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| Title | Date | Date Unique | Author | Body | Research Area | Topics | Thumb |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nuclear Weapons Use in Japan and the Status of Nuclear Disarmament | August 14, 2023 | Rajiv Nayan |
The world is commemorating the 78th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima (6 August) and Nagasaki (9 August). The number of persons killed and badly affected as a result of the atomic bombings has been a subject of contention. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists states that “the most credible estimates cluster around a ‘low’ of 110,000 mortalities and a ‘high’ of 210,000”.1 Highlighting this wide gap in estimates, the author seems perplexed that the varied estimates are made by experts and credible institutions. Although the remembrance services are organised all over the world, the two bombed cities become the focus of tributes and speech-making every year. This year, too, speeches have been that term the bombings horrific. The release of the movie Oppenheimer is drawing more attention to the destruction caused to the two Japanese cities by the efforts of the ‘father of the atomic bomb’. The need for disarmament is repeated in the speeches of the Mayors of the two cities and statements of other organisations and groups involved in disarmament efforts. On these two dates, the world overwhelmingly realises the imperative need for a world without nuclear weapons. This annual ritual builds norms for nuclear disarmament, but the reality of nuclear disarmament is yet to be realised. On the somber occasion, it is imperative to assess the state of affairs of nuclear disarmament. How are the regimes and institutions along with other actors treating the idea of nuclear disarmament? Is the world serious about it? The stark reality is that the world appears paying only lip service to nuclear disarmament and the regimes and the institutions are not able to break the deadlock. The most-famed legal instrument, which includes the element of nuclear disarmament as part of a grand bargain, is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Article VI of the treaty lays down provisions for nuclear disarmament. It asks the member countries of the treaty which are possessing nuclear weapons to start negotiations for not merely halting the nuclear arms race but also nuclear disarmament. The Review Conference of the NPT held from 1 to 26 August 2022, in which several grand ideas were exchanged, also had to pass through the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing days. Nuclear disarmament also came up for discussion during the 2022 RevCon. At the 2022 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), the Group of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the treaty gave a presentation which emphasised nuclear disarmament. Similarly, the New Agenda Coalition consisting of countries from both the developing and the developed worlds, established in 1998, did express its concern about completely ignoring ‘the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons’ by the nuclear weapon states of the NPT. Nuclear Disarmament has been a contentious issue among the member states of the treaty. Some of the RevCons of the 21st century failed to agree to outcome documents and reports, predominantly due to differences on nuclear disarmament. Quite notably, the nuclear disarmament related article has been interpreted2 differently by and in the nuclear weapons states, especially the United States for a long period. A section of the policy community refuses to accept that Article VI obliges nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament. The US government though struck a reconciliatory tone at the 2022 RevCon by stating that the objective of the Non-Nuclear Weapons States and the Nuclear Weapons States was the same—‘a world free of nuclear weapons’. The outcome document of the 2022 NPT RevCon, though not adopted, underlines the fact that the treaty provides a ‘foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament’, and stipulates ‘legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty’. It further recognises the reality that nuclear disarmament can promote international peace and security. The ‘total elimination’ of the nuclear stockpile is considered the ultimate solution. The same document also mentions unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral methods to cut, and finally end the nuclear stockpile. The roadmap to achieve it, however, is clearly missing in the document. Unfortunately, a section of the international community interprets that Article VI merely suggests negotiations in good faith to stop the arms race and to go for the reduction of nuclear arsenals and if possible, for nuclear disarmament. Some of them also maintain that as long as nuclear weapons exist, a nuclear weapons state may have to rely on nuclear weapons for its security. The Mayor of Hiroshima in 2023 once again asked the nuclear weapons states to move away from nuclear deterrence and go for nuclear disarmament. The state and the global civil society pay tribute to the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but remain ineffective in realising nuclear disarmament. Instead of going for nuclear disarmament, the dominant section of the international community appears to prefer arms control, nuclear proliferation, and reduction of nuclear risks. Even the 2022 NPT outcome document considers ‘miscalculation, miscommunication, misperception, or accident’ quite relevant. This is relevant because nuclear disarmament is not in sight. Quite significantly, arms control mechanism like New Start Treaty are struggling. The new Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty is also out of the horizon. Even the non-proliferation regime, which has the NPT as a mainstay, is under pressure. The leading powers and their allies do not vote on the key UN resolutions for reducing nuclear dangers. The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are highlighted in different forums and documents. The 2022 outcome document too reflects the humanitarian angle when it affirms that the immediate, mid-and long-term consequences of nuclear weapon detonations, inter alia, on health, the environment, biodiversity, infrastructure, food security, climate, development, social cohesion, and the global economy are interlinked, and would not be constrained by national borders but have regional or global effects and that a nuclear war could even threaten the survival of humanity.3 However, it seems that the humanitarian consequences, highlighted in different meetings and dreadfully experienced in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has had little policy impact on concluding a genuine nuclear disarmament convention. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is being touted as a nuclear disarmament convention. The treaty, which has been adopted and opened for signature in 2017, became operational in January 2021.4 Currently, it has 92 signatories and 68 of them are state parties which have ratified or acceded to the treaty.5 However, all the nuclear weapons possessing countries are outside the TPNW and did not even participate in the negotiations process of the treaty. Moreover, almost all the NATO countries stayed away from negotiations, and none of them have joined the treaty as yet. The TPNW was seen by many as undermining the NPT process and giving a backdoor exit to its nuclear member states and their nuclear disarmament commitment. Yet, for a country like India, ‘this Treaty does not constitute or contribute to the development of customary international law; nor does it set any new standards or norms’.6 Despite being a nuclear weapons country, India envisions a world without nuclear weapons. Quite touchingly, the Indian Parliament pays tribute to the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki every year. Negotiating the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament would have given it legitimacy, and it would have been negotiated probably with better expertise. A comprehensive convention could have required provisions for the proper implementation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. As of now, the treaty looks ad hoc with several loopholes and limitations. The crisis generated by the Ukraine–Russia conflict is going to complicate the future nuclear disarmament scenario. The world does not seem to be realising the urgency of nuclear disarmament. The general apprehension is that the security of non-nuclear weapons states vis-à-vis nuclear weapons states may become a powerful tool for the spread of nuclear weapons if the doctrine of negative security assurance is not adopted by the nuclear weapons states. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Nuclear and Arms Control | Japan, Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Weapons | system/files/thumb_image/2015/japan-nuclear-disarmament-t.jpg | |
| BRICS Summit and ICC Warrant against Putin | August 14, 2023 | Saurabh Mishra |
The clouds of confusion on the BRICS Summit to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa from 22–24 August 2023 have cleared as speculations regarding Russian President Vladimir Putin’s participation in the event have been put to rest. Russian authorities confirmed that President Putin shall participate in the high-profile event in a virtual mode, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov will attend in person.1 South Africa, as Chair of the BRICS, had decided to go ahead with hosting the Summit meeting2 amidst controversy in the wake of International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant issued against Putin in March 2023.3 South Africa and ICCThis was not the first occasion that an international summit in South Africa was under scanner due to dilemmas and repercussions related to her membership of the ICC. South Africa faced a similar situation in 2015, when Omar Al-Bashir, the erstwhile President of Sudan attended the African Union (AU) Summit meeting in the country.5 The ICC had issued an arrest warrant against Bashir for acts of crime against humanity, war crimes, and genocide committed in Darfur, Sudan between 2003 and 2008. South Africa however did not execute the warrant citing Bashir’s sovereign immunity. It must be noted that Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute but was acquired in the jurisdiction of the ICC through a referral by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under Article 13(b) of the Statute for investigating and trying only the crimes and atrocities committed in Darfur under President Bashir. In July 2017, the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC concluded that South Africa violated the Rome Statute by not arresting Bashir. It also concluded that by agreeing to host AU Summit meeting, South Africa could not automatically assign immunity to President Bashir. Nevertheless, the negative observation by the Chamber did not lead to the reference of South African non-compliance to the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute or the UN Security Council (UNSC) for further action.6 Had the case been referred to ASP, the country could have faced further referral to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), while in case of UNSC, the Russian veto would have nullified any action. There are no punitive provisions in the Rome Statue for a state failing to cooperate and execute its orders. However, if referred to the ICJ or UNSC, the countries in question may face binding obligations failing which they shall be liable to UN actions under Chapter VI or VII depending on the severity of the case. The ICC has been institutionalised as a complementary Court which is supposed to act if the national administration and courts of a country—where a war crime, crime against humanity, or genocide has been committed, or to which the perpetrators belong to, fail to act in prosecuting and punishing them. South African courts had taken note of the non-compliance and concluded that South Africa defaulted by not arresting Bashir.7 The Pre-Trial Chamber II seemed satisfied by the proceedings in the South African courts and given the record of previous referrals to ASP or UNSC did not see any benefit in escalating the case for further action.8 But the Chamber would have been under immense pressure if it repeated the same in case of South Africa failing to arrest Putin. As South Africa is a member of both ICC and BRICS, the country sometimes finds herself divided between the two. It was reported that the Russians insisted for the meeting to be offline with physical presence of all the BRICS leaders,9 while South Africa was trying hard to find a middle path which resulted in the current Russian decision. The Russian President’s decision not to attend the BRICS Summit physically therefore rescued both South Africa and the ICC from a diplomatic quagmire. ICC and GeopoliticsThe Rome Statute is seen as politicising the prosecution process with the inclusion of provisions of referral of even non-state members by the UNSC. Another provision of the Court allows it to try perpetrators from a non-party state without her consent.10 Such provisions are viewed as legal aggression in the traditional sovereign jurisdictions, by BRICS countries like Russia. Since Russia possesses veto in the UNSC, the ICC Prosecutor took up the Ukrainian case via another route. Ukraine, through two separate declarations, accepted the Court’s jurisdiction for the crimes committed on its territory from 21 February 2013 onwards. The investigation of the recent situation in Ukraine was initiated by the head of the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC. Lithuania, a party to Rome Statute and member of NATO, referred the alleged crimes by Putin to the ICC. A total of 43 State parties to the Court, especially EU members, backed the referral of the Ukrainian situation for investigation to put diplomatic pressure on Putin.11 This put South Africa, one of the endorsers of the idea of the ICC, in a difficult spot, so much so that it seriously contemplated pulling out of the Rome Statute. The country decided not to go for the extreme step only recently.12 The South African situation highlights the complexities of the functioning of international system. Being a prominent economy and a middle power from Africa, the country has assumed a larger role of supporting peace and order on the continent. For this, it has aligned and cooperated with regional or international bodies that promise to bring a semblance of peace and eliminate impunity from the continent. South Africa signed the Rome Statute in one of its idealist moments that had emerged due to the impunity prevalent primarily in Africa and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. South Africa and other countries who joined in the Court prioritised the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of violence over the universally accepted principle of national sovereignty in certain cases. For the signatories of the Rome Statue, this was the price to be paid for eliminating impunity and creating a sense of justice in international society. However, several major powers and European countries were not on the same page on this point. The US, China, Russia and India have since then kept out of the Rome Statute for similar reasons. The Court has also been accused of double standards and Eurocentrism. All the 31 cases that have been confirmed and listed in the court are from Africa.13 The controversy regarding Putin’s participation in the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg due to the ICC arrest warrant highlights the geopolitical overtones and inadequacies of the ICC in the contemporary world. BRICS is one of the most important international groupings representing around 42 per cent of humanity and contributing more than a quarter of the global GDP.14 The case of warrant against Sudan’s Bashir was technically the same but substantively and politically very different from that of Putin. Arresting one of the heads of BRICS states with one of the strongest militaries possessing nuclear weapons and a veto in the UNSC would have led to far greater consequences as against the Bashir case. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated in a document submitted to the court that “Russia has made it clear that arresting its sitting President would be a declaration of war.”15 The issue caused diplomatic discomfort between the two countries, which now stands resolved due to the understanding shown by both the sides. Looking into the FutureThe set of events highlight a world in flux and the tight rope walk by middle powers like South Africa. Brazil, another middle power and party to the Rome Statute, may be seen walking the same tight rope during its presidency of BRICS. Therefore, the Rome Statute has the potential to create diplomatic issues and geopolitical discord among countries. Many countries see the ICC as an agenda which is not in sync with conditions of the contemporary world. The party states either have to press for amendments in the Statute to avoid such situations in future or be ready to see the ICC decrees being violated and becoming ineffective due to geopolitical interplays. The positions taken by BRICS countries during the deliberations before signing and enforcement of the Rome Statute may guide such amendments. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Eurasia & West Asia | Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), International Criminal Court (ICC) | system/files/thumb_image/2015/putin-brics-t.jpg | |
| Missile Defence and China | M.S. Prathibha |
China has considerably improved its missile defence capabilities which is generally thought as a way to counter the US nuclear superiority after the abolition of the ABM Treaty. However, the Chinese responses show a broader understanding that the US nuclear superiority is more than a competition to reduce the efficiency of the Chinese deterrence. The monograph shows that the responses of the Chinese state has been influenced by its identity as a missile power that had built considerable deterrence benefits without succumbing to nuclear arms race with the US. About the AuthorDr M. S. Prathibha is an Associate Fellow at the East Asia Centre in MP-IDSA. She researches on Nuclear policy and strategy of China, China's Elite Politics, military and strategic force modernisation, and East Asian security dynamics. She won the China Government Scholarship to read Political Theory and Mandarin at School of Marxism, Beijing Normal University. She is a Member of the Editorial Board of Strategic Analysis (Routledge). She received her doctorate from Chinese Studies Division, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. She has Master's in International Studies and Bachelor's in Mathematics. Posted on August 04, 2023 |
East Asia | Missile Defence, China | system/files/thumb_image/2015/monograph-81-t.jpg | ||
| Turkiye’s Support of Sweden’s NATO Accession and Implications | August 04, 2023 | Abhishek Yadav |
In May 2022, Finland and Sweden expressed interest in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Finland’s application was approved, and the country became a member in April 2023. However, Sweden’s accession faced an obstacle as Turkiye, one of NATO’s 31 members, blocked the process. Turkiye alleged that Sweden was harbouring Kurdish separatists. As a result, Sweden’s membership in NATO remained pending due to this contentious issue raised by Turkiye. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted NATO to reinforce its collective defence. On 10 July 2023, in a joint press statement with Ulf Kristersson, Prime Minister of Sweden and Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan endorsed Swedish accession into NATO. Turkiye has agreed to submit the Accession Protocol concerning Sweden to the Grand National Assembly of Turkiye (GNAT) and collaboratively engage with the Assembly to ensure and facilitate the ratification process.1 Erdogan has achieved many desired outcomes in favour of Turkiye by supporting Sweden’s accession into NATO. He has successfully extracted significant concessions while maximising Turkish national interest. After winning the Turkish presidential election in May 2023, Erdogan has continued his government’s assertive foreign policy. Turkiye is pursuing a multidimensional and multidirectional foreign policy while taking care of its strategic autonomy.2 Hard Bargain with SwedenThe visits of Swedish PM Ulf Kristersson on 8 November 2022 and Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom on 22 December 2022 to Turkiye3 laid a good foundation for further cooperation and strategic partnership between Sweden and Turkiye. Fulfilling the mutually agreed provisions outlined in the Trilateral Memorandum of 2022, involving Sweden, Turkiye and Finland, Sweden has made constitutional amendments. It has substantially enhanced its counter-terrorism cooperation with Turkiye in dealing with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terror group and resumed exporting arms to Turkiye.4 Sweden’s new anti-terrorism law, which went into force on 1 June 2023, aims to address Turkiye’s main demands for ratifying the Nordic country’s NATO membership. The law criminalises membership in terrorist organisations and imposes up to four years in prison for individuals involved in terrorist activities or supporting such organisations. Billstrom highlighted that the law would help assuage Turkiye’s concerns, particularly related to the PKK’s activities in Sweden.5 Under a new bilateral Security Compact between Sweden and Turkiye, the ministerial level meeting will take place annually. During the inaugural meeting of the Security Compact, Sweden will present a roadmap outlining its ongoing efforts to combat terrorism in all its forms. Sweden reaffirmed its stance of not providing support to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the organisation referred to as Fethullah Terrorist Organisation (FETO) in Turkiye.6 Moreover, Sweden has committed to actively support endeavours to revitalise Turkiye’s accession process to the EU. This commitment includes advocating for the modernisation of the EU–Turkiye Customs Union as well as promoting visa liberalisation initiatives between Turkiye and the EU.7 Re-Energising Relations with the EUBefore heading to Lithuania to attend the NATO Summit, Erdogan highlighted that Turkiye has been fulfilling the commitments relating to the open door policy of NATO, supporting its expansion. Despite that, he lamented that “Turkiye has for over 50 years been kept waiting at the door of the European Union.”8 Erdogan demanded Turkish membership in the EU and stated “first clear the path to the EU in front of Turkiye and then we will clear the path in front of Sweden, just as we did for Finland”.9 At the NATO Summit, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg supported Turkiye’s ambitions to become a member of the EU.10 The Foreign Affairs Council of the EU held discussions on EU–Turkiye relations, emphasising the need for the EU to re-engage with Turkiye and foster cooperation based on common interests while addressing existing differences. They highlighted the importance of achieving a sustainable de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean and finding a solution to the Cyprus question under relevant UN Resolutions for regional stability and security. Additionally, upholding fundamental freedoms and values, as defined in the European Convention of Human Rights, was underscored as essential, given Ankara’s party status to the Convention.11 These positions do indicate that the prospects for Turkish membership in the EU seems bleak as of now. Advancing Bilateral Relations with the USTurkiye’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system has caused prolonged tensions with the US and NATO due to concerns about compromising security and interoperability. Both the US and NATO have cautioned Turkiye that the S-400 system is incompatible with NATO’s defence infrastructure, which could potentially expose sensitive information to Russia. Despite these warnings, Turkiye has persisted with the deal, leading to the US taking punitive actions such as suspending Turkiye from the F-35 fighter jet programme in 2019 and imposing sanctions on Turkish entities and officials involved in the S-400 purchase.12 In October 2021, Turkiye requested the US to purchase US$ 20 billion worth of 40 Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter jets, along with approximately 80 modernisation kits for its existing fleet of warplanes.13 In that regard, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin recently remarked that the US supports Turkiye’s military modernisation. Additionally, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan explicitly hinted towards moving forward with the request of Turkiye to purchase F-16 fighter jets in consultation with Congress.14 However, the congressional concerns relating to Turkish belligerence against Greece and Armenia and the deterioration of the human rights situation in Turkiye15 are likely to be factored in the discussion regarding the F-16 sale. US President Joe Biden welcomed Erdogan’s readiness to promptly ratify the Accession Protocol for Sweden’s membership into the NATO to GNAT for ratification. He expressed his readiness to collaborate closely with Erdogan and Turkiye in strengthening defence and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic region.16 At the NATO Summit in Lithuania, Biden and Erdogan exchanged perspectives on defence and economic priorities, underscoring their commitment to strengthen collaboration in these areas.17 Canada and Netherlands Policy ShiftThe export of certain drone technology from Canada to Turkiye was suspended in 2020 following the determination that Azerbaijan’s forces had utilised the equipment during the conflict with Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.18 Following Ankara’s endorsement of Sweden’s NATO membership, Canada has decided to resume discussions with Turkiye regarding lifting export controls on drone parts, including optical equipment.19 It may be seen as a potentially significant development for the Turkish defence industry. Canadian PM Justin Trudeau met Erdogan in Lithuania and discussed shared priorities, including collective security, investment and people-to-people ties. He thanked Erdogan for his leadership on the Black Sea Grain Initiative.20 The Netherlands has lifted its arms restrictions against Turkiye, which were imposed in 2019 due to its military actions in Syria. The Dutch government abolished its “presumption of denial policy” regarding arms exports.21 The move by Turkiye to support Sweden’s accession led to a shift in the Dutch position. Despite the policy change, the Netherlands will continue monitoring the use of its goods in conflicts in Northern Syria and Yemen. Previously, the Netherlands mainly exported tank and armoured vehicle parts, fighter plane technology, and attack helicopter components to Turkiye.22 ConclusionErdogan has continued his government’s assertive foreign policy that has yielded positive outcomes. While endorsing Sweden’s accession to NATO, Ankara has compelled Sweden to be more accountable vis-à-vis Turkish security concerns. Turkiye has re-energised its efforts to improve relations with the EU. The Netherlands’ decision to lift the arms sanctions on Turkiye is also likely to benefit the Turkish economy and defence sector. Moreover, the resumption of talks with Canada on lifting export controls and the US sending positive signals on approval for F-16 reflects a significant step forward for the Turkish defence economy. Although challenges relating to chronic inflation and weakened Lira persist, Turkiye’s efforts to strengthen defence cooperation and re-establish itself as a key player in NATO demonstrate the positives flowing out of its assertive foreign policy stance. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Eurasia & West Asia | Turkey, European Union, NATO, Sweden | system/files/thumb_image/2015/turkiye-nato-eu-t.jpg | |
| The Okinawa Factor in Japan–China Relations | August 04, 2023 | Arnab Dasgupta |
On 3 July 2023, a delegation of 80-odd members of the Japanese Association for the Promotion of International Trade, led by former House of Representatives speaker Yohei Kono, visited Beijing for a four-day trip to meet with senior Chinese officials.1 Among the delegation was Denny Tamaki, Governor of Okinawa prefecture, Japan’s southernmost set of islands. During the visit, Tamaki paid his respects at the collective grave of people from his prefecture interred on the outskirts of Beijing. The graves are of people who died due to various causes during the later half of the Qing dynasty (1636–1911).2 Tamaki then headed to Fujian province in the south of China, where he met local Communist Party officials, including the governor of the province.3 After returning to Japan, he expressed satisfaction with his visit, and prayed for good relations to continue. Okinawa’s Complex HistoryOkinawa was originally known as Ryukyu (Luchu to the Chinese) and was an independent kingdom under its own government. In the 15th century, the kingdom rose to prominence as a trade hub between the Japanese and Chinese empires, and entered into tributary relations with both Ming China and later the feudal samurai lords of the Satsuma domain (presently Kagoshima prefecture) in Japan. China’s goalsIt is these anxieties that China wishes to exploit. By cultivating a sense that Okinawans are an independent entity, the Chinese may be able to stoke opposition to the bases, and embolden anti-base activists to oppose the facilities more stridently. They could also encourage the Okinawans to seek alternative sources of investment and trade from Chinese sources in order to counter the tight financial control exercised by Tokyo, enabling Okinawa to stand up to the latter in matters of national security. Should Japan oppose this or place artificial controls on Okinawan investment, China could easily make the case that Japan’s control of the islands is coercive after all, and help to dent Japan’s image in the eyes of the international community, as any controls would effectively violate Japan’s democratic norms. ConclusionIf Okinawans’ genuine concerns are to be assuaged, an acknowledgement of Japan’s ethnic diversity would go a long way. The government made a good start in 2019 by acknowledging through legislation that the Ainu community of Hokkaido are the indigenous inhabitants of Japan.10 A similar legislation that notes Ryukyu’s independent history and acknowledges mainland Japanese assimilation policies as oppressive would take the sting out of several points of criticism. Additionally, in order to prevent the base issue from festering, Japan could consider moving a sizeable number of US bases out of the prefecture to other places around the Japanese mainland. Doing so would not only lighten the burden currently borne by Okinawa, but also improve national security, as dispersed bases in multiple locations would make it harder for China to launch missile strikes against them. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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East Asia | China-Japan Relations | system/files/thumb_image/2015/china-japan-t.jpg | |
| Changing State Perception of Nuclear Deterrence in Japan and South Korea | August 03, 2023 | Abhishek Verma, Arnab Dasgupta |
SummaryJapan and South Korea face the combined threat of an increasingly assertive China and a progressively more destabilising North Korea, not to mention a Russia which has resumed its role as a Pacific power. The US has enhanced its engagement with its East Asian partners in nuclear planning and consultation mechanisms. The prospects of indigenous nuclear weapons acquisition by Japan and South Korea, though, cannot be ruled out. IntroductionIn 2021, after Prime Minister Fumio Kishida came to office, Setsuko Thurlow, an atomic bomb survivor and well-known anti-nuclear weapons activist, urged him to sign the newly-negotiated Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).1 She blamed the Japanese government for seeking continued protection from the very weapons that had been twice used on its soil by the very power that now guaranteed Japan’s security. She urged Prime Minister Kishida to sign the treaty and lead the campaign against nuclear weapons. Japan however did not sign the TPNW and the nuclear umbrella of the United States remains intact. The nuclear programme of North Korea continues to churn, with little to no oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Russia, the world’s largest nuclear-armed state, continues to threaten the deployment of tactical weapons against Ukraine. China modernises its arsenal and refuses to participate in arms control talks until the US and Russia reduce their arsenals first.2 Kishida’s hesitation to sign the TPNW and commit to a non-nuclear stance reflects the threat perception held by East Asian democracies such as Japan and South Korea, as they face the combined threat of an increasingly assertive China and a progressively more destabilising North Korea, not to mention a Russia which has resumed its role as a Pacific power. Evolving Nuclear PolicyHistorically, Japan and South Korea were early adopters of norms against nuclear proliferation. Japan is a signatory to all major international treaties relating to nuclear weapons (with the exception of the TPNW), as is South Korea. However, in the immediate post-war period, both had very divergent views on nuclearisation. Japan aligned itself closely to a staunchly negative stance towards nuclear weapons, while South Korea attempted to actually pursue its own domestic nuclear weapon, even as both were protected by the extended nuclear deterrence umbrella of the US. After 1945, as Japan slowly recovered from the war, its new constitution forbade it from possessing and maintaining any war-making capacity other than the bare minimum required for national defence. The US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty (called the Nichibei Anpo in short in Japanese), guaranteed the security of Japan by posting on Japanese soil a substantial number of forces who would, it was assumed, provide the offensive edge in the event of a conflict with the emerging Communist bloc. Nuclear weapons were part of the bargain, though there was significant hesitation on the part of the Japanese to reveal the existence of nuclear-armed forces in Japan. This instinct was further confirmed in 1954, after the Daigo Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon No. 5) incident, when there was a huge outcry in Japan against the US and Russia’s ongoing nuclear weapons tests. This led then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato to declare the cornerstone of Japan’s stance on nuclear weapons: the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Under these, Japan would not allow possession, production or storage of nuclear weapons (by the US) on its soil. Since then, despite the constant transit of US nuclear-armed submarines across Japanese waters, as well as the presence of the nuclear-powered US Seventh Fleet in Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan continued to maintain that its territory would remain free of nuclear weapons. It was partially these assurances which enabled it to become the only NPT non-nuclear signatory to possess the complete fuel cycle facilities necessary to reprocess uranium control rods from civil reactors into the high-yield variety capable of producing nuclear weapons. South Korea had a different trajectory, one which led it to attempt to produce its own nuclear weapon in the 1970s. After independence from Japan, the Koreans were immediately embroiled in the Cold War due to the presence of Soviet and US troops along the 38th parallel bisecting the country. The Soviet-supported state, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), then invaded the weaker and less developed south, which under US control had become the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1950, leading to the Korean War. This three-year conflict, which ended with the division of the country in 1953, resulted in the new ROK finding itself adjoining a Communist dictatorship that was perpetually attempting to destabilise it. Therefore, the military junta in power at the time under President Park Chung Hee decided that despite US security guarantees, the presence of US troops on Korean soil, and the extended deterrence provided by the nuclear umbrella, the ROK needed to have its own weapon3 . In 1970, US President Richard Nixon’s declaration that the US would withdraw its troops from the Korean peninsula caused the South Koreans to set up the Weapons Exploration Committee4 , which explored ways of obtaining, processing and manufacturing enough high-yield plutonium to make weapons. The fall of South Vietnam in 1975 further heightened Korean anxiety, and hastened the development project. However, by 1975, the US, which had caught wind of the secret programme, pressured France to refuse to supply the necessary equipment, and the programme was shut down, though sporadic efforts continued till 19795 . By 1975, the ROK had signed the NPT, and placed its nuclear facilities under the IAEA inspection mechanism. In 1991, President Roh Tae-Woo emulated Japan’s example and issued the Five Non-Nuclear Principles: the ROK would not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.6 At the same time, the US removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the South led to gradual public support for a nuclear deterrent of its own culminating in the present majority support for hosting nuclear weapons on its soil. Altered Threat PerceptionNorth Korea’s rapid nuclearisation, and the rise of China to great power status have altered these countries’ threat perception. It was already well-known that North Korea possessed the wherewithal to manufacture nuclear weapons. In the 1970s and 1980s, Abdul Qadeer Khan started a network that explicitly (with the connivance of the Pakistani government) marketed nuclear fuel processing equipment and expertise that could only have been used in a nuclear weapons programme to North Korea.7 North Korea’s march to nuclearisation continued, and in 2006 it tested its first nuclear weapon. Despite United Nations sanctions, the North continued to develop its nuclear capability further, leading to the persistent missile tests that have become such a common sight today. The initial response to North Korea’s tests were to conduct dialogue. The Six-party Talks8 , comprising the US, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China and Russia, were intended to convince the North to give up its weapons in exchange for food aid, security guarantees and international recognition. However, the North Korean regime’s insistence on US forces being withdrawn from East Asia entirely, and its refusal to subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection, doomed the talks to failure. Since then, North Korea has made increasingly belligerent threats of annihilation towards South Korea followed by repeated missile tests as well as further nuclear tests in 2009, 2013, 2016 (twice) and 2017. A far more concerning threat, however, comes from China. After developing a nuclear weapon in 1964, China quickly developed thermonuclear weapons with the assistance of the Soviet Union, and in 1967 conducted its first test of that more dangerous weapon. Since then, it has maintained a strategic arsenal of more than 400 weapons. While China has signed the NPT as a nuclear weapon state, it has not signed the CTBT. China maintains a No First Use (NFU) policy, though statements by Foreign Ministry officials in recent times have indicated that NFU may be waived against certain opponents, such as India and Japan. Another concern altering threat perceptions is the fact that an aggressive China under President Xi Jinping has recently declared significant expansion of its nuclear assets, after refusing to participate in US–Russia talks on reducing the nuclear weapon stockpiles held by both countries.9 Japan and the ROK have responded cautiously to the security threats and provocations emanating from North Korean missiles tests and Chinese excesses. The barrage of missile tests last year by North Korea, continuing well through this year, have necessitated fundamental realignment in the traditional security structures the ROK and Japan have long relied on. The strategic documents released by Japan and the ROK in December 2022 and June 2023 respectively have amply reflected these realignments in light of acute provocations from the North as well as the systemic challenge posed by China. Japan’s Response to Contemporary Security ChallengesJapan faces several regional and extra-regional security threats as reflected in the National Security Strategy (NSS) document. Chinese military activities in the Indo-Pacific region, both normatively and empirically, have “become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community.”10 With the ambition of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, China has increased its defense expenditure and has embarked on enhancing and modernising its nuclear and missile capabilities. China has intensified unilateral activities in East and South China Sea as well as Sea of Japan altering the status quo in and around Senkaku Islands in the Sea of Japan. The issue of Taiwan also inextricably impacts the security dynamics of Japan. Evidently, a missile entered Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ) when a missile launch demonstration was conducted by China during Taiwan Strait crisis last year. Hence, China presents a long term, credible and enduring security threat. On the other hand, North Korea presents an immediate security threat in terms of missile and nuclear provocations. There have been instances of cruise and ballistic missile tests conducted by North Korea including some of the missiles being launched over Japanese territory or falling within the EEZ of Japan setting off evacuation alarms across Japan. In yet another provocative steps to enhance its offensive military capabilities, North Korea made a failed attempt to launch first military surveillance satellite in June this year. Earlier in March 2023, before the ‘Freedom Shield’ joint exercise between South Korea and the US, North Korea warned in a statement that if the US took military action against the North’s strategic weapons test, it would be seen as ‘declaration of war’. Further, Kim Yo Jong, the sister of the North Korean leader, stated that “the Pacific Ocean does not belong to the dominium of the US or Japan.”11 The taboo of not threatening the use of a nuclear weapon appears to be diluting, which will have an inevitable impact on East Asian security dynamics. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons has continuously been issued in the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war. The importance that the Sea of Okhotsk plays in Russian strategic nuclear forces doctrine further multiplies their activities in Northern Japan. Joint naval drills and joint flight of strategic bombers with China appears to be yet another challenge, further amplifying the insecurity among the regional states. In order to address these challenges, Japan has prioritised the US–Japan alliance as the core of their strategy. Further, Japan’s recently unveiled National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy provide for reinforced capabilities including counterstrike and reconsideration of US-conceived integrated deterrence. Dramatic advancement in missile-related technologies including hypersonic weapons have rendered Japanese ballistic missile defences insufficient. It is for this reason that the NSS 2022 proposes adoption of counterstrike capabilities in effective coordination with missile defense systems. In what the document calls ‘flexible deterrence option’, it clarifies that first strike is impermissible. To advance these objectives, Japan is slated to increase its defence budget to 2 per cent of GDP by 2027. The challenge for Japan can be summarised in 2 Ds—deterrence and disarmament. Under Prime Minister Kishida, who hails from Hiroshima, the government’s solemn commitment to disarmament is quite conspicuous. His government’s aggressive approach towards disarmament is shaping both governmental and non-governmental discourses. On one hand, Kishida spearheaded the establishment of the 15-member International Group of Eminent Persons for a world without nuclear weapons.12 In February 2023, the group convened their second meeting which recommended three main action points—reinforcing and expanding norms; concrete measures on nuclear risk reduction; and revitalising the NPT’s review process.13 Kishida also took a group of most industrialised G7 members (including Ukrainian President Volodmyr Zelenskyy) to Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park as a part of 2023 G7 Summit schedule. To set the discourse against the use of threat of nuclear weapons, as a part of G7 outcome documents, ‘G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament’ was also released.14 At the same time, Japan’s reliance on the United States’ extended nuclear deterrence presents a dichotomous situation wherein the US nuclear umbrella cannot be diluted due to its regional security implications, while the discourse around effectuation of disarmament must also be continued. Amidst the advancing nuclear and ballistic missile tests, including missiles launched by Beijing and Pyongyang last year in and over Japanese territory, Washington’s deterrence commitments have become more important than ever before for Tokyo. South Korean Response to Contemporary Security ChallengesThe security threat from Pyongyang is more acute in Seoul. Traditionally, under the US security umbrella, South Korea has increasingly found the alliance architecture insufficient to deter the North’s provocations. Since last year, North Korea has conducted over 120 cruise and ballistic missile tests as a response to the trans-Pacific alliance between the US and its East Asian partners. In past years, the North Korean threat of deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and preemptive nuclear strikes has further strengthened the multi-dimensional US-ROK security alliance. Besides the threat of North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction, convergence of strategic interest between China and Russia, as also the unfolding great power competition between the US and China, present eminent challenges for South Korean security interests. Acknowledging the emerging threats—including the adverse impact of the Russia–Ukraine War, the Yoon Suk Yeol Administration came up with a new National Security Strategy (NSS) in June 2023. The document underlines the solidification of extended nuclear deterrence in the ‘Washington Declaration’15 which entailed the establishment of a Nuclear Consultation Group, deployment of US strategic assets and commitment to extended nuclear deterrence. It further details a South Korean ‘three axis system’ to tackle North Korean nuclear and missile threats based on three stages of confrontation—preemption, defense strategies and retaliatory strategy (Figure 1). These are Kill Chain strategy, Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) respectively. Kill Chain strategy aims to preemptively destroy North Korean nuclear and missile assets in case of clear indication of their intention to use nuclear weapons. Hence, it relies upon sophisticated surveillance and reconnaissance assets, along with precision strike capabilities. KAMD is a complex, multi-layered defence system that is designed to detect and intercept various types of missiles. KMPR aims at punitive massive retaliation with overwhelming force in order to deter North Korea and convey that the repercussion of its first strike would be so overwhelming that any perceived benefits from a first nuclear strike would be outweighed. ConclusionThe presence of the US extended nuclear deterrence to Japan and South Korea has ensured stability in the East Asian region for decades. However, deterrence has increasingly been diluted ever since the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea in 2006. While domestic debates on nuclear weapons gained urgency given Chinese and North Korean provocations, South Korean President in January 202317 called for the deployment of US nuclear weapons or development of an indigenous nuclear weapon capability. The US has responded by enhancing engagement and integration of its East Asian partners in nuclear planning and consultation mechanisms. With increasing North Korean nuclear and missile threats, and Chinese nuclear force modernisation, the prospects of indigenous nuclear weapons acquisition by Japan and South Korea cannot be ruled out. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Terrorism & Internal Security, East Asia | Nuclear Deterrence, Japan, South Korea | system/files/thumb_image/2015/nuclear-missile-t.jpg | |
| DDoS Attacks and the Cyber Threatscape | August 01, 2023 | Rohit Kumar Sharma |
SummaryDDoS attacks are posing a formidable challenge than ever before, due to technological advancements and other facilitating factors. When combined with other form of cyberattacks, the impact of disruption multiplies, leading to severe consequences for digital infrastructure. IntroductionIn June 2023, Microsoft identified increased traffic against some services that temporarily impacted availability to the company’s flagship office suite, including the Outlook email, OneDrive file-sharing apps, and cloud computing platform. On investigating the brief interruption, Microsoft identified a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) operation orchestrated by a threat actor that the company tracks as Storm-1359.1 Despite the sophistication involved in the operation, Microsoft assured customers that there was no evidence of unauthorised access to customer data. The company concluded that the threat actor appears to be focused on disruption and publicity. Within hours of the outage, a group named ‘Anonymous Sudan’ took responsibility for the attack on its encrypted Telegram channel with a message ending with, “We hope you enjoyed it, Microsoft”.2 DDoS Attacks and EnablersDDoS attacks are a form of cyberattack that render websites, servers, and other services inaccessible to legitimate users by overwhelming them with more traffic than they can handle.3 The perpetrators in such attacks attempt to exhaust network, server, or application resources to make them unavailable to legitimate users. In the event of a DDoS attack, a website or service is flooded with a barrage of HTTP requests and traffic, which originates from a coordinated network of bots known as a botnet.4 There are several types of DDoS attacks that are carried out by using different attack vectors. DDoS attacks have existed for decades; nevertheless, their prevalence has surged exponentially in terms of volume and intensity, owing to many factors. Threat actors are no longer limited to ‘computer geeks’ or ‘script kiddies’ but constitute sophisticated and organised groups with varying motivations. Advancement in technology has also been an enabler in amplifying such cyber incidents. The ubiquity of digital devices such as the Internet of Things (IoTs) has increased the threat landscape of DDoS attacks. The widespread adoption of digitalisation has expanded the attack surface, while the persistent problem of inadequate cybersecurity measures continues to persist. Another facilitating factor that has contributed to the rise in the frequency of such attacks is the ready availability of DDoS attack services, which is narrowing the gap between skilled and amateur hackers. Not that this is a new phenomenon of the underground market, as illustrated in 2016 report detailing the underground hackers market. The report noted that providing DDoS remains a popular service hackers offer on the underground market.5 The report also pointed out that most of these hackers were willing to perform a free 5 to 10 minutes DDoS test for customers and even charged higher if the target website had anti-DDoS protection installed. The black market also provides rented botnet infrastructure to execute DDoS attacks. MotivationThe motivation behind DDoS attacks varies with threat actors; hacktivists may use it for ideological reasons, cybercriminals for financial motives, and states for larger geopolitical reasons. According to an assessment, the DDoS threat landscape in the first half of 2022 was dominated by geopolitical events, with the financial sector being the most targeted segment.6 The ideologically driven APTs such as pro-Russian ‘KillNet’ and pro-Ukrainian were not only targeting the opposing nation with DDoS attacks but also countries and organisations seen to be supporting those nations. The most notable event was when the Vatican City website was knocked offline by a DDoS attack, allegedly by a group sympathetic to Russia.7 Another major geopolitics-driven attack was against the key Taiwanese websites by China-state-backed threat actors at the time of Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.8 Occasionally, DDoS attacks were carried out to extort ransom payments, colloquially known as Ransom DDoS (RDDoS) attacks. The RDDoS attack should not be mistaken for ransomware, which may be driven by similar motivations but employs different tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The operational method in ransomware requires ‘denial of data’ by a malicious script, whereas RDDoS involves denial of service, generally by a botnet.9 Running a ransomware operation requires access to internal systems, which is not the case in ransom DDoS attacks. In RDDoS, threat actors leverage the threat of denial of service to conduct extortion, which may include sending a private message by email demanding ransom amount to prevent the organisation from being targeted by a DDoS attack.10 According to a threat intelligence report, throughout the 2020–2021 global RDDoS campaigns, attacks ranged from few hours up to several weeks with attack rates of 200 Gbps and higher.11 The DDoS attack can also serve as a means of reconnaissance, allowing attackers to assess the target’s vulnerabilities and gauge the strength of its defenses. Lately, these attacks have been incorporated into triple extortion ransomware strategies, where data is not only encrypted and exfiltrated, but in case the ransom fails, the attackers may initiate a DDoS attack on the targeted services to intensify their operation.12 The Case of Anonymous SudanAnonymous Sudan best exemplifies the re-emergence of DDoS as a form of weaponisation of cyberspace to achieve varying objectives. According to reports, Anonymous Sudan emerged on 18 January 2023 and swiftly initiated its operations aimed at Sweden within a week.13 The group initiated cyber attacks against the Swedish government and companies in response to what it considered anti-Islamic actions in Sweden. Driven by ‘religious’ motivations, the group subsequently decided to focus its efforts on targeting Denmark and France. Upon creating its Telegram channel, the Anonymous Sudan account initially engaged in minimal activity, primarily expressing its objective to target “enemies of Sudan”.14 The account also shared posts amplifying the activities of Russian hacktivists groups such as KillNet and Anonymous Russia. Reportedly, on several occasions, the group has undertaken operations in tandem with other threat actors. For instance, in May 2023, Anonymous Sudan and an Iranian hacking collective known as Asa Musa (Persian for Moses Staff) made a failed bid to sabotage Israeli rocket alert applications during an episode of violence between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.15 In another incident, Anonymous Sudan, alongside KillNet (a pro-Russia hacker group) and REvil (notorious for ransomware attacks), unveiled their plans for attacks on the US and European Banking systems on their Telegram channels.16 A few days later, the European Investment Bank confirmed a DDoS attack affecting its operations without attributing the incident to any threat actor. However, the group claimed responsibility for the cyber incident on its Telegram channel. To date, the group has targeted many countries, including Australia, Germany, Israel, India, and the US. These countries have experienced attacks across various sectors such as government institutions, educational establishments, financial institutions, airports, and healthcare facilities. Motivation and Modus OperandiAnonymous Sudan has gained notoriety for engaging in DDoS attacks and defacing websites during its nearly six months of existence. The group asserts that it operates from Sudan and is involved in cyber activism, commonly referred to as hacktivism. The group’s claims and announcements provide significant insight into the ‘social’ and ‘political’ motivations driving their operations. Nevertheless, some assessments indicate a potential association between Anonymous Sudan and the pro-Russian hacktivist collective known as KillNet.17 Others suggest that the group is likely a state-sponsored Russian actor pretending to be motivated by Islamist ideologies. Based on its operational pattern and choice of target, the group initially appeared as a threat actor driven by religious motives. The group also asserted its affiliation with the larger Anonymous collective, which gained prominence in the early 2000s by instrumentalising digital activism to advocate for societal and political transformation. However, a detailed report on the group refuted this claim and indicated a potential connection between the group and the Russian hacker collective ecosystem. Other cyber threat intelligence firms have also reaffirmed the presence of a Russian connection in their assessments. Another sign of its close association with Russian threat actors, if not directly with the state, is the use of Russian language in its official Telegram channel alongside Arabic and Persian. During a recent interview conducted via Telegram, a ‘representative’ of Anonymous Sudan shared some intriguing insights with the interviewers. Due to the group’s tendency to seek publicity and make sensational claims, however, caution must be exercised before fully believing their assertions. On being inquired about TTPs, it was revealed that the group tailor the plan of action depending on the target, which may vary from Layer 4 attack to Layer 7 attack based on requirements.18 Refuting the allegations of being part of Russian cyber military campaign, Anonymous Sudan asserted that the accusations were unfounded. Interestingly, the interview was abruptly ended when questioned about the group’s self-proclaimed role as the defender of Islam while also demonstrating inaction against China’s persecution of one million Uyghurs . Lately, the group seems to have shifted from presenting themselves as politically-motivated hacktivists to using extortion tactics for financial gains.19 According to reports, the group demanded US$ 3 million from Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) to halt DDoS attacks against the airline’s website. The underlining reason behind the shift is uncertain, but the group appears to be well-funded. Rather than employing networks of infected or compromised computers to launch attacks cheaply, the group opted for a different approach. For targeting infrastructure in Denmark, the group rented 61 servers located in Germany from IBM Corporation’s SoftLayer division to carry out their operations.20 By doing so, they effectively concealed their activities behind multiple layers of anonymity. Even in the recent Microsoft outage, it was observed that the attacks likely relied on access to multiple virtual private servers (VPS) in conjunction with rented cloud infrastructure.21 Also, it is highly improbable for a grassroots hacktivist collective to utilise paid proxy services for carrying out their attacks, revealing subtle indications of the state’s involvement in guiding their operations.22 Attacks in IndiaAfter drawing attention to its ‘religiously’ motivated attacks in the Western world, the group shifted its focus towards targeting Indian infrastructure. The attacks specifically targeted airports, hospitals, and other critical infrastructure.According to a report, India ranked second in terms of being the most targeted country by religious hacktivist groups, after Israel.23 In April 2023, a well-coordinated DDoS attack was launched against major airports and healthcare institutions in India.24 Anonymous Sudan, which claimed responsibility for the incident, used a combination of Layer 3–4 and Layer-7 DDoS attacks that lasted nearly nine hours.25 While the consequences of DDoS attacks may appear insignificant, they should not be underestimated. These attacks can potentially incur significant costs to an organisation regarding time, finances, and reputation. Furthermore, they can lead to the loss or deterioration of essential services, including critical sectors such as healthcare. A threat actor might also employ a DDoS attack as a means to redirect focus from more sinister activities, such as the insertion of malware or the unauthorised extraction of data. As the government continues to spread awareness about such threats, organisations, especially those managing critical infrastructure, must take initiatives to prevent and mitigate DDoS attacks. Such organisations must develop a DDoS response plan and promote a culture of cyber hygiene among their workforce. In short, DDoS is no longer a low intensity/low impact threat but a danger with actual loss and cost. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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North America & Strategic Technologies | Cyber Security, Cyberspace | system/files/thumb_image/2015/ddos-attack-t.jpg | |
| S-70 Okhotnik UCAV Debuts on the Russia–Ukraine Battlefield | July 31, 2023 | Akshat Upadhyay |
The Russian S-70 Okhotnik (Hunter) unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) was reportedly used on the Ukrainian battlefield on 27 June 2023, where it struck Ukrainian military facilities in the regions of Sumy and Kremenchuk.1 This is an important development in the war since it showcases Russian capability to move beyond tactical and ad-hoc equipped drones like Orlan-10, Lastochka, Forpost-R and Orion,2 commercial Chinese quadcopters (DJI and Air series)3 and the Shahed and Mohajer series loitering munitions (LMs) imported from Iran,4 to staking a major technological claim in the form of a UCAV. In the short term, Russia will still depend on Iranian expertise in LMs given that a manufacturing plant has been set up inside Russia.5 The successful strikes by the S-70, with the option of manned–unmanned teaming (MUM-T) with the Su-57 fighter jet, provide the country with a deployable option, still under development by other powers like the US and the UK. The Okhotnik project has been in the making since 20116 and has been envisaged as a “loyal wingman” for the Su-57.7 A loyal wingman is a UCAV which, using onboard AI, can collaborate with manned fighters and is seen as being significantly low-cost than its manned counterpart.8 This expands the tasking and deployment options for the pair (at the very least one UCAV and one manned fighter are being considered but the numbers of UCAV can increase depending on the cognitive load on the pilot). The project is being jointly developed by Sukhoi and Mikoyan as a sixth-generation heavy UCAV.9 A sixth generation air vehicle has parameters like onboard data fusion and artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities, advanced stealth airframes, advanced variable cycle engines and integration of directed energy weapons (DEW).10 Two prototypes have been developed so far, the first one with a circular exhaust and the latter with a more square-shaped one to increase stealth.11 Two more are under development and these are supposedly similar to the ones which will finally undergo serial production.12 The design of the S-70 is that of a ‘flying wing’, similar to that of the F-117 Nighthawk, the RQ-170 and the Shahed-136.13 Okhotnik’s first autonomous flight testing, which included a flight time of around 30 minutes, alongside an Su-57, was conducted on 27 September 2019.14 The Su-57 has been used as a flying laboratory for testing the Hunter’s avionics. Unguided bombs were tested in 2021,15 followed by the test-firing of Kh59 Mk2 precision guided munition (PGM) in May 2022.16 The current version of Su-57 is a single-seat fighter but a twin-seater variant has been flight-tested with the Hunter where the co-pilot will be exclusively responsible for controlling and monitoring the UCAV, with the pilot performing his/her basic functions. Certain other developments in this project merit attention. When operationally ready, each Su-57 will command up to four S-70s.17 Already, four Su-57s have been used to conduct suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) in Ukraine on 9 June 2022.18 The interesting part was that all four were “linked to a single information network to destroy air defense systems through automatic communication systems, data transmission, navigation and identification in real-time”.19 The Okhotnik has also been trialed with the Mig-29.20 In a standalone mode, it may also be deployed on the still-in-development Project 23900 Ivan Rogonov helicopter carriers, each of which has a capacity to accommodate 4 S-70s.21 Russian analysts have also dubbed the S-70 the world’s first “outer space” drone.22 Manned–Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)The Okhotnik’s strikes in Ukraine can act as proof of concept for the MUM-T concept, under development in a number of countries including India. MUM-T has been defined differently by different armed forces across the world. While the US Army Aviation Centre (USAACE) defines MUM-T as “synchronized employment of soldier, manned and unmanned air and ground vehicles, robotics, and sensors to achieve enhanced situational understanding, greater lethality, and improved survivability”,23 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s standardisation agreement (STANAG) calibrates five levels of interoperability (LOI) between manned and unmanned platforms,24 with the first being indirect receipt of UAV-related data, going up to level five which relates to the control and monitoring of the UAV along with launch and recovery functions.25 In India, the Combat Air Teaming System (CATS) is meant as an umbrella term for a combination of manned and unmanned assets which can reduce human casualties, perform air-to-air and air-to-ground strikes from a standoff distance and also act as atmospheric satellites for high altitude surveillance.26 The initial prototypes are being tested on the Jaguar aircraft and will later be fitted on the Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) acting as the “mothership”.27 Similar projects are being developed in the US (collaborative combat aircraft or CCA)28 , Australia (air teaming system or ATS)29 and the UK (Project Tempest).30 Within the US, a number of parallel programs are in progress. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is field testing the Skyborg program with the Kratos’ X-58 Valkyrie.31 The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is moving ahead with the air combat evolution (ACE) program,32 and in a simulation featuring a US Air Force (USAF) pilot competing with an AI pilot under the AlphaDogFight program, had shown that AI could beat human pilots in number of fighter manoeuvres and targeting actions.33 There were obviously some caveats and one could say that the dice was loaded in favour of the AI. However, even granting those advantages to the AI, the performance has been nothing short of impressive and heralds the future of air combat. MUM-T, when implemented during conventional combat scenarios, offers the advantage of combining the strengths of manned and unmanned aircrafts, while complementing each other’s shortfalls. The UCAV can be sent ahead in a dense air defence (AD) environment to scout for targets, perform SEAD and force the adversary to reveal its surface to air missile (SAM) sites. This data, most of which is computed within the UCAV using edge processing, can be sent back to the manned fighter, already at standoff range, and used for conducting air and ground attacks. The UCAV, when equipped with either air-to-air or air-to-ground (AAM/AGM) missiles can also act as a ‘flying magazine’ for the manned fighter, increasing the inventory and range of the aircraft. With the number of unmanned platforms under the pilot’s control increasing and the unmanned platforms themselves carrying LMs, similar to what is envisaged in the CATS program, the pilot now has the opportunity to conduct what this writer calls “simultaneous multi-roles” (SMRs) where the capabilities of the manned fighter will increase manifold. At the same instant, the pilot can engage air targets, perform precision bombing against pin-point high value targets and saturate the battlefield with LMs and conventional unguided bombs. Air combat is likely to undergo a major change with the entry of UAVs of all shapes and sizes. Countries which can proactively take advantage of this phase of air combat evolution are likely to have a greater edge over their adversaries. As the Okhotnik trials and later operational use shows, the combination of the human mind and computational strength of microchips, integrated into a single system, has the potential to impose on the adversary a major decision dilemma regarding the system to be countered and can act as a combined arms offensive in the air. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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North America & Strategic Technologies | Russia-Ukraine Relations, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) | system/files/thumb_image/2015/russia-ukrian-war-t.jpg | |
| South Africa’s Rhetoric of Non-alignment in Focus | July 31, 2023 | Abhishek Mishra |
Following months of speculations, a decision has finally been made—Russian President Vladimir Putin won’t attend the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) Summit which is taking place in Johannesburg from 22 to 24 August 2023. The development comes as a relief for South African officials as it helps Pretoria dodge an awkward diplomatic and legal dilemma. Being a signatory to the Rome Statute which governs the International Criminal Court (ICC), South African officials would have been obliged to arrest Putin upon arrival. In March 2023, ICC issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest over alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine.1 Two other members of BRICS—India and China—are not signatories to the Rome Statute. Brazil is a member but since it wasn’t hosting the meeting, it did not have to deal with this situation. The moment speculations about Putin’s possible attendance began, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa employed every possible means to diffuse the situation and navigate his way out of the tight diplomatic spot. First, his administration proposed Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov lead the Russian delegation instead of Putin. This request was denied by Moscow. Secondly, rumors began to fuel speculations that the BRICS summit could become a virtual summit or may even get shifted to China.2 Such rumors were categorically denied by Ramaphosa as his administration insisted on hosting a physical summit. Moreover, President Ramaphosa is trying to consolidate his own domestic standing and garner support from various flanks of his ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), with the South African general elections scheduled to take place in 2024. US Ambassador’s AllegationThe troubled period for South African administration began on 11 May when the United States Ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety held a press conference in which he accused South African officials of allegedly loading weapons onto a sanctioned Russian ship in December 2022.3 This triggered a long drawn diplomatic spat between Washington and Pretoria. It was claimed that the Russian cargo ship known as The Lady R docked at Simon’s Town naval base near Cape Town last December with its tracking device switched off. This prompted questions whether the ship was loaded with arms before returning to Russia. Even before this development, tensions between US and South Africa were already palpable. On the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2023, South African military participated in a ten-day exercise – Exercise Mosi, along with Russia and China. This provoked criticism both at home and abroad.4 With Ambassador Brigety’s accusation, South Africa’s officially proclaimed “non-aligned” position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine came under scrutiny. Following the press conference, the immediate fallout was felt in the financial markets with the South African Rand plummeting to a record low of 19.51 to the dollar.5 The other implication was the possibility of South Africa being suspended from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which is due to expire in 2023. Under AGOA, South Africa currently enjoys preferential duty-free market access to the US, South Africa’s third-largest trading partner. If South Africa’s preferential status indeed gets suspended, then industries like wine, citrus and motor would be gravely affected, leading to job losses and reduced export revenues.6 In response, the South African government categorically denied US accusations and defended its decision to participate in military exercise with Russia and China citing its right to pursue its own international policy since it is a sovereign nation. South Africa’s Minister of Defence Thandi Modise claimed that the Lady R docked to deliver a shipment of ammunition for the South African National Defence Force’s Special Forces Regiment, equipment that had been ordered prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.7 Owing to the seriousness of the allegations and its potential impact on South Africa’s international image, Ramaphosa established a three-person panel to investigate the incident.8 However, the timeline for completing the investigation and providing a final report remains undetermined for the time being. South Africa’s Rhetoric of Non-AlignmentThe paradox of being formally neutral on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, yet parallelly deepening military relationship with Russia is continuing to strain US–South Africa relations. Right from the start, South Africa has insisted that it supports the “peaceful resolution” of the conflict.9 Pretoria along with a group of five African countries volunteered to visit both Moscow and Kyiv and constitute a “peace mission”. The delegation put forward a 10-point plan that stressed on unimpeded grain exports through the Black Sea. Yet in practical terms, Africa’s peace mission failed to yield meaningful results.10 The delegation faced several logistical and security challenges. Problems with the US have been further complicated with South Africa continuing to abstain on voting at the UN General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the war and Russia’s withdrawal from Ukrainian territory. India has followed a similar path whereas China has voted against such resolutions. Although there are no cultural or linguistic ties between South Africa and Russia, the former’s support for the latter could be attributed to the roots of the ANC. Being Africa’s oldest liberation movement fighting against white minority rule in South Africa, the ANC relied heavily on support from the erstwhile Soviet Union. The armed wing of the ANC—known as Umkhonto we Sizwe—received arms, ammunitions, and military training from the Soviets in 1960s. With such historical affinities, it is understandable why South Africa would be standing on the fence on the Russia–Ukraine conflict. However, the question of whether South Africa has been able to substantiate its doctrine of non-alignment or usage of the term non-aligned is debatable.11 Additionally, the West had raised the stakes for South Africa to pursue a course of action tantamount to economic sabotage. Apart from potential suspension from AGOA, Putin’s arrival and South Africa’s failure to arrest him would have subjected Pretoria to penalties such as exclusion from various Western payments platform and protocols. On 9 June 2023, US Congressional leaders also issued a bipartisan letter urging President Joe Biden to question South Africa’s eligibility for continued inclusion in the AGOA and to consider moving the venue of 2023 AGOA Forum from South Africa to another country.12 Apart from these challenges, the principal line of argument coming from South African officials relates to its own role in negotiation and mediation on peace and security issues. Currently, there are not many states that have access to both President Putin and President Volodymyr Zelensky and can engage with the two parties simultaneously. This sentiment has been echoed by South Africa’s Minister for International Relations and Cooperation Dr Grace Naledi Pandor. However, by being a signatory to the Rome Statute, South Africa has inadvertently put itself in a difficult position when it comes to hosting leaders in the future. Unless the Rome Statute of 2002 is amended, the question of any future state visit by the President of Russia to South Africa will remain in question. With South Africa slated to host the G20 Summit in 2025, similar kind of diplomatic pressure may continue to be applied unless the statue is amended. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Eurasia & West Asia | South Africa, Russia, Non-alignment | system/files/thumb_image/2015/south-africa-russia-t.jpg | |
| US Voluntary Code of Conduct on AI and Implications for Military Use | July 28, 2023 | Akshat Upadhyay |
Seven technology companies including Microsoft, OpenAI, Anthropic and Meta, with major artificial intelligence (AI) products made voluntary commitments regarding the regulation of AI at an event held in the White House on 21 July 2023.1 These eight commitments are based on three guiding principles of safety, security and trust. Areas and domains which are presumably impacted by AI have been covered by the code of conduct. While these are non-binding, unenforceable and voluntary, they may form the basis for a future Executive Order on AI, which will become critical given the increasing military use of AI. The voluntary AI commitments are the following:
The eight commitments of US’s Big Tech companies come a few days after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the first time convened a session on the threat posed by AI to global peace and security.3 The UN Secretary General (UNSG) proposed the setting up of a global AI watchdog comprising experts in the field who would share their expertise with governments and administrative agencies. The UNSG also added that UN must come up with a legally binding agreement by 2026 banning the use of AI in automated weapons of war.4 The discussion at the UNSC can be seen as elevating the focus from shorter term AI threat of disinformation and propaganda in a bilateral context between governments and Big Tech companies to a larger, global focus on advancements in AI and the need to follow certain common standards, which are transparent, respect privacy of individuals whose data is ‘scraped’ on a massive scale, and ensure robust cybersecurity. Threat posed by AILawmakers in the US have been attempting to rein in the exponential developments in the AI field for some time now, since not much is known about the real impact of the technology on a longer-term basis. The reactions to the so-called danger of AI have been polarizing, with some even equating AI with the atom bomb and terming the current phase of growth in AI as the ‘Oppenheimer moment’5 , after the scientist-philosopher J. Robert Oppenheimer, under whom the Manhattan Project was brought to a fruitful conclusion with the testing of the first atomic bomb. This was the moment that signaled the start of the first nuclear age—an era of living under the nuclear shadow that persists to this day. The Oppenheimer moment, therefore, is a dividing line between the conventional past and the new present and presumably the unknown future. Some academics, activists and even members of the Big Tech community, referred to as ‘AI doomers’ have coined a term, P(doom), in an attempt to quantify the risk of a doomsday scenario where a ‘runaway superintelligence’ causes severe harm to humanity or leads to human extinction.6 Others refer to variations of the ‘Paperclip Maximiser’, where the AI is given a particular task to optimise by the humans, understands it in the form of maximising the number of paperclips in the universe and proceeds to expend all resources of the planet in order to manufacture only paperclips.7 This thought experiment was used to signify the dangers of two issues with AI: the ‘orthogonality thesis’, which refers to a highly intelligent AI that could interpret human goals in its own way and proceed to accomplish tasks which have no value to the humans; and ‘instrumental convergence’ which implies AI taking control of all matter and energy on the planet in addition to ensuring that no one can shut it down or alter its goals.8 Apart from these alleged existential dangers, the new wave of generative AI9 , which has the potential of lowering and in certain cases, decimating entry barriers to content creation in text, image, audio and video format, can adversely affect societies in the short to medium term. Generative AI has the potential to birth the era of the ‘superhuman’, the lone wolf who can target state institutions through the click of his keyboard at will.10 The use of generative AI in the hands of motivated individuals, non-state and state actors, has the potential to generate disinformation at scale. Most inimical actors and institutions have so far struggled to achieve this due to the difficulties of homing onto specific faultlines within countries, using local dialects and generating adequately realistic videos, among others. This is now available at a price—disinformation as a service (DaaS)—at the fingertips of an individual, making the creation and dissemination of disinformation at scale, very easy. This is why the voluntary commitments by the US Big Tech companies are just the beginning of a regulatory process that needs to be made enforceable, in line with legally binding safeguards agreed to by UN members for respective countries. Military Uses of AISlowly and steadily, the use of AI in military has been gaining ground. The Russia-Ukraine war has seen deployment of increasingly efficient AI systems on both sides. Palantir, a company which specialises in AI-based data fusion and surveillance services,11 has created a new product called the Palantir AI Platform (AIP). This uses large language models (LLMs) and algorithms to designate, analyse and serve up suggestions for neutralising adversary targets, in a chatbot mode.12 Though Palantir’s website clarifies that the system will only be deployed across classified systems and use both classified and unclassified data to create operating pictures, there is no further information on the subject available in the open domain.13 The company has also assured on its site that it will use “industry-leading guardrails” to safeguard against unauthorized actions.14 The absence of Palantir from the White House declaration is significant since it is one of the very few companies whose products are designed for significant military use. Richard Moore, the head of United Kingdom’s (UK) MI6, on 19 July 2023 stated that his staff was using AI and big data analysis to identify and disrupt the flow of weapons to Russia.15 Russia is testing its unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) Marker with an inbuilt AI which will seek out Leopard and Abrams tanks on the battlefield and target them. However, despite being tested in a number of terrains such as forests, the Marker hasn’t been rolled out for combat action in ongoing conflict against Ukraine.16 Ukraine has fitted its drones with rudimentary AI that can perform the most basic edge processing to identify platforms like tanks and pass on only the relevant information (coordinates and nature of platform) amounting to kilobytes of data to a vast shooter network.17 There are obviously challenges in misidentifying objects and the task becomes exceedingly difficult when identifying and singling out individuals from the opposing side. Facial recognition softwares have been used by the Ukrainians to identify the bodies of Russian soldiers killed in action for propaganda uses.18 It is not a far shot to imagine the same being used for targeted killings using drones. The challenge here of course is systemic bias and discrimination in the AI model which creeps in despite the best intentions of the data scientists, which may lead to inadvertent killing of civilians. Similarly, spoofing of the senior commanders’ voice and text messages may lead to passing of spurious and fatal orders for formations. On the other hand, the UK-led Future Combat Air System (FCAS) Tempest envisages a wholly autonomous fighter with AI integrated both during the design and development phase (D&D) as well as the identification and targeting phase during operations.19 The human, at best, will be on the loop. ConclusionThe military use of AI is an offshoot of the developments ripping through the Silicon Valley. As a result, the suggestions being offered to rein in the advancements in AI need to move beyond self-censorship and into the domain of regulation. This will be needed to ensure that the unwarranted effects of these technologies do not spill over into the modern battlefield, already saturated with lethal and precision-based weapons. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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North America & Strategic Technologies | Artificial Intelligence, Military Modernisation | system/files/thumb_image/2015/artificial-intelligence-t.jpg |
