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Summary

The Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), an ISIS affiliate operating primarily in the Af-Pak and Central Asian regions, is expanding its regional influence. The ISKP has Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in its crosshairs. The Taliban’s heavy-handed approach towards its ethnic minorities has played a crucial role in aiding the recruitment of Central Asians into ISKP’s ranks.

The Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021 altered Afghanistan’s political landscape, paving the way for major terrorist groups—Al-Qaeda (AQ), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP)—to expand their influence. Notably, the humanitarian catastrophe, exacerbating tensions within the Taliban regime and between rival jihadist groups, has added to regional volatility. Central Asian countries have faced heightened security threats such as radicalisation and terrorism attributed to ISKP. This terrorist outfit has the bordering states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in its crosshairs, as indicated by its propaganda.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)

ISKP is an ISIS affiliate operating primarily in the Af-Pak and Central Asian regions. Its beginnings as the Tehreek-e-Khilafat Pakistan and subsequent evolution as the Khorasan Wilayat (province) have roots in the disgruntled Pashtun leaders who defected from TTP, AQ, and the Afghan Taliban.1 Nonetheless, its membership has expanded to include foreign fighters like Chechens, Chinese, Iranians, and Central Asians. Considering the abhorrence towards nation-states, ISKP, like its parent organisation, ISIS, aims to coercively erode the Westphalian borders and integrate Central Asian countries into its fold.

The group adheres to an extremist interpretation of Salafi Islam.2 It emphatically advocates for overthrowing the existing order through violent means and establishing a Khalifah (Caliphate). This contravenes the predominantly quietist approach associated with most Salafi Muslims.

Historically, Khorasan encompassed vast swathes of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran, particularly during the Middle Ages.3 Furthermore, its significance in Islamic eschatology, heralding the end of time’s occurrence, remains necessary to understand ISKP’s doctrinal beliefs.

As per a hadith attributed to Prophet Mohammed, an army carrying black flags would appear in this region, swiftly seizing control of all Muslim lands. Finally, the flags would be mounted in Jerusalem, and the army would pledge allegiance to Imam Mehdi.

“…If you see the black banners coming from Khorasan, join that army, even if you have to crawl over ice; no power will be able to stop them. And they will finally reach Baitul Maqdis (Jerusalem), where they will erect their flags...”4

Following its inception, the group established its presence in Afghanistan, particularly in Nangarhar (where it has suffered maximum casualties), Herat (bordering Turkmenistan), Helmand, and the Kunar provinces. However, since the Taliban regained power, ISKP has primarily been active in Northern Afghanistan, which adjoins Central Asia.5 In 2022, it attacked Kunduz and Mazar-i-Sharif, bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, respectively, to expand its control over other parts of the wilayat. ISKP’s primary doctrinal foe in the region is the Afghan Taliban, a Hanafi-Deobandi movement.

Their competing ideological differences have moulded their starkly different approaches toward Central Asia. Interestingly, AQ, despite being a Salafi jihadist organisation, worked in tandem with the Taliban because of its willingness to negotiate with non-conformist entities and distance itself from any resource or territorial conflicts with its Afghan ally.

At the same time, it is vital to recollect that ISKP has not claimed any major attack in Afghanistan for over two months. This aligns with the overall decline in attacks by ISIS and ISIS-backed affiliates globally, including during Ramadan.

Taliban and ISKP: Contestations and Convergences

The nearly eight-year conflict between the Taliban and ISKP does not resemble the reciprocal relationship based on goodwill initially cultivated between ISIS core and the de facto Afghan government. Furthermore, for nearly two years, ISKP has assumed the role of a militant insurgent group, a label previously associated with the Taliban.

Mutually antagonistic ideological beliefs provide the basis for their ongoing rivalry. On the one hand, ISKP supports the call to establish a global Caliphate. On the other hand, the Taliban is a nationalist entity focused on Afghanistan.

Their differing ethnic composition is an added point of difference. While the Taliban is predominantly Pashtun-led, ISKP draws on a diverse cohort of militant jihadists. The latter has also frequently positioned itself as a more inclusive alternative while capitalising on the harsh measures enacted by the Taliban against ethnic minorities to bolster its ranks.

At the same time, ISKP has attempted to position itself as the ‘martyr of jihad’ to attract the hardliners disillusioned with its rivals for not being extremist enough. For this purpose, it has targeted the Taliban as an illegitimate religious authority for engaging with the United States, Iran, Central Asian states, or Russia.6 The Taliban government has also been criticised for being ISI’s puppet and Iran’s protégé.

Moreover, the Taliban is willing to establish diplomatic ties with its Central Asian neighbours, barring Tajikistan. This is all the while ISKP perceives the neighbourhood as being controlled by un-Islamic leaders who need to be eliminated and their political-economic systems overhauled to be governed as per Sharia.

To thwart its rival on the battlefield, the Taliban has reached out to anti-ISKP factions (Islamic Jihadi Union, Al-Qaeda, Jamaat Ansarullah). Additionally, it has tried to assuage the global community’s security concerns to potentially achieve a breakthrough and rally support for its domestic counter-terror efforts.

Salafism in Central Asia

Islam's presence in Central Asia has proven resilient, irrespective of repressive Soviet-era policies which sought to co-opt and reconfigure it in a way that aligned with the communist worldview of religion. Nevertheless, the religious revivalism that ensued due to the vacuum created after the Soviet Union’s collapse paved the path for a wave of Islamism and Salafi-styled radicalisation to take hold.7 This was visible during the Tajik civil war, where Salafi Muslims fought alongside Afghan jihadists.

Most Central Asians adhere to the Hanafi-Deobandi or Sufi traditions. However, Salafism's presence, dating to Tablighi Jamaat's rise between 1950 and 1970, has gradually acted as a catalyst for the spread of Salafism8 which aides ISKP's influence in the region. This has posed a significant threat to regional security. Moreover, the festering resentment among the populace towards their governments resulted in many joining the ranks of ISIS during its heyday.

Additionally, the presence of various terror groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan (IMT), and the Islamic Jihadi Union (IJU) has further exacerbated the security challenges.

The ISKP and Central Asia

ISKP views the Central Asia region as integral to establishing its Khorasan wilayat. Furthermore, the group’s targeted attacks to destabilise the region have encompassed missile attacks and locals’ indoctrination.

The presence of pro-ISIS groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in proximity has facilitated advancing its objectives. Afghanistan’s destabilisation has further strained the situation, with potential terrorist threats spilling over into Central Asia. Two rocket attacks launched in 2022, the first on the Afghan-Uzbek border and the second on the Afghan-Tajik border,9 legitimises the threat the ISIS affiliate poses.

The attempts to destabilise the government in Turkmenistan and rally Central Asians to overthrow their governments is another attempt by the ISKP to make further inroads in Central Asia. This marks the Khorasan wilayat’s expansion of the ‘Great Jihad’ into Central Asia.

The ISKP sees the region as fertile ground. Therefore, it could exploit the recent instability in the region caused due to various protests, more prominently in the border areas of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and Russia’s pre-occupation in Ukraine to destabilise the regional governments.

Furthermore, recent statements underscore the regional threat perceptions regarding ISKP. For example, Marat Imankulov, the Secretary of the Security Council of Kyrgyzstan, highlighted the increasing numbers of ISKP fighters, approximately 7,000 fighters in areas bordering Northern Afghanistan.10 As a result, this organisation can potentially transform into the ‘highlighted nuisance of terrorism’ for the entire region, including Central Asia. In addition, the Chief of Joint Staff of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Anatoly Sidorov, announced the presence of 4,000 ISKP near the Tajik border of Afghanistan, with grave security implications for Central Asia.11 Finally, the United Nations has highlighted how Afghanistan remains a primary source of terror threats for Central and South Asia, with ISKP being attributed as the source to a large extent.12

Recruitment from Central Asia

Apart from demands for establishing Sharia in Central Asia, the group also has a strong history of recruiting Central Asians. During the starting days of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, data shows that an estimated 1,650 people from Central Asia, including migrants working in Russia, were recruited.13

However, ISKP’s target audience is not limited to Central Asians within the home countries and the Central Asian diaspora, mainly labour migrants in Russia; it also includes the returnees from West Asia.  Notably, Uzbekistan was the first Central Asia country where the ISIS flag was displayed publicly in 2014.14 Recently, it has expanded its outreach to Russian Muslims through its propaganda in the Northern Caucasus region by bringing out a poster of Emir Khattab, a renowned Salafist who fought in both Chechen wars against Russia. The ISKP may use the same Central Asian migrant groups to push its agenda toward Russia and its Northern Caucasus region. 

The Muhajireens’ (foreign fighters) role, particularly in the capacity of Inghimasi,15 is one of the reasons for the increased focus in the Central Asian region due to their tactics. The ISKP has even used various mediums such as radio messages, propaganda scriptures and posters, social media and religious sermons to indoctrinate and recruit Central Asians. Another recruitment avenue for the organisation could be traced to those repatriated from Syria and Iraq. These returnees are well-versed in IS tactics and profoundly committed to its ideology. 

Mediums of Recruitment

Propaganda disseminated through its media outlets, Al-Azaim and Voice of Khorasan, Movaraunnaha, which recently began using Uzbek and Tajik languages to promulgate its messages, is one of its most vital tools. Other outlets include Khurasan Wilayah News, Tor Bairghuna, Al-Millat Media, and Khurasan Ghag Radio.16 The propaganda outlets rely on audio and visual aids to radicalise potential supporters. In addition, various critical Salafist-style messages on Aqeedah (belief) and Manhaj (performing) are being spread through media outlets across the border to potential individuals. To target the Uzbek population, it has established two Uzbek media units, Xuroson Ovozi and Al-Azaim Uzbek.

Furthermore, audio productions featuring IMU ideologues like Mohammed Ali Domla, Abduvali Mirzayev, Asadulloh Urganchiy, Juma Namangani, and Tahir Yuldash have also been released to advance its cause.17 The main themes have been the propagation of various sermons, ideological statements, and ISKP propaganda for radicalising individuals. The group has used similar tactics for the Tajiks, for example, statements of ISKP Tajik prisoners in Jalalabad prison which ISKP attacked.18 As a result, it came under attack by ISKP in 2020 to undermine the taghut (pagan) government of Tajikistan. The group uses these subliminal messages to further the agenda of creating recruits and paint other Central Asian governments as non-compliant with Sharia.

This is because Uzbeks and Tajiks terror ideologues could aid the group in connecting with potential supporters, particularly in former terror hotbeds like the Fergana Valley. For example, Abduvali Mirzayev, a former Salafi imam from Andijan, was known to have given birth to the first generation of Salafi Jihadis in Fergana; the use of his sermons is symbolic and well-planned. Therefore, the ISKP could use the same sermons to give birth to a new generation of jihadis and recreate instability in Fergana. Another ideologue famed for spreading propaganda is Yusuf Tajiki, who previously called upon all Central Asian Muslims to join the ISKP and eulogised ISKP’s regional operations.  However, the Taliban reportedly neutralised him after successfully infiltrating one of ISKP’s cells.

Social Media and encrypted chat forums, following in its parent organisation’s footsteps, have been other critical tools exploited by ISKP, nurturing a generation of tech-savvy jihadis. For example, Telegram channels like Movaraunnaha have published official Voice of Khorasan materials and content like videos and posters.  With far-reaching access to various social media platforms, there is sufficient space for ISKP to connect to spread its propaganda.

Taliban Factor in Recruitment

The Taliban’s heavy-handed approach towards its ethnic minorities has played a crucial role in aiding the recruitment of Central Asians into ISKP’s ranks. This is in addition to the historical and shared animosity, going back to Taliban 1.0 and the Tajiks and Uzbeks.

This holds even though the current Afghan regime had recruited two minorities, who fell out of favour afterwards, into its leadership ranks. The arrests of famed Uzbek commander Makhdoom Alam and Tajik commander Qari Wakil19 highlight that the Taliban’s past behavioural patterns have remained unchanged. The arrest sparked protests among minorities and revived deeply-rooted mistrust. Such situations could help further a wedge between the Taliban and the minorities, which the ISKP could use for propaganda, recruitment, and rejuvenating animosity against the Taliban.

Moreover, after Mullah Omar died in 2013 and ISKP came into being in 2015, the IMU (an erstwhile Taliban ally) split into three factions. Two of them, including the famous Usman Gazi faction, pledged allegiance to ISKP.20 As a result, the Taliban unleashed its wrath on now-hostile elements, particularly in Afghanistan’s Zabul province. At the same time, ISKP has used the Taliban’s actions against IMU as fodder for propaganda, portraying it as anti-Uzbek.

This ideological divergence between IMU and the Taliban has also given ISKP more ammunition while recruiting Central Asians and directing their seething anger against the Taliban. Simultaneously, ISKP has provided anti-state radical Uzbeks with the necessary support. Gaining the help of some factions of the IMU ensures that the ISKP has an old seasoned terror group with a regional foothold. In addition, the IMU provides geographical knowledge and ethnic and language connections for ISKP to exploit in the Fergana Valley, earlier serving as IMU’s core area of recruitment and influence.

Future Trajectory

Considering that Russia, the primary regional security guarantor, is preoccupied with the events in Ukraine, Central Asia has become increasingly vulnerable. ISKP might further capitalise on this situation, particularly in the border states. The process is already underway, as evident by the attacks across the border, which only began following Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. 

A significant challenge facing Central Asia is the rising protests during the past year, indicating rising dissent. As a result, more protests could erupt in the future. ISKP could co-opt them to carve its space to erode regional stability further and bolster its strength.  Nonetheless, it might not be Central Asia’s Arab Spring moment.

Furthermore, the Tajik civil war, which began after the Soviet Union’s disintegration, had played out between Islamists and Emomali Rahmon, who still wields power. ISKP could tap into past resentments and re-ignite the hostile sentiments of those dissatisfied with the government to bring about a decisive victory. The country also connects with the Fergana Valley and has a history of terror attacks and terror groups. Moreover, Tehreek-e-Taliban Tajikistan’s presence at the Badakhshan border is a festering security issue for the Tajik leadership. ISKP’s targeted aim at the country could further complicate the already sensitive security establishment.     

Overall, there is little to no scope for ISKP to emerge as a destabilising force in Central Asia, reminiscent of ISIS’ blitzkrieg and devastating rise in Iraq and Syria in the near future. This is despite the terrorist organisation’s intensifying efforts to consolidate its base and undermine regional security.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1.  Catrina Doxsee and Jared Thompson, “Examining Extremism: Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 8 September 2021.
• 2. Salafism is the idea that the most authentic Islam is found in a lived example of the early, righteous generations of Muslims known as the Salafs, who were in close proximity and time to the Prophet Muhammad. They believe in both spirit and the letter of the law and are considered ultraconservatives. Salafis are usually considered to have a quietist approach, but a section tends to emphasize the military exploits of the Salafs and give violence a more divine imperative. The ISKP falls into this section of the jihadi militant faction of Salafism. See Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar, “Islamism, Salafism, and Jihadism: A Primer”, Brookings, 15 July 2016.
• 3. Ellen Knickmeyer, “How Dangerous is Afghanistan’s Islamic State?”, Associated Press, 27 August 2021.
• 4. Mustazah Bahari and Muhammad Haniff Hassan, “The Black Flag Myth: An Analysis from Hadith Studies”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 6, No. 8¸ September 2014, pp. 15–20.
• 5. Lucas Webber, “ISKP Expands its Focus Toward Central Asia”, Jamestown Foundation, 14 April 2023.
• 6. Richard Weitz, “The Taliban: Unrecognized and Unrepentant”, Middle East Institute, 1 April 2022.
• 7. Ebrahim Khodayar, Amir Javan Arasteh and Hojjat Modarresi, “Salafi Sufism in Central Asia and its Future” International Journal of Humanities, Vol. 29, No.4, 2022, pp. 36–59.
• 8. Ibid.
• 9. Sudha Ramachandran, “ISKP Attacks in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan”, The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 31 August 2022.
• 10. “Breaking: ISKP will concentrate approximately 7,000 militants in the northern part of Afghanistan by summer”, The Khorasan Diary, Twitter, 11 May 2023.
• 11. Nizamuddin Rezahi, “4000 ISIS-K Fighters Stationed in Afghanistan Near Tajikistan Border: Anatoly Sidorov”,Khaama Press News Agency, 15 February 2023.
• 12. “30th report of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Tea”, United Nations Security Council, 15 July 2022.
• 13. A.A. Kazantsev, “Central Asia: Secular Statehood Challenged By Radical Islam”, Valdai Papers, Vol. 2, No. 42, January 2016.
• 14. “Islamic State Flag Hung From Tashkent Bridge”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4 September 2014.
• 15. Inghimasi are fighters used by terror groups who plunge into the enemy front lines to inflict the maximum number of causalities with no plan to return alive (suicide terrorists). See Uran Botobekov, “ISKP Tajik Fighters Step Up Sophisticated Inghimasi Attacks Against Taliban and Intimidate the U.S.”, Homeland Security Today, 23 July 2022.
• 16. Riccardo Valle and Lucas Webber, “The Growth and Internationalization of Islamic State Khurasan Province’s Media Operations”, Militant Wire, 17 February 2022.
• 17. Lucas Webber and Bruce Pannier, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s Enduring Influence on IS-Khurasan”, The Global Network on Extremism and Technology, 3 March 2023.
• 18. Lucas Webber and Riccardo Valle, “Perspectives: Islamic State in Afghanistan Seeks to Recruit Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz”, EurasiaNet, 17 March 2022.
• 19. Bruce Pannier, “Taliban's Arrest of Ethnic Uzbek Commander Sparks Clashes in Northern Afghanistan”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 January 2022.
• 20.  Edward Lemon, “IMU Pledges Allegiance to Islamic State”, EurasiaNet,1 August 2015.

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Summary

Defence cooperation between India and Vietnam is multi-faceted in scope and intensity and includes defence dialogues, training and exercises, collaboration in capacity building and Navy and Coast Guard ship visits. Vietnam at the same time is following a pragmatic and diversified foreign policy approach, and has strengthened relations with other major countries such as Japan, South Korea and Russia.

Vietnam’s Minister of National Defence General Phan Van Giang held talks with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on 19 June 2023. Both sides reviewed the progress on various bilateral defence cooperation initiatives and expressed satisfaction at the ongoing engagements.1 The two-day visit of Gen Giang comes amidst reports that India may be considering to sell the BrahMos missiles to Vietnam, with the value of the deal estimated at $625 million.2 Vietnam has shown interest in acquiring BrahMos in order to help strengthen its coastal defence operations. The Defence Minister of Vietnam also visited DRDO headquarters and discussed ways to enhance defence industrial capabilities by enhancing cooperation in defence research and joint production.3 The regular military exchanges and high-level visits between India and Vietnam reflects the deepening in the partnership which has evolved as a consequence of the rapidly changing regional security dynamics. 

Towards a Comprehensive Defence Partnership

The growing trajectory of the India-Vietnam defence cooperation has continued through the Strategic Partnership established in 2007 which was elevated to the level of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in September 2016. Defence and security cooperation between India and Vietnam has emerged as a key component under the CSP, with both sides emphasising on the need to further enhance existing areas of collaboration. India-Vietnam collaboration in the defence sector began in 1994 with the signing of the first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation. It was followed by a formal Defence Protocol in March 2000 where both nations agreed for joint military exercises, joint campaigns on anti-piracy in the South China Sea (SCS) and anti-insurgency training.

In 2003, a Joint Declaration was signed which binds both nations to conduct periodic high-ranking visits and pledged expansion of cooperation in the defence and security spheres. The signing of the MoU on Defence Cooperation in November 2009 has helped build closer interactions, through regular defence dialogue, training, exercises, and Navy and Coast Guard ship visits, along with capacity building.4  Since the establishment of Strategic Partnership and the CSP, there has been progress in the bilateral defence cooperation that included exchange of high-level visits with the first India-Vietnam Security Dialogue taking place in July 2018.5

The India-Vietnam Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity, and People announced in December 2020 is significant as it serves as the cornerstone for a new era in the bilateral defence partnership. In terms of defence and security cooperation, key agreements include implementing arrangements on defence industry cooperation, increased frequency/regular high-level and institutionalised exchanges aimed at enhancing the security partnership to help maintain and promote stability in the Indo-Pacific.6

During an online interaction between Rajnath Singh and Gen Phan Van Giang of the Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam on 1 July 2021, both sides expressed commitments to further enhance cooperation in defence industry and technology domain under the framework of the Joint Vision Statement of 2020.  On 8 June 2022, during the visit of Minister Singh to Vietnam, both sides signed the ‘Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030’. A MoU on Mutual Logistics Support was also singed during that visit.7 The MoU was the first such agreement signed by Vietnam with any other country. This would help simplify the procedure of acquiring logistical equipment and support between the two nations.8   

Defence cooperation between India and Vietnam is multi-faceted in its scope and intensity that includes wide-ranging contacts between the services, through closer interaction and regular defence dialogues, training and exercises, collaboration in capacity building and Navy and Coast Guard ship visits. In February 2016, for the first time, a Vietnamese ship participated in the International Fleet Review at Vishakhapatnam. In December 2020, the Indian Navy took part in the ‘passage exercise’ (PASSEX) with the Vietnamese Navy in the SCS as part of efforts to boost maritime cooperation between the two countries.

Two Indian Naval Ships, INS Shivalik and INS Kamorta paid port calls to Ho Chi Minh City Port in November 2022 and INS Delhi and INS Satpura made a port call at Da Nang Port from 19-22 May 2023. The gifting of the indigenously-built in-service missile corvette INS Kirpan, during the recent visit of the General Phan Van Gang would enhance the capabilities of the Vietnam People’s Navy.9 Apart from conventional security, the two nations are also enhancing cooperation in the non-traditional security domain in the area of counter-terrorism, transnational organised crimes, and disaster management and response.

Geo-Political Context      

The November 1991 Sino-Vietnamese Summit, which normalised relations between the two countries, was driven at least in part by ideology as well as more pragmatic considerations. Over the years, Vietnam has built close political, economic, military as well as cultural ties with China. Although Vietnam has been able to resolve most of its land border disputes with China, the mutual confidence between the two countries has not been fully restored.10 This is as a consequence of the ongoing divergences between Vietnam and China regarding sovereignty in the East Sea/ South China Sea that still remains unsettled.

While Vietnam’s relations with China since the normalisation has matured and grown, there remains a shared mistrust that makes the relationship complex.11 Vietnam has a 2,000-mile coastline facing the East Sea/SCS with significant contribution from the marine economic sector to its GDP. The ongoing maritime dispute thus becomes critical in terms of Vietnam’s geo-strategic thinking with Vietnam prioritising the protection of maritime sovereignty and the maritime economy as a key national security pillar.12

Since 2010, sovereignty disputes in the SCS have intensified with rise in the number of standoffs that includes low intensity engagements such as firing at fishing vessels by the navies of some of the claimants. Further, China’s unilateral action to increase its military presence in the region includes construction of new military bases in the SCS. This poses a major challenge as it impacts regional peace and stability while also having environmental consequences.13

Vietnam remains one of the most strident voices in Southeast Asia against China’s unilateral actions in the SCS. According to China’s self-declared maritime boundary – the ‘nine-dash line’ – the Paracel and the Spratly islands fall within its maritime boundary. Four Southeast Asian countries – Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, are involved in the SCS territorial and maritime boundary disputes with China. Malaysia and the Philippines claim jurisdiction over some of the Spratly Islands while Brunei claims jurisdiction over the centre on the Louisa Reef in the Spratly. The dispute between China and Vietnam in the SCS is over the Paracel and the Spratly islands. Vietnam continues to emphasis on maintaining stability in the SCS, and complying with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which both countries are signatories. 14

The contestation over the demarcation of maritime borders in the SCS in recent years has witnessed China’s unswerving sovereignty claims supported by its ongoing military modernisation and growing economic clout.15 These factors have escalated tensions between the two countries with China sending more ships to Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The presence of Chinese research, coast guard, and civilian ships in the SCS, sailing through sensitive locations within Vietnamese waters, has been increasing and causing tensions.16

Vietnam acknowledges that the prevailing geo-economic, geo-political and geo-strategic tensions are exerting immense pressure on regional stability and peace. The great power rivalry in the region has further influenced and intensified the ongoing traditional and non-traditional challenges being faced by the region. In this regard, disputes over territorial sovereignty in the SCS has become more complex, which could potentially lead to conflicts, and threaten regional stability, peace, and prosperity.17

The consequence of this evolving scenario has triggered a regional arms race. The rapid growth of China as a military power and its renewed activities in the SCS is one of the major drivers of increased military spending, arms acquisitions and force deployment by Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. Vietnam is increasing its military spending, especially on its navy, in tandem with its fast-growing economy and in response to perceived threats, including from China. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Vietnam has seen one of the largest increase in military expenditure in Southeast Asia. Between 2003 and 2018, its military spending increased nearly 700 percent, from $841 million to $5.5 billion. It has been estimated that from 2018 to 2020, there was an annual increase of nearly nine percent in Vietnam’s military spending, as per the report published by The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Further, Vietnam was in the 12th position of top arms importers in the world between 2010 and 2016. As per data from SIPRI, from 1995 to 2021, Vietnam’s arms imports totalled $ 9.07 billion.18  

The issue over the SCS is one of the biggest challenges for Vietnam’s foreign policy in terms of the political and security dimensions. Vietnam’s military has been prioritising maritime security-related activities by focussing on strengthening its air force, air defence systems, surface, and subsurface capabilities. The procurement of naval combatants, aerial defence, intelligence systems, and surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment indicates a strategy of building the capability to engage with any threat from another country, even one far away from the home country, as well as the capability to strike at a foreign country or protect far-off interests such as trade routes or source of raw materials.19   

This has also led to Vietnam adopting a more pragmatic and diversified approach in its foreign policy based on multilateralism. Vietnam not only promotes its relations with India, but is also looking at strengthening its relations with other major countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Russia.20 Vietnam prioritises its defence cooperation with countries with which it has established a strategic partnership or a comprehensive strategic partnership.21

Vietnam’s 2019 Defence White Paper outlines the pursuit of a non-aligned policy known as ‘four no and one-depend’. These are No military alliances; No aligning with one country against another; No foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil; No using force or threatening to use force in international relations. Depending on circumstances and specific conditions, Vietnam will also consider developing necessary defence and military relations with other countries at various levels.22

This policy of non-alignment being followed in Vietnam’s defence policy is evident given that it shares a Strategic Partnership with all of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) along with a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with two of the five P5 members, namely, China and Russia. Such policy positions ensures that Vietnam has the flexibility in order to meet its strategic goals through enhancing its military and defence capabilities.

Conclusion

India-Vietnam relations are based on the long historical and cultural linkages, with defence cooperation becoming a key pillar of the emerging partnership. In the post-Cold War period, the new security environment which led to India’s growing engagement with ASEAN also enabled India and Vietnam to strengthen their bilateral defence cooperation. It is fair to state that as both nations began to deepen their strategic partnership, defence has emerged as a major area of cooperation. This relation is based on the commonality of principles, and is maturing in the context of the emerging security challenges of the 21st century.

India and Vietnam geographically lie at the centre of the Indo-Pacific region. Both countries would play a major role in this strategic space which is becoming a core theatre of competition for power and influence amongst the major powers. The India-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement of 2020 recognises the importance of this partnership towards addressing the emerging geopolitical and geo-economic landscape of the region and beyond. Further, the Joint Vision Statement on Defence Partnership signed in 2022 has significantly enhanced the scale and scope of the bilateral defence cooperation. Vietnam is a key pillar in India’s Act East policy and an important partner in its Indo-Pacific vision. The India-Vietnam defence partnership is exploring new initiatives besides continuing cooperation on regional and global issues of shared interest.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Raksha Mantri & Minister of National Defence of Vietnam Hold Talks in New Delhi to Carry Forward Bilateral Defence Cooperation”, Press Information Bureau, 19 June 2023. 
• 2. “India Considering Potential Sale of BrahMos Missiles to Vietnam in a Deal Worth Up to $ 625 Million”, Indian Defence Research Wing, 10 June 2023.
• 3. “Raksha Mantri & Minister of National Defence of Vietnam hold talks in New Delhi to carry forward bilateral defence cooperation”, No. 1.
• 4. P V Rao, “India and Vietnam: Forging a Durable Strategic Partnership”, in Vijay Sakhuja (ed), India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: Exploring Vistas for Expanded Cooperation, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2011, pp. 152-153.
• 5. “India-Vietnam Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 2018.
• 6. “India - Vietnam Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People”, Press Information Bureau, 21 December 2020.
• 7. “Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh & His Vietnamese Counterpart General Phan Van Giang Hold Bilateral Talks in Hanoi”, Press Information Bureau, 8 June 2022. 
• 8. Ridipt Singh, “Decoding Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership”, CESCUBE, 14 July 2022.
• 9. “India Gifts Indigenously-built Missile Corvette ‘INS Kirpan’ to Vietnam”, ANI, 19 June 2023.
• 10. Tridib Chakraborti, “Rising India-Vietnam Ties in the Emerging Security Architecture of the Asia-pacific Region”, in Rajiv K Bhatia, Vijay Sakhuja and Vikash Ranjan (eds), India-Vietnam; Agenda  for Strengthening Partnership Shipra Publication, New Delhi, 2013, pp. 104-105.
• 11. Donald G. Mc Cloud, Southeast Asia: Tradition and Modernity in the Contemporary World, Westview Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 247-248.
• 12. “Vietnam-Country Commercial Guide”, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, United States of America, 15 December 2022.  
• 13. Jeremy Page and Julian E. Barnes, “China Expands Island Construction in Disputed South China Sea”, The Wall Street Journal, 18 February 2015.
• 14. Donald E. Weatherbee, “ASEAN and Indochina: The ‘ASEANization of Vietnam”, in Sheldon W. Simon (ed), East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, New York, 1993, pp. 211-212.
• 15. Jihyun Kim, “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Implications for Security in Asia and Beyond”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 9 No. 2, Summer 2015, p. 121 and 129.
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The development of society provides for constant changes in the axiological foundations of legal regulation within the State. The Constitution, on the other hand, acts as a fundamental document that forms the basis of relations between the cells of society, taking into account current values. Based on the study of the world experience in constitutional construction, a conclusion is made about the presence of a general trend in the replenishment of the value catalogue of Constitutions, taking into account the historical experience accumulated by States and national priorities. The article discusses the process of improving the organization of the State power system in the context of constitutional reforms on the example of Russia and others Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and some European countries in recent years. It concludes that the conditions improving the efficiency and consistency of the entire public administration system in the countries under consideration have unconditionally formed due to ongoing constitutional reforms that have updated the system of social relations. The subject of the study are the constitutional amendments in the countries under study, mainly in the context of changes in the model of functioning and interaction of the higher State authorities.

Turkiye discovered the world’s second-largest deposit of rare earth elements (REEs) in the Beylikova district of Eskisehir in 2022. With an estimated reserve size of 694 million tons, the discovered rare earth element deposit ranks second-largest globally.1 China currently holds the top position with its rare earth element field boasting a reserve of 800 million tons. China dominates the global landscape of rare earth minerals, contributing significantly to various stages of their production and processing. Specifically, China holds a commanding position by accounting for 60 per cent of the worldwide rare earth mined production, 85 per cnet of the rare earth processing capacity, and 90 per cent share in the manufacturing of high-strength rare earth permanent magnets.2

Significance of Rare Earth Elements

As per the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), REEs or rare earths consist of 17 distinct metallic elements, encompassing scandium and yttrium, as well as the lanthanide series, which includes 15 elements—lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium.3 They play critical roles in various modern industries and technologies, including electronics, magnets, batteries, catalysts, and lighting.

REEs are indispensable for a wide range of defence technologies. These include targeting lasers, precision-guided munitions, communication systems, aerospace engines, airframes, radar systems, optical equipment, electronic countermeasures and sonar.4 REEs are vital components in these technologies, providing enhanced precision, efficiency and capabilities for defence operations. Despite the complexities involving the extraction and processing of REEs, its increasing demand is driven by technological advancements and the quest for renewable energy.

The anticipated growth in the demand for critical minerals, which play a vital role in clean energy and other technological applications, is expected to be substantial in the forthcoming decades. Therefore, in June 2022, the United States and several partner countries introduced the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) 5 , aimed at strengthening critical mineral supply chains. The primary objective of the MSP is to ensure that critical minerals are extracted, processed, and recycled in a manner that maximises the economic benefits derived from geological resources.

MSP intends to facilitate government and private sector investments throughout the entire value chain while upholding the highest standards of environmental sustainability, social responsibility, and governance. The MSP includes Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Commission. These partners are dedicated to establishing responsible and resilient critical mineral supply chains that support both economic prosperity and climate-related objectives. It can be seen as an effort to reduce the dependency on China.

Turkiye’s Progress So Far

Turkiye has a long history of exploration for rare earths, with reports dating back to the early 1970s. However, the most concrete work began in 2011, with Eti Maden, a Turkish state company specialising in mining and geology of these elements. During the six years that followed, 125,193 meters of drilling were carried out, and 59,121 samples were collected from the field. These samples were analysed, leading to the discovery of 694 million tons of rare earth elements.6

Eti Maden plans to initially process around 1,200 tons of ore per year at a pilot facility. However, with a significant investment in a larger industrial facility in the coming years, this amount is expected to increase substantially to approximately 570,000 tons. The processed ore is projected to yield about 10,000 tons of rare earth oxide, 72,000 tons of barite, 70,000 tons of fluorite, and 250 tons of thorium, a nuclear industry fuel.7

According to the then Turkiye’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Fatih Donmez, the newly uncovered rare earth element reserve is conveniently located close to the surface. This advantageous positioning implies that the extraction process will be less expensive. He also stated that Turkiye could produce ten rare elements from this reserve. This significant discovery will enable domestic production of rare elements primarily for Turkiye’s industrial sectors while also creating export opportunities.8

As highlighted by Donmez, the Turkish economic model encompasses key principles such as investment, employment, production, and export. In line with this model, the focus is on leveraging Turkiye’s rare earth element reserves to establish a flourishing high-end industry. By transforming the ore into intermediate and end products, the aim is not only to meet the needs of the domestic industry but also to surpass them and create opportunities for exports. This approach encompasses the entire supply chain, from initial production to final products, fostering the production of high-tech, value-added goods that cater to the Turkish market.9

Ultimately, this strategy is designed to drive economic growth, promote investment, generate employment, and enhance Turkiye’s standing in the global economy. While Turkiye's claim has garnered attention, experts urge caution, pointing out that the true extent and quality of the rare earth elements in Turkiye’s deposit remain uncertain and require further assessment. Furthermore, even if Turkiye possesses a significant deposit, the challenge lies in establishing efficient processing capabilities, where China currently holds a competitive advantage.10

Significantly, European Union has been actively involved in partnering with Turkiye for exploration and relevant research on rare earths. For instance, the ERA-MIN Joint Call 2019 project titled “Recovery of rare earth elements from complex ores in Turkey and their potential use in high tech industrial applications” is being undertaken from December 2020 to November 2023. The project, with the acronym RETECH, aims to recover rare earth elements from complex ores in Turkiye and explore their potential applications in high-tech industries. The partners involved in the project include Rare Earth Elements Research Institute (Turkiye), the National R&D Institute for Nonferrous and Rare Metals (Romania), the General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (Turkiye), Rumelisiad Girisim A.S. (Turkiye), and INCDMRR (Romania).

Turkiye’s General Directorate of Industry has initiated the project titled ‘Enhancing the Rare Earth Elements (REEs) Research and Innovation Capacity of Turkey’11 to establish a national supply chain for REEs in the country, ensure a safe, continuous and reliable supply while increasing Research and Development (R&D) capacity. Over a 24-month duration, starting from 21 July 2022, the project, with the European Union’s contribution of more than Euros 11 million, focuses on specific objectives. These include establishing a reliable supply chain for REEs, recovering and purifying REEs from mineralisation areas, recycling rare earths from electronic waste, undertaking R&D for Neodymium iron boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets and high-value-added products, and developing the research infrastructure and commercialisation of new products using REEs.

The project has aimed to strengthen the national REE ecosystem, improve Munzur University Rare Earth Elements Application and Research Center (MUNTEAM)’s infrastructure, establish a recycling facility at the General Directorate of Mineral Research Exploration (MTA), provide training and consultancy for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and stakeholders, and raise awareness about REEs.

The first sectoral workshop12 of the REE Project was held from 31 January to 1 February 2023 at MTA in Turkiye. The workshop aimed to increase Turkiye’s national R&D capacity in REE and establish a sustainable supply chain for economic development. Participants included SMEs, R&D centres, manufacturing companies, and entrepreneurs in the field. The workshop featured presentations on REE deposits, ore processing, purification techniques, production from primary and secondary sources, and business potentials. It also involved group work and discussions on resource potential, mining, purification, recycling, and industrial applications of REEs. The workshop facilitated networking and collaboration, showcasing Turkiye’s increasing prioritisation towards REE sector.

Path Ahead

The discovery of substantial rare earth reserve in Turkiye offers the potential to boost its deteriorating economy and diversify the global supply chain. However, Turkiye will have to work on multiple aspects, including lowering extraction costs and setting up a complete and durable industrial chain. In such context, it is yet to be seen whether Turkiye will collaborate with China to gain technical expertise and technology or continue its existing collaboration with the EU. Whatever course it takes, it may be said that there is a long and arduous path ahead for Turkiye to gain the requisite industry experience to become a significant producer of rare earths.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

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• 2. Xianbin Yao, “China is moving rapidly up the rare earth value chain”, BRINK News, 7 August 2022.
• 3. “Rare Earths Statistics and Information”, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).
• 4. Xianbin Yao, “China is moving rapidly up the rare earth value chain”, BRINK News, 7 August 2022.
• 5. “Minerals Security Partnership”, U.S. Department of State, 14 June 2022.
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• 8. “Turkiye uncovers world’s second-largest rare earth element reserve”, Anadolu Agency, 2 July 2022.
• 9. David Boos, “Turkey Discovers World’s 2nd Largest Rare Earth Element Reserve”, The European Conservative, 23 July 2022.
• 10. Chris Baraniuk, “Turkey Probably Hasn’t Found the Rare Earth Metals It Says It Has”, Wired, 13 July 2022.
• 11. “Enhancing the Rare Earth Elements (REEs) Research and Innovation Capacity of Turkey”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkiye, 4 April 2023.
• 12. “Rare Earth Elements Project Held Its First Sectoral Workshop”, Ministry of Industry and Technology, Republic of Turkiye, 31 January 2023.