only behind China. Dhaka's exports to India reached a total of US$ 1990 million in 2021–22, whereas imports from India amounted to a US$ 13.69 billion in the same period. In FY23 (until February), Indian exports to Bangladesh tallied at US$ 10.63 billion, equivalent to 2.6 per cent of India's total exports. Conversely, Bangladesh's imports from India during the same period totalled US$ 1.86 billion, constituting 0.28 per cent of India's overall imports.6 Furthermore, if we take into account trade transactions conducted through unofficial channels, the volume of bilateral trade between the two nations expands even further. In this scenario, shifting towards trade settlements in Indian rupees is anticipated to alleviate the strain on Bangladesh's foreign exchange reserves. Bangladesh Takes Steps to Reduce Over-Reliance on DollarIn its effort to lessen its reliance on the US dollar for foreign trade settlements, Bangladesh has commenced the use of the rupee to conduct bilateral transactions with India starting from 11 July 2023. Both the Bangladesh Bank and the RBI have granted permission to two Indian banks to facilitate bilateral trade settlements in Indian rupees (INR). The Bangladesh Bank has authorised three banks—Sonali Bank, Eastern Bank, and State Bank of India (country office) in Bangladesh—to establish nostro accounts7 with their counterparts in India. On the Indian side, SBI and ICICI Bank are participating in this initiative. Under the new arrangement, Bangladeshi exporters will receive their earnings in rupees, which will be deposited in their nostro accounts with ICICI Bank and SBI. These funds will then facilitate Bangladesh's import transactions with India. Initially, trade settlements will occur in INR, with a later transition to BDT (Bangladeshi Taka) once the two Indian banks establish nostro accounts with Bangladesh's EBL and Sonali Bank. Sonali Bank and Eastern Bank Limited will establish Rupee Nostro accounts with India's ICICI Bank and SBI. Once this system starts functioning smoothly, other banks from both countries will be allowed to participate in this process. Bangladesh Adopts Rupee Trade: BenefitsThe commencement of cross-border trade settlements between Bangladesh and India using the INR marks a significant milestone in the expanding bilateral commerce, with particular implications for Bangladesh. Prior to the inclusion of the rupee as a currency for cross-border transactions, Bangladesh predominantly settled trades in the US dollar, followed by the pound sterling and the euro. However, the Russia–Ukraine conflict in February 2022 brought about disruptions in international payments for goods and services due to scarcity of the US dollar in various nations and the imposition of a ban on the employment of the global payments network, SWIFT, for transactions involving Russia.8 Bangladesh’s foreign exchange reserves have also dwindled due to heightened import expenditures in contrast to relatively moderate remittances and export earnings. Bangladesh is now struggling to pay for imported fuel because of the dollar shortage.9 As of 6 July 2023, Bangladesh's foreign exchange reserves have decreased from US$ 41.8 billion in 2022 to US$ 29.97 billion, a decline of about 28 per cent. Confronted with this foreign exchange crisis, the Bangladesh Bank (BB) has responded by adopting the practice of settling bilateral trade utilising the currency of its neighbouring country. BB Governor Abdur Rouf Talukder had previously expressed the country's intention to engage in trade with India using the rupee, up to an extent that corresponds to the nation's export earnings. This new arrangement enables Bangladesh to conduct foreign trade with India amounting to US$ 2 billion, which is equivalent to its current annual export proceeds from India. The inclusion of the INR among the currencies for cross-border trade marks a significant transition for Bangladesh. According to the central bank of Bangladesh, the country’s total imports stood at US$ 75.60 billion in 2021–22. Hence, the strategic shift towards trade settlement in rupee will not immediately reduce the dependence of Bangladesh on dollar. Initially, the scope of import payments would be limited to approximately US$ 2 billion, equivalent to Bangladesh's export earnings from India. As a result, an immediate surge in Bangladesh's foreign currency reserves is not expected. Over the past year, these reserves have declined by about 28 per cent due to elevated import expenditures juxtaposed with lower-than-projected export and remittance earnings. Trade analysts in Bangladesh view this development as a positive stride, one that will foster stronger trade bonds between neighbouring countries, decrease reliance on the US dollar, and reduce business expenditures.10 Lower trade costs will contribute to improved competitiveness, potentially attracting a larger customer base and, consequently, boosting Bangladesh's exports to India. The ongoing challenges related to the country's forex reserves have somewhat constrained Bangladesh's ability to open letters of credit. Settling letters of credit in the rupee could alleviate this predicament to some extent.11 The full benefits of rupee-denominated trade could materialise if Bangladesh manages to augment its exports to India. Historically, India has extended lines of credit to Bangladesh, which could potentially ease pressure on forex reserves in the future. Opting for a market-based exchange rate could prove advantageous for Bangladesh. Over the past year, the taka has experienced a steep depreciation against the US dollar, while the rupee has not witnessed such a drastic decline. The taka has depreciated by around 10 per cent against the INR within the past year, whereas it has weakened by about 25 per cent against the US dollar. Therefore, the practice of settling trades in rupees stands to benefit Bangladesh., The rupee and the taka have not exhibited parallel fluctuations against the US dollar, implying that a more substantial depreciation of the Bangladeshi currency could work to its advantage. However, it's important to acknowledge that the rupee itself might fluctuate in future. Engaging in INR trading offers cost-efficiency as it eliminates the need for currency hedging. Conversely, trading in US dollars involves expenses associated with hedging against currency fluctuations. In essence, the integration of the INR into trade transactions offers a strategic avenue for Bangladesh to optimise its trade operations, minimise currency-related expenses, and capitalise on the stability and potential advantages offered by the rupee's exchange rate dynamics. A Dual Currency Card in the OffingThe shift to settlement of bilateral trade in Indian Rupee has made both India and Bangladesh to also think of a dual currency card. The issue of dual currency cards was discussed during a meeting of Bangladesh's National Economic Council, presided over by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. In this meeting, Bangladesh Bank Governor Abdur Rouf Talukder reportedly mentioned that this initiative could alleviate strain on foreign currency reserves, considering the substantial amount spent on various expenses in India. Each year, Bangladeshi nationals spend approximately US$ 2 billion on medical care, tourism, and education in India. Moreover, India ranks among the top three import destinations for Bangladesh. BB Governor Talukder stated that a dual currency Taka–Rupee card could be introduced in September 2023. This card will enable travellers to conduct transactions in both Bangladesh and India, providing a convenient solution.12 Apart from local transactions, users of this Pay Card will also enjoy the convenience of being able to spend up to US$ 12,000 worth of rupees when traveling to India.13 In contrast to the current practice, which necessitates acquiring US dollars before entering India and subsequently converting them to rupees upon arrival, this card's utilisation would effectively help travellers mitigate potential exchange rate losses.14 ConclusionThe new initiative aimed at facilitating bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh through the use of Indian rupees initially, and subsequently Bangladeshi Taka, is set to benefit both countries. This arrangement will not only be advantageous for businessmen on both sides, but also for the general populace. Particularly, it will prove to be of great assistance to Bangladeshis who frequently travel to India for purposes such as trade, tourism, education, and medical treatment. Additionally, it will be beneficial for certain Indians employed as experts in Bangladeshi companies. However, it is important to note that this initiative will not replace the US dollar, rather, it will complement it. Trading in Indian rupees offers several advantages, including a decrease in the overall demand for the US dollar, reduced costs resulting from currency conversions, and a shorter processing time required for trade transactions. The success of this endeavour will also hinge on the participation of the private sector. Exporters must be willing to receive their earnings in local currencies instead of the US dollar. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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South Asia | India-Bangladesh Relations, Trade | system/files/thumb_image/2015/ind-bang-trade-t.jpg | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Defence Public Sector Units and Exports | August 18, 2023 | S. Samuel C. Rajiv |
Defence exports by India in recent times have witnessed a significant surge. During the past decade, from 2013–23, India exported defence equipment worth about Rs 64,250 crore.1 Exports by the nine defence public sector units (DPSUs)2 accounted for 56 per cent of total defence exports in 2013–14 (and even stood as high as 97 per cent in 2014–15) but have since reduced to reach about 9 per cent in 2021–22.3 The volume of exports by the nine major DPSUs have no doubt increased during this period, from Rs 385 crore to Rs 1,126 crore, but given that the overall volume of defence exports from India has increased, the percentage share of the exports by DPSUs has reduced. With the government’s emphasis on ‘Atmanirbharta’ and ambitious targets relating to defence production, defence indigenisation and defence exports, the ability of the DPSUs to contribute to the defence exports pie will continue to be in focus. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Defence Economics & Industry | Defence Export, Defence Industry | system/files/thumb_image/2015/defence-thumb.jpg | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| South America’s ‘Lithium Triangle Countries’ and Green Transition | August 17, 2023 | Priyanshi Agrawal |
SummaryCritical minerals are essential to achieve green energy transition. Argentina, Bolivia and Chile are assessed to possess 58 per cent of the world’s known lithium reserves. While Argentina and Chile accounted for 90 per cent of the total lithium supplies to the US in 2019, China is emerging as a key player in the lithium industry in Bolivia. India has also been increasing its diplomatic outreach to the LTCs for accessing the mineral. Fossil fuel accounted for 80 per cent of the Total Energy Supply (TES) in 2020.1 The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) posits that renewables will constitute 91 per cent of the world energy mix by 2050. For renewable energy to achieve this transition, critical minerals (lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper and manganese) used in semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, rechargeable batteries in wireless electronics, wind turbines, solar panels and energy storage equipment are essential. Additionally, these minerals have strategic use in advanced weaponry, nuclear technologies, aerospace and medical applications. With more than 20 countries launching their respective legislations and strategies to secure the supply of critical minerals like lithium, the importance of these minerals cannot be overestimated.2 Lithium, the lightest metal in the world but with high energy density, is used in rechargeable batteries in mobile phones, laptops and other portable electronics. Though lithium reserves are well distributed in sufficient amounts worldwide, their production and processing are highly concentrated. With the ongoing green transition push, end use of lithium has transformed in the last decade, as seen in Table 1. Table 1: Lithium End Use
Source: World Economic Forum Due to environmental and geographical concerns of lithium mining, sodium-ion batteries are emerging as an alternative. However, lithium is likely to dominate the battery demand as evidenced by the price of lithium carbonate, which has increased from GBP 45 in January 2015 to GBP 445 in January 2023.3 As a result, geopolitical competition between countries to secure the supply of ‘white gold’ of energy storage technology may prove to be a gamechanger for lithium-rich countries. In the 1990s, the US was the largest producer of lithium, in stark contrast to the present producers as listed in Table 2. The Latin American countries of Argentina, Bolivia and Chile have emerged as the lithium bank to fuel green transition. These three countries supply 38 per cent of the world’s lithium and are known to possess 58 per cent of the world’s known lithium reserves. Hence, these countries in the Andean southwest corner of South America with adjacent borders are known as ‘Lithium Triangle Countries’ (LTCs). Bolivia holds the world’s largest lithium resources that are yet to be commercially developed.4 While Australia is currently the largest lithium producer, accounting for 52 per cent of total global production, Australian lithium is extracted from hard rock deposits. LTCs produce lithium from salt brines, which is costlier than extracting the metal from hard rock deposits. However, the lithium so produced requires less processing and therefore can achieve higher margins.5 The LTCs therefore have a competitive edge, in anticipation of high demand for EVs and green energy.6 Table 2: Country-wise lithium production
Source: World Economic Forum Lithium-Iron-Phosphate (LFP) batteries accounted for largest market share of global EV batteries produced in 2022.7 The LTCs produce lithium carbonate, used to produce Lithium-Iron-Phosphate (LFP) batteries, which are considered cheaper, durable and safer than Nickel-Manganese-Cobalt (NMC) batteries.8 The supplies for NMC batteries are risk prone, given that Chinese firms own cobalt mines of major producers like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Further, countries like Indonesia, which account for half of global nickel production,9 have an export ban on nickel. The ongoing Russia–Ukraine war is a further risk factor. ArgentinaArgentina possesses the world’s second largest lithium reserves (at 21 per cent) and is the world’s fourth largest lithium producer. It has two operational lithium salt flat mines in the north-western provinces, while 20 others in same region are in different stages of exploration.10 While Chile and Bolivia have listed ‘lithium’ as a strategic mineral, Argentina treats lithium similarly to other minerals and has liberalised the mining sector by opening it for foreign investment since 1990s. There is relative autonomy to the provinces in mining the mineral, with a 1993 law giving tax breaks to mining firms. These companies are also entitled to keep more than 70 per cent of the profit, while paying royalty of only 3 per cent to the government.11 Consequently, lithium exports have risen 234 per cent Year-On-Year (Y-O-Y) in 2022 and accounted for one-fifth of the country’s total mining exports.12 Investments in the country’s lithium sector reached an estimated US$ 1.5 billion in 2022. Companies from the US, China and Europe are vying to increase their stakes in the mining companies of Argentina. Though US companies have been extracting lithium in the country for 20 years, Chinese firms are rapidly expanding their footprints. Chinese companies significantly hold stake in six of the nine lithium production projects in Argentina. Ganfeng Lithium, the world’s second largest lithium processor and third largest producer of lithium salts, has pledged to invest US$ 2.7 billion and produce 74,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate in the coming years. Simultaneously, US-based Livent Corp and Argentina’s Allkem expect to double their output to 42,500 tonnes of lithium carbonate in the coming years.13 South Korea’s steelmaker Posco Holdings Inc. aims to invest US$ 4 billion in Argentina, with a target to produce 100,000 tonnes of lithium hydroxide.14 Most of these foreign investments are made in the upstream stage of the supply chain (which involves mining, refining and processing). Going forward, Argentina could also aim to partner with companies engaged in downstream stages of supply chain – assembly of batteries and EV manufacturing.15 BoliviaAmong the three Andean countries, Bolivia has largest lithium reserves, 24 per cent of the world’s total, and hosts the world’s largest salt flat—Salar de Uyuni (single-biggest lithium deposit). Despite having the largest reserves, Bolivia stands nowhere among the world’s top producers. The government has majority stakes in extraction and processing of lithium but inconsistent policies have marred optimum extraction of the resource.16 Unlike lithium extraction through solar evaporation in Chile and Argentina, rainy season and wetter grounds in Bolivian salt flats lead to a time-intensive extraction process. Additionally, the extractive process is highly water intensive, given higher quantities of impurities. This has also led to protests from environmentalists and indigenous groups. Consequently, a project with Germany’s ACI Systems was stalled as local communities in the Potosi region were demanding more benefits and royalties.17 The government is now welcoming investments in Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE) technology, a process which ensures faster speed, higher yields and lower water use, to overcome its geographical constraints.18 The Bolivian government recently signed a deal worth US$ 1.4 billion with Russian state nuclear firm Rosatom and China’s Citic Guoan Group to develop lithium mines.19 Another US$ 1 billion agreement was signed with Contemporary Amperex Technology, a Chinese consortium to tap lithium reserves using DLE technology, which is also the world’s largest EV battery maker. ChileChile is the world’s largest lithium producer from brines, and stands third in terms of total lithium reserves. The country boasts of highest concentration of finest quality lithium brine salt flats in Salar de Atacama, 40 of which are currently mined by only two companies- Albemarle, a US-based company and SQM, a Chilean chemical company, under strict production quotas. There is a requirement to sell up to 25 per cent of output at preferential prices to local buyers, a different model from neighbouring Bolivia, where the state has full control of the sector, and Argentina, in which the state simply grants concessions for companies to operate. On the other hand, the second-largest reserves in the country’s Salar de Maricunga region have been left unexploited and uncommercialised due to corruption, red tape and environment sustainability issues.20 The country unveiled ‘National Lithium Strategy’ in April 2023, which aims to develop lithium extraction in salt flats through a PPP wherein private sector will be allowed to exploit and mine the white metal but control of the mine will rest with the government. Chile aims to create a National Lithium Company, on the lines of Codelco, the national copper mining company and also the world’s largest copper producer. Resource Geopolitics and Climate ChangeThe demand for these minerals owing to high-end electronics manufacturing are projected to rapidly rise, with limited availability of functioning mines, skills and cutting-edge technology. Given the demand, price of lithium is predicted to rise 40-fold by 2040.21 In order to exploit such opportunities, Latin American countries like Bolivia, for instance, need to have in place the right mix of private sector participation and government control for optimum commercial exploitation. While Argentina and Chile accounted for 90 per cent of the total lithium supplies to the US in 2019, China is a key player in the lithium industry in Latin American region, especially so in Bolivia.22 It is also a dominant player in downstream as well as upstream processing of the mineral. To counter China’s dominance, the US has forged many alliances with like-minded countries. For instance, the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP) consisting of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Sweden, the European Union, apart from the US, aims to secure minerals supply chains. The alliance includes Japan and South Korea, which along with China make up for more than 90 per cent of the battery cells supply chain, for different categories and components. The US has also taken steps like pressurising the Netherlands to pause the export of semiconductor advanced machinery equipment and has sought to restrict China’s access to high-tech microchips and critical technology.23 In retaliation, China has restricted the export of gallium and germanium to the US, two of the many critical minerals used to manufacture semiconductor chips.24 While lithium exploration may prove to be lucrative for the Andean economies, the ubiquitous devastating impacts of climate change cannot be ignored. Lithium extraction through salt flats is a water-intensive process which can deprive the region of water, which is already facing severe drought conditions. For instance, Argentina is experiencing its worst drought in over 60 years, gravely impacting its processed soy, wheat and corn exports, which are the country’s main source of export revenue. Argentina could move towards sustainable techniques like DLE and climate smart-agriculture practice to sustain its economy and environment as well as fully exploit its mineral resources like lithium. Similar to protests in Bolivia, recent protests against displacement and chemical infiltration in the groundwater have also erupted in Argentina. Water depletion in Chile’s Salar da Atacama, one of the driest places on Earth has impacted the regional biodiversity ecosystem, especially the population of flamingos. Time-intensive processing of extracting lithium through solar evaporation takes more than a year, which affects local climate cycle, and in turn indigenous population. India and LTCsIndia has also been increasing its diplomatic outreach to the LTCs for accessing the mineral. Former President Ramnath Kovind’s State visit to Bolivia and Chile in 2019 is a case in point, where he was accompanied by business delegation. Discussions on lithium mining to achieve India’s ambitious target of EV Vision 2030 were held during that visit.25 In January 2023, Union Minister of State (MoS) Meenakshi Lekhi also paid a four-nation visit to Latin America and the Caribbean region. In Bolivia, discussions focused on long-term partnership in the lithium and battery sector, and partnership in metals and mining sector.26 Further, India has launched ambitious plan to manufacture Advanced Chemistry Cell (ACC) under the PLI scheme with a budgetary outlay of Rs 18,100 crore, to boost battery production.27 However, India still imports 100 per cent of its lithium metal, mostly from East Asian countries like China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Republic of Korea for battery production.28 States like Telangana are also aspiring to become the EV manufacturing hub of India. The state government has put in place institutional mechanisms to forge collaborations with joint venture partners to secure access to lithium in the LTCs, for its battery and ACC manufacturing ecosystem.29 Even as it seeks such critical minerals overseas, India also aims to exploit lithium deposits in places like Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi has also been inducted as a partner in the US-led MSP alliance. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Non-Traditional Security | Latin America, Renewable Energy | system/files/thumb_image/2015/lithium-green-energy-t.jpg | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Strengthening Resilience: Atmanirbhar Bharat and Tackling Supply Chain Vulnerabilities | August 17, 2023 | Rajneesh Singh |
The concept of supply chain resilience has evolved as a response to various economic changes, technological advancements, vulnerabilities due to infrastructure disruptions, besides natural disasters and environmental concerns. Supply chains are susceptible to geopolitical tensions and war time disruptions. Globalisation and lean production practices have enhanced efficiency but have brought about greater interdependency and reduced buffer stocks, thereby increasing vulnerabilities. The complexity and interconnection of global supply chains has heightened the realisation of the need for supply chain resilience and self-reliance in production. India's defence supply chain, like many others around the world, faces a range of vulnerabilities that has a direct impact on defence preparedness and operational efficiency of its armed forces. Indian armed forces have been further constrained due to traditional reliance on imports for a significant percentage of its weapons platforms, technology, and assemblies and sub-assemblies. Lengthy and complex procurement processes have resulted in delays in acquisition and limitations of domestic manufacturing and technological dependence have exposed vulnerable supply chain to extraneous influences. The challenges to India's supply chain and defence manufacturing have got magnified because of the general shift in industrial supply chain towards East Asia, particularly to China. This shift in industrial manufacturing has placed India's supply chain under threat, especially during wars. China has a disproportionate influence over the global supply chain because of the large R&D budget, and civilian industrial base including high-tech manufacturing. There are also challenges of ownership of the firms, including those located in friendly countries, but with Chinese ownership. Taiwan and Israel have the world's leading electronics and semiconductor industries. Over-concentration of indispensable items for defence manufacturing increases vulnerabilities and calls for diversification. The ‘Atmanirbhar Abhiyan’ was launched in May 2020 with an aim to make India self-reliant across various sectors, reducing its dependence on imports and enhancing domestic production capabilities. The programme focuses on five key pillars: economy, infrastructure, system, vibrant demography, and demand. By promoting indigenous manufacturing, innovation, and skill development, the programme seeks to build a robust and self-sufficient economy. The government's initiative aims to mitigate and adapt to shocks, disruptions, and uncertainties in supply chain by establishing domestic production capabilities of defence equipment and platforms. The ‘Atmanirbhar Abhiyan’ is an enabler for the three services to procure weapons and equipment as per the operational requirements without the impediments of external vetoes. The programme does not aim to isolate India's defence ecosystem from foreign participation, rather India will continue to pragmatically import foreign equipment involving niche technology, not available in the country. This is to obviate near-term defence vulnerabilities. Foreign participation in domestic manufacturing should be seen as a welcome contribution to the 'Make in India, Make for the World' agenda of the Prime Minister, articulated during his Independence Day speech of 2022. 'Atmanirbhar Bharat' is not about isolating India's manufacturing ecosystem from the world, rather it is about merging domestic production and consumption with global supply chains. The programme aims to be self-sustaining and self-generating. Since 2020, a slew of measures has been announced by the government to improve defence indigenisation and domestic manufacturing. Prominent amongst these are emphasis on procuring from domestic manufacturers; the positive indigenisation lists; establishment of defence industrial corridors; and the corporatisation of Ordnance Factory Board. The government is also committed to encourage innovations through schemes of iDEX and has earmarked funds for research and development by private industry and startups. In order to encourage domestic procurement, the government has earmarked more than 75 per cent of the capital acquisition budget for the year 2023–24 (more than Rs 100,000 crores) for domestic procurement, as against Rs 85,000 crores in 2022–23.1 As a result of these steps, not only has foreign procurement reduced in recent times (from 46 per cent in 2018–19 to 36 per cent in 2020–21),2 the value of domestic defence production has also risen (to more than Rs 100,000 crore in 2022–23),3 while there has been a significant rise in defence exports as well (Rs 16,000 crore in 2022–23).4 India has ambitious plans to become part of the global defence supply chains. The 2020 Draft Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy laid out a vision for the Indian defence industry to reach a turnover of Rs 175,000 crores by 2025, with exports amounting to Rs 35,000 crores. While the country is on course to achieve these ambitious targets, there is a need to take steps to reinforce defence supply chains and mitigate vulnerabilities. A critical component of the defence supply chain are the MSMEs which require governmental support. The Ministry of Defence has taken significant steps for promoting the role of the MSMEs in the defence sector, including encouraging defence innovation by startups, earmarking orders up to Rs 100 crore exclusively to domestic MSMEs, modifying offset guidelines to ensure integration of MSMEs in the global defence supply chain, among others. Given the key role of innovation in maintaining competitive edge, partnerships like INDUS-X between the US and Indian defence startups can be expected to add value and deliver critical edge to Indian defence manufacturing, as indeed efforts like the Strategic Partnership model that encourage foreign OEMs to set up domestic manufacturing units for critical platforms. The path to supply chain resilience and self-reliance is not without challenges. Transitioning from a foreign dependent supply chain model to a more self-reliant one requires careful planning, policy reforms and huge investment. The government will have to walk the fine line to balance the advantages of international trade and collaboration with the need for domestic production capabilities. It requires a collaborative approach involving government agencies, industry stakeholders and academia. Domestic manufacturing, especially by private industry, is driven by commercial considerations. Indian private defence industry and startups require governmental hand-holding to become players of some reckoning in the global supply chain. This will require industry-friendly policies which support Indian players and allow them to survive and flourish in extreme environment of cut-throat competition in the global supply chain. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Defence Economics & Industry | Atmanirbhar Bharat, Defence Production, Defence Procurement | system/files/thumb_image/2015/atmanirbhar-bharat-t.jpg | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Saudi Arabia and the Russia–Ukraine War | August 16, 2023 | Prasanta Kumar Pradhan |
Saudi Arabia’s approach towards the Russia–Ukraine War is characterised by a commitment to neutrality, mediation efforts and providing humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainian refugees. While Riyadh’s primary political and security focus has traditionally remained within the Arab and Islamic world, it has displayed a profound concern for the ongoing developments in the Russia–Ukraine War. This Saudi stance towards the Russia–Ukraine War underscores the Kingdom’s dynamic and forward-looking foreign policy initiatives, as championed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. On 5–6 August 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting of the National Security Advisers/representatives of over 40 countries along with the representatives of the United Nations, the European Commission and the European Council. The meeting, held in Jeddah, agreed to continue consultations and exchange opinions to find a way to restore peace between Russia and Ukraine. Ironically, Russia was not invited to the meeting. While Ukraine described the meeting as “fruitful consultations”,1 Russia stated that “without … taking into account its interests, no meetings on the Ukrainian crisis have the slightest added value”.2 Since the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine War, Saudi Arabia has adhered to a stance of neutrality while consistently advocating for a peaceful resolution through diplomatic negotiations. Over time, this neutrality has evolved into a more proactive diplomatic engagement, with Saudi Arabia striving to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. Despite the deepening engagements with Russia, Saudi Arabia has voted in favour of the UN resolutions calling for the cessation of conflicts, the withdrawal of Russian forces and the Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory.3 The Kingdom has maintained a good relationship with both Russia and Ukraine which makes it believe that it is uniquely positioned as a neutral, and credible mediator in the crisis. While appealing for a halt to the war, Saudi Arabia has provided humanitarian assistance for the Ukrainian refugees. In February 2023, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud visited Ukraine and met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Both countries signed agreements worth US$ 400 million that included US$ 300 million in oil derivatives for Ukraine and providing humanitarian assistance of US$ 100 million through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSRelief).4 The Saudi foreign minister also expressed his country’s willingness to mediate in the conflict and help in resolving the situation. In less than two weeks, on 9 March 2023, Farhan Al Saud visited Moscow and met his counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. He also reiterated the Saudi willingness to mediate between Russia and Ukraine to end the war.5 Since the creation of OPEC+ in 2016, Saudi–Russian cooperation in the energy sector has significantly deepened. For the US, the Saudi–Russia bonhomie in the OPEC+ and its impact on the global oil market has been a major concern. At a time when the US and the European countries have imposed an import ban on Russian oil, the OPEC+ deal has helped the Russian economy during the war. It has also helped Saudi Arabia to maintain its dominance in the oil market and keep its economy in shape. Thus, Saudi Arabia has ample reasons to uphold a neutral stance in the war, evading pressure from the US. Its relationship with Ukraine has also been warm with good political and economic ties. Saudi Arabia invited Zelenskyy to participate in the Jeddah summit of the Arab League in May 2023, where he sought the support of the organisation against Russian aggression. Riyadh is seeking to strengthen its reputation as a credible mediator in its neighbourhood and beyond. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has been mediating in a number of regional conflicts and mediation has become an important feature of Saudi diplomacy. It has mediated in regional conflicts in the Arab/Islamic region such as in Lebanon, between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine, and most recently between the conflicting parties in Sudan. Riyadh often uses its religious soft power to establish its credibility as a mediator and also provides financial aid to support and pacify the conflicting parties. In December 2022, Saudi Arabia and the UAE mediated between the US and Russia for the release of Brittney Griner, an American sportsperson jailed in Russia, and Victor Bout, a Russian citizen who was in a US prison.6 This has lent Riyadh a degree of confidence to engage in mediation between Russia and Ukraine. Success in mediation in the 18-month long Russia–Ukraine War, however, would be a formidable task for Riyadh as the war is taking place in a region which is beyond its Arab/Islamic neighbourhood where its soft power is ineffective. Despite maintaining good relations with them, Riyadh’s political and diplomatic leverages to influence the decisions of Moscow and Kiev are limited. Convincing Russia to withdraw without an acceptable deal would be difficult to achieve. In the current situation, where Russia has captured Ukrainian territory, the US and NATO are actively supporting Ukraine in the War and a refugee crisis continues to exist, the efficacy of Riyadh's mediation would remain constrained. In the Jeddah meeting, Riyadh has made a good start to bring the key stakeholders from across the world for consultation. Saudi mediation efforts have the potential to build an international consensus to bring the war to an end, but the intricate challenge lies in the successful translation of this consensus into tangible and effective actions on the ground. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Eurasia & West Asia | Saudi Arabia, Russia-Ukraine Relations | system/files/thumb_image/2015/russia-ukrain-saudi-arabia-t.jpg | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Nuclear Weapons Use in Japan and the Status of Nuclear Disarmament | August 14, 2023 | Rajiv Nayan |
The world is commemorating the 78th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima (6 August) and Nagasaki (9 August). The number of persons killed and badly affected as a result of the atomic bombings has been a subject of contention. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists states that “the most credible estimates cluster around a ‘low’ of 110,000 mortalities and a ‘high’ of 210,000”.1 Highlighting this wide gap in estimates, the author seems perplexed that the varied estimates are made by experts and credible institutions. Although the remembrance services are organised all over the world, the two bombed cities become the focus of tributes and speech-making every year. This year, too, speeches have been that term the bombings horrific. The release of the movie Oppenheimer is drawing more attention to the destruction caused to the two Japanese cities by the efforts of the ‘father of the atomic bomb’. The need for disarmament is repeated in the speeches of the Mayors of the two cities and statements of other organisations and groups involved in disarmament efforts. On these two dates, the world overwhelmingly realises the imperative need for a world without nuclear weapons. This annual ritual builds norms for nuclear disarmament, but the reality of nuclear disarmament is yet to be realised. On the somber occasion, it is imperative to assess the state of affairs of nuclear disarmament. How are the regimes and institutions along with other actors treating the idea of nuclear disarmament? Is the world serious about it? The stark reality is that the world appears paying only lip service to nuclear disarmament and the regimes and the institutions are not able to break the deadlock. The most-famed legal instrument, which includes the element of nuclear disarmament as part of a grand bargain, is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Article VI of the treaty lays down provisions for nuclear disarmament. It asks the member countries of the treaty which are possessing nuclear weapons to start negotiations for not merely halting the nuclear arms race but also nuclear disarmament. The Review Conference of the NPT held from 1 to 26 August 2022, in which several grand ideas were exchanged, also had to pass through the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing days. Nuclear disarmament also came up for discussion during the 2022 RevCon. At the 2022 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), the Group of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the treaty gave a presentation which emphasised nuclear disarmament. Similarly, the New Agenda Coalition consisting of countries from both the developing and the developed worlds, established in 1998, did express its concern about completely ignoring ‘the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons’ by the nuclear weapon states of the NPT. Nuclear Disarmament has been a contentious issue among the member states of the treaty. Some of the RevCons of the 21st century failed to agree to outcome documents and reports, predominantly due to differences on nuclear disarmament. Quite notably, the nuclear disarmament related article has been interpreted2 differently by and in the nuclear weapons states, especially the United States for a long period. A section of the policy community refuses to accept that Article VI obliges nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament. The US government though struck a reconciliatory tone at the 2022 RevCon by stating that the objective of the Non-Nuclear Weapons States and the Nuclear Weapons States was the same—‘a world free of nuclear weapons’. The outcome document of the 2022 NPT RevCon, though not adopted, underlines the fact that the treaty provides a ‘foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament’, and stipulates ‘legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty’. It further recognises the reality that nuclear disarmament can promote international peace and security. The ‘total elimination’ of the nuclear stockpile is considered the ultimate solution. The same document also mentions unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral methods to cut, and finally end the nuclear stockpile. The roadmap to achieve it, however, is clearly missing in the document. Unfortunately, a section of the international community interprets that Article VI merely suggests negotiations in good faith to stop the arms race and to go for the reduction of nuclear arsenals and if possible, for nuclear disarmament. Some of them also maintain that as long as nuclear weapons exist, a nuclear weapons state may have to rely on nuclear weapons for its security. The Mayor of Hiroshima in 2023 once again asked the nuclear weapons states to move away from nuclear deterrence and go for nuclear disarmament. The state and the global civil society pay tribute to the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but remain ineffective in realising nuclear disarmament. Instead of going for nuclear disarmament, the dominant section of the international community appears to prefer arms control, nuclear proliferation, and reduction of nuclear risks. Even the 2022 NPT outcome document considers ‘miscalculation, miscommunication, misperception, or accident’ quite relevant. This is relevant because nuclear disarmament is not in sight. Quite significantly, arms control mechanism like New Start Treaty are struggling. The new Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty is also out of the horizon. Even the non-proliferation regime, which has the NPT as a mainstay, is under pressure. The leading powers and their allies do not vote on the key UN resolutions for reducing nuclear dangers. The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are highlighted in different forums and documents. The 2022 outcome document too reflects the humanitarian angle when it affirms that the immediate, mid-and long-term consequences of nuclear weapon detonations, inter alia, on health, the environment, biodiversity, infrastructure, food security, climate, development, social cohesion, and the global economy are interlinked, and would not be constrained by national borders but have regional or global effects and that a nuclear war could even threaten the survival of humanity.3 However, it seems that the humanitarian consequences, highlighted in different meetings and dreadfully experienced in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has had little policy impact on concluding a genuine nuclear disarmament convention. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is being touted as a nuclear disarmament convention. The treaty, which has been adopted and opened for signature in 2017, became operational in January 2021.4 Currently, it has 92 signatories and 68 of them are state parties which have ratified or acceded to the treaty.5 However, all the nuclear weapons possessing countries are outside the TPNW and did not even participate in the negotiations process of the treaty. Moreover, almost all the NATO countries stayed away from negotiations, and none of them have joined the treaty as yet. The TPNW was seen by many as undermining the NPT process and giving a backdoor exit to its nuclear member states and their nuclear disarmament commitment. Yet, for a country like India, ‘this Treaty does not constitute or contribute to the development of customary international law; nor does it set any new standards or norms’.6 Despite being a nuclear weapons country, India envisions a world without nuclear weapons. Quite touchingly, the Indian Parliament pays tribute to the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki every year. Negotiating the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament would have given it legitimacy, and it would have been negotiated probably with better expertise. A comprehensive convention could have required provisions for the proper implementation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. As of now, the treaty looks ad hoc with several loopholes and limitations. The crisis generated by the Ukraine–Russia conflict is going to complicate the future nuclear disarmament scenario. The world does not seem to be realising the urgency of nuclear disarmament. The general apprehension is that the security of non-nuclear weapons states vis-à-vis nuclear weapons states may become a powerful tool for the spread of nuclear weapons if the doctrine of negative security assurance is not adopted by the nuclear weapons states. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Nuclear and Arms Control | Japan, Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Weapons | system/files/thumb_image/2015/japan-nuclear-disarmament-t.jpg | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| BRICS Summit and ICC Warrant against Putin | August 14, 2023 | Saurabh Mishra |
The clouds of confusion on the BRICS Summit to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa from 22–24 August 2023 have cleared as speculations regarding Russian President Vladimir Putin’s participation in the event have been put to rest. Russian authorities confirmed that President Putin shall participate in the high-profile event in a virtual mode, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov will attend in person.1 South Africa, as Chair of the BRICS, had decided to go ahead with hosting the Summit meeting2 amidst controversy in the wake of International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant issued against Putin in March 2023.3 South Africa and ICCThis was not the first occasion that an international summit in South Africa was under scanner due to dilemmas and repercussions related to her membership of the ICC. South Africa faced a similar situation in 2015, when Omar Al-Bashir, the erstwhile President of Sudan attended the African Union (AU) Summit meeting in the country.5 The ICC had issued an arrest warrant against Bashir for acts of crime against humanity, war crimes, and genocide committed in Darfur, Sudan between 2003 and 2008. South Africa however did not execute the warrant citing Bashir’s sovereign immunity. It must be noted that Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute but was acquired in the jurisdiction of the ICC through a referral by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under Article 13(b) of the Statute for investigating and trying only the crimes and atrocities committed in Darfur under President Bashir. In July 2017, the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC concluded that South Africa violated the Rome Statute by not arresting Bashir. It also concluded that by agreeing to host AU Summit meeting, South Africa could not automatically assign immunity to President Bashir. Nevertheless, the negative observation by the Chamber did not lead to the reference of South African non-compliance to the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute or the UN Security Council (UNSC) for further action.6 Had the case been referred to ASP, the country could have faced further referral to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), while in case of UNSC, the Russian veto would have nullified any action. There are no punitive provisions in the Rome Statue for a state failing to cooperate and execute its orders. However, if referred to the ICJ or UNSC, the countries in question may face binding obligations failing which they shall be liable to UN actions under Chapter VI or VII depending on the severity of the case. The ICC has been institutionalised as a complementary Court which is supposed to act if the national administration and courts of a country—where a war crime, crime against humanity, or genocide has been committed, or to which the perpetrators belong to, fail to act in prosecuting and punishing them. South African courts had taken note of the non-compliance and concluded that South Africa defaulted by not arresting Bashir.7 The Pre-Trial Chamber II seemed satisfied by the proceedings in the South African courts and given the record of previous referrals to ASP or UNSC did not see any benefit in escalating the case for further action.8 But the Chamber would have been under immense pressure if it repeated the same in case of South Africa failing to arrest Putin. As South Africa is a member of both ICC and BRICS, the country sometimes finds herself divided between the two. It was reported that the Russians insisted for the meeting to be offline with physical presence of all the BRICS leaders,9 while South Africa was trying hard to find a middle path which resulted in the current Russian decision. The Russian President’s decision not to attend the BRICS Summit physically therefore rescued both South Africa and the ICC from a diplomatic quagmire. ICC and GeopoliticsThe Rome Statute is seen as politicising the prosecution process with the inclusion of provisions of referral of even non-state members by the UNSC. Another provision of the Court allows it to try perpetrators from a non-party state without her consent.10 Such provisions are viewed as legal aggression in the traditional sovereign jurisdictions, by BRICS countries like Russia. Since Russia possesses veto in the UNSC, the ICC Prosecutor took up the Ukrainian case via another route. Ukraine, through two separate declarations, accepted the Court’s jurisdiction for the crimes committed on its territory from 21 February 2013 onwards. The investigation of the recent situation in Ukraine was initiated by the head of the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC. Lithuania, a party to Rome Statute and member of NATO, referred the alleged crimes by Putin to the ICC. A total of 43 State parties to the Court, especially EU members, backed the referral of the Ukrainian situation for investigation to put diplomatic pressure on Putin.11 This put South Africa, one of the endorsers of the idea of the ICC, in a difficult spot, so much so that it seriously contemplated pulling out of the Rome Statute. The country decided not to go for the extreme step only recently.12 The South African situation highlights the complexities of the functioning of international system. Being a prominent economy and a middle power from Africa, the country has assumed a larger role of supporting peace and order on the continent. For this, it has aligned and cooperated with regional or international bodies that promise to bring a semblance of peace and eliminate impunity from the continent. South Africa signed the Rome Statute in one of its idealist moments that had emerged due to the impunity prevalent primarily in Africa and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. South Africa and other countries who joined in the Court prioritised the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of violence over the universally accepted principle of national sovereignty in certain cases. For the signatories of the Rome Statue, this was the price to be paid for eliminating impunity and creating a sense of justice in international society. However, several major powers and European countries were not on the same page on this point. The US, China, Russia and India have since then kept out of the Rome Statute for similar reasons. The Court has also been accused of double standards and Eurocentrism. All the 31 cases that have been confirmed and listed in the court are from Africa.13 The controversy regarding Putin’s participation in the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg due to the ICC arrest warrant highlights the geopolitical overtones and inadequacies of the ICC in the contemporary world. BRICS is one of the most important international groupings representing around 42 per cent of humanity and contributing more than a quarter of the global GDP.14 The case of warrant against Sudan’s Bashir was technically the same but substantively and politically very different from that of Putin. Arresting one of the heads of BRICS states with one of the strongest militaries possessing nuclear weapons and a veto in the UNSC would have led to far greater consequences as against the Bashir case. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated in a document submitted to the court that “Russia has made it clear that arresting its sitting President would be a declaration of war.”15 The issue caused diplomatic discomfort between the two countries, which now stands resolved due to the understanding shown by both the sides. Looking into the FutureThe set of events highlight a world in flux and the tight rope walk by middle powers like South Africa. Brazil, another middle power and party to the Rome Statute, may be seen walking the same tight rope during its presidency of BRICS. Therefore, the Rome Statute has the potential to create diplomatic issues and geopolitical discord among countries. Many countries see the ICC as an agenda which is not in sync with conditions of the contemporary world. The party states either have to press for amendments in the Statute to avoid such situations in future or be ready to see the ICC decrees being violated and becoming ineffective due to geopolitical interplays. The positions taken by BRICS countries during the deliberations before signing and enforcement of the Rome Statute may guide such amendments. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Eurasia & West Asia | Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), International Criminal Court (ICC) | system/files/thumb_image/2015/putin-brics-t.jpg |
