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Summary

The laws of armed conflict seek to protect people who do not take part in hostilities. The Israel–Hamas conflict has resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties on both sides. Upholding humanitarian law in the complex and volatile environment of Gaza continues to be a formidable challenge.

The current conflict in Gaza between Israel and Palestinian armed groups, particularly Hamas—the de facto governing authority in Gaza—has given rise to significant humanitarian concerns, as the civilian population of nearly two million Palestinians living in Gaza are in a state of a siege. There have been a large number casualties of civilians, aid workers and attacks on protected facilities like hospitals, the latest one being the Al Shifa hospital.1

Humanitarian law, also known as the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law (IHL), is a set of rules that seek to protect people who do not take part in hostilities and limit the means and methods of warfare. IHL is a product of international cooperation and agreements globally recognised and legalised in the aftermath of the World War. The 1948 Geneva Conventions along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were two instruments that came out of the brutality witnessed in the two World Wars.2

IHL governs the conduct of parties involved in armed conflicts, distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. Firstly, all actions in combat should be in accordance with the principles and rules established by IHL to ensure their actions are following international law. Secondly, one of the primary objectives of IHL is the protection of civilians who are not taking part in the hostilities. All belligerents must be aware of these rules to minimise harm to civilians and ensure their safety. Thirdly, IHL is closely linked to human rights law, and requires prevention of human rights abuses and violations in conflict zones.

Adherence and awareness to IHL is mandatory even for any deployment under the aegis of United Nations operations ( Chapter VI and VII). During peacekeeping operations, awareness of IHL ensures that peacekeepers are accountable for their actions and understand the legal consequences of violating IHL. It helps in preventing misconduct and maintaining the credibility of peacekeeping missions. Knowledge and adherence to IHL contributes to conflict resolution efforts by promoting respect for humanitarian principles and fostering a culture of dialogue and negotiation. United Nations Peacekeepers, often operating under the mandate of international organisations, need to work within this global legal framework.3

For execution of IHL there must be an emphasis on training and awareness which ensures they are prepared for the challenges they may face in conflict zones. It will help in understanding the legal and ethical dimensions of armed conflict to make informed decisions in complex and dynamic situations. In summary, being aware of IHL is crucial for ensuring the legal and ethical conduct of their operations, protecting civilians, upholding human rights, and contributing to the broader goals of conflict resolution.

The primary sources of IHL4 include:

1. The Geneva Conventions: These treaties establish the humanitarian rules to be followed in times of armed conflict. They provide protections for wounded and sick soldiers on land and at sea, prisoners of war, and civilians.
2. The Hague Conventions: These conventions focus on the laws and customs of war and aim to protect cultural property during armed conflicts.
3. Additional Protocols: Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II provide further clarification and expansion of the rules of IHL, particularly concerning international armed conflicts (Protocol I) and non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II).
4. Customary International Humanitarian Law: This includes established practices that are recognised as legally binding, even if not explicitly stated in treaties.

The key principles of IHL5 include Distinction (between military targets and civilian objects), Proportionality (anticipated military advantage of an attack should not outweigh the expected harm to civilians and civilian property), Precautions (to prevent, as far as possible, harm to the civilian population) and Military Necessity (necessary to accomplish a legitimate military objective). This includes providing effective warnings and ensuring that attacks are not indiscriminate. Essentially, laws of armed conflict consist of sets of prohibitions on when and how they can kill and on who can be killed.

IHL and Attacks on Healthcare Facilities

While IHL is clear in its principles, the challenges in implementing these rules in the Gaza crisis are complex. The trigger was the inhuman and dastardly attacks against Israel where a stunned nation found itself attacked by hordes and displaying medievalism and brutality in the attacks against women, children, elderly and the unarmed. The attacks were barbaric and defied all civilised norms of conduct by belligerents.

There is no denying the fact that Israel has taken precautions in the military campaign like warning civilians to vacate north Gaza and go towards the South of the Strip through designated routes, and other measures yet the casualties have been high.6 One of the main reasons is that Gaza Strip is one of the world’s most densely populated regions and the inevitable proximity of military targets to civilians makes it difficult to ensure that attacks are proportionate and do not harm non-combatants. Israeli airstrikes and use of rockets by both sides has led to a high risk of civilian casualties and widespread destruction.

The destruction of infrastructure including hospitals and other protected areas combined with blockade and limited access has aggravated the situation by making the delivery of humanitarian assistance and access to medical care challenging. There have been blatant violations of IHL in this war, beginning with the attacks by Hamas and the reprisals on civilian targets, women, children and the elderly, indiscriminate use of force, and violations of the principle of necessity distinction and proportionality. These violations can be difficult to investigate and prosecute. Holding those responsible for violations of IHL accountable is a significant challenge, and the lack of international consensus on the situation complicates efforts to enforce humanitarian law.

The protection of hospitals during armed conflicts is primarily addressed in the Geneva Conventions, particularly Article 18 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention,7 which states:

Civilian hospitals organised to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.

This article emphasises the absolute prohibition of attacking civilian hospitals and mandates that they must be respected and protected by all parties involved in an armed conflict. The protection extends to hospitals that are providing care to the wounded, sick, infirm and maternity cases. The intention is to safeguard medical facilities that play a crucial role in providing humanitarian assistance and medical care to those in need during times of war. Any intentional attack on a civilian hospital is considered a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

However, these protections are not absolute, and certain conditions may lead to the loss of their protected status. Loss of protected status under the Geneva Conventions8 can occur under specific circumstances, typically involving the violation of the rules outlined in the Conventions which are as under:

1. When the hospital or medical facility is used for purposes that are harmful to the enemy and not related to its medical function, or
2. When weapons or soldiers are intentionally placed within or near a hospital, with the aim of using the hospital's protected status to shield those military objects, or
3. When such facilities are directly participating in hostilities, such as by providing support to combatants or engaging in military activities.

If a hospital is used to store military equipment or as a base for military operations, for instance, it could be considered a legitimate military target. If a hospital is directly participating in hostilities, such as by providing support to combatants or engaging in military activities, it may lose its protected status. The primary purpose of a hospital is to provide medical care to the wounded and sick, and any direct involvement in hostilities may compromise its protected status.

Further, when a party to the conflict intentionally places military objectives, such as weapons or soldiers, within or near a hospital, with the aim of using the hospital's protected status to shield those military objectives, the hospital may lose its protected status. This is known as the principle of "human shields", where the presence of civilians or protected objects is used to deter attacks. However, it is important to note that intentional attacks on hospitals, regardless of the circumstances, are generally considered war crimes and are strictly prohibited under international law. Even if a hospital were to lose its protected status due to misuse, it does not justify deliberate attacks on the facility or the harming of civilians within.

It is not the first time hospitals have been attacked in conflict, either deliberate or accidental, causing harm to civilians and healthcare workers. Some of the notable examples include the Syrian Civil War, the conflict in Yemen, and the conflict in Afghanistan. The list of hospitals that have been attacked in the last 20 years are compiled as under:

1. Kunduz, Afghanistan (2015): In 2015, a Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) hospital in Kunduz was bombed by U.S. forces.9 This incident resulted in casualties and raised significant concerns.
2. Aleppo, Syria (2016): Several hospitals in Aleppo, including the Al-Quds Hospital, were targeted during the Syrian Civil War.10
3. Yemen (Various Instances): Hospitals and medical facilities in Yemen have been repeatedly hit during the conflict between Houthi rebels and the Saudi-led coalition.11
4. Gaza Strip (Various Instances): Hospitals in the Gaza Strip have been targeted during conflicts between Israel and Palestinian groups, including in the 2014 Gaza War.
5. Ukraine (Various Instances): Hospitals and medical facilities in eastern Ukraine have faced attacks during the conflict between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists.
6. South Sudan (Various Instances): Hospitals and clinics have been attacked during the ongoing civil conflict in South Sudan

Fog of War and False Flag Operations: Implications and Consequences

Attacks on hospitals and healthcare facilities are violations of international humanitarian law and can have devastating consequences for civilian populations. These incidents are widely condemned by the international community, and efforts are made to protect healthcare facilities and workers during armed conflicts. So, whether it was Hamas that fired the rocket that caused the Al-Ahli Arab Hospital blast or an Israeli munition is difficult to conclude in the fog of war.12  

Militant and terror groups are known to host false flags as a strategy in their operations. A false flag involves carrying out an attack or a blatant violation of IHL and making it appear as if it was perpetrated by the other entity. It is a part of a broader strategy to conceal the group's true objectives and intentions while portraying itself as a victim to be exploited for propaganda purposes, gaining the sympathy and support of the international community.

The group can create such incidents to create a diplomatic crisis between states taking away the lens from the activities of the group carrying out the operation. After the IDF carried out attacks on the Al-Shifa hospital, the existence of command post and militarised tunnel networks were reported. The primary objectives of such actions can include:

1. Deception: Terror groups and militants may carry out attacks on civilian facilities while disguised or using deceptive tactics to create confusion about the identity of the perpetrators. This can make it appear as if the attacks were carried out by state actors or rival groups.
2. Propaganda and Manipulation: These groups can exploit the resulting confusion and blame states or other entities to garner sympathy, support, or international condemnation against their perceived adversaries. They may use these incidents to advance their own narrative and propaganda.
3. Escalation of Conflict: By falsely attributing attacks to states, terror groups may aim to provoke a stronger response from the accused state, potentially escalating the conflict and drawing in international actors.
4. Distraction and Cover: False flag operations can be used to divert attention from the real intentions, actions, or identity of the militants. They may seek to create distractions to avoid detection or to continue their activities under the radar.

The advantages accrued by accusations and false flag operations against a state actor like Israel are listed below:

1. Diplomatic Isolation: It can lead to diplomatic tensions and potential isolation. Other countries may condemn Israel, impose sanctions, or limit cooperation.
2. International Condemnation: Israel may face international condemnation, criticism, and pressure from international organisations, which can harm its standing on the global stage.
3. Damage to Reputation: Israel's international reputation could be tarnished, affecting its ability to engage in diplomatic negotiations and other international activities.
4. Humanitarian Fallout: It can lead to a loss of public support and trust. Humanitarian consequences could include restrictions on aid and relief efforts in conflict zones.
5. Legal Implications: False accusations can lead to legal challenges, including potential investigations by international bodies or courts.
6. Escalation of Conflict: False accusations can escalate the conflict with adversaries, increasing the risk of further violence and instability in the region.
7. Impact on Peace Efforts: It can undermine peace initiatives and negotiations, making it more challenging to achieve a peaceful resolution to conflicts.

It is important to note that the use of false flag tactics is not unique to one side of a conflict, and even state actors have also been accused of carrying out such operations to achieve their strategic or political objectives. Some of the famous cases include:

1. The Mukden Incident in 1931, in which the Imperial Japanese Army detonated explosives near a Japanese-owned railway in Manchuria, using it as a pretext to invade.
2. The Lavon Affair in 1954, where Israeli agents carried out bombings in Egypt while pretending to be Egyptian nationalists.
3. The Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, which played a role in escalating the Vietnam War.
4. Various instances in the Syrian Civil War, where different parties have been accused of carrying out false flag attacks to manipulate international opinion.

Protected persons under the Geneva Conventions

Conventions which provide protections for individuals who are not taking part in hostilities are listed below.13 Essentially, these are civilians and certain categories of wounded or sick individuals. Protected persons under the Geneva Conventions include:

1. Civilians (Geneva Convention IV): Civilians who find themselves in the hands of a party to the conflict or an occupying power of which they are not nationals.
2. Wounded and Sick (Geneva Convention I and II): Members of the armed forces who are sick, wounded, or shipwrecked, regardless of their nationality.
3. Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III): Members of the armed forces who have fallen into the hands of the enemy, as well as certain non-combatants.
4. Medical and Religious personnel, parliamentarians; civil defence personnel; personnel assigned to the protection of cultural property.

As for using civilians as shields, it is crucial to know how the civilians came to be in a militarily exposed position and the choices they had. In case they volunteered to stay back and join the defender or were coerced by their defenders into staying, then the responsibility lies with the defender even though they may have not killed them. On the other hand, where the civilians were permitted to evacuate an area impending an attack but willingly stay back, the onus of protecting non-combatants lies with the attacker as it does when they are prevented from fleeing the intended target by the attacker. In both these cases, the deaths that are caused are clearly attributable to the attacker.

Though no civilians can be attacked, the laws of armed conflict however are silent as to how far should a combatant go to protect a civilian life. These decisions are left to the individual solider who are guided by their military traditions and moral upbringing. The theory of double effect is a moral and ethical concept that helps in evaluating the ethical implications of actions that may have both intended and unintended consequences in the context of Just War Theory and International Humanitarian Law.

Moral Reality of War and Conflict

The moral reality of war has two parts—the first being the reasons that it is fought for. World sympathy stood in favour of Israel when they decided to go to war as restraint was not an option. The second relates to the means and methods that are employed for winning the war. There is much outrage with Israel accused of committing war crimes.

But this is not the first time in the history of modern warfare that civilians have been targeted. Listed below is an overview of some major conflicts and estimates of civilian casualties. These numbers can vary significantly between different sources, and accurate counts are often challenging to obtain. The actual toll of civilian casualties in these and other conflicts may be higher or lower than these estimates.14

1. Korean War (1950–1953): It is estimated that hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed during the Korean War, with estimates ranging from 1 to 3 million civilian casualties and up to 10 million families separated almost a third of the combined population.15
2. Vietnam War (1955–1975): Civilian casualty estimates vary but a figure exceeding one million deaths is acknowledged.
3. Bosnian War (1992–1995): Tens of thousands of civilians died, with some estimates suggesting around 100,000 civilian casualties.
4. Rwandan Genocide (1994): It resulted in the deaths of an estimated 800,000 to 1 million civilians.
5. Darfur Conflict (2003–Present): Estimates range from hundreds of thousands to over a million civilian casualties.
6. Iraq War (2003–2011): Estimates of civilian deaths exceed 100,000.
7. Syrian Civil War (2011–Present): Estimates range from several hundred thousand to over a million.
8. Yemeni Civil War (2015–Present): Estimates exceed tens of thousands of civilian deaths.

In times of war, the laws fall silent and it is not the so-called evil powers that defy the laws. When Britain adopted the policy of terror bombing of Germany, nearly 300,000 civilians were killed and 800,000 wounded. The British bomber commands orders for reprisal attacks were clear—targets were not to be dockyards and factories but the heart of the city and built-up areas. The justification was that it was a reprisal and the aim was to render a third of Germans homeless so that the conditions would become intolerable for the German population. Even as the war was almost won, Britain bombed the city of Dresden where nearly 135,000 civilians were killed.16

These inhuman bombings by Britain provided a precedent to US President Harry Truman who ordered the firebombing of Tokyo and the use of nuclear weapons not on one but two major cities of Japan. While it is to the credit of Japanese that they targeted only army and naval facilities in Pearl Harbor, the American attacks targeted civilians of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The number of civilians killed by the allies number around half a million and there was nothing the civilians did that forfeited them the right to protection from harm. Though unmatched in the tally of the Axis powers and the victims of the holocaust, none the less, it was something not to be imitated and what one would expect from the powers at war with Nazism.

Closer to our times, as per the American “rules of engagement” in Vietnam, it was an acceptable tactic to bomb and strafe villages with air power and artillery known to be hostile or from where American troops have been fired upon. There was also a free fire zone that permitted firing at will for anyone who stayed back by their own consent. In other words, Americans blurred not just the distinction between Combatants and Non-Combatants but also created a new distinction—between hostile/friendly and loyal /disloyal civilians.17

It is unknown to many that it was farsighted of the U.S. President Abraham Lincoln during the American civil war to task Francis Lieber to set out rules of conduct during hostilities for Union soldiers . He issued “General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field,” more popularly known as the “Lieber Code” The Lieber Code was later used as a template for international efforts in the late 19th century to codify the laws and customs of war alongwith the efforts of Henry Dunant and the Red Cross movement that arose out of the Battle at Solferino18

The Lieber Code states in article 16 that:19

Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult

Truly, it is in the times of war the relevance of the old latin phrase 'inter arma enim silent leges' dawns on us . It literally means "In times of war, the law falls silent."

Conclusion

It is important to realise that the moral reality of war is not fixed by actual activities and measures taken to prevent civilian deaths but by opinions. There can never be a consensus on what started the war and who has the onus to end it. What is needed is that peace needs to be given a chance. Just as the attacks beyond the tipping point both in Dresden by Britain and the second Atom Bomb over Japan, the continued reprisals against civilians and pressing the war beyond a certain point by Israel amounts to re-committing the crime of aggression.

Upholding humanitarian law in the complex and volatile environment of Gaza is a formidable challenge. The unique combination of factors, including a dense population, the proximity of military targets to civilians, and the impact of a longstanding blockade, has made it exceptionally difficult to minimise the impact of hostilities on non-combatants. Efforts to protect civilians, ensure humanitarian access, and establish a sustainable ceasefire are ongoing.

As the situation continues to evolve, it is vital for all parties to the conflict to respect and adhere to the principles of humanitarian law. The international community must play a central role in ensuring accountability for violations and promoting a peaceful resolution to the Gaza crisis, which would bring much-needed relief to the beleaguered population. The complexity of the challenge should not deter the commitment to uphold humanitarian law and minimise the suffering of civilians in conflict zones like Gaza.

There is no doubt that war is hell not just for those who must fight it but also to those who live through it. Fighting by the rules also does not make war acceptable. In the current crisis, the argument appears to be that rules can be violated for the sake of the cause. In other words, the perceived justice or injustice allows the belligerent to justify acts that are considered inadmissible violence. True victory is not in the defeat of an enemy but that which paves a way for a better peace to prevail. The people of Gaza are owed an experiment in negotiations after having lived through the hell of war. Hopefully, the hostage swap will resolve the current crisis and pave the way for acceptance of the two-state solution by Israel and whoever inherits the mantle from Hamas as the governing authority in Gaza.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. The attacks by Hamas on Israel across the Gaza Strip has resulted in the highest single day deaths in Israel’s history since the creation of the State of Israel and also the Holocaust. Since beginning of hostilities by Israel, over a hundred UNRWA staff’s members have died and several have been injured. This has been the greatest number of UN staff ever in the history of UN.
• 2. Robert Kolb, “The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: A Brief History of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions”, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 30 September 1998;  “Geneva Conventions at 71: An In-depth Look from the Indian Perspective”, The Economic Times, 13 August 2020.
• 3. "Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law", UN Secretary General's  (UNSG) Bulletin 1999/13, 6 August 1999.
• 4. “Sources of IHL: Treaties and Customary Law”, ICRC.
• 5. “Fundamental Principles of IHL”, ICRC.
• 6. “Israel Drops Evacuation Leaflets in Southern Gaza, Signaling Expansion of Invasion”, PBS NewsHour, 16 November 2023.
• 7. “Article 18 - Wounded and Sick III. Protection of Hospitals”, ICRC.
• 8. For more details, please see ICRC website which defines “In which circumstances can medical establishments and units lose their protection granted by IHL?”.  The questions answered are “The Protection of Hospitals during Armed Conflicts: What the Law Says”, ICRC, 2 November 2023.
• 9. For more details on this attack, see “Afghanistan: Marking Five Years since US Attack on MSF Hospital in Kunduz”, Doctors Without Borders, 5 October 2020.
• 10. “WHO Condemns Massive Attacks on Five Hospitals in Syria”, World Health Organization, 16 November 2016.  
• 11. “Yemen: Coalition Airstrikes Hit Hospital”, Human Rights Watch, 27 October 2015.
• 12. There is confusion about what caused the blasts. See “After Blast Kills Hundreds at Gaza Hospital, Hamas and Israel Trade Blame as rage Spreads in Region”, The Associated Press News, 18 October 2023.  
• 13. The concept of “protected persons” comes under the GC I, Art. 13; GC II, Art. 13; GC III, Art. 4; GC IV, Art. 4. See “Protected Persons”, ICRC.
• 14. Michael Ray, “8 Deadliest Wars of the 21st Century”, Encyclopedia Brittanica, 18 April 2023.
• 15. B. C. Koh, “The War's Impact on the Korean Peninsula”, The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1993, pp. 57–76.
• 16. Please refer to The Destruction of Dresden by David Irving. He says these attacks killed 135,000 people. In the words of the author David Irving who is British, “For the first time in the history of the war, an air raid had wrecked a target so disastrously that there were not enough able-bodied survivors to bury the dead.” By comparison the American raid on Tokyo on the night of 9 March 1945, killed 83,793 people, and the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima killed 71,379. Also see “Overkill Over; The Destruction of Dresden. By David Irving”, The New York Times, 1 March 1964.
• 17. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 188–192.
• 18. "The Battle of Solferino (24 June 1859)", ICRC, 6 April 1998. 
• 19. "Article 16", International Humanitarian Law Databases, ICRC.

Despite various advantages, Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled programmes like ChatGPT can also be used for criminal purposes. There are concerns that individuals, whether lone wolves or members of violent extremist or terrorist organisations, can easily tap into the resourceful information generated on this AI platform for preparing and carrying out subversive acts.  At a Five Eyes Intelligence Summit in California in October 2023, these concerns were flagged by MI5’ Director General Ken McCallum and FBI’s Director Christopher Wray.1

As pointed out by EUROPOL, ChatGPT safety mechanisms can be circumvented in some cases with the ‘correct prompt engineering’, which is the ‘practice of users refining the precise way a question is asked in order to influence the output that is generated by an AI system’. The report notes that this ‘can be abused in order to bypass content moderation limitations to produce potentially harmful content’.2

It is true that the coding fed into it by its developers can indeed detect and refuse to obey sensitive commands and searches, for example, those related to crafting storylines about murder, citing ethical considerations.3 However, by using seemingly ordinary phrases and commands, actors can find ways to undermine human and national security. Some of the key concerns are enumerated below.

Disinformation and Propaganda

Disinformation and misinformation are not just the prerogatives of state actors. Experts have even underscored that this AI platform can assist terrorists in creating ‘malicious web pages and social engineering reliant scams’.4 Non-State actors, including terrorists, can exploit these tactics to spread their propaganda, rally support, and discredit legitimate state representatives and institutions. Some experts have also highlighted issues relating to ‘astroturfing, which is propaganda designed to look like a grassroots campaign—giving the sense that lots of people believe a sentiment when that’s not actually true or real’.5

What aids violent non-State actors is that access to basic services provided by ChatGPT requires no monetary costs, only a stable internet connection and a device on which carefully crafted instructions can be issued to the AI platform. This aspect underscores how decentralisation, affordability, and access to technology, while empowering billions globally, has also facilitated its exploitation by many.

Furthermore, despite increased surveillance to detect and clamp down on terrorists or violent extremists sharing propaganda and participating in radicalised and extremist discussions, use of carefully articulated prompts has ensured that ChatGPT provides avenues to deceive the system. The AI platform, for instance, recommends the use of Tor Browser, Signal, ProtonMail, DuckDuckGo, SecureDrop, and Zeronet—forums prioritising security and complete anonymity, when asked, ‘What are the forums that can be used to freely exchange views amid increased surveillance?’

In December 2022, one of the servers operated by ISIS on Rocket.Chat, an open-source communications platform, announced that the outfit had begun relying on ChatGPT to strengthen and protect a renewed Caliphate. According to the server’s operatives, the AI platform, superior to those present in the public domain, provided ‘precise guidelines for identifying and enlisting a core group of supporters, formulating a political and ideological strategy, garnering backing from the Muslim community, capturing territory, [and] establishing institutions and governmental structures.’6

ChatGPT can churn out information that, if put to use, can strengthen a non-State actor’s strategy to radicalise and recruit extremist individuals. Similar knowledge, disseminated into public space, can inspire lone wolves to commit violence or attempt to do so. In the past, at the peak of COVID-19, it has generated information legitimising conspiracy theories, including the QAnon Movement.7 This political conspiracy theory has been responsible for socio-political fragmentation and polarisation in Western countries like the United States and radicalising those who became disillusioned with the liberal democratic order’s promises.

Furthermore, ChatGPT is accused of replicating, ‘the ideologically consistent, interactive…online extremist environments … amplifying extremist movements that seek to radicalize and recruit individuals’.8 Analysts note that AI chatbots ‘may be trained – or worse, decide – to disseminate violent extremist ideas’.9

Violent Video Games and Radicalisation

ChatGPT’s exploitative use can be expanded to include compilation of ideas to create gripping video games. They are a particularly attractive recreational avenue for the youth and one of the key mediums of radicalising the habitual gamers. Law enforcement, analysts, and security agencies have pointed out the steep rise in this trend recently.10

ChatGPT can create storylines likely to gain traction along themes used by far-right groups in the West or once used by ISIS previously. Notably, video games, filled with violent imagery and audio-visual effects, were one of the many strategies applied by ISIS to expand its recruitment until its physical caliphate’s defeat in March 2019. Today, it is mainly far-right and neo-Nazi extremist groups adopting this strategy to mobilise support.

The fact that ChatGPT can be a resourceful platform to generate a beginner’s manual to build video games from scratch can be a worrying factor for security and law enforcement officials. This is because these build-your-own games can also be launched on various self-publishing platforms like Epic Games Store, with minimal effort and regulation involved. ChatGPT listed this gaming platform as one of the many avenues when prompted with the question of ‘What is the best self-publishing platform for video games?’

ChatGPT also lists some popular video editing platforms in response to question of ‘What is the most popular and accessible audio and video editing software with gripping effects on the audience?’ These platforms can be used to create doctored videos at minimal or no cost. This dilemma can exacerbate deepening concerns regarding deep fakes and the spread of disinformation in the public domain.

3D Weapons

A detailed breakdown of instructions to construct 3D weapons and instruments, the production and sale of which are not necessarily regulated (unlike conventional firearms), and more so within confines of private properties, can be easily found on this AI platform. It provided a 13-step blueprint, from conceptualisation to appropriate software modelling techniques, ways to create required textures, animation, and documentation, when prompted with this instruction—‘Please provide a detailed breakdown on making 3D instruments or weapons.’

Such information can later be released on chat forums like 4kun, 8 Chan, and Gab, which are not subjected to content moderation. The problem is exacerbated by the ease of access to low and high-cost 3D printers, which can be used for violent acts. ChatGPT lists some of the more commonly found 3D printers, such as Creality 3D Ender 3 Series, Prusa i3 MK3/MK4, and Anycubic i3 Mega, with their descriptions when prompted with ‘What is the most easily available 3D printer?’ While the use of such weapon types is in its nascent stages, it can become more popular as future, technologically-equipped generations become gradually exposed to it, and the technology gains more traction commercially.

3D weapons have been used in the past to carry out acts of violence. For example, a synagogue in Halle (Germany) was targeted in October 2019 using a firearm comprised of some of the 3D components made at home by the perpetrator, Stephen Baillet. At least two people died in that attack. The UK witnessed the first-ever conviction of a far-right lone-wolf terrorist in July 2021 for possessing a 3D firearm.11

Data Privacy

ChatGPT even gives insights into some of the most secure platforms like High Fidelity and Decentraland to engage with other individuals in the metaverse, emphasising data security and user privacy. Metaverse can be exploited by terrorists and violent extremists to congregate and formulate plans for their activities.

Moreover, given the right prompts, ChatGPT can outline a detailed list of encrypted chat forums and secure cryptocurrency platforms, providing pathways to evade detection or stringent surveillance in a controlled ecosystem. It recommended using Matrix/Riot, Mastodon, Diaspora, Monero, and Zcash when asked, ‘What are the encrypted chat forms and cryptocurrency platforms that unfailingly uphold freedom of speech and expression?’

Notably, encrypted chat forums have been one of the more commonly used means for those looking to bypass surveillance by law enforcement and intelligence authorities, disseminate propaganda, recruit and radicalise new members and engage in terror financing. User privacy and data protection facilitated by platforms providing crypto trading and funding make such avenues attractive to hostile actors.

Conclusion

Apart from the November 2015 Paris Attacks, casualties have not exceeded double digits in recent extremist or terrorist attacks. Even these events have been restricted to the US due to lax gun regulations. Nevertheless, amid this shift in terrorist trends, as technological dependence increases and expertise to put together weapons inspired by such developments becomes easily available on platforms like ChatGPT, concerns regarding global security architecture’s future have proliferated. While ChatGPT has no doubt contributed to decentralising access to technology, it also allows far-reaching expertise to be gained from the comfort of one’s home, which can equally be put to deleterious use.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Dan Sabbagh, “Terrorists Could Try to Exploit Artificial Intelligence, MI5 and FBI Chiefs Warn”, The Guardian, 18 October 2023.
• 2. “ChatGPT: The Impact of Large Language Models on Law Enforcement”, Report, EUROPOL, 27 March 2023.
• 3. Daniel Siegal and Mary Bennett Doty, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Artificial Intelligence and the Production of Extremist Propaganda”, Insights, Global Network on Extremism & Technology, 17 February 2023.
• 4. Christina Schori Liang, “Terrorist Digitalis: Preventing Terrorists from Using Emerging Technologies”, Report, Institute for Economics & Peace, March 2023.
• 5. Maria Gardner, “AI, ChatGPT, and Language as Technology: Q&A with William Marcellino”, Blog, Rand Corporation, 12 May 2023.
• 6. Gadi Eshed, “Is the Chatbot a Threat or an Opportunity for Security Organizations?”, Commentary, The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, June 2023.
• 7. Brooke Borel, “Talking to ChatGPT About Vaccine Conspiracies”, The Wire Science, 17 February 2023.
• 8. Kris McGuffie and Alex Newhouse, “The Radicalizations Risks Posed by GPT-3 and Advanced Neural Language Models”, Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism, 14 September 2020.
• 9. Mehul Reuben Das, “AI Chatbots like ChatGPT Can Be Used to Groom Young Men into Terrorists, Says Top UK Lawyer”, Firstpost, 10 April 2023.
• 10. Menso Hartgers and Eviane Leidig, “Fighting Extremism in Gaming Platforms: A Set of Design Principles to Develop Comprehensive P/CVE Strategies”, Analysis, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 1 June 2023.
• 11. Andrew Brown, “Terror, Tech, and Transformation: Will Emerging Technologies Revolutionize Terrorism?”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2023, pp. 308–320.

Summary

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) since its formation in 2007 has emerged as one of Pakistan’s deadliest terrorist organisations. Following the breakdown of Imran Khan government’s peace negotiations in 2021 and subsequent surge in TTP’s terrorist actions, it is likely the group, inspired by Afghan Taliban, is working to take control over territories in Pakistan’s tribal areas with the eventual aim of extending its control over all of Pakistan.

On 4 November, as reported by Pakistani analyst, Tehreek-e-Jihad (TEJ) Pakistan, an affiliate of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacked Pakistan Air Force MM Alam Air Base at Mianwali, Punjab leading to loss of 14 aircrafts and 35 military men.1 The attack serves as a reminder of the resurgence of TTP and the threat posed by the group to Pakistan.

This Brief delves into the TTP's genesis, objectives, its fluctuating fortunes of decline and resurgence, and the Pakistan government's efforts to neutralize the TTP, both militarily and politically. Additionally, the intricate dynamics of the TTP's alliance with the Afghan Taliban which renders it a formidable and seemingly existential threat to Pakistan are analysed.

Following its formation in 2007, the TTP has emerged as one of Pakistan’s deadliest terrorist organisations. It has to its (dis)credit some of the bloodiest attacks in the country’s history—attack on PNS Mehran airbase in 2011; an attack on Karachi’s international airport in 2014; and massacre at the Army Public School in Peshawar on 16 December 2014 that killed around 150 people out of whom 134 were students. On 15 June 2014, Pakistan Army launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb [Strike of Muhammad’s Sword] in North Waziristan to re-impose state’s monopoly over violence. Barely six months after it was launched, the TTP struck in Peshawar Army Public School, which led to further intensification of the operation. A year later, Pakistan’s military claimed 2,763 terrorists killed, 837 hideouts destroyed, 253 tons explosive recovered. The veracity of these figures has not been independently confirmed and various sources have decried loss of civilian life and property.2 Operation Zarb-e-Azb, US drone operations and factors intrinsic to the organisation precipitated TTP’s steep decline, and by 2016, TTP’s capability to launch terrorist attacks within Pakistan had drastically weakened.3

TTP which was pushed out of the tribal belt by 2014–2015 saw a resurgence around 2020, coinciding with the rise of Afghan Taliban, north of Durand Line. The Imran Khan government attempted peace negotiations with TTP after the Taliban came to power in Kabul in August 2021 and mediated the talks, which collapsed in late 2021 even after there was an agreement in favour of a month-long ceasefire in early November 2021. There was again an attempt to hold dialogue in May 2022, mediated again by Afghan Taliban which resulted in an indefinite ceasefire in June 2022, which lasted till September 2022. The sticking point in the talks was reversal of merger of FATA with Khyber Pakthunkhwa and release of TTP cadres. Since then, there has been a sharp increase in terrorist attacks perpetuated by TTP culminating in attack on Pakistan’s Air Force base in Mianwali. This attack has been claimed by TJP, an affiliate of TTP.4

The Genesis and Relationship with Pakistan Army

Following the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, thousands of Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists crossed over into Pakistan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as well in parts of the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. Pakistani tribesmen and madrassa students were recruited by the Afghan Taliban leaders, with the complicity of some of the local tribal leaders, to fight US and NATO forces.5 The atrocities committed by Pakistani army, during the counterterrorist operations, and the resultant loss of civilian life and property, provided further impetus to insurgency in the region and led to greater coordination amongst the terrorist groups. The US and Pakistani forces targeted al Qaeda creating an environment for the resurgence of Afghan Taliban and the rise of TTP in the various tribal agencies. The Islamist forces in FATA that combined to form TTP later targeted local tribal elders, disrupted the existing political structures, and instituted their own version of Islamic governance.6 It was in this environment that the TTP emerged in December 2007 as an umbrella organisation under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, a terrorist leader from South Waziristan.7

Lieutenant General Asad Durrani, former Director General of ISI, and Military Intelligence of Pakistan, attributes the rise of TTP to the military operation of 2004 in South Waziristan. He suggests that the tribesmen took up arms against the state because Pakistan Army violated their traditions and agreements with them.8

Pakistan Army has a long history of raising and collaborating with terrorist organisations of various hues. Some of these terrorist organisations have been granted special favours for their perceived strategic usefulness, while military operations have been launched to destroy others. The escape of former spokesperson of TTP, Ehsanullah Ehsan, from the custody of Pakistan Army in January 2020 is intriguing and is an apt commentary on duplicitous relationship between terrorist organisations and Pakistani establishment. Ehsan, on behalf of the TTP and later its breakaway incarnation Jamat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), had claimed the slaughter of thousands of Pakistanis including the attack on Nobel-laureate Malala Yousufzai. During his detention, Ehsan was housed in a villa in Peshawar’s suburban Hayatabad Township amid civilians, indicating that there was not even an intention of bringing him to justice.9 He has also claimed that, during his time in detention, Pakistani authorities had given him a hit list of people who they would like to be killed in the north-western province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.10

Objectives of TTP

Amira Jadoon, who has worked at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and has researched extensively on TTP, submits that the group’s key goals included implementing sharia law, fighting US and NATO forces in Afghanistan (prior to US withdrawal), and engaging in jihad against the Pakistan Army. She cites a statement by Baitullah Mehsud’s spokesman, Maulvi Omar, of December 2007 that a key reason for the creation of the TTP was to present a united front against the Pakistan Army’s operations.11

TTP since its inception has been a loose umbrella group of a number of smaller factions with many competing agendas. Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir diverged with Baitullah Mehsud’s aggressive stance against Pakistani state and support to foreign terrorists. These and other differences led to internal dissensions and breakups and mergers of various groups and sub-groups of TTP weakening the organisation.12 Internal discords coupled with Pakistani Army’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb forced TTP to relocate to Afghanistan towards the end of 2014. The group actively supported Afghan Taliban’s war with US led NATO forces leading up to their withdrawal in 2021. Taliban’s victory emboldened and strengthened TTP. The group then turned its attention to Pakistani state after carrying out series of mergers and structural changes in its organisation. The decision making was centralised and the group was armed with new and sophisticated weapons. With Afghan Taliban in power, the TTP now enjoys ‘strategic depth’, enhancing its military potential and survivability against Pakistani army operations.

Following the breakdown of Imran Khan government’s peace negotiations in 2021 and subsequent surge in TTP’s terrorist actions, it is likely the group, inspired by Afghan Taliban, is working to take control over territories in Pakistan’s tribal areas with the eventual aim of extending its control over all of Pakistan.13

The Rise and Fall of TTP

An analysis of TTP’s operations for the period 2007—2020 indicates that the inception and consolidation phase of the group lasted from 2007 to 2009. It was involved in 269 attacks during this period, primarily in FATA and KP. It was in 2010 when the activities of TTP peaked, with the group involved in 402 attacks. There was a significant drop in TTP’s activities in the following years with the group being involved in 202 attacks in 2011 and 392 attacks in 2012. Thereafter, it was a period of steady decline in TTP’s activities with 96 attacks being recorded in 2015. The reduction in terrorist activities was a result of multiple factors and not the least, Pakistan army’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which was launched in June 2014. The group was involved in 21 attacks in 2018—lowest since its inception in 2007. By the end of the decade, the group’s operational potential had weakened significantly.14

TTP saw a decline in its operational capabilities due to neutralisation of its leaders at frequent intervals. Baitullah Mehsud, a veteran of the Afghan “jihad”, and founder of TTP was killed in a drone strike in August 2009. He was replaced by Hakimullah Mehsud, the group’s new leader, who was also neutralised, like his predecessor, in a drone strike, in November 2013. His death opened cracks in the TTP alliance.15 The group splintered after the death of Hakimullah Mehsud as his successor, Mullah Fazlullah, a non-Mehsud and non-tribal, could not hold alliance together. The group suffered from infighting and discord. It was around this time that the Pakistani military launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which struck a critical blow to the group.16

The TTP leadership fled to Afghanistan, where it concentrated in eastern Afghanistan—Kunar and Nangarhar provinces. Mullah Fazlullah was later killed in a drone strike in June 2018 and the leadership was passed back to a Mehsud-Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud. The challenge before the new leader was to bring together the various factions which had parted ways and undertake new recruitment. The internal rivalries and military operations resulted in sharp fall in numbers of the members of TTP. In mid-2009, the TTP was estimated to have between sixteen and twenty thousand members. The numbers peaked in 2012 when it was estimated that the group consisted of twenty and twenty-five thousand members.17 By late 2019, however, the US Department of Defense estimated the number of TTP fighters in Afghanistan to be around three to five thousand, and a UN report in 2020 put this figure at around six thousand.18

Reorganisation and Resurgence of TTP

In 2017, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud wrote a book, Inquilabi-e-Mehsud, which analysed the grounds for downfall of the group. The book highlighted kidnapping for ransom, extortions, and targeted killings of innocents as the main reasons.19 Later, when he took over the leadership of the group, the Mufti disseminated a ‘Code of Conduct’ which aimed to bring about greater discipline by announcing rules of engagement, legitimate targets, and procedure to be followed for suicide attacks. He also reorganised the group’s organisational structure and concentrated greater authority in the central leadership and brought about greater clarity regarding the chain of command.

Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud’s tribal affiliations facilitated him to bring in the Mehsud factions back into the fold of TTP, and won over the support of Taliban from Mohmand, Bajaur, and other tribal districts. He also managed to establish operational and logistic support relations with al-Qaeda and the Punjabi Taliban. The Mufti also relocated the headquarters of the group to Bermal district which provided easy access into the former TTP stronghold of south Waziristan.20

Many former factions came back into the fold of TTP in 2020-Hakimullah Mehsud Group, Amjad Farouqi group, Usman Saifullah Kurd group and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Hizbul Ahrar. Among the factions, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Hizbul Ahrar were involved in many deadly attacks within Pakistan, especially against Pakistani security forces.

The Sheheyar Mehsud Group merged with TTP in October 2021. The reintegration of splinter groups improved the TTP’s overall standing, reach, and ability to strike at targets within Pakistan. The mergers are also suggestive of the future course of action of the group—TTP is unlikely to dilute its demands of extending sharia law all over Pakistan.21

Taliban’s Return to Power Provided Boost to TTP’s Jihadist Agenda

The TTP was the first terrorist group to officially celebrate Taliban’s takeover within hours of the group entering Kabul. In a statement released on 17 August 2021, the TTP declared the Taliban’s return to power as a great victory for the jihadi project.22 The two groups share ideological and operational linkages, yet there is one issue of divergence between them. The TTP has announced jihad against the Pakistan Army, while the Afghan Taliban has no such stated policy. The Taliban publicly discourages its members from fighting Pakistani state, but a large majority of its members consider it a religious and national obligation to support the TTP from an ideological perspective and due to tribal and personal connections cemented in the last two decades of insurgency.

Despite this difference, TTP prizes its special relationship with the Afghan Taliban. TTP chief Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, in a video purportedly shot in 2021, had declared that his outfit came under the larger "umbrella" of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The claim was refuted by Afghan Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid in an interview with Arab News.23 Afghan Taliban’s rebuttal notwithstanding, the TTP leader’s assertion is indicative of close bond between the two groups.

The TTP has fought alongside and provided recruits to Afghan Taliban in their war against US led Western forces and the West supported Afghan government. Post Operation Zarb-e-Azb, TTP terrorists found shelter in Afghanistan and used safe havens in remote border areas to conduct cross-border attacks. When the Afghan Taliban came to power after the withdrawal of US forces, it released the jailed TTP leaders.24 This led to souring of relations between the Pakistani establishment and the Afghan Taliban. The relationship received further setback when despite Pakistani demands, Afghan Taliban have not denied shelter to TTP or attempted to dissuade them from attacking Pakistani forces.25

The withdrawal of US forces also helped the TTP secure modern weapons, including the sophisticated M24 sniper rifle, M4 carbines with Trijicon ACOG scopes, and the M16A4 rifle with Pulsar Trail XQ38/XQ50 thermal scope.26 These weapons have enhanced TTP’s operation capability against Pakistani security forces. The group’s resurgence has seen a dramatic rise in terror activities and the arc of terror has expanded from the tribal belt to major cities in Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh province. The number of TTP-claimed attacks more than tripled between 2020 and 2022, with the monthly attack average increasing from 14.5 in 2020 to 23.5 in 2021 and 45.8 in 2022.27

The US forces’ hasty, chaotic, and humiliating exit from Afghanistan in August 2021 culminated in Taliban’s return to power. The Afghan Taliban’s astounding success in defeating the sole superpower has emboldened the TTP which believes it can replicate the success against the Pakistani ‘infidel’ state.28   

Failed Attempts at Rapprochement

Shortly after Taliban took over the reins of power in Kabul, Pakistan government sought the group’s assistance to facilitate peace negotiations with TTP. Despite initial reluctance, the Afghan Taliban was able to convince the TTP to initiate peace negotiations with the Pakistani government.29 A month-long ceasefire was announced along with peace talks on 9 November 2021. The talks broke down with TTP accusing the government of failing to honour the decisions reached earlier and launching operations in which TTP members were killed and detained by the security forces. In late 2021, TTP resumed attacks against Pakistani forces, which increased in frequency and intensity in the following months. The TTP claimed 45 attacks in December 2021 and set a record of 54 attacks in April 2022.30 The Pakistani armed forces retaliated by launching cross border air strikes31 and covert operations to neutralise TTP leadership in Afghanistan.

Despite increased terrorist activities, the government of Pakistan and TTP in May 2022 again agreed to a ceasefire and resumed negotiations.32 Several rounds of talks were held and there were indications that a breakthrough may be possible but the negotiations again failed with TTP resuming terrorist activities across Pakistan.33 Although the TTP officially announced resumption of jihadi activities in November 2022, the attacks had begun when some of the TTP leaders were thought to have been eliminated in covert operations by the Pakistani security agencies.34 Killing of Abu Wali alias Umar Khalid Khurasani and transfer of Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed35 as the Bahawalpur corps commander in August 2022 also did not help the cause of peace negotiations.

Is TTP an Existential Threat to Pakistan?

Taliban’s success in Afghanistan has greatly emboldened the TTP which is increasingly reinventing and modelling along the lines of Taliban. During the Afghan war, the Taliban in 2005 had divided the country into provinces and appointed shadow governors. Along with provinces, Taliban also formed 18 commissions which acted like ministries, encompassing portfolios like political, economic, media and culture. The military commission was the most influential and important due to the ongoing war, followed by the economic one. As the Afghan Taliban acquired more terrain and expanded, they gradually set up new provinces and shadow governors to rule the territory. 

The TTP following the similar model has adopted new administrative and operational structure. In February 2023, the group announced the formation of two zones—north and south—where nine administrative and operational units (wilayahs or shadow provinces) have been established. Later in June, establishment of wilayahs was announced in Balochistan (Qalat and Makran) followed by Punjab. Every province is headed by a shadow governor and at least a deputy, and is supervised by an intelligence officer. The TTP also has spiritual linkage with the Afghan Taliban. The TTP emir is under the direct bayt of the Afghan Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada. In jihadist ideology, this oath of allegiance has secured the support of the Afghan Taliban in times of crisis.36

The adoption of new administrative and operational structures by TTP by itself do not pose existential threat to Pakistan. However, when seen in the context of severe economic crisis in Pakistan and increasingly radicalised society, the threat posed by the exponential increase in the TTP’s operational capability and the ‘strategic depth’ provided by Afghan Taliban led IEA, the contours of Pakistan’s security dynamics alter significantly. TTP has the potential to threaten the very existence of Pakistan as a sovereign, independent entity.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan Army Should Leave Politics & Get Back to Security. An Airbase Was Just Attacked”, The Print, 7 November 23.
• 2. Sachchal Ahmad, “After Zarb-E-Azb: Now What?”, Stimson, 18 August 2015.
• 3. Amira Jadoon, The Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, No. 494, May 2021, pp. 3–4.
• 4. TJP has released a 5-minute video and has claimed that 35 aircrafts were damaged in the attack. See Manoj Gupta, “Pakistan Air Force Base Attack Was a Well-Planned Move, Has Caused ‘Major Damage’: Sources”, News 18, 5 November 2023.
• 5. Mona Kanwal Sheikh, Guardians of God: Inside the Religious Mind of the Pakistani Taliban, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016.
• 6. Hassan Abbas,“A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban,” CTC Sentinel 1, No. 2, 2008.
• 7. Amira Jadoon, The Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, no. 3.
• 8. Asad Durrani, Pakistan Adrift Navigating Troubled Waters, Chennai: Westland Publications Private Limited, 2018, p. 238.
• 9. Mohammad Taqi, “Pakistan’s Army Continues to Mollycoddle Terrorists and Hound its Critics”, The Wire, 14 February 2020.
• 10. “Taliban Terrorist Ehsanullah Ehsan Confesses Leading Death Squad on Pak Army's Behest”, WION, 13 August 2020.
• 11. Paul Staniland, Asfandyar Mir and Sameer Lalwani, “Politics and Threat Perception: Explaining Pakistani Military Strategy on the North West Frontier,” Security Studies, Vol.27, No. 4, 2018, pp. 535–574.
• 12. Amira Jadoon, The Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, no. 3, p. 6.
• 13. Bill Roggio of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a U.S.-based think tank, is of the opinion that. “The TTP will not be satisfied with ruling a small portion of Pakistan, it will inevitably want more than what it is given. Like the Afghan Taliban wanted to rule Afghanistan, the TTP wants to rule Pakistan.” See Kathy Gannon, “Afghan Taliban’s Victory Boosts Pakistan’s Radicals”, The Diplomat, 18 October 2021.
• 14. For detailed analysis of the TTP’s operational activities, see Amira Jadoon The Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, no. 3, pp. 8–9.
• 15. TTP splinted into three main groups: the Shahryar Mehsud group, the Khalid Sajna group, and the Asmat Muawiya group.
• 16. The Pakistan and US army operations against the TTP undermined its operational capability, but the group survived by dispersing its remaining members and leadership in Afghanistan.
• 17. Amira Jadoon, The Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, no. 3, p. 11.
• 18. “Operational Freedom’s Sentinel: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2019–March 31, 2019,” 25, Table 2.
• 19. “Breakaway Faction, Splinter Group Join TTP”, Dawn, 18 August 2020.
• 20. Daud Khattak, “The Pakistani Taliban is Back”, The Diplomat, 9 March 2021.
• 21. Umair Jamal, “Pakistan’s Great Expectations of the Taliban”, The Diplomat, 8 October 2021.
• 22. Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud (Abu Mansur Asim), “Congratulations to Islamic Amirate on behalf of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan”, Umar Media, 17 August 2021.
• 23. “Afghan Taliban Reject TTP Claim of Being a 'Branch of IEA'”, Dawn, 11 December 2021.
• 24. The Taliban released hundreds of jailed TTP terrorists, including senior commanders such as founding deputy emir Maulawi Faqir Muhammad Bajauri and former spokesperson Mufti Khalid Bulti.
• 25. “Pakistan: Shoring Up Afghanistan’s Peace Process”, International Crisis Group, 30 June 2021.
• 26. Tweet by War Noir @war_noir, 7 September 2023.
• 27. Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover”, CTC West Point, May 2023, Vol. 16, No. 5.
• 28. Kathy Gannon, “Afghan Taliban’s Victory Boosts Pakistan’s Radicals”, The Diplomat, 18 October 2021.
• 29. The Pakistani government and the TTP accepted that the IEA would play the role of a mediator and that both sides would form five-member committees each which, under the supervision of the mediator, would discuss the next course of action and demands of each side. See Ismail Khan, “TTP Declares End to Ceasefire”, Dawn, 10 December 2021.
• 30. Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover”, no. 27.
• 31. On 15 April 2022, PAF hit a refugee camp and another location, killing at least 40 civilians. UNICEF said 20 children were believed to be among the dead. See Kathy Gannon, “Afghan Taliban’s Victory Boosts Pakistan’s Radicals”, AP, 19 May 2022.
• 32. Ismail Khan, “Islamabad, TTP Agree on Indefinite Ceasefire”, Dawn, 31 May 2022.
• 33.  “TTP Declares End to Truce, Orders Attacks across Pakistan”, Firstpost, 28 November 2022.  
• 34. “TTP’s Lethal Return”, The Express Tribune, 2 December 2022.
• 35. Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, former DG ISI, led talks with TTP as Peshawar Corps Commander. His transfer from Peshawar to Bahawalpur negatively impacted the peace process.
• 36. Iftikhar Firdous, Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud and Riccardo Valle, “How TTP’s Resurgence Came to Pass”, Dawn, 10 July 2023.

When most of the global scientific cooperation remains suspended over the Arctic, on 27 September 2023, Xuelong 2, China’s first domestically built scientific icebreaker ship returned to its home port Shanghai, after concluding 13th scientific research expedition to the Arctic. The ice-breaker also carried an autonomous underwater vehicle (XH1000) developed by Harbin Engineering University. Equipped with domestically developed detection sonars, this polar observing autonomous underwater vehicle surveyed an area of about 7,000 square meters beneath the Arctic ice and conducted multiple under-ice environment detection operations near the Chukchi Sea.1

Scientific Activities

The 13th expedition was mainly focused on undertaking scientific investigations in the Gakkel Ridges and the central section of the Pacific Arctic region. During the journey of about 15,000 nautical miles, Chinese researchers undertook 49 comprehensive marine surveys, deployed five sets of submersible buoys, carried out 142 groups of meteorological soundings tests, established six short-term and one long-term ice stations and deployed 26 sets of quasi-disposable ice-based buoys.

Various types of data was gathered on meteorology, atmospheric composition, aerosols, sea debris, gravity, sea surface temperature, profiling of currents, ship stress and related parameters.2 Apart from this, seabed seismic surveying, magneto telluric surveying and geological sampling from the Arctic Ocean were also conducted.3 About 130 strains of bacteria from seawater and Arctic sediments and around 68 genetic samples of marine flora and fauna for undertaking further research at Chinese laboratories and scientific institutions.4  

China claimed that such experimentation and observations are aimed at strengthening its scientific understanding of the Arctic region. It is however pertinent to flag the dual-use implications of the experiments that were conducted. One such experimentation involved the use of Synthetic Aperture Radars (SARs) to observe Arctic region. SARs can be mounted on satellites, high-altitude airships, manned aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles. They use microwave signals that can penetrate through dust, darkness, clouds and rain to create high-resolution images.5 During the expedition, Chinese scientists used five different frequency bands of SAR to build an integrated testing platform, for conducting sea ice observation by microwave remote sensing.6

Assessment

Chinese scholars claim that the success of the mission demonstrates the credibility and endurance of Xuelong 2 and its onboard polar research equipment, which is seen as a big boost for the country’s domestic manufacturing industries undertaking R&D in polar resilient technologies. Chinese scientists claim that the scientific experiments conducted during this expedition would enable further understanding of multiple processes occurring in the region and help expand the scale of the country's Arctic research.7  

Not only is the scale and size of China’s scientific research activities in the Arctic significantly increasing, as evident from China’s annual expedition to the region, China has also developed some of the most critical dual-use infrastructural capabilities. China’s scientific research in the Arctic remains highly integrated where research activity on one aspect comprehends the other. Research on sea ice is an important parameter for Chinese engineers involved in the design and manufacturing of ice-breakers and other scientific instruments and infrastructure required for Polar Regions.8

Second, deployment of some of the unmanned buoys (domestically developed) on floating Arctic ice floes, that would make observation and record data on various parameters throughout the winters with capabilities to relay this data remotely to various civil–military research institutions in mainland China, is noteworthy. Critical instruments like vector hydrophones, along with multiple sensors deployed on these buoys, apart from undertaking scientific readings beneath Arctic Sea ice, could also be used to detect the movement of submarines and ships in the region.9

Third, each Chinese polar scientific expedition is having multiple dual-use scientific equipment on board manufactured indigenously. Their successful performance on multiple parameters in extreme polar environments helps China undertake extensive R&D. Such technologies not only strengthen China’s domestic technological capabilities but also open up prospects for exports.

Fourth, biological samples collected during this expedition will strengthen and replenish China’s National GeneBank (CNGB) in Shenzhen that has been operational since September 2016. China has ambitions of making this facility as the world’s biggest biological information data centre, and further its capabilities in critical domains such as bio-informatics and gene editing.

Fifth, China claims to be undertaking scientific research in the Arctic to address the global environmental challenges emanating from the region. Its research however remains primarily concerned with the impact of climate change to China’s own national interests. Increasing incidents of flooding and extreme weather patterns pose serious threats to Chinese agriculture which would have future implications for its food and economic security.10 China therefore could not tend to ignore the ongoing transformation in the Arctic region and is seeking to understand the region’s scientific and environmental dimensions.

Sixth, China’s polar research is progressing as per its ‘great leap-style development’ approach. China’s intentions in the Polar Regions are aimed at initially surpassing the capabilities of developing states, followed by efforts to surpass the developed polar states.11

Seventh, as per Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the portions of the seabed that lies outside the jurisdiction of coastal states, have the status of the “common heritage of mankind” (Article 136) and such areas are not subject to the “claim and exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights” (Article 137).12 Three Arctic States—Denmark on behalf of Greenland (2014), Canada (2019) and Russia (initially in 2001 and then subsequent revised submissions in 2015, 2021 and 2023)—have made sovereignty claims over the ‘Gakkel Ridge’ that lies in the central Arctic Ocean before the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelves (CLCS) on which CLCS has not made any decision.

Chinese surveys in ‘Gakkel Ridge’ raise speculations regarding its future intentions in the region, which is extremely rich in polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts in its deep seabeds. Research assessments suggest that China’s future approach in such areas could be on two fronts—seek to exploit these critical or rare earth minerals for its domestic needs and seek avenues to export these resources in raw or furnished forms globally.13

Eighth, amid gaps in global scientific cooperation and hung mechanisms of Arctic governance, China’s 13th Arctic expedition for the first time witnessed the cooperation and participation of scientists and researchers from Thailand. The expedition also received bilateral support and cooperation from Russian counterparts who joined Chinese researchers to study local gravity, magnetic force and other physical data during the expedition.14 This shows China’s efforts to emerge as a new player in Arctic affairs and work with like-minded partners in polar research. 

Conclusion

Xuelong 2 again set sail (along with Xuelong 115 and a cargo ship Tianhui) for China’s 40th expedition to Antarctic on 1 November 2023. This is the biggest flotilla of research vessels currently enroute to the Antarctic with 460 personnel onboard along with a large amount of logistics and construction material for building China’s fifth research station on Antarctica.16 The scale of China’s ongoing activities and the dual-use nature of its scientific research indicates that it will continue to accrue critical capabilities to strengthen its scientific and strategic objectives in the Polar Regions.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Wang Qingchen and Zhu Zhongben, “Harbin Project's ‘Xinghai 1000’ polar AUV explores the North Pole”, Harbin Engineering University, 2 October 2023.
• 2. Yu Taoran, “China's 13th Arctic Ocean Scientific Expedition Team Triumphantly Made Important Progress in Independent Equipment Research and Development and Other Aspects”, Shanghai Observer, 27 September  2023. 
• 3. Ibid.
• 4. “Chinese Scientists have Completed the First Stage of the 13th Expedition to the Arctic Ocean”, TACC, 14 August 2023.
• 5. Ricardo Rendon Cepeda, “Applications of Synthetic Aperture Radar Satellites to Environmental Monitoring”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 9 November 2020.
• 6. “Chinese Scientists Complete Crucial Researches during Expedition to Arctic Ocean”, CGTN, 20 September 2023.
• 7. "Arctic Expedition Home After Finishing Mission”, China Daily, The State Council People Republic of China, 28 September 2023.
• 8. “The 13th Arctic Ocean Scientific Expedition丨Popular Science: From Theory to Site--The first Line of Sea Ice Research”, Xinhua News, 21 August 2023.
• 9. Heiner Kubny, “China Deploying Acoustic Buoys in Arctic Ocean Triggers Concerns”, Polar Journal, 28 August 2023.
• 10. “China’s Arctic Policy”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, January 2018.
• 11. Anne-Marie Brady, China as a Polar Great Power, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 55.
• 12. Lars Kullerud and Oran R. Young, “Adding a Gakkel Ridge Regime to the Evolving Arctic Ocean Governance Complex”, Marine Policy, Vol. 122, December 2020.
• 13. P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse and Ryan Dean, “Why China is Not a Peer Competitor in the Arctic”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, September–October 2022.
• 14. “Chinese Scientists Carry Out Research at Arctic Ocean Expedition”, CGTN, 8 August 2023.
• 15. The XueLong 1 was initially an ice-strengthened cargo ship purchased by China from Ukraine in 1993. After undertaking several refits and modifications, China converted this into its polar research and resupply vessel.
• 16. China currently maintains four operational research stations in Antarctica. These are the Great Wall Station (1985), Zhongshan Station (1989), Kunlun Station (2009) and Taishan Station (2014).