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| Title | Date | Date Unique | Author | Body | Research Area | Topics | Thumb |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tanzania: A Key Partner for India in the Western Indian Ocean Region | October 13, 2023 | Abhishek Mishra, Avit A. Chami |
Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan visited India on an official state visit from 8 to 10 October 2023, during which the two countries announced the elevation of their bilateral relationship to the level of ‘Strategic Partnership’.1 With this, Tanzania became the fourth African country after South Africa, Rwanda, and Egypt, with whom India has elevated ties to the level of strategic partnership. The move is hardly surprising since both India and Tanzania are extended maritime neighbours across the Indian Ocean and have enjoyed cordial ties for more than 62 years. The visionary leadership of Julius Nyerere and Jawaharlal Nehru and their shared understanding of ideologies like self-reliance, Non-Aligned Movement, South-South Cooperation, and foreign affairs laid the foundations of a strong partnership between the two nations. President Hassan’s visit came close on the heels of India hosting the G20 summit in September 2023 in New Delhi. In fact, she is the first African President to visit New Delhi after the inclusion of the African Union (AU) as a permanent member of the G20, a cause which was strongly advocated for by India. In recent years, both countries have taken substantial steps to strengthen their diplomatic ties. The Presidential visit from Tanzania took place after a period of eight years and served to inject fresh impetus into India–Tanzania bilateral ties. From the Indian side, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Dar es Salaam in July 2016 marked a significant milestone and cemented the strong developmental partnership of both countries. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in July 2023 co-chaired the 10th India–Tanzania Joint Commission on Economic, Technical, and Scientific Cooperation in Dar es Salaam.2 Nature of existing cooperationTanzania is an important partner and a key linchpin of India’s overall outreach towards Africa and serves as a gateway for Indian access to other landlocked countries in Africa. Over two thousand years ago, trade thrived between Mandvi port in Gujarat and Zanzibar. The Sidi tribe of India traces its origins to the Zanzi coast of East Africa. Currently, there are over 60,000 People of Indian Origin in Tanzania who are treated as one of Tanzania’s tribes known as ‘Wahindi’. They are well-known for their enterprising culture and are mostly involved in trade and small businesses. Despite the challenges posed by COVID-19 pandemic, India and Tanzania’s bilateral trade continues to grow, and currently stands at US$ 6.5 billion.3 Tanzania mostly imports petroleum products, medicines, and engineering goods from India, while exporting cereals, cashew nuts, pigeon peans and avocado to India. Tanzania is also a major beneficiary of India’s Duty-Free Tariff Preference (DFTP) scheme under which 98 per cent of product lines from Tanzania are imported tariff-free. Air Tanzania operates a direct flight from Mumbai to Dar es Salaam three times a week, which has helped to increase connectivity between the two countries. Additionally, India is also among the top five investment sources for Tanzania whereby 630 investment projects worth US$ 3.74 billion have been registered.4 This is expected to create 60,000 new jobs for local Tanzanians. Indian investors are also exploring the possibility of setting up an Investment Park in Tanzania for which 1,000 acres of land will be allocated. The possibility of conducting trade in local currencies (Rupees and Tanzanian Shillings) are also being explored under which authorised banks in India will open Special Rupee Vostro Accounts (SVRA) of correspondent banks in Tanzania.5 The development cooperation aspect of the relationship merits special mention. India has been strongly involved in sectors like water, health, capacity building, scholarships, information, and communications technology (ICT), among others. India’s Export Import Bank (EXIM Bank) has extended Lines of Credit (LoC) worth US$ 1.1 billion for various projects, particularly in the water sector.6 India’s water projects in Tanzania are expected to enable access to safe drinking water to 6 million residents across 24 towns of Tanzania. Some notable projects are the Kiduthani project in Zanzibar and the Kibamba project in Dar es Salaam. In terms of scholarships for capacity building, India offers 450 slots under its ITEC programme and 70 under ICCR scholarships to Tanzanian nationals. The ITEC slots for Tanzania are now increased to 1,000 and will cover emerging areas like Smart Ports, Space, Artificial Intelligence, Biotechnology, Aviation Management, etc. India is also looking to export its digital solutions to African countries, including Tanzania, by encouraging more participation from the private sector. To increase Africa’s digital connectivity, India’s digital stack, including biometrics, Jan Dhan technology, and mobile connectivity can be leveraged.7 India has also set up a vocational training center in Pemba, Zanzibar and two ICT Centers at Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology and Nelson Mandela African Institute for Science & Technology (NMAIST) in Arusha. The most commendable development has been the opening of Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Madras campus in Zanzibar, which is the first offshore IIT campus to be inaugurated in early November 2023.8 Outcomes of President Samia’s visitA host of key initiatives were undertaken during President Samia’s visit to New Delhi. The elevation of the bilateral ties to the level of ‘Strategic Partnership’ is consequential. Tanzania’s proximity and location along the East African coast of the Indian Ocean and its stable political system makes it a natural partner for New Delhi. Being maritime neighbours, Tanzania holds an important place in India’s vision of Security and Growth for all in the Region (SAGAR). As the centre of gravity is moving towards the Indo-Pacific region, which also encompasses the east coast of Africa, India and Tanzania’s role will be critical in tackling the emerging non-traditional challenges, blue crimes, and for ensuring secure, free, and open shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean Region. During the visit, a total of 6 MoUs were signed.9 These related to sharing of successful digital solutions to be implemented at population scale for digital transformation, an MoU on cultural exchange programme from 2023 to 2027, an MoU between National Sports Council of Tanzania and Sports Authority of India, MoU on setting up of an industrial park in Tanzania, a Technical Agreement between the Indian Navy and Tanzanian Shipping Cooperation Agencies on White Shipping, and an MoU between Cochin Shipyards Ltd and Marine Services Co. Ltd on Cooperation in Maritime Industry. From training-centric to a strategic partnershipThere are important developments particularly in the defence and security sector which has seen visible improvement in bilateral ties. At the second Joint Defence Cooperation Committee meeting held in Arusha in June 2023, India and Tanzania set up a five-year roadmap for defence cooperation. Earlier in October 2023, India’s Chief of Army Staff Gen. Manoj Pande went to Tanzania to take stock of current defence ties and explore areas of further collaboration. Tanzanian Defence Minister Stergomena Tax has also visited India in August 2022 and February 2023. Additionally, India has deployed an Indian Military Training Team (IMTT) at Tanzania’s Command and Staff College in Duluti. The fact that India has successfully hosted mini-Defence Expos twice in Dar es Salaam in May 2022 and October 2023 is an indication of the growing interest between both the countries in expanding their cooperation in the defence industry. The Tanzanian example serves as a perfect template which India should try to implement in other African countries along the Western Indian Ocean region like Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, among others. Blue Economy is another emerging focus area where potential for collaboration exists in areas like tourism, marine scientific research, seabed mining, and ocean conservation. Although bilateral ties between India and Tanzania have improved, they continue to be constrained by inadequate awareness of the potential opportunities and the strong rise of China’s involvement in Tanzania’s business space. While India does recognise it cannot match China in terms of sheer economic heft, it can focus on its core competencies in areas like ICT, human resource development, healthcare, agriculture, capacity building, etc. Till now, the nature of India and Tanzania’s defence and security cooperation have for the most part been training-centric. Given the challenges posed by China in the Indian Ocean, it is time for both India and Tanzania to re-orient their relations from focusing on training to a partnership that is more strategic in nature. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | India-Tanzania Relations, Tanzania | system/files/thumb_image/2015/india-tanzania-t.jpg | |
| Historic 7 March 1971 Speech of Bangabandhu* | March-April 2023 | Sheikh Mujibur Rahman |
“My brothers, I have come before you today with a heart laden with sadness. You are aware of everything and know all. We have tried with our lives. And yet the sadness remains that today, in Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, Rajshahi and Rangpur the streets are soaked in the blood of my brothers. Today the people of Bengal desire emancipation, the people of Bengal wish to live, the people of Bengal demand their rights be acknowledged. What wrong have we committed? Following the elections, the people of Bangladesh entrusted me and the Awami League with the totality of their electoral support. It was our expectation that the Parliament would meet, there we would frame our Constitution, that we would develop this land, that the people of this country would achieve their economic, political and cultural freedom. |
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| The Indian Test and the Nuclear Game Rules | March-April 2023 | Ashok Kapur |
It is possible to argue that India’s nuclear strategy seems to have changed, but this does not necessarily at present mean a change in the fundamentals of India’s nuclear policy as these were outlined in the late 1940s and the 1950s. The nuclear test appears to have damaged the NPT, and the test implies a re-orientation in India’s relations with China and the Super Powers. |
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| The Indian Nuclear Test in a Global Perspective | March-April 2023 | K. Subrahmanyam |
The Pokhran test carried out by the Indian Atomic Energy Commission on 18 May 1974, by and large, evoked predictable reactions. Those countries that had come to accept the conventional wisdom on the issue of nuclear proliferation expressed regrets ranging from mild to profound. Some Third World countries expressed satisfaction but Pakistan reacted very strongly. The Indian Government’s declaration that the test was part of a series to exploit nuclear explosive technology and that India did not intend to manufacture nuclear weapons was accepted by many governments, while others expressed varying kinds of reservations about it. Within the country, we were proud of the achievements of our scientific and technological community and angry at what we considered to be double standards of those who muted their protests about the tests of the five nuclear weapon powers but came out loud against the safe and well-contained test at Pokhran. Since then, the declaration that this country does not intend to manufacture weapons has been repeated in many forums, both inside and outside the country. At the same time, India’s right to conduct peaceful underground explosions for developing technology has been reasserted and it has been pointed out that this country did not break any treaty but had reserved the right to carry out these explosions since 1967, when it had protested against the prohibition of such peaceful explosions under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was one of the reasons why India abstained from that treaty. |
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| Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India’s Foreign Policy, Rajesh Basrur, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press | March-April 2023 | Anuttama Banerji |
The International Relations scholarship in India has rarely paid heed to domestic politics as a variable in foreign policy analysis. Most such attempts have focused on anecdotal discussions; this is mainly to do with the securitised nature of the foreign policy discourse in India. Even in cases where the scholarship has tried to engage with domestic determinants, the focus has been on relations with, or policy towards, specific States or they are treatises on the contribution of statesmen. Consequently, other internal factors that have potentially influenced Indian foreign policy have received scant attention. This is where Rajesh Basrur’s Subcontinental Drift stands apart and reframes ‘a version of realism’, acknowledging ‘the importance of structure of the international system’ and incorporating domestic politics as a determinant of Indian policy-making (p.13). |
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| Sovereign Attachments: Masculinity, Muslimness, and Affective Politics in Pakistan, Shenila Khoja-Moolji, Oakland, CA, University of California Press | March-April 2023 | Muneeb Yousuf |
Asserting sovereignty across its territories remains the primary purpose of the modern State. There exist two kinds of sovereignties: legal sovereignty and de facto sovereignty. While legal sovereignty encompasses the formal ideologies of rule and legality, de facto sovereignty includes the actual ability to kill, punish, and discipline a specific fragment of society or a section of it. Non-State actors can also perform the latter deeds. |
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| The Wires of War: Technology and the Global Struggle for Power, Jacob Helberg, New York, Avid Reader Press | March-April 2023 | Anubha Gupta |
The defining feature of contemporary international politics is the global power struggle taking place at the intersection of technology and geopolitics. This power struggle has given way to a new ‘tech cold war’ between the United States and China. While the United States remains at the forefront of technological innovations, China has through decades of investment in gaining technological knowhow—at times through questionable means as well as through research and development—begun to compete with the best in the world. The quest for technological innovation and gaining an edge over competitors, however, does not remain confined to the United States and China, as other big and middle powers too have indulged in the struggle for acquiring advance technology both through technology transfer and innovation. |
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| COVID-19 and Lessons from ‘Triple Lock’: COVID Containment Strategy of Kerala Police | March-April 2023 | D. Padma Kumar Pillay, Vijay Sakhare |
This Article reviews Kerala’s efforts to check the spread of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) without additional expenditure or infrastructure and employing the state police forces. This was remarkable in the face of the fact that healthcare systems were stretched the world over and were struggling beyond capacity to treat the number of people affected by the virus. To add to the overstretched healthcare systems, there were reports of attacks on healthcare workers and facilities. The state of Kerala was among the first to report a coronavirus case in January 2020. Against this backdrop, Kerala’s approach to mobilize the state’s resources, particularly the police, ran counter to that of many other states and their demands for assistance and financial support from the central government. This article details how one state addressed the problem during a national and international crisis. It includes a review of Kerala’s lateral thinking and successful case studies from the field. This research provides strategic thinking and solutions that other states could potentially follow when dealing with pandemics within their borders, both today and in the future. |
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| India’s Space Policy and Counter-Space Capabilities | March-April 2023 | Anushka Saxena |
As contestation in outer space has evolved into increased militarization since the Cold War era, multiple stakeholders have come to play a significant role in shaping the international regime governing activities of State and non-State actors in outer space. India has interacted with this international regime in a dynamic manner, and currently contributes about 2 per cent to the US$ 360 billion global space industry. Its own security compulsions in outer space are shaped by its national interests vis-a-vis data collection, C4ISR, satellite communications, and of course, deterrence against the rising military might of hostile countries in its neighbourhood—China and Pakistan. In this light, this article looks at the potential of India’s domestic material and policy-based space architecture, including the functioning of ISRO and its collaboration with the private sector, as well as India’s current space-based assets and ASAT capabilities. On the basis of this assessment of India’s current institutional and infrastructural assets for outer space, the article also attempts to chart a trajectory forward for India’s space policy and counter-space capabilities. |
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| Evolution of Pakistan’s Influence Operations in Jammu & Kashmir: An Analysis | March-April 2023 | Tejusvi Shukla |
Influence Operations (IOs) are tailored actions to shape perceptions of a targeted audience within the information domain. They pursue political, economic, social, or military outcomes. Their adaptable transparent nature poses challenges for containment. Pakistan’s IOs, active since Partition, target India a (especially Jammu and Kashmir) through State agencies like the Inter-Services Public Relations and its support to non-State entities. Their objectives vary from destabilization to reshaping the culture of J&K. The Article examines Pakistan’s IOs focussing on core elements: operation narratives and dissemination means for influencing the target audience. It investigates their evolution considering historical roots and categorizing them as ‘Short-term’ and ‘Long-term Projects.’ |