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The Khalistan Movement in Canada: A Political Consensus

Abhishek Verma
Mr Abhishek Verma is a Research Analyst in the Internal Security Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. Click here for detailed profile.

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    Abhishek Verma
    July 26, 2024

    Introduction

    On 22 July 2024, the BAPS Swaminarayan Mandir in Edmonton was vandalised by the Khalistan separatists with hateful and anti-India graffiti.1 This incident occurred on the heels of another incident on 19 June 2024 wherein the Canadian parliament observed a minute’s silence on the first death anniversary of designated Khalistani terrorist Hardeep Singh Nijjar. A moment of silence in the parliament reflects an unequivocal consensus among representatives of all the political parties in the House of Commons.2

    Such non-partisan consensus vis-à-vis Khalistani separatists has not been uncommon in Canada. Since the early 1980s, the Canadian political landscape, irrespective of the political parties in power, has been permissive, if not sympathetic, to the Khalistan movement. The driving forces behind such political consensus have ranged from Cold War dynamics before 1990s to domestic politics at present.

    For years, successive Canadian governments, regardless of the political parties in power, have demonstrated a tendency to overlook Indian security concerns and have adopted a lenient approach towards Khalistan-related activities. While doing so, the Canadian government's attitude has been shaped by three overarching factors—Cold War dynamics; political stance on freedom of expression; and considerations of vote bank politics.

    Cold War Era Dynamics

    During the Cold War, in alignment with other Western countries, Canada engaged with India through various bilateral avenues such as project financing, food aid and technical assistance. This was exemplified by the establishment of the CIRUS nuclear reactor at the Trombay Atomic Energy Establishment in 1954. However, bilateral relations between the two nations experienced a downturn following India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 with fissile materials sourced from the aforementioned reactor.

    During this phase (1970s–1980s), the Liberal Party government of Pierre Trudeau and subsequent government of Progressive Conservative Brian Mulroney largely aligned their foreign policy with the United States. The tendency became particularly evident as Cold War dynamics exerted influence in the Indian subcontinent, notably marked by the India–Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

    Amidst the height of Khalistani militancy in India during 1980s, the Canadian government neglected the burgeoning Khalistani secessionist activities within Canada. In one such incident, despite repeated requests for the extradition of a notorious Khalistani terrorist Talwinder Singh Parmar in 1982, the government of Pierre Trudeau rejected Parmar's extradition on frivolous grounds related to Commonwealth protocols. As per the Canadian government, extradition could not proceed because India only recognises Her Majesty as Head of the Commonwealth, and not as Head of State.3 Moreover, the Canadian government’s indifference was further underscored by the failure to bring the perpetrators of the Air India ‘Kanishka’ Bombing of 1985 to justice.

    Subsequent administrations, including those of Jean Chretien, Paul Martin, and Stephen Harper, witnessed a partial improvement in Indo-Canadian relations owing to India's enhanced rapport with the broader Western world. However, Canada maintained its longstanding stance on the issue of Khalistan. It affirmed unequivocal support for a united India while concurrently upholding the view that freedom of expression is an inalienable democratic right. They insisted that mere advocacy for a Khalistani homeland in Punjab did not inherently constitute illegal activity.

    Vote Bank Politics: A Political Consensus

    Since the formation of Justin Trudeau’s government in 2015, considerations of vote banks has induced political parties to adopt a policy of Sikh appeasement. Under Trudeau’s Liberal party government, pro-Khalistan sentiments have been strategically utilised for electoral purposes. Following the 2015 general election, Trudeau's Liberal Party secured a majority with 184 Members of Parliament (MPs). The new Parliament had 18 Sikhs, four of which were cabinet members.

    With the increasing numbers and significance of Sikhs in Canadian Parliament, Prime Minister Trudeau's first term witnessed the implementation of specific populist measures aimed at mobilising Sikh community. In 2017, the ruling Liberal Party in the Ontario Provincial Legislative Assembly passed a resolution characterising the anti-Sikh riot of 1984 as an act of genocide.

    Interestingly, a report issued by Canada's Ministry of Public Safety titled ‘2018 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada’4 explicitly identified Sikh extremism as a security threat to Canada. However, following a formidable backlash from the Sikh community, the Trudeau administration revised the Report and republished it without any reference to Sikh extremism.

    On the other hand, a motion was also brought by opposition Conservative party's Erin O'Toole and Candice Bergen in February 2018, indicating similar sentiments of the opposition towards Khalistan extremists. The said motion was introduced on 27 February 2018 in the House of Commons by the conservative party members to:

    • Value the contributions of Canadian Sikhs and Canadians of Indian origin in our national life;

      • Condemn in the strongest terms all forms of terrorism, including Khalistani extremism and the glorification of any individuals who have committed acts of violence to advance the cause of the Khalistani state in India; and

    • Stand with a united India.

      • Various Sikh organisations like the Canadian Sikh Association and the World Sikh Organisation of Canada, among others, strongly denounced the motion. They believed the motion unfairly targeted the entire Sikh community by designating them as terrorists. Following a considerable backlash, the party decided to drop the motion in the House of Commons.5

    During subsequent years, the political significance of the community continued to increase due to increasing Sikh demography and the formation of a minority government in Canada. In an extraordinary event on 18 September 2023, Prime Minister Trudeau alleged a “potential link between agents of the Government of India and the killing of a Canadian citizen, Hardeep Singh Nijjar”.6 Initially, the Conservative Party questioned the Prime Minister's judgement and demanded evidence for the assertion. Later on, the Party's MPs condemned the killing and took a somewhat sympathetic turn towards the Khalistani extremists.

    In Canadian political discourse, the Liberal Party and New Democratic Party have, in general, adopted the policy of appeasement towards the Canadian Sikh community as well as a section of it that advocates an independent state of Khalistan. However, current political dynamics indicate that the Conservatives (like the liberals and others) prefer to garner as much Sikh political support as possible.

    In the recently concluded Ipsos poll conducted for Canadian news platform Global News, 44 per cent of Canadians think that Pierre Poilievre, leader of the Conservative Party, would make the best Prime Minister of Canada. In the same poll, Trudeau ranked a distant second, with 25 per cent votes in his favour. While Trudeau's supporters fell by 6 per cent since September 2023, support for Poilievre increased by 4 per cent during the same period.7 With such favourable poll performance and increased prospects of forming the next government in Canada, the Conservatives do not want to antagonise the Sikh community through their anti-Khalistan rhetoric.

    Conclusion

    The above analysis indicates mutual consensus across the political and ideological spectrum in Canadian politics on the issue of Khalistan movement. The nature of this consensus has evolved over a period of time. During the initial phase of pro-Khalistan advocacy in Canada, Cold War dynamics guided the government’s approach towards the issue of Khalistan and other anti-India activities. Aligning its policies with the larger Western consensus, Canada adopted a permissive approach towards anti-India and pro-Khalistan movement in Canada while dismissing India’s security concerns. Subsequently, as the Sikh diaspora and their political significance increased, vote bank politics started guiding Canadian politics towards the issue of Khalistan movement.

    In the current political landscape, the three mainstream political parties—the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party and the New Democratic Party—have explicitly demonstrated their sympathy towards Sikh extremists’ agenda, granting further impunity to the anti-India elements inside Canada. This trend of bipartisan support will continue in the near future considering the growing population of Sikh community in Canada and their substantial influence on domestic politics.

    Against this background, India–Canada relations can be expected to remain sour primarily due to Canada’s unwillingness to acknowledge and act on India’s concerns.8 The veneer of freedom of speech, expression and protest cannot be indefinitely invoked to incite secessionist tendencies in other countries. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign state is an equally important international norm and democratic virtue as are freedoms relating to speech and expression.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    Keywords: 
    Khalistan Movement
    Canada

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