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Chemical Weapon Profile: Libya

Pranamita Baruah
Pranamita Baruah is Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

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    • Pranamita Baruah
    January-June 2011
    Country Profile

    Recently, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya drew a lot of international attention following the violent crackdown on the protests there. As the situation deteriorated further, the possibility of Colonel Gaddafi using chemical weapons against the rebels opened a new dimension to the Libyan crisis. Soon, reports regarding Libya’s possession of weapons grade chemical stockpile started pouring in.

    Libya’s association with chemical weapon is not a recent phenomenon. It first began as a victim when, in 1930, Italy’s autocratic leader Benito Mussolini authorized the use of sulfur mustard against the Libyan rebels. However, since mid-1980s, Libya itself has pursued an offensive chemical warfare programme. At that time, several factors were offered as drivers of Libya’s chemical weapon programme. Firstly, in order to compensate Libya’s military weakness vis-à-vis neighbouring states (particularly Egypt and Israel), Libyan leader Gaddafi felt it necessary to pursue such a programme. Secondly, it has been argued that Libya went ‘chemical way’ in concert with an aggressive programme to develop a ballistic missile delivery capability. Finally, increasing security threat posed by the alleged pursuit of chemical weapons by neighbouring states (particularly Egypt, Iraq and Syria) also largely pushed Libya to pursue a chemical weapons strategy.1

    In the second half of 1980s, Libya initiated its chemical weapon programme with the help of foreign suppliers (mostly from Western Europe). Its first chemical weapon production facility was established near the village of Rabta in 1998. It was believed that the new pharmaceuticals facility, known as Pharma-150, could produce at least 100 metric tons of blister and nerve agents in the span of three years. Later on, two more facilities, Pharma-200 and Pharma-300 (Rabta II) were established. Of the two, Pharma-300 or Rabta II was established in Tarhuna, near the Libyan capital-Tripoli, to serve as a secure storage location. It was built using sandstone shields and reinforced concrete in order to survive air strikes.2Therefore, it can be said that Libya was aware of the illegality of its chemical weapons strategy.

    In September 1987, allegations that Gaddafi was willing to use chemical weapons against Chadian forces drew international attention. What concerned the West most was that although Libya had the capacity to start chemical warfare even when it was not going to be decisively useful or even legitimate. Subsequently, in order to deal with the increasing threat from Libyan chemical weapons, the then US President Ronald Reagan hinted at the possibility of a military strikes on the Rabta plant. However, before any attempt could be made against it, the production capability of the Rabta plant was reportedly destroyed by a fire. Later on, the fire was discovered to be a hoax, intended to discourage the US strike.

    Nevertheless, soon enough, details of foreign assistance in Libya’s pursuit of chemical weapons were revealed. Several West German companies, including Imhausen-Chemie, were allegedly involved in Libya’s chemical weapon programme. Finally, a total of twelve firms from both Eastern and Western bloc countries, including a few from Japan, were named for their alleged assistance to Libya’s chemical weapons program.3 Such revelations had a substantive impact in isolating Libya from the international community.

    In January 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) opened for signature and it came into force on April 29, 1997. However, Libya, along with Egypt and other Arab countries, abstained from signing it due to Israel’s alleged nuclear arms programme. They further argued that chemical weapons disarmament could be effective only within the context of a regional WMD ban. Still, Libya attended the first CWC Review Conference (RevCon) from April 28 to May 9, 2003 as a non-state party. By October 2003, Libya consented to US and British inspections of its WMD-related facilities to verify the state and extent of the former’s chemical weapon and other WMD programmes.4 Interestingly, it was only on December 20, 2003 that Gaddafi publicly acknowledged his government’s pursuit of WMD in the past and pledged to abandon all such progranmes. In its statement, the Libyan government declared: “The Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah has urged the countries in the region to make the Middle East and Africa a region free of weapons of mass destruction.”5Gaddafi pledged to abide by all relevant nonproliferation treaties, including the CWC.

    It is worth noting that in 2003, the US reached an important agreement with Libya under which the latter agreed to give up its pursuit for WMD in return for the restoration of normal diplomatic relations with the US. Accordingly, among other things, Libya destroyed its longer-range missiles. 3,300 aerial munitions which were used to disperse mustard gas and other chemical agents were also abolished. In 2004, Libya joined the International Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).6 Soon, OPCW inspectors started monitoring the destruction of its aerial bombs designed to deliver chemical agents. It also began the verification process of Libya’s initial declaration of possessing 50,700 lbs. (~ 23 MT) of mustard agent and 2.9 million lbs. (~1.315MT) of nerve agent precursor chemicals. On March, the Hague-based body confirmed the presence of 23 MT of sulfur mustard and approximately 1,300 MT of sarin precursors. The inspections however also revealed poor storage and maintenance of the chemical agents. It was believed that Libya manufactured some poor quality CW agents as well which probably began degrading rapidly.7 This indicated Libya lacked either the technical know-how or the desire to maintain and manufacture robust storage of chemical weapons.

    Although the Libyan regime claimed to extend unwavering support for international arms control and disarmament initiatives, the eradication process of its chemical agents as well as chemical weapons production facility could not be completed as fast as was initially expected. It was primarily due to the spats between Washington and Tripoli over funding and logistics. Besides, Libya was allegedly reluctant to provide US and British officials visas to monitor the process. The Gaddafi regime however cited environmental concerns for slowing down.8

    In November 2005, Libya was granted an extension by the OPCW to destroy its entire stockpile of chemical weapons by May, 2011.9 The OPCW recently reported that all of Libya’s delivery systems-the 3,300 unloaded aerial bombs- were crushed by bulldozers in 2004. Nearly 13.5 metric tons (15 Tons) of sulfur mustard-which constitutes about 54% of Libya’s chemical stockpile, have also been destroyed. Since 2005, nearly 40% of the chemicals used to make sulfur mustard have also been destroyed. The twice-yearly inspections conducted so far also have not indicated Libya’s intention to revive its chemical weapon programme.10

    Although Libya pledged to fulfill its destruction obligations by 2011, due to slow progress and the recent political turmoil, it seems unlikely that it would able to meet that deadline. As of February 2011, Libya reportedly still possessed 9.5 MT of mustard gas and more than half of the 1,300 MT of precursor chemicals used for developing chemical agents.11 11It reportedly also possesses Scud B missiles. Although under the 2003 agreement with the US, Libya agreed to destroy the chemical weapons only after the US helped Tripoli upgrade its defence through purchasing of other weapons, later on, Tripoli alleged that Washington backed out on its pledge.12

    During the recent political crisis in Libya, there was an increasing concern that not only Col. Gaddafi could resort to use chemical agents against the rebels, the extremists also might exploit the deteriorating security situation in the country and try to misappropriate the mustard gas. All such speculations however were largely put to rest when OPCW spokesman Michael Luhan stated that Libya destroyed its capacity to deliver chemical agents seven years ago13 and without the delivery systems, the utility of the chemical agents is lessened. Extending the argument further, a former Western government official stated: “The (mustard) gas isn’t weaponized and I doubt if it could be within a military significant timeframe. The residual stocks of mustard gas are probably badly degraded and as much of a threat to those holding them as to any potential targets.”14 According to Paula DeSutter, former Bush administration disarmament specialist, “Had the destruction process not started, we would be facing a far more dangerous situation— On the other hand, we would certainly feel more secure if all of the mustard gas had been eliminated.”15

    In spite of the fact that the recent political turmoil in Libya precipitated a large number of unsubstantiated allegations concerning Libya’s remaining chemical weapons capabilities and intentions, as of today, Gaddafi’s regime seems to lack dedicated chemical weapon delivery system. The chemical weapon agents, due to their suboptimal manufacturing and poor maintenance, are apparently not very effective. Although political instability and deteriorating elations with the US and Britain have slowed down the elimination process of the chemical weapons, Libya’s permanent representative to the OPCW Director-General recently reaffirmed his country’s unwavering commitment towards CWC compliance.16

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