The abidance to ceasefire does not mean an end to the conflict, but it surely would work as a confidence-building measure, at least for now, to address the bigger challenge of
coronavirus.
Yemen has been ravaged by conflicts for decades and there seems to be no end to it. Due to the ongoing civil war, Yemen has witnessed one of the worst humanitarian crises.1 The civil war has left thousands of people internally displaced and several thousands dead. In the last five years, the Iran-Saudi rivalry has intensified in Yemen. Recently, in March, the warring factions in Yemen expressed their desire for a mutually acceptable ceasefire, followed by a ceasefire declaration from a Saudi-led alliance in April. What do these ceasefires really mean, particularly as coronavirus ravages the region?
Yemen's Complex Geopolitical Landscape
Yemen has a history of fractured polity, leading to tribal clashes, along with the presence of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). As a result, the country is undergoing a massive humanitarian crises due to the internal displacement of people on a large scale. The recent figures from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimate that, “Over 80 per cent have been displaced for more than a year.”2 In 2019, the death toll in Yemen had reached 100,000 since the war began five years ago, which includes 12,000 civilian casualties, as per the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).3 The principal power struggle lies between the UN-recognised government of Mansour Hadi, supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Iranian-backed Houthis.
The Houthis belong to the Zaydi sect of Shias, which comprise nearly 40 per cent of the Yemeni population.4 Under the al-Ahmar family, Zaydis had ruled over Northern Yemen for almost a millennium before being overthrown in a coup in 1962. For next three decades, the Zaydis who “for centuries had been at the top of country’s social pyramid” were marginalised both politically and economically by the government, which finally led to the creation of Ansar Allah movement founded by Mohammad Badr al-Din Houthi along with Muhammad Izzan.5 The movement soon turned into an armed movement which carried out extensive military campaigns during 2002-09 in the hope of securing greater political participation. The Houthis achieved a breakthrough in September 2014 when they captured capital Sanaa and placed President Mansour Hadi under house arrest. Later in January 2015, President Hadi resigned and escaped to Saudi Arabia, where he pleaded to the international community to restore his elected government in Yemen. As a result, in March 2015, an alliance led by Saudi Arabia and UAE and comprising of several other Arab countries, with logistics and intelligence support from the US, commenced the military campaign against the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen. This intervention significantly complicated the prospects of any peace in the existing multi-dimensional regional crisis. What makes it even more difficult to find any solution to the problem is that each faction has its vision for the future of Yemen.
In a war-ravaged country that continues to fight the bloody civil war, the advent of COVID-19 has exposed the people of Yemen to a completely new set of challenges. Though the country has seen only one confirmed case so far, the lack of testing facilities could mean that several cases especially among the internally displace people and refugees might have gone unnoticed. In the light of increasing threat of pandemic that has crippled the functioning of daily life all over the world, the UN Secretary-General has called for an “immediate global ceasefire in all corners of the world” and made an appeal “to put armed conflict on lockdown and focus together on the true fight” of human lives.6
Driven by the seriousness of the crisis, the Saudi-led coalition announced a two-week ceasefire on April 09. In response, Houthi spokesperson Mohammed al-Bukhaiti stated, “We will continue to fight and target their military installations and industrial sites since they continue with the siege…There has to be total end of the siege or else the war will continue.”7 Iran, so far, has not taken an official position on the ceasefire. However, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, a senior foreign policy adviser to the Iranian Parliament, had stated, “Ending strikes in Yemen is a good move, but the unsustainably Saudi-initiated some-day truce...is not the solution.”8 Houthis have also alleged that despite the declaration of a ceasefire, airstrikes have been carried out by the coalition.9 The Houthis want more guarantees from the UN that the other side will not exploit their withdrawal.
COVID-19: A New Phantom
On April 10, Yemen’s Supreme National Emergency Committee confirmed the first case of COVID-19 infection in the Hadramout Province,10 which now has been put under a partial curfew.11 The border with the neighbouring al-Mahra Province has been sealed, as informed by Farag al-Bouhsni, Governor of Hadramout Province.12 In March, the World Health Organisation (WHO) warned against a ‘pending explosion’ of COVID-19 cases in Yemen.13 In response to the potential spread of the pandemic, the government started taking precautionary measures as early as mid-March. The Hadi Government announced the shutting down of airports, border-crossings and schools. In a televised speech, Yemen’s Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed asked the nation to be “ready for the pandemic.”14 Some 50,000 Yemenis who returned home have already been tested for the virus since January 18, and for any future tests to be conducted, the country is increasingly dependent on help from outside. Yemen’s existing stock of testing kits has been consumed. The government is counting on support from the WHO, King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center and the international community to fight COVID-19.15 Yemen’s Prime Minister has called all warring factions to set aside their differences and focus on preventive measures to fight this pandemic.
The Yemeni healthcare system remains one of the most fragile in the region, particularly in rural areas of the country. A lot of medical facilities and infrastructure in Yemen has been a casualty of airstrikes during the civil war. In places where conflict is no longer continuing, the wrecked healthcare infrastructure has not been overhauled. In a war ravaged country, reaching out to people even for providing essential supplies such as food and medicine has become extremely difficult. Any support from WHO or other stakeholders under present situation may not be very effective. Altaf Musani, the WHO representative in Yemen, has stated, “Health system is functioning at 50 per cent of its capacity in Yemen.”16 Taha al-Mutawakel, Health Minister of Houthis’ National Salvation Government, has similarly warned that “93% of medical devices and equipment were out of readiness.”17
In the past, Yemen has struggled to deal with starvation, malnutrition and various other virulent yet deadly diseases such as cholera, diphtheria and dengue. But battling Covid-19 is going to be an uphill task. Another cause for worry would be the recent announcement by the US to cut healthcare aid to Yemen18 as well as cuts to aid provided by the World Food Programme owing to budgetary constraints, which are likely to affect several Houthi-controlled areas.19 Moreover, the Donald Trump administration's move to halt funding to WHO20 would severely undermine WHO's efforts in Yemen. In a nation that is facing one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent history, dealing with COVID-19 is going to be extremely tough. The role of Iran and Saudi Arabia would become crucial in avoiding the deterioration of COVID-19 crisis. To a great extent, the outcome of the COVID-19 crisis in Yemen would depend upon the response of regional and international stakeholders.
Iran-Saudi Rivalry
The Saudi-Iran rivalry is being played out in Yemen, making it extremely difficult for any peace deal to come through. In March, the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm, often dubbed as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Salman’s war, has completed five years of operations.21 Earlier in 2015, when the operation commenced with massive bombing campaigns and naval blockade, perhaps it was thought that it would promptly reinstate Mansour Hadi’s government in Sanaa. Instead, backed by Tehran, Houthis have demonstrated a strong defence, and the conflict has prolonged with a continuous military stalemate in various provinces, effectively turning Yemen into a battlefield of Iran-Saudi rivalry.
In May 2015, a study published by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) had cautioned that “Yemen is heading towards becoming another theatre of Shia-Sunni conflict or proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.”22 Over the last five years, the assessment has been repeatedly ascertained. Saudi Arabia has carried out extensive military campaigns with minimal success. Iranian support to Houthis has systematically grown after the beginning of Saudi campaign with the shipment of small arms to include heavy artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and even small range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). In 2015, as per the SIPRI Arms Database, an agreement of sale was finalised between the Houthis and the Iranian regime to deliver 10 Qiam-1 SSMs.23 The delivery of weapons finally took place in 2017. A study by London–based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) notes, “It was only after the launch of Operation Decisive Storm that Iran shifted from providing assistance to the Houthis to forming something closer to an alliance with them.”24
Despite the declaration of a “comprehensive ceasefire” by Saudi Arabia, Tehran is yet to make an official statement on the issue. However, given the impact of COVID-19 pandemic in Iran and its sanctions hit economy, it is unlikely that Tehran would have sufficient resources to actively stay involved in the Yemeni conflict. Riyadh too is exhausted with the war and deeply affected by falling oil prices in addition to its internal political problems. In such a situation, Riyadh may look for an honourable exit from Yemen’s war theatre.25 It can be argued that under present circumstances, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have sufficient number of reasons to make the ceasefire work.
The cooperation of UAE, a partner of Riyadh in the coalition, would be equally crucial. The UAE, like Saudi Arabia, too seeks to end its direct military involvement in the conflict. In March, UAE had sent medical supplies to Iran amid the coronavirus crisis, followed by an official call between the foreign ministers of the two countries.26 This signals a positive development that might serve as an opportunity for Tehran and Riyadh to bridge gaps through Abu Dhabi.
Prognosis
Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, Yemen’s current predicament with large-scale humanitarian emergency, coupled with presence of terrorist groups, could have serious consequences for the entire region. The Yemeni conflict has already engulfed Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman. It is imperative to come up with long-lasting options to end the civil war; otherwise, country’s vulnerability would expand to the whole Arabian Peninsula. Undoubtedly, the ceasefire is a welcome development, but there are some serious doubts about the effectiveness of the ceasefire. Since 2015, the Yemeni conflict had been a saga of ceasefires and their relentless violations. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that this time it is going to be any different unless both sides adhere to it.
However, the malaise of COVID-19 – a common concern for all in the region – may be a reason for some optimism. The abidance to ceasefire does not mean an end to the conflict, but it surely would work as a confidence-building measure, at least for now, to address the bigger challenge of coronavirus. No peace initiative will work without cooperation between Riyadh and Tehran. Perhaps, the pandemic could be an opportunity to reduce, if not entirely end the Iran-Saudi rivalry in Yemen.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
4. Meena Singh Roy, M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi and Zaki Zaidi, “Crisis in Yemen: Imperatives for Region and Beyond”, MP-IDSA Issue Brief, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, May 05, 2015 (Accessed April 17, 2020).
Hanging of Bangabandhu’s Killer Boosts India-Bangladesh Ties
Anand Kumar
April 23, 2020
The execution of Bangabandhu’s killer is likely to lift the morale of the pro-liberation forces while weakening that of the anti-liberation groups who were already in disarray.
Bangladesh will mark the centennial birth anniversary of its founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman later this year. A yearlong celebration planned to commemorate this historic event has, however, been muted so far on account of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. At least 30 prominent global leaders, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, had been expected to attend the celebratory programmes. In fact, Prime Minister Modi was to deliver the keynote address on March 17, 2020 to start the yearlong celebrations. These events now stand postponed.1
Amidst the COVID-19 induced gloom, the popular sentiment turned celebratory on the announcement of the arrest of Captain Abdul Majed – one of the killers of Mujib – in Dhaka on April 7, 2020. Arguably, this was a key achievement for the pro-liberation forces represented by the Awami League and its secular politics in their rivalry against the anti-liberation forces represented by Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh Nationalist Party and other Islamist forces.
Arrest and Execution of Majed
Captain Abdul Majed represented the anti-liberation forces in Bangladesh. This self-proclaimed killer of Mujib, who had been absconding for decades2, was executed by the state in the early hours of April 12 – five days after his arrest.
It is widely believed that India had played a key role in his arrest.3 Bangladeshi media had reported that Abdul Majed came to Dhaka in the middle of March from Kolkata where he claimed to be hiding for almost 23 years.4 Bangladeshi Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan had described his arrest as “the biggest gift” for Bangladesh in 2020.5
Bangladesh achieved its liberation under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1971. Unfortunately, his rule was short-lived and within four years of the country’s liberation, he was assassinated on August 15, 1975 by a faction of the army opposed to his policies. The same renegade army personnel also wiped out his entire family residing in Bangladesh. The only two survivors of the Sheikh’s family - daughters Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana - lived to see the day since they were based in West Germany at that time.
Sheikh Mujiburs’s Assassination: A Turning Point in the History of Bangladesh
Sheikh Mujibur’s assassination was a turning point in the politics of Bangladesh. It led to the complete sidelining of the pro-liberation forces by the anti-liberation groups. Within 90 days of Mujib’s assassination, his killers were given immunity through an Indemnity Ordinance issued by then President Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad on September 26, 1975. This ordinance was converted into a formal statute by Major General Ziaur Rahman and later approved by the Bangladeshi Parliament - Jatiyo Sangshad - through the Fifth Amendment on July 9, 1979. The Indemnity Act, therefore, was enshrined in the Constitution of Bangladesh. The subsequent governments, including that of President Ziaur Rahman, rewarded Mujib’s killers by promoting and posting them in lucrative diplomatic missions abroad.
After carrying out Mujib’s assassination, Majed and other officers involved in the killing went to Libya via Bangkok, allegedly on the directive of the then army chief Ziaur Rahman.6 These officers were aptly rewarded with Majed being appointed as Bangladesh's Ambassador to Senegal in 1980. After his retirement from the army, he was appointed as Deputy Secretary at the Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Corporation (BIWTC) in March 1980 where he was later promoted as Secretary. After BIWTC, he joined the youth development ministry as its director before being eventually transferred to the national savings department in the same designation. 7
The policies of subsequent governments left little doubt about their connivance with the anti-liberation forces in the killing of Mujib. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that these killers were not punished under the rule of the army. They were largely left unpunished even when democracy was restored in 1990 with the coming to power of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) headed by its leader Khaleda Zia - the widow of General Ziaur Rahman.
It was only when Sheikh Hasina assumed power in 1996 that steps were taken to bring the culprits to justice. The controversial Indemnity Act was abrogated in November 1996.8 This paved the way for the start of their trial in Dhaka in 1997 - 22 years after the assassination. In 1998, the trial court awarded death penalty to Abdul Majed and 11 other former army personnel for their involvement in the killing. The death sentence of all the killers – Syed Farooq-ur Rahman, Sultan Shahriar Rashid Khan, Muhiuddin Ahmed, AKM Mohiuddin, Bazlul Huda, Shariful Haque Dalim, Khandker Abdur Rashid, Rashed Chowdhury, Nur Chowdhury, Abdul Majed, Moslem Uddin and Aziz Pasha – was confirmed by the High Court on April 30, 2001.
However, this issue was once again put on the backburner with the BNP-led coalition government coming back to power in 2002. Notably, the coalition comprised of strong anti-liberation forces, including the Jamaat-e-Islami which had sided with Pakistan during the liberation war. This period also coincided with a spurt in Islamist radicalism across the country. Given these developments, the government protected rather than punish Mujib’s killers.
The death penalty was once again revived when Sheikh Hasina came back to power in January 2009. The Supreme Court, on November 19, 2009, upheld the High Court’s judgment. After completing all legal procedures, the government executed five convicts on January 28, 2010. Of the remaining seven absconding convicts, Aziz Pasha reportedly died in Zimbabwe in 2001 while Rashed Chowdhury has taken political asylum in the US. Nur Chowdhury and Moslem Uddin are believed to be residing in Canada9 and Pakistan10, respectively. It was only Abdul Majed who was suspected to be hiding in India. The whereabouts of two other convicts are not known.
The Sheikh Hasina-led ruling regime has sought to repatriate the remaining absconders and bring them to justice in a year which is being celebrated as Mujib Borsho. This endeavour is being led by a task force that was first set up in 2010. It is headed by the law, justice and parliamentary affairs minister and comprises of key officials of the foreign, law, and home ministries.11 The Bangladesh Government has also appealed to the international community to track down the culprits. Two law firms in the US and Canada have been hired to fast-track the process.12 Meanwhile, Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen has spoken to his American counterpart, the Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, while Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has written a letter to President Donald Trump on the repatriation issue.13 Notably, while the US is yet to take a call on this matter, Canada has expressed its reservations in deporting the wanted personnel, given the existing provision of death penalty in Bangladesh. Therefore, barring the arrest of Captain Majed, the current government has not had tangible success in bringing the remaining absconders to justice.
A Boost to India-Bangladesh Ties
The perceived help extended by India in the arrest of Captain Abdul Majed can be seen as another feather in the cap of the growing security cooperation between India and Bangladesh, initiated under the stewardship of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.14 Over the last decade, Dhaka has handed over to New Delhi a number of wanted insurgent leaders, especially from India’s north-eastern states, who had been hiding in Bangladesh. This has helped establish a modicum of peace in the region.
Arguably, the arrest and execution of Captain Majed – the self-confessed assassinator of Bangabandhu - is a new milestone in the history of bilateral ties. Today, India-Bangladesh ties have been completely transformed, notwithstanding the occasional irritants including the issue of illegal migration from Bangladesh. The maturity of their ties has been reflected in India recently sending its newly appointed foreign secretary, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, to Bangladesh to clear the air over the National Register of Citizenship (NRC).15 Therefore, given these developments, it is likely that the arrest and execution of one of the killers of Bangabandhu will further strengthen India-Bangladesh ties.
Meanwhile, for Bangladesh, the execution is likely to lift the morale of the pro-liberation forces while weakening that of the anti-liberation groups who were already in disarray. This portends new political dynamics in the future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
COVID-19: Perfect Storm for Israel, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan
Adil Rasheed, Jatin Kumar
April 21, 2020
The COVID-19 crisis would severely impact the four countries at the social, political, economic and humanitarian levels, as these states were already facing multi-vector exigencies at the time of the pandemic’s outbreak.
Idiomatically speaking, a ‘perfect storm’ refers to the deadliest combination of a multitude of adversities striking at the most vulnerable moment. Already reeling under endemic political crises, severe economic meltdown and a prolonged wave of popular discontent, the states of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon have been dealt a debilitating blow by the COVID-19 pandemic, which makes the aforesaid analogy unfortunately the most apposite.
Even the state of Israel is today contending with one of its most formidable security threats, as the pandemic has already infected thousands of its citizens, and has wreaked havoc on the economy with unemployment figures mounting to over 22 percent.1 The floundering state machinery and deplorable health system in adjoining Arab states — caused by years of civil strife, massive displacement of populations, rampant corruption and misgovernance — augurs ill for this area.
The Situation
As of April 20, the coronavirus had infected 1,539 people and claimed 82 lives in Iraq.2 Almost a quarter of these cases are from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). As of April 18, KRI reported 337 confirmed cases with four associated deaths and 244 recoveries.3 According to March 26 report of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), about 44 per cent female and 56 per cent male constitute the total Iraqi number,4 which has a heavier concentration among middle-aged and elderly adults.
The number of those infected by the coronavirus in Israel stood at 13,362 with 171 deaths, as of April 20.5 Meanwhile, the West Bank tally had 322 positive cases with two deaths by April 19.6 The first confirmed positive case of the pandemic was reported on February 21 in Israel, after a female citizen tested positive on her return to the country from the Diamond Princess ship from Japan.7
Since February 21, Lebanon Info Center has been disseminating official reports on the number of coronavirus cases and deaths online.. As of April 21, Lebanon reported 677 confirmed cases of coronavirus and 21 deaths.8 The Al Jazeera has reported that the number could be much higher in that country, as migrant workers without proper papers were not being tested for the virus, given the growing strain on the healthcare system.9 Similarly, Jordan had 417 confirmed cases with seven deaths by April 20.10
However, health officials in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria are wary the number of people infected with coronavirus far exceeds the official figures disclosed, and claim that militias and other non-state actors are quarantining entire communities of patients in areas outside state control.11
Meanwhile, the wave of public protests, sparked by issues of misgovernance and economic downturn, may have ebbed in the wake of government lockdown to fight the pandemic, government injunctions regarding social distancing has spurred its own set of political controversies in Lebanon. For instance, it is reported that lockdown measures are particularly harsh in Palestinian and Syrian refugee camps, as it is alleged that they are perceived to be spreaders of COVID-19 in Lebanon.12 Refugee communities are reportedly complaining that their curfew hours are only relaxed for five hours, while the general citizenry enjoys greater relaxation in the clampdown. Some observers argue that the Lebanese expatriate community is more liable to spread the virus than the refugee community.
The Response
Israel’s Institute for Biological Research has been trying its best to develop the vaccine as soon as possible. The institute recently had a “significant breakthrough in understanding the biological mechanism and qualities of the virus, including better diagnostic capability, production of antibodies for those who already have the coronavirus”.13 However, the development of the vaccine requires a series of tests and experiments that may take more time.
On March 18, Israel passed an emergency law to use mobile phone data for tracking infected citizens. Even Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s close aides tested positive for COVID-19.14 Amid shortage of protective gear and testing kits, Israel’s Ministry of Defence has taken the responsibility for the purchase of essential medical items. Even Israel’s spy agency Mossad has been included in the fight against COVID 19.15
For its part, Iraq took the politically difficult decision to close its borders with Iran on February 20 in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak.16 It only allowed returning Iraqi citizens, as the pandemic was spreading in Iran. Thereafter, the Iraqi Government closed universities, schools and even cinema halls in Baghdad on February 27 and banned large public gatherings in various cities. A country-wide lockdown, including the Kurdish region, was later imposed in mid-March until April 11.17 The Iraqi Government also banned travelers from Qatar, Germany, France, Iran, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Spain, South Korea and Thailand.18
In response to the outbreak in Iraq, Jordan restricted land and air travel with Iraq March 10 onwards. The kingdom has been screening people entering the country’s borders and airports. It has strongly enforced mandatory chest and throat examinations19 along with temperature checks at all points of entry,
On March 15, Lebanon declared a state of medical emergency given the lack of sufficient medical facilities and the government closed the airport, seaports and land entrances from March 18.20 The citizenry was instructed by the government to stay home and the army was asked to intervene by order from the Lebanese President and Prime Minister.
The Fallout
According to the Human Rights Watch, Lebanon’s medical practitioners and public officials are very worried about providing patients with urgent medical care because of the financial crisis.21 The same concern is expressed by the Jordanian and Lebanese officials.
All four states were already in the midst of a severe economic crisis when the pandemic hit, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for security forces to keep the hungry and unemployed stay at home indefinitely. Even Israel is suffering a severe economic downturn with unemployment rate crossing 20 per cent.22
For Iraq, the fall in crude prices has drained revenues for this crude exporting country that are now critical for containing the health crisis. At this point, the leadership void at the federal government level is causing a major concern.
The COVID-19 crisis would severely impact the four countries at the social, political, economic and humanitarian levels, as these states were already facing multi-vector exigencies at the time of the pandemic’s outbreak.
A surprise fallout of the pandemic has been that the European countries have announced temporary withdrawal of some of their troops from the anti-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) coalition and training mission in Iraq.23 Britain, France, Spain and Netherlands have decided to withdraw hundreds of their troops from the country, as part of a temporary pause in their missions due to the coronavirus epidemic.
In the wake of these developments, ISIS stated in its publication Al Naba (Vol. 220) on February 2, 2020 that it was an opportune time to hit Western states as, “the last thing they want today is to be struck during these trying times. The caliphate soldiers will prepare to hit them like they hit Paris, London, Brussels and [other] cities. Moreover, in some places security and medical personnel are stretched very thin so the last thing they wish is to be surprised by the mujahidin.”24
It is still early to fully analyse the deep impact of COVID-19 on the region but it is almost certain that the cumulative effect of this crisis would snowball across several strategic vectors in time and space.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Pakistan’s efforts to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak may get severely constrained due to the refusal of the ulema and religious leaders to ensure that their followers abide by the rules of the lockdown and social distancing.
The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) Pakistan held its annual gathering, starting March 11, 2020, in Raiwind, Lahore, where its Markaz is headquartered, with participation from about 80 countries. Both the federal and state governments failed to persuade the TJ to cancel the event. The five-day event was shortened to just two days because of rain, but by then the damage was already done. The first four cases reported in southern Sindh were attendees of the TJ gathering in Lahore. This was the beginning of Pakistan’s corona nightmare. Since then, as of April 20, more than 8,400 positive cases have been registered in the country, with most of the cases traced to the Raiwind congregation.1
According to the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) of Government of Punjab, as of April 19, about 1531 cases have been reported from Raiwind congregation alone.2 In Sindh, until April 2, about 94 TJ members had tested positive.3 While the exact number of coronavirus cases related to TJ is not available yet, thousands of TJ members who participated in the Raiwind congregation are still being tracked down by officials.4 The Raiwind gathering was held in the immediate aftermath of the TJ’s international annual event, held in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur, from February 27 to March 1, 2020.5 This event was attended by over 16,000 people, including 1,500 foreigners. The Ijtima (religious congregation) participants subsequently participated in Tabligh congregations in both India and Pakistan, playing a critical role in the spread of the disease in both countries.
Negligence or Helplessness?
The Imran Khan-led government initially did not take the issue of possible spread of COVID-19 seriously. The Pakistani prime minister refused to enforce a lockdown in spite of compelling reasons to do so. Instead, he urged people to maintain social distance. Interestingly, while many Pakistanis practised social distancing following government instructions and provinces went for complete lockdown, the ulema and other religious groups defied government instructions and went ahead conducting Jumma (congregational) prayers in mosques.
In order to bring religious leaders on board, Pakistan President Arif Alvi, sought a fatwa (a religious decree) from the Al-Azhar University in Egypt, an authority on Islamic injunctions, to suspend congregational prayers at mosques. In his fatwa, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar quoted the hadith (sayings of the Prophet) in which the Prophet advised his companions to offer prayers at home in case there is a strong rain, or if they were unwell and their illness could cause problems for others or lead to a pandemic.6 However, the ulema insisted that closing mosques and stopping Jumma prayers and sermons contravened the principles of Islam. According to Mufti Muneeb-ur-Rehman, the head of the government-appointed Ruet-t-Hilal Committee (tasked with spotting the new moon in Pakistan), insisted that they cannot close mosques as it was “not possible in any circumstances in an Islamic country”.7 Their stance reflected the inflexible attitude of these religious groups, driven by narrow political interests to remain relevant by anointing themselves as the protectors of faith, rather than choosing to adopt progressive interpretations of the injunctions in Islamic jurisprudence.
These religious leaders also termed the enforcement of lockdown as a Western conspiracy against Islam, indirectly supporting Imran Khan’s secular objections to the lockdown (as it would disadvantage the poor and the destitute). The ulema branded COVID-19 as a punishment (azaab) from Allah for not conforming to religious diktats and asked the common people to offer more prayers soliciting Allah’s grace in this hour of crisis. Mufti Taqi Usmani, one of the most influential religious leaders in Pakistan, a recipient of Sitara-e Imtiaz (star of excellence) in the field of public service in 2019, and Shaykh al-Hadith at Darul Uloom, Karachi, went to the extent of saying that it was “not possible to get rid of corona without asking God for forgiveness.”8
Why did the ulema in Pakistan reject the government order to close down mosques and ban Friday prayers even when the epitomes of the Islamic centres of the two sects — Sunni and Shia — Saudi Arabia and Iran, mandated and enforced such shut-downs domestically in their countries? The answer lies in the competition between various religious groups for social legitimacy at one level and between these groups and the state at another. The debate on whether the state should be allowed to prevail over the ulema on religious matters is an ongoing one in Pakistan. In the case of most other Muslim majority countries, whether they are democratic or authoritarian, it is the state which prevails over the religious groups while maintaining public order.
However, in Pakistan, both the political and religious leaderships are locked in an eternal squabble over the issue. This competition has, more often than not, pitted the state and the ulema against each other in the public sphere. The current government’s reluctance to use its authority to close mosques and reinforce its ban on Friday congregations is a manifestation of its weakness and vulnerability vis-à-vis the ulema over any issue concerning Islam. The governments have been always reluctant to take the ulema head-on. If the past is any guide, the threat of street protests issued by the ulema could have been a disturbing prospect for the government, as it would have weakened its efforts at combatting COVID-19, given the street power that religious groups command.
Military’s Role
The military in Pakistan has appropriated Islam over the past several decades and has effectively positioned itself as the principal saviour of the nation and its faith. As on several occasions in the past, this time too, the army acted swiftly to enforce a countrywide lockdown, recognising the gravity of the situation without paying much heed to either Prime Minister Khan’s ambivalence about enforcing a lockdown or the reluctance of the ulema to behave responsibly. There is a view in Pakistan that Imran deliberately encouraged the military to announce the lockdown because he knew that religious organisations would not protest against the military and, moreover, he would be spared of the wrath of the vociferous mullahs. By so doing, the Pakistani Prime Minister not only lost an opportunity to prove his mettle as a leader capable of taking strong decisions but also reconfirmed the popular perception that the civilian government in Pakistan would continue to play second fiddle to the military in all circumstances.
State on Back foot
While the government failed in its efforts to persuade religious leaders to ensure lockdown and follow social distancing norms, it is even reluctant to call out the TJ for its key role in spreading the virus in the country. Naming and shaming the TJ could invite the anger of the right-wing elements in the society, including within the government as also within the army. Over the years, TJ has infiltrated the Pakistani military and the trend has been extensively explored by Shuja Nawaz in his recently published book The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood. This started with Zia ul Haq’s Islamisation of the Pakistan military, where keeping beard, offering five-time regular prayers and spending time with the TJ were given priority over other standard criteria for promotion.9
The benign image TJ has created and the goodwill it has among religious groups could be gauged from the recent statement of late General Hamid Gul’s son, Abdullah Gul, who is associated with the pro-army Milli Yak Jehti and Difa-e-Pakistan Council and known for his pro-Jihad sentiment. Gul asserted that the media outlets were “spewing venom” against the TJ, which is “hurting sentiments of millions of people”. He called for the imposition of heavy fines on “religion-weary news anchors, producers, and all news directors …”10 A cleric in Karachi told his followers that they were “not too weak to let this one virus empty our mosques.”11 On April 3, when police tried to stop a Friday prayer congregation at a mosque in Liaqatabad, Karachi, a religious mob pelted stones and attacked officials.
Urdu Media Pitches for TJ
Over the years, since its inception in 1927, the TJ has carefully built its image as a peaceful and apolitical organisation devoted to piety and spiritual reformation. The Pakistani vernacular media, known for its conservative biases, has been particularly liberal in its praise of TJ’s activities within Pakistan and beyond. Therefore, quite predictably, apart from a few editorials and commentaries in the English language media criticising TJ for its irresponsible behaviour, the coverage of TJ’s role in spreading the coronavirus in Pakistan’s vernacular media has been rather sparse and uncritical. Instead, the Urdu media focused its attention on Shia pilgrims returning from various religious sites in Iran as the potential source of spread of virus in the country.12 These infected pilgrims, according to the vernacular media, were allowed to enter at Taftan border in Balochistan without being properly quarantined, while there was a disproportionate hullabaloo being raised over the TJ.
Conclusion
On April 5, 2020, a Chinese delegation of health experts advised Pakistan to extend the lockdown for another 28 days.13 However, the continuing religious gatherings on Fridays to offer Jumma prayers show that the religious leaders are unwilling to close mosques, even as the state is disinclined to take action against them. Moreover, the stubbornness of the TJ members who are not voluntarily disclosing their participation in the Raiwind congregation is making both social distancing and lockdown redundant. Pakistan’s efforts to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak may get severely constrained due to the religious group’s obstinacy. Their pressure on the government to keep the mosques open is also likely to increase with the advent of Ramadan (a month of fasting) starting from the last week of April. At this juncture, when the world has already witnessed more than 165,990 deaths (as of April 20),14 and 8,418 people have tested positive in Pakistan with 176 dead,15 stupidity has superseded wisdom, enhancing the COVID-19 risks in Pakistan.
Once the coronavirus reaches the third stage of community transmission, Pakistan’s health care system which is already in shambles may not be able to deal with the pandemic effectively. The country that is still struggling to combat rabies and polio due to opposition by religious fundamentalists to vaccination, would find itself in a huge crisis, unless, of course, either sanity prevails among its ulema and religious leaders to ensure that their followers abide by the rules of lockdown and social distancing, or the state enforces its writ with all the power at its command, howsoever politically risky it may turn out to be.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Coronavirus in Pakistan’s Urdu Media: God’s Punishment to Conspiracy to Biological Warfare!
Nazir Ahmad Mir
April 20, 2020
While scientists all over the world are working tirelessly to find an antidote to COVID-19, the narratives doing the rounds in Pakistan – pushed and peddled by the Urdu media, accuse them of conspiring to turn this virus into a weapon to not only kill but also to alter the human psyche.
The vernacular Urdu media, both print and electronic, remains the main source of news and information for the majority of the people in Pakistan. According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 4.6 million out of over six million daily circulated newspapers in the country were Urdu dailies.1 Among the Urdu newspapers, Jang is the most circulated newspaper with a subscription of 8,50,000. Nawa-i-Waqt holds the second place with 5,00,000 subscribers, followed by Pakistan (2,79,000) and Khabrain (2,32,000). Other important Urdu dailies are Ausaf, Ummat and Jasarat. In comparison, the subscription of English language dailies is low with the top three among them – The News (1,20,000), Dawn (1,09,000) and Business Recorder (22,000) together selling less than Pakistan, which is third in the list of vernacular newspapers.2 According to another Pakistan Bureau of Statistics report, Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa have the highest number of Urdu dailies.3 Overall, out of 695 newspapers and periodicals published in Pakistan, 84 are in English whereas the corresponding number for Urdu is 514.4
Opinion pieces and editorials in Urdu dailies are mostly conservative and regressive in orientation. The meagre liberal voice, mostly in Jang but also sporadically in some other newspapers, gets drowned in the cacophony of impassioned orthodoxy peddled by a huge army of commentators who wear their sectarian/religious consciousness up their sleeves. Views of columnists writing such orthodox opinion pieces find their way into Pakistan’s collective consciousness much easily than that of the sane and reasoned observers who find it difficult to overwhelm their counterparts in the vernacular media. A report in Dawn had once noted that in Pakistan, “objectivity, balance, fairness and the right to reply are alien concepts for Urdu newspapers.”5
Given its reach among the common masses, media’s power to shape people’s perceptions remains significant.6 As Florian Zollmann points out, “the news media provide a significant portion of the information on which citizens base their political choices.”7 In Pakistan, given its outreach and wide readership, the role of vernacular media is important. It is also the reason why the Pakistan Army tries to influence Urdu media8 through both ‘envelope journalism’ and coercion.9
At a time when COVID-19 is posing a major non-conventional threat to Pakistan, it is thus pertinent to examine the line adopted by the vernacular media, especially since the government’s narrative on methods to fight such a disease is getting embroiled in an increasingly regressive religious discourse.
Reportage on Coronavirus
Like elsewhere, the COVID-19 pandemic has emerged as a major issue in Pakistan around which comments are being written and debates being held. The federal government’s approach in dealing with the issue has come under severe criticism. Prime Minister Imran Khan’s decision of not working with the opposition and asking the provinces to not enforce a complete lockdown reflects the unpreparedness of the government. Meanwhile, the country’s health system remains inadequate10 while an economic crisis looms around the horizon, as evident from an external debt of US $105 billion and currency depreciation by a whopping 30 per cent in 2019.11 Several business lobbies with vested interests are also seeking to influence the government against adopting tough measures that include a complete lockdown.12
These issues are being increasingly reflected in the editorial pages of the Urdu media. Interestingly, while the narratives in vernacular media revolve around criticising the government for its failures, several commentators have been peddling various conspiracy theories and advocating that people’s sufferings are due to God’s wrath or punishment (azab). This is particularly evident from the insistence of several ulemas on holding Friday congregational prayers, in defiance of the government’s orders. Their participation in prayers held in mosques has led to violence in Islamabad and Karachi.13
Corona a ‘God’s Punishment’
The argument that COVID-19 is God’s wrath on the people for the sins they have committed is believed by many in Pakistan. One commentator labelled the pandemic as a “test for humans, to ensure that sinful followers go back to the Allah for seeking His forgiveness for their sins”.14 Others have argued that it is time for human beings to be truthful in their acts to avoid such wraths of God. A commentator, while calling it an azab (torment or punishment) from Allah, argued that “such azabs have come upon people whenever they have committed sins and have indulged in fornication/adultery, strayed from the path of the God and became selfish (ooswaqt Allah ke azab se dochaar huye, jab un mein bigaad payada huwa, bilkhasoos jab insaan burayee aur badkari ke raste per chal nikla).”15 These comments reflect the views of some of the conservative ulema, who remain unhappy over the government’s decision to impose lockdown on mosques and stop congregational prayers.
The vernacular media has offered wide coverage to Sahabzada Peer Abdul Basheer, Chairman of Milli Yakjehti Council, who stated, “this is the moment that we should offer prayers and seek forgiveness from the God. But we have taken the opposite position and closed the doors of the God’s houses (masjids). This is like inviting the azab (suffering) from the God.”16 He asked people to pray instead.
Corona a ‘Conspiracy’
A few commentators in the vernacular media believe that coronavirus is designed to target Islam and Muslims, while others look at it as a strategy for containing China. One commentator wrote in Nawa-i-Waqt that Muslims need to recognise that there is a powerful anti-Islam and anti-Muslim lobby in the world which targets Islam/Muslims whenever it gets a chance. He further added, “The fear thus created (by the pandemic) is meant to close the holy places in Saudi Arabia and mosques across the world and in this way, (the lobby has been able) to stop five-time congregational prayers in mosques, which are integral to Islam. In the absence of any such scare, it would not have been possible to close down these places.”17
The daily Ummat, in an editorial, lashed out at the Saudis for shutting down the two holiest sites of the Muslims – Kabbah and Masjid-e-Nabawi. It raised the question: “When a big country like China can control the coronavirus, why cannot countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan do so?” The editorial further opined that “any such policy of closing masajid (mosques) can only be adopted as per the wishes of Allah or for the security of the people. However, in a situation like this, all Muslims believe that the death will come only when Allah wants it to come. They should not feel insecure to visit and pray in mosques. The prevailing fear among the rulers because of the pandemic is a sign of the decline and fall of the Ummah.”18
Domestically, the Tablighi Jamaat members have accused the government of trying to stop them from carrying out their proselytising activities, as ordained by Allah. One Jamaat leader stated that “the crime of the Tablighi members is that they invite people towards the righteous path and the government is scared of it.” According to him, the ban on religious congregations and closure of masjids are signs of God’s unhappiness. Therefore, Allah has unleashed his wrath upon the people and the only way the Muslims can overcome this situation is by collectively praying for Allah’s forgiveness. However, the government’s resolve in enforcing the lockdown is seen as a key obstacle in achieving this objective.19
Corona a ‘Biological Weapon’
The vernacular media has widely reported COVID-19 as a biological weapon. Notably, this hypothesis has been discussed in detail. For instance, a commentator alleges that “people across the world will be put in prison-like places and some of them will be incarcerated in their homes. Then 5G will be used for surveillance on humans which will meet the requirements of the post-corona world.”20 He even went on to claim that people who were earlier reluctant to take vaccines for polio will now “blindly take any medicine (or vaccine) to avoid being infected. Scientists may now invent a vaccine that would introduce gene-mutation in the people so that they would not able to differentiate between likes and dislikes and could alter their taste. It may turn human beings into slaves, operating at the order of their masters.”21
A report carried in Ummat highlighted the claims of an acclaimed American human rights lawyer and professor of international law, Francis Boyle, that the virus was invented in a laboratory and sold to China. According to the report, Boyle stated that “coronavirus is not natural but an artificial one created by scientists and was meant to be used as a biological weapon. However, the virus got leaked because of negligence.” He further claimed that “a certain technology (a technology in virology to introduce change in microbes/proteins) has been used so that the COVID-19 could be spread widely in humans.”22
Another report quoting Chinese sources blamed the United States (US) for planting the virus in China during a joint US-China military exercise in Wuhan and subsequently calling it a “Chinese Virus”.23 The commentators argued that this was a well-crafted American conspiracy to not only damage China’s reputation as a responsible actor but also to contain it.
Conclusion
It is unfortunate that while scientists all over the world are working tirelessly to find an antidote to COVID-19, the narratives doing the rounds in Pakistan – pushed and peddled by the Urdu media, accuse them of conspiring to turn this virus into a weapon to not only kill but also to alter the human psyche. Given its deep reach in Pakistani society, the country’s vernacular media is working tirelessly to promote a yet another baseless and fictitious narrative. This is being ostensibly done to hide the failure of the state to provide basic health and other facilities as well as to strengthen the hold of the religious groups in the Pakistani society. The relative silence of the Pakistani civil society, the government and even the powerful military on this crucial issue indicates the diminishing influence of the liberal constituency in Pakistan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1.“Print”, Media Landscapes, European Journalism Centre (Accessed April 09, 2020).
2.“Pakistan”, Press Preference (Accessed April 10, 2020).
9. Imtiaz Alam, Twitter Post, November 22, 2018 (Accessed April 07, 2020). ‘Envelope journalism’ or ‘brown envelope journalism’ is the practice of bribing journalists for favourable media coverage.
Considering the impending financial crunch due to the Covid-19 pandemic and uncertainty about allocations in the coming years, it is unlikely that the MoD will be able to launch many new procurement programmes under the new DPP any time soon.
The 700-odd pages of the draft Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2020 contain many new ideas but make for a tedious reading and may end up making capital acquisitions more complicated. This is not to belittle the efforts that have gone into putting the document together, but to point out that the draft requires a para-by-para review of the proposed policy and procedural changes, also taking into account the comments received by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on the draft.1
The need for this exercise is twofold. One, at the policy level, it must be ensured that the proposed changes serve a distinct purpose, which is not served by, or cannot be served by modifying, any pre-existing provision. Two, at the procedural level, the provisions must be crystal clear, leaving no room for subjective interpretations, and no untied ends. The draft DPP 2020 must pass muster on these yardsticks before it is promulgated.
To illustrate, arguably the most significant change at the policy level concerns addition of several new procurement categories and alterations in the offset guidelines, both of which seem problematic. Talking about the procurement categories, their number has gone up from two in 2002 to 13 in 2020. Six of these, including a new category, are arranged in a hierarchical order with descending order of precedence.
The hierarchy comprises the Buy (Indian – Indian Designed, Developed and Manufactured), Buy (Indian), Buy and Make (Indian), Buy and Make, Buy (Global – Manufacture in India), and Buy (Global) categories. Besides these, other categories include the new Lease category with two sub-categories, Make category with three sub-categories, Innovation category, and Design and Development category.
In addition, there is the Strategic Partnership Model and the Technology Development Fund schemes. The proliferation of procurement categories could complicate the process of categorisation, not least because some of these categories have identical or similar overall objective.
The Buy (Indian – IDDM), for example, refers to “… procurement of products from an Indian vendor that have been indigenously designed, developed and manufactured …”, while the Design & Development and Innovation categories refer to procurement of “… equipment/system/subsystem/assembly/sub-assembly, major components, or upgrades thereof, to be designed, developed and manufactured by an Indian vendor …”.2
The commonality of the objective of these two categories, as evident from the italicised words in the preceding para, overlaps with the objective of the Make category which the draft DPP 2020 describes in these words: “…Projects under ‘Make’ or ‘Innovation’ category, except ‘Make III’, will essentially pertain to products involving indigenous design, development and manufacturing…’”3
With some suitable changes, it should be possible to amalgamate these three categories into one broad-based category. Similarly, going simply by their objectives and defining attributes, it should be possible to combine Buy and Make, Buy (Global – Manufacture in India) and the Strategic Partnership Model. Lesser number of more clearly defined categories, distinct from one another in purpose and content, would make the process of categorisation simpler and procurement more expeditious.
The changes made in the offset guidelines is another case in point. Apart from several somewhat inexplicable policy changes – deletion of the provision for offset banking and services as an avenue for discharging the offset obligation, just to mention two such changes, there are procedural changes which could be problematic. Take for example, offset credit on account of transfer of technology (ToT) which can now be claimed based on valuation by a recognised/certified valuation firm. This is a welcome step, but for the rider about valuation of technology.
The draft DPP says that “(i)t would be appropriate if the (technology) is transferred by the vendor to the government and it then hires the valuer jointly with the vendor” and that “(a)nother option is for the valuer to be hired by the vendor in consultation with the Government”.4 This is a potential procedural bottleneck because there is no clarity about the consequences of hiring a valuer without consultation with the government, which is otherwise not mandatory. If, on the other hand, that is acceptable to the MoD, it is not clear as to what is the objective of specifying this option.
While on the subject, it is a bit disappointing that the provisions for approval of the Indian Offset Partners (IOPs), change of IOPs, rephasing of the offset implementation schedule, etc., by the MoD have been retained. Similar controls are envisaged in relation to many other processes in the DPP. Ease of doing business requires such controls to be relaxed where the requirements to be complied with are clearly specified. Alternatively, if the MoD wants to retain the control, it would be helpful both to the acquisition personnel and the vendors if the grounds on which the permission would be granted or rejected are laid down in the DPP.
There is clearly a lot of work that needs to be done before finalisation of the draft DPP 2020, starting with attenuation of this voluminous document, which should not be very difficult. One of the seven chapters on shipbuilding and repair/refit of vessels (on which there is a separate chapter in the Defence Procurement Manual [DPM] 2009) runs into almost 200 pages. Since this is a self-contained chapter, and it is of relevance only to the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard, it could be delinked from the DPP and the DPM and notified as a separate manual.
Some attention also needs to be paid to comprehensiveness, as well as the text of the various provisions in the draft DPP, particularly the template of various undertakings, request for proposal (RfP) and the contract, which have legal implications. The Fall Clause in the RfP5, for example, requires the vendors to submit an undertaking while submitting their bids that they have not supplied the same item to any government department at a lower price, and that if it is discovered after signing of the contract that the vendor had indeed supplied the same item at a lesser price, the contract price will be lowered to that level.
A strict interpretation of the clause would mean that no vendor can ever expect to supply the same item at a higher price even if the last time it was supplied at a lower price was several years earlier. Obviously, this is not possible and, to be fair, it does not seem to be the intention underlying the standard text of this clause. This calls for modification in the text of this clause, and other similarly problematic clauses and provisions in the DPP.
It bears recalling that the DPP 2016 was amended as many as 47 times, which, among other things, points to that document having been promulgated without ironing out the rough edges. Considering the impending financial crunch due to the Covid-19 pandemic and uncertainty about allocations in the coming years, it is unlikely that the MoD will be able to launch many new procurement programmes under the new DPP any time soon.
There is, therefore, a case for deferring promulgation of DPP 2020 to the next year by which time the present draft can be thoroughly revised. Other manuals like the DPM and those followed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) can also be revised to ensure that all documents are in harmony and serve the common objective of equipping the armed forces with the latest equipment expeditiously and in a cost-effective manner.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Draft DPP 2020 needs to cut out obfuscation, repetitions, and bring out core issues for the consideration of the decision-makers in a concise and clear manner.
While most of the world is locked down to contain the spread of COVID-19, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) continues to work and make another attempt to refine the existing Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). The MoD has uploaded the latest draft of DPP 2020 on its website and comments are sought by May 8, 2020. By the year-end, after taking cognisance of all the suggestions, DPP 2020 is expected to be finalised and issued.
The DPP defines the process for capital expenditure from the annual defence allocation. For the current financial year, it is pegged at Rs. 1,18,555 Crores and is approximately one-third of capital expenditure of the Government of India. Therefore, the process of refining the DPP is significant. After the Bofors incident that rocked the nation, the DPP took a formal format in 1992. In the aftermath of Kargil Conflict, on the recommendations of the Group of Ministers, DPP took shape as a comprehensive document on capital procurements in 2002. With practical experience gained and observed inability to speed up the procurement process, it was continuously revised. Its new incarnations in 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2013 and 2016 did not deviate from the fundamental structure and process of procurement, resulting in no significant enhancement in the efficiency of capital procurements.
In the last 50 years, India, with seven per cent of global arms imports, has emerged as the largest arms importer. Saudi Arabia is a distant second with a little over three per cent of global arms imports.1 For decades, both policymakers and policy implementers have struggled to reverse the trend. The formalisation of DPP in 1992, creation of offset models in 2006 and the Strategic Partnership Model in 2016 has not changed the narrative. India continues to be the only major economy with a relatively modest defence industry. Therefore, the main aim of DPP 2020 should be to efficiently and effectively utilise capital budget allocation for modernisation of the Indian Armed Forces and simultaneously give a boost to the indigenisation of defence industry as a long-term strategic objective.
There are five foundational changes needed. First is the inherent underlying principle that to ensure financial probity, multiple checks are mandatory. A clearly annunciated flow chart, well-defined responsibilities and distinct accountability of all participants in the process are necessary for any process to be efficient. DPP in all its incarnations has lacked that and relies on individual and collective checks at multiple levels. A simple observation in the procurement process may have to be commented upon by 15 individuals before a case can move forward.2 The approach of collective responsibility has invariably allowed diminished individual accountability, which was adversely commented upon by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India in its report on Capital Acquisitions for Air Force tabled in the Parliament in February 2019. This needs to change.
The second issue is about the structure of DPP. DPP stands for Defence Procurement Procedure and this aspect needs to be the focal point. Besides covering the procurement procedure, the draft has so many other aspects related to partnerships, research and development (R&D), innovations, manufacture, offsets et al. Structurally, DPP needs segregation of R&D from the procurement procedure. All processes related to capabilities not currently available need de-hyphenation from DPP. For example, the chapter on ‘Make and Innovation’ must not be part of DPP. In any case, the preliminary procedure given in all these cases leads only to the first stage of procurement. This resets the time and process to zero and the procurement process starts ab initio. So, the elimination of these processes will de-clutter the DPP. These processes are significant for developing an indigenous ecosystem. But DPP is not the place for its germination. A separate policy and guidance document, to cover all aspects of R&D for the defence sector from innovation to design and development as articulated in draft DPP 2020, will be ideal.
The third issue is about the complexity of the process. It starts with the first stage of procurement that leads to acceptance of necessity and categorisation of the capital acquisition scheme. Based on estimated cost, every capital acquisition case is categorised at an appropriate level that defines the source and method of procurement, for example, Buy Global) or Buy and Manufacture. The types of categorisation in draft DPP 2020 is mind-boggling. In fact, with every new incarnation, DPP has added new ways for categorisation. Simply stated, the decision-maker needs to categorise the operationally required capability into two verticals - Buy or Lease. In either case, every required capability needs to be acquired or leased on a globally competitive basis to obtain the best value for money. At this juncture, it may seem contrary to 'Make in India’ goal. But it is not so in case certain clauses are added to the entire procurement process that is discussed a little later.
The fourth change needed is about the offset policy. The intention of this clause was to plough back capital expenditure on imported military hardware to initiate the indigenous defence industry. But it has not happened. In fact, offset credits and verification or accurate measure of indigenous content in various platforms remain suboptimal owing to a very complex and cumbersome process. It is well known that the offset clause adds to the final contract value. Eliminating offsets will simplify the contracting process and possibly enhance financial efficiency. But support to 'Make in India' too is mandatory for long term defence goal. A simple method can be adopted to counterbalance the removal of offset clause and energise indigenous manufacture. As all capital acquisition schemes are proposed via a global tender, a clause of part payment in Non-Repatriable Rupees (NRR) will not only support ‘Make in India’ but also assist in offsetting the notional loss by current suboptimal offset procedure. The international vendors will like to factor this aspect in their bids akin to offset clause. A simple procedure like this is likely to be more efficient than the unwieldy offset clause. The payment in NRR will have to be utilised to source equipment/services from the Indian entities. This is a simple method to ensure the requisite level of sourcing of equipment/services from India and can objectively be monitored for compliance.
Additionally, the outbreak of COVID-19 and a looming recession combined with the changing character of conflict presents an ideal time frame for India to indigenise defence industry.3 DPP 2020 must make use of the current challenges to invigorate the indigenous defence industry by making procedures simple. Will foreign vendors find loopholes in money repatriation clauses and route the money to parent company through fictitious firms in India? Some companies will definitely attempt this. But overall, this simplified process will be very effective in supporting ‘Make in India’.
Now coming back to categorisation riddle of DPP once again. Along with categorisation as Buy or Lease, the decision-maker needs to qualify the share of contract value that needs to be paid to the vendor in NRR. And this could vary between 30 to 100 per cent based on the individual case at the sole discretion of the decision-maker. Earmarking 100 per cent payment in NRR will obviously eliminate global players and this aspect needs a clear understanding by the decision-maker.
The last point is about clarity in DPP. It needs to be drafted for the decision-makers. Although size-wise even the 700-page draft DPP 2020 pales in comparison to the United States Defence Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement or Direction Générale de l'armementInstruction of France or similar procedure in the United Kingdom (UK), but in all these countries personnel operating these instructions are formally trained and stay in these departments for decades. Without any formal training and with relatively very short average tenure of two to three years in India, it is difficult for most personnel to comprehend a complex document like the draft DPP 2020. This assertion is valid for most of the personnel manning the acquisition wings of the MoD or Services Headquarters. Year after year, the CAG reports have been pointing out major and multiple procedural deviations in almost all capital procurements.
The DPP 2020 needs to cut out obfuscation, repetitions, and bring out core issues for the consideration of the decision-makers in a concise and clear manner. This can be done in case issues associated with R&D are cut off, categorisation is simplified, and clauses like offset eliminated.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. “Performance Audit Report on ‘Capital Acquisition in Indian Air Force’”, Union Government (Defence Services) Air Force, Report No. 3 of 2019, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, pp. 31-32.
The lack of international cooperation and trust deficit to tackle the COVID-19 crisis is stark. The pandemic of fear may deepen an ongoing shift towards increased anarchy reflected in ‘everyone for himself’ and could further energise the process of weakening international institutions and agreements.
It is perhaps too early to judge the scope and long-term impact of COVID-19 on the geopolitical landscape. What is not in doubt, however, is the certainty that there will be global political and strategic effects. Presently, the dominant emotion that runs across the global population is the ascendant fear that stems from the known and unknown aspects relating to the coronavirus. While it is known how the virus spreads and what its symptoms are, no known cure has been discovered nor is a vaccine likely before 12-18 months, if at all. One of the major challenges in containing its spread though is its ability to transmit, even during the incubation period. Herd immunity1 is said to theoretically provide the best available defence against the virus, but it comes at a major cost in terms of human lives and the infection quantum.
The Big Picture
Different nations have adopted diverse approaches and the jury will continue to be out as to which nations, that can, in the shortest possible time, restore and sustain normal activities while minimising mortality rates. China, South Korea, Turkey and Iran are among the few that have been able to restore a relatively better semblance of normality. Mortality rates for South Korea are the lowest, while others are closer to the global average. But what could differentiate South Korea from the rest is that it is unlikely to have achieved much herd immunity and, therefore, could be vulnerable to COVID-19 making several comebacks. Their healthcare system though is geared to speedily course through a Testing, Tracing and Treatment model. On the other hand, China, Turkey, Iran and the United States (US) may have achieved some amount of herd immunity and may, therefore, be able to normalise activities and restrict disruption to a shorter time span.
The US, meanwhile, is the worst affected country with nearly 6.4 lakhs infected and over 28,000 deaths, as of April 16. However, the worst seems to be over and some amount of herd immunity could have been created. Internal political divides in the country though have widened. President Donald Trump is being blamed for poor leadership and for reacting too late. The Trump administration is also accused of being more concerned about the economy than saving people’s lives. There has been discord between the states where the Democrats are in power and the Trump administration, with the latest being about who will lead the reopening with Trump claiming complete powers on the issue of public health and police powers inside the States.2 A $2 trillion rescue plan has been announced to help in economic recovery. There is popular resentment against China and this could inhibit the US from depending on China’s ability to supply cheap goods.
In the European Union (EU) countries and Russia, despite having efficient and well-funded public health infrastructural frameworks, the impact of COVID-19 got aggravated due to their older demographic profile. From the quantum of people infected, acquiring herd immunity is likely, though economies would be put to stress. But like China, the US and Japan, the EU has the financial capacity to launch stimulus initiatives to revive the economy. EU has already announced its revival plan.3 Russia has been dealt a double whammy by the pandemic, due to the steep drop in oil prices.
India’s COVID-19 journey seems to be relatively successful from a public health perspective but has been economically debilitating due to a nation-wide lockdown that is now programmed to last for 40 days. India’s political and scientific decisions have received widespread domestic support and have aimed to save human lives as well as prevent the nation’s fragile health care infrastructure from being overwhelmed. It was initially expected that 21 days lockdown would facilitate the containment of the virus and also provide, inter alia, the time to beef up the public health infrastructure and help in resource mobilisation and data collection. It is now planned to allow for agricultural activities and some essential manufacturing from April 20. The economy has already taken a major hit that will certainly pose major challenges for recovery. It is evident that India would require bold and innovative economic recovery plans.
It is also possible that the process of getting the Indian economy back on track may be impeded by COVID-19 making repeated comebacks. The current Indian approach is not expected to build any herd immunity and beyond a point, the spread cannot be restricted due to the density of the country’s population and limitations on public health resources. However, if official statistics are close to reality, there might be a dubious silver lining — the prolonged and abysmal living conditions of the elderly among the poor may seem to have resulted in some herd immunity.
Geo-political Implications
The uncertainty wrought by COVID-19 had added a critical layer to the turbulence in the prevailing global order. The lack of international cooperation and trust deficit to tackle the COVID-19 crisis is stark. Notably, the US has shown no inclination to play a leadership role to harness international cooperation. China has blocked discussions in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the issue. The pandemic of fear may deepen an ongoing shift towards increased anarchy reflected in ‘everyone for himself’ and could further energise the process of weakening international institutions and agreements.
Even if China emerges relatively better in economic terms over the long-term, it will have to contend with the consequences of the worldwide resentment it has generated, as it is seen as the main cause of the predicament. Even prior to COVID-19, Trump’s trade war with China was a manifestation of the narrative gaining traction domestically within the US of China’s essential malfeasance, vis-à-vis trade relations. This has been further strengthened post COVID-19.
A similar narrative is gaining strength in East Asia, ASEAN countries, India, Africa and the EU. There is a growing realisation and acknowledgement of the predatory nature of China under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. Given the above, the present pattern of over-dependence on China is likely to see a pushback from most of the major economies on account of its concomitant hazards. This may also strengthen regional and global alignments to China’s disadvantage. China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) project could face opposition to a degree where projects underway may be stalled and some abandoned.
COVID-19 has, therefore, unequivocally eroded China’s legitimacy and trust that is necessary to sustain itself as a global power. Beijing could no doubt still make future gains but that will to a significant extent depend on the US reducing its global role, a possibility very much on the cards. China’s efforts to achieve global geo-political dominance vis-à-vis the US could be further hindered if major countries shed their ambivalence regarding China, excepting Russia, perhaps, whose reliance on China may deepen. Many countries like the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and India, including regional groupings such as the EU and ASEAN, could reconsider their political and economic postures that have so far been based on accruing economic benefits as a result of cooperating with China, while at the same time conceding Beijing’s dominance. China can no doubt be expected to push back against this trend. India too must review its present equation with China though there can be no easy choices.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. ‘Herd immunity’ in the context of COVID-19 is when many people in a community become immune, due to the protection offered by anti-bodies that results from infections. See “What Is Herd Immunity and Could It Help Prevent COVID-19?”, Healthline, April 02, 2020.
As the COVID-19 cases continue to rise, the key priorities for the GCC countries are to contain the spread of the pandemic, maintain the flow of trade across their borders and preserve their economies from adverse impacts.
The COVID-19 outbreak has created a lot of concern among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. As of April 15, 2020, Saudi Arabia remains the worst affected country with 5369 confirmed cases and 73 deaths, followed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with 4933 cases and 28 deaths; Qatar with 3428 cases and seven deaths; Kuwait with 1355 cases and three deaths; Bahrain with 1528 cases and seven deaths; and Oman with 910 cases and four deaths.1 As the COVID-19 cases continue to rise, the key priorities for the GCC countries at this point are to contain the spread of the pandemic, maintain the flow of trade across their borders and preserve their economies from adverse impacts.
The GCC countries have adopted several precautionary measures to deal with the pandemic. To contain the further spread of the virus, all these countries have suspended commercial flight operations, shut the government and private sector offices, closed mosques, educational institutions, and have declared curfews and lockdowns. They have been raising awareness among the people by establishing special helplines and through media including social media and the internet. The GCC has set up a ‘joint operations room’ for exchange of information and joint coordination of the fight against the pandemic.2 As a result of these precautionary measures, the spread of the virus has been controlled to a significant extent.
The closure of the industrial and commercial activities because of the pandemic would certainly affect their economies. In their meetings, all the GCC member-states have decided to maintain seamless flow of cross-border trade in order to keep the supply of essential commodities intact at this difficult time. In order to deal with the immediate situation, all the GCC countries have announced financial stimulus packages to support their citizens, businesses and institutions.
Saudi Arabia announced financial stimulus measures of US $32 billion, which includes support for small and medium-sized businesses, banking and financial institutions.3 Keeping in view the fall in global oil prices, the kingdom has announced a five per cent cut in its 2020 budget.4 Similarly, the UAE has announced a package of US $34.45 billion to deal with the challenges emerging out of the spread of the pandemic.5 Bahrain has announced a package of US $11.38 billion to help its citizens to fight COVID-19. The Kuwaiti Government has approved an additional budget of US $1.62 billion to fight the coronavirus.6 The Central Bank of Oman announced a financial stimulus package of US $20.8 billion to provide additional liquidity to the financial institutions. Oman has now cut down the budgets of its civil, military and security agencies by five per cent. Similarly, Qatar has announced a package of US $20.6 billion for the private sector and another US $2.75 billion to be invested in the Qatar Stock Exchange.
For the GCC countries, the spread of the pandemic comes at a time of falling global oil prices. As the economies of these countries are heavily reliant on the export of oil and gas, the fall in the oil prices is going to hit them even harder. The spread of COVID-19 is affecting the energy markets as the movement of people and goods in the region and beyond have been severely restricted. Key oil importers such as China, Japan, Korea and India are facing severe difficulties due to the spread of the pandemic and thereby affecting the energy demand and supply. Global oil prices have also fallen sharply in the last two months. The dual shock of the spread of the pandemic and the fall in oil prices will have a deep impact on the economies of the oil-producing GCC states.
In the Gulf region, Iran remains the worst affected country with 74,877 confirmed cases and 4683 deaths, as of April 15.7 Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have alleged that Iran is responsible for spreading the virus in their respective countries, as it has not been stamping the passports of their nationals who are travelling to Iran. Iran has out-rightly refuted such allegations. For Saudi Arabia, “Iran bears direct responsibility” for the spread of COVID-19. It has stated that Iran not stamping the passports creates a health risk for all.8 Similarly, Bahrain has accused Iran of “biological aggression” by not stamping the passports of the Bahraini nationals who visited Iran.9 While Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have adopted an aggressive approach towards Iran over the spread of COVID-19, in contrast, other GCC member states such as Qatar, UAE and Kuwait have offered aid to Iran in the time of crisis. Omani officials too are in regular consultations with their Iranian counterparts. Such divergent approaches towards Iran over the spread of coronavirus shows the existing fissures in the organisation. On any other day, there would have been a strong and united condemnation of Iran by the GCC.
As a regional organisation, the GCC has been facing a lot of internal challenges especially since the boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain in June 2017. However, despite the existing differences, all the member countries have come forward together to fight the pandemic. At this unprecedented time, securing the health of the citizens, supporting businesses and the private sector and, at the same time, maintaining unity remains the key challenges and priorities for the GCC.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
China is too important for Pakistan’s power elite, given that their stakes are tied firmly to the success of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Similarly, China would also need dependable and loyal allies like Pakistan willing to support and disseminate the emerging Chinese narrative on COVID-19.
COVID-19, which originated in Wuhan, Hubei Province has not spared Pakistan, China’s closest strategic partner. Claiming success in containing the disease domestically, China is delivering help to Pakistan, as also to many countries around the world, to meet this rather unprecedented health crisis.
United in Crisis
Pakistan’s National Assembly praised China’s efforts against COVID-19 in a resolution passed on February 13, 2020, and lauded China’s help to Pakistani nationals stranded in Wuhan at the peak of the crisis.1 The Pakistani resolution was ‘highly’ commended by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which noted that both countries “were close neighbours with a fine tradition of helping each other”.2 President Xi Jinping also spoke to Prime Minister Imran Khan. To exhibit its solidarity with China, Pakistan President Arif Alvi visited Beijing mid-March, at the peak of the COVID crisis.3 A joint statement issued at the end of the visit applauded China’s efforts to eradicate the disease, reiterated their status as steadfast ‘iron brothers’ and pledged to uphold each other’s ‘core national interests’.4 Subsequent to the visit, the Khunjerab Pass in Gilgit Baltistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) was opened. China is transporting aid and equipment through this pass to help Pakistan fight the spread of the virus.
The Chinese Embassy in Islamabad tweeted that “at least 2 tonnes of masks, test kits, ventilators, medical protective clothes worth Rs 67 million were handed over [to Pakistani officials] at Khunjerab Pass”.5 China is also helping to set up temporary hospitals to deal with rising numbers of COVID-19 patients. Another tranche of testing kits and other equipment from China arrived in Pakistan by a special cargo flight, which also ferried Chinese specialists and health workers to execute relief measures in Pakistan.6 A special plane carrying relief equipment funded by private Chinese entities, such as the Alibaba Foundation, was also sent.7
Strategic Convergences
That China is pouring in tonnes of supplies to Pakistan in this crisis situation should not surprise many. The more than five-decade-old relationship rests on solid planks of mutual benefit and strategic convergences. While countries, including India, swiftly moved out its citizens from Wuhan when the crisis began, Pakistan chose not to evacuate its citizens — mostly about 1000 students, to avoid embarrassing China, in spite of heavy criticism at home.8 Pakistan instead insisted that the decision not to fly them back was conditioned by concerns about possible spread of the virus at home. It was also only towards the end of February that Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) suspended flights to China and Japan.9 The flight operations are expected to begin by mid-April, as per media reports.
While Pakistan’s economy has been weak, it has received external help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as friendly countries like China. COVID-19 will further weaken the Pakistani economy, necessitating further doles from friendly countries like China. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has forecast ‘headwinds’ for Pakistan in 2020, where growth rate could further descend to about 2.6 from the existing 3.3 per cent with high double-digit (11.3 per cent) inflation.10
Pakistan occupies a pivotal position in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the estimated $62 billion worth China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) being the flagship project. There are, however, speculations that COVID-19 could affect the CPEC, further giving traction to constituencies in Pakistan that remain sceptical about its feasibility and success. To dispel such scepticism, Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi has already started assuring people that the pandemic will not impact the progress of CPEC.11
Pakistani analysts like its former Ambassador to the United Nations, Abdullah Hussain Haroon, also supported the view offered by the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Zhao Lijian, that there could be an American hand behind the origin of the coronavirus pandemic. Haroon blamed the United States (US), Europe and Israel as being responsible for the spread of the virus in order to upend China’s stupendous economic growth.12 Another scientist, Ata-ur Rahman, currently heading the Task Force constituted to develop a COVID-19 vaccine in Pakistan, asserted that Wuhan was not the epicentre of the virus, and alleged that work on modification of the virus had been undertaken at a military-controlled laboratory in the US. Notably, Rahman was awarded the China International Science and Technology Cooperation Award for the year 2020 by President Xi Jinping.13
The Imponderables
While the strong bilateral relations would suggest continuation of bonhomie between the two states in the fight against COVID-19, potential hurdles remain. In the past, it has been observed that the Lal Masjid siege in 2007 presented one such tipping point, when Chinese nationals were abducted by fundamentalists in Islamabad. Even before the crisis could disrupt bilateral ties, then President Pervez Musharraf ordered the siege of the mosque housing the fundamentalist elements apparently at the behest of China.14 Similarly, recurring attacks on the Chinese workers, especially in the province of Balochistan, have the potential to sour the bilateral ties. This has not been the case so far because the army has set up special units to provide security to Chinese workers. Moreover, despite Pakistan’s Islamist leaning, it has never raised the issue of Chinese excesses against the Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang. On the contrary, Pakistan has taken summary action against Uighur militants and handed over Uighur activists operating from inside its territory to China.
Pakistan’s relations with the US, meanwhile, have been largely insulated from the rivalry between the US and China. Pakistan continues to receive help from both of them to deal with the pandemic.15
Notwithstanding all this, there is some measure of aversion against China within Pakistan. Despite curbs in the mainstream media, messages have circulated in social media holding China responsible for the pandemic. Whether this would sway public sentiments adversely vis-à-vis China or whether China offering preventive and palliative measures would help blunt such criticism, remains to be seen.
Large sections of the Pakistani society have long remained averse to vaccination drives, to counter polio for instance. There have been several attacks on health workers administering the polio vaccine, and some of them have even been killed by terrorist groups. The aversion to vaccination among the religious groups indicates that the response of the society and the state to a highly contagious pandemic like COVID-19 would be half-hearted. Compliance to strict measures requiring no gatherings in mosques for Friday prayers is patchy, further compounding the problem. The deadly outbreak has put Pakistan’s healthcare system under the scanner, increasingly seen as ‘dilapidated’, weak and unprepared to respond to emergencies.16 A severely constrained health care infrastructure has been further aggravated by budget cuts in 2019.17 Such systemic inadequacies may reduce the impact of Chinese assistance to help Pakistan fight against COVID-19.
Strategically, China is too important for Pakistan’s power elite, given that their stakes are tied firmly to the success of Chinese-funded domestic infrastructure projects. Similarly, China would also need dependable and loyal allies like Pakistan willing to support and disseminate the emerging Chinese narrative on COVID-19. In the post COVID-19 period, the world opinion could be steeply polarised against China. Whether this would constrain Pakistan’s choices and propel Islamabad to recalibrate its relations with its most trusted ally, is a moot question.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The abidance to ceasefire does not mean an end to the conflict, but it surely would work as a confidence-building measure, at least for now, to address the bigger challenge of
coronavirus.
Yemen has been ravaged by conflicts for decades and there seems to be no end to it. Due to the ongoing civil war, Yemen has witnessed one of the worst humanitarian crises.1 The civil war has left thousands of people internally displaced and several thousands dead. In the last five years, the Iran-Saudi rivalry has intensified in Yemen. Recently, in March, the warring factions in Yemen expressed their desire for a mutually acceptable ceasefire, followed by a ceasefire declaration from a Saudi-led alliance in April. What do these ceasefires really mean, particularly as coronavirus ravages the region?
Yemen's Complex Geopolitical Landscape
Yemen has a history of fractured polity, leading to tribal clashes, along with the presence of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). As a result, the country is undergoing a massive humanitarian crises due to the internal displacement of people on a large scale. The recent figures from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimate that, “Over 80 per cent have been displaced for more than a year.”2 In 2019, the death toll in Yemen had reached 100,000 since the war began five years ago, which includes 12,000 civilian casualties, as per the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).3 The principal power struggle lies between the UN-recognised government of Mansour Hadi, supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Iranian-backed Houthis.
The Houthis belong to the Zaydi sect of Shias, which comprise nearly 40 per cent of the Yemeni population.4 Under the al-Ahmar family, Zaydis had ruled over Northern Yemen for almost a millennium before being overthrown in a coup in 1962. For next three decades, the Zaydis who “for centuries had been at the top of country’s social pyramid” were marginalised both politically and economically by the government, which finally led to the creation of Ansar Allah movement founded by Mohammad Badr al-Din Houthi along with Muhammad Izzan.5 The movement soon turned into an armed movement which carried out extensive military campaigns during 2002-09 in the hope of securing greater political participation. The Houthis achieved a breakthrough in September 2014 when they captured capital Sanaa and placed President Mansour Hadi under house arrest. Later in January 2015, President Hadi resigned and escaped to Saudi Arabia, where he pleaded to the international community to restore his elected government in Yemen. As a result, in March 2015, an alliance led by Saudi Arabia and UAE and comprising of several other Arab countries, with logistics and intelligence support from the US, commenced the military campaign against the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen. This intervention significantly complicated the prospects of any peace in the existing multi-dimensional regional crisis. What makes it even more difficult to find any solution to the problem is that each faction has its vision for the future of Yemen.
In a war-ravaged country that continues to fight the bloody civil war, the advent of COVID-19 has exposed the people of Yemen to a completely new set of challenges. Though the country has seen only one confirmed case so far, the lack of testing facilities could mean that several cases especially among the internally displace people and refugees might have gone unnoticed. In the light of increasing threat of pandemic that has crippled the functioning of daily life all over the world, the UN Secretary-General has called for an “immediate global ceasefire in all corners of the world” and made an appeal “to put armed conflict on lockdown and focus together on the true fight” of human lives.6
Driven by the seriousness of the crisis, the Saudi-led coalition announced a two-week ceasefire on April 09. In response, Houthi spokesperson Mohammed al-Bukhaiti stated, “We will continue to fight and target their military installations and industrial sites since they continue with the siege…There has to be total end of the siege or else the war will continue.”7 Iran, so far, has not taken an official position on the ceasefire. However, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, a senior foreign policy adviser to the Iranian Parliament, had stated, “Ending strikes in Yemen is a good move, but the unsustainably Saudi-initiated some-day truce...is not the solution.”8 Houthis have also alleged that despite the declaration of a ceasefire, airstrikes have been carried out by the coalition.9 The Houthis want more guarantees from the UN that the other side will not exploit their withdrawal.
COVID-19: A New Phantom
On April 10, Yemen’s Supreme National Emergency Committee confirmed the first case of COVID-19 infection in the Hadramout Province,10 which now has been put under a partial curfew.11 The border with the neighbouring al-Mahra Province has been sealed, as informed by Farag al-Bouhsni, Governor of Hadramout Province.12 In March, the World Health Organisation (WHO) warned against a ‘pending explosion’ of COVID-19 cases in Yemen.13 In response to the potential spread of the pandemic, the government started taking precautionary measures as early as mid-March. The Hadi Government announced the shutting down of airports, border-crossings and schools. In a televised speech, Yemen’s Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed asked the nation to be “ready for the pandemic.”14 Some 50,000 Yemenis who returned home have already been tested for the virus since January 18, and for any future tests to be conducted, the country is increasingly dependent on help from outside. Yemen’s existing stock of testing kits has been consumed. The government is counting on support from the WHO, King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center and the international community to fight COVID-19.15 Yemen’s Prime Minister has called all warring factions to set aside their differences and focus on preventive measures to fight this pandemic.
The Yemeni healthcare system remains one of the most fragile in the region, particularly in rural areas of the country. A lot of medical facilities and infrastructure in Yemen has been a casualty of airstrikes during the civil war. In places where conflict is no longer continuing, the wrecked healthcare infrastructure has not been overhauled. In a war ravaged country, reaching out to people even for providing essential supplies such as food and medicine has become extremely difficult. Any support from WHO or other stakeholders under present situation may not be very effective. Altaf Musani, the WHO representative in Yemen, has stated, “Health system is functioning at 50 per cent of its capacity in Yemen.”16 Taha al-Mutawakel, Health Minister of Houthis’ National Salvation Government, has similarly warned that “93% of medical devices and equipment were out of readiness.”17
In the past, Yemen has struggled to deal with starvation, malnutrition and various other virulent yet deadly diseases such as cholera, diphtheria and dengue. But battling Covid-19 is going to be an uphill task. Another cause for worry would be the recent announcement by the US to cut healthcare aid to Yemen18 as well as cuts to aid provided by the World Food Programme owing to budgetary constraints, which are likely to affect several Houthi-controlled areas.19 Moreover, the Donald Trump administration's move to halt funding to WHO20 would severely undermine WHO's efforts in Yemen. In a nation that is facing one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent history, dealing with COVID-19 is going to be extremely tough. The role of Iran and Saudi Arabia would become crucial in avoiding the deterioration of COVID-19 crisis. To a great extent, the outcome of the COVID-19 crisis in Yemen would depend upon the response of regional and international stakeholders.
Iran-Saudi Rivalry
The Saudi-Iran rivalry is being played out in Yemen, making it extremely difficult for any peace deal to come through. In March, the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm, often dubbed as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Salman’s war, has completed five years of operations.21 Earlier in 2015, when the operation commenced with massive bombing campaigns and naval blockade, perhaps it was thought that it would promptly reinstate Mansour Hadi’s government in Sanaa. Instead, backed by Tehran, Houthis have demonstrated a strong defence, and the conflict has prolonged with a continuous military stalemate in various provinces, effectively turning Yemen into a battlefield of Iran-Saudi rivalry.
In May 2015, a study published by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) had cautioned that “Yemen is heading towards becoming another theatre of Shia-Sunni conflict or proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.”22 Over the last five years, the assessment has been repeatedly ascertained. Saudi Arabia has carried out extensive military campaigns with minimal success. Iranian support to Houthis has systematically grown after the beginning of Saudi campaign with the shipment of small arms to include heavy artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and even small range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). In 2015, as per the SIPRI Arms Database, an agreement of sale was finalised between the Houthis and the Iranian regime to deliver 10 Qiam-1 SSMs.23 The delivery of weapons finally took place in 2017. A study by London–based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) notes, “It was only after the launch of Operation Decisive Storm that Iran shifted from providing assistance to the Houthis to forming something closer to an alliance with them.”24
Despite the declaration of a “comprehensive ceasefire” by Saudi Arabia, Tehran is yet to make an official statement on the issue. However, given the impact of COVID-19 pandemic in Iran and its sanctions hit economy, it is unlikely that Tehran would have sufficient resources to actively stay involved in the Yemeni conflict. Riyadh too is exhausted with the war and deeply affected by falling oil prices in addition to its internal political problems. In such a situation, Riyadh may look for an honourable exit from Yemen’s war theatre.25 It can be argued that under present circumstances, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have sufficient number of reasons to make the ceasefire work.
The cooperation of UAE, a partner of Riyadh in the coalition, would be equally crucial. The UAE, like Saudi Arabia, too seeks to end its direct military involvement in the conflict. In March, UAE had sent medical supplies to Iran amid the coronavirus crisis, followed by an official call between the foreign ministers of the two countries.26 This signals a positive development that might serve as an opportunity for Tehran and Riyadh to bridge gaps through Abu Dhabi.
Prognosis
Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, Yemen’s current predicament with large-scale humanitarian emergency, coupled with presence of terrorist groups, could have serious consequences for the entire region. The Yemeni conflict has already engulfed Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman. It is imperative to come up with long-lasting options to end the civil war; otherwise, country’s vulnerability would expand to the whole Arabian Peninsula. Undoubtedly, the ceasefire is a welcome development, but there are some serious doubts about the effectiveness of the ceasefire. Since 2015, the Yemeni conflict had been a saga of ceasefires and their relentless violations. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that this time it is going to be any different unless both sides adhere to it.
However, the malaise of COVID-19 – a common concern for all in the region – may be a reason for some optimism. The abidance to ceasefire does not mean an end to the conflict, but it surely would work as a confidence-building measure, at least for now, to address the bigger challenge of coronavirus. No peace initiative will work without cooperation between Riyadh and Tehran. Perhaps, the pandemic could be an opportunity to reduce, if not entirely end the Iran-Saudi rivalry in Yemen.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The execution of Bangabandhu’s killer is likely to lift the morale of the pro-liberation forces while weakening that of the anti-liberation groups who were already in disarray.
Bangladesh will mark the centennial birth anniversary of its founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman later this year. A yearlong celebration planned to commemorate this historic event has, however, been muted so far on account of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. At least 30 prominent global leaders, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, had been expected to attend the celebratory programmes. In fact, Prime Minister Modi was to deliver the keynote address on March 17, 2020 to start the yearlong celebrations. These events now stand postponed.1
Amidst the COVID-19 induced gloom, the popular sentiment turned celebratory on the announcement of the arrest of Captain Abdul Majed – one of the killers of Mujib – in Dhaka on April 7, 2020. Arguably, this was a key achievement for the pro-liberation forces represented by the Awami League and its secular politics in their rivalry against the anti-liberation forces represented by Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh Nationalist Party and other Islamist forces.
Arrest and Execution of Majed
Captain Abdul Majed represented the anti-liberation forces in Bangladesh. This self-proclaimed killer of Mujib, who had been absconding for decades2 , was executed by the state in the early hours of April 12 – five days after his arrest.
It is widely believed that India had played a key role in his arrest.3 Bangladeshi media had reported that Abdul Majed came to Dhaka in the middle of March from Kolkata where he claimed to be hiding for almost 23 years.4 Bangladeshi Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan had described his arrest as “the biggest gift” for Bangladesh in 2020.5
Bangladesh achieved its liberation under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1971. Unfortunately, his rule was short-lived and within four years of the country’s liberation, he was assassinated on August 15, 1975 by a faction of the army opposed to his policies. The same renegade army personnel also wiped out his entire family residing in Bangladesh. The only two survivors of the Sheikh’s family - daughters Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana - lived to see the day since they were based in West Germany at that time.
Sheikh Mujiburs’s Assassination: A Turning Point in the History of Bangladesh
Sheikh Mujibur’s assassination was a turning point in the politics of Bangladesh. It led to the complete sidelining of the pro-liberation forces by the anti-liberation groups. Within 90 days of Mujib’s assassination, his killers were given immunity through an Indemnity Ordinance issued by then President Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad on September 26, 1975. This ordinance was converted into a formal statute by Major General Ziaur Rahman and later approved by the Bangladeshi Parliament - Jatiyo Sangshad - through the Fifth Amendment on July 9, 1979. The Indemnity Act, therefore, was enshrined in the Constitution of Bangladesh. The subsequent governments, including that of President Ziaur Rahman, rewarded Mujib’s killers by promoting and posting them in lucrative diplomatic missions abroad.
After carrying out Mujib’s assassination, Majed and other officers involved in the killing went to Libya via Bangkok, allegedly on the directive of the then army chief Ziaur Rahman.6 These officers were aptly rewarded with Majed being appointed as Bangladesh's Ambassador to Senegal in 1980. After his retirement from the army, he was appointed as Deputy Secretary at the Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Corporation (BIWTC) in March 1980 where he was later promoted as Secretary. After BIWTC, he joined the youth development ministry as its director before being eventually transferred to the national savings department in the same designation. 7
The policies of subsequent governments left little doubt about their connivance with the anti-liberation forces in the killing of Mujib. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that these killers were not punished under the rule of the army. They were largely left unpunished even when democracy was restored in 1990 with the coming to power of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) headed by its leader Khaleda Zia - the widow of General Ziaur Rahman.
It was only when Sheikh Hasina assumed power in 1996 that steps were taken to bring the culprits to justice. The controversial Indemnity Act was abrogated in November 1996.8 This paved the way for the start of their trial in Dhaka in 1997 - 22 years after the assassination. In 1998, the trial court awarded death penalty to Abdul Majed and 11 other former army personnel for their involvement in the killing. The death sentence of all the killers – Syed Farooq-ur Rahman, Sultan Shahriar Rashid Khan, Muhiuddin Ahmed, AKM Mohiuddin, Bazlul Huda, Shariful Haque Dalim, Khandker Abdur Rashid, Rashed Chowdhury, Nur Chowdhury, Abdul Majed, Moslem Uddin and Aziz Pasha – was confirmed by the High Court on April 30, 2001.
However, this issue was once again put on the backburner with the BNP-led coalition government coming back to power in 2002. Notably, the coalition comprised of strong anti-liberation forces, including the Jamaat-e-Islami which had sided with Pakistan during the liberation war. This period also coincided with a spurt in Islamist radicalism across the country. Given these developments, the government protected rather than punish Mujib’s killers.
The death penalty was once again revived when Sheikh Hasina came back to power in January 2009. The Supreme Court, on November 19, 2009, upheld the High Court’s judgment. After completing all legal procedures, the government executed five convicts on January 28, 2010. Of the remaining seven absconding convicts, Aziz Pasha reportedly died in Zimbabwe in 2001 while Rashed Chowdhury has taken political asylum in the US. Nur Chowdhury and Moslem Uddin are believed to be residing in Canada9 and Pakistan10 , respectively. It was only Abdul Majed who was suspected to be hiding in India. The whereabouts of two other convicts are not known.
The Sheikh Hasina-led ruling regime has sought to repatriate the remaining absconders and bring them to justice in a year which is being celebrated as Mujib Borsho. This endeavour is being led by a task force that was first set up in 2010. It is headed by the law, justice and parliamentary affairs minister and comprises of key officials of the foreign, law, and home ministries.11 The Bangladesh Government has also appealed to the international community to track down the culprits. Two law firms in the US and Canada have been hired to fast-track the process.12 Meanwhile, Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen has spoken to his American counterpart, the Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, while Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has written a letter to President Donald Trump on the repatriation issue.13 Notably, while the US is yet to take a call on this matter, Canada has expressed its reservations in deporting the wanted personnel, given the existing provision of death penalty in Bangladesh. Therefore, barring the arrest of Captain Majed, the current government has not had tangible success in bringing the remaining absconders to justice.
A Boost to India-Bangladesh Ties
The perceived help extended by India in the arrest of Captain Abdul Majed can be seen as another feather in the cap of the growing security cooperation between India and Bangladesh, initiated under the stewardship of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.14 Over the last decade, Dhaka has handed over to New Delhi a number of wanted insurgent leaders, especially from India’s north-eastern states, who had been hiding in Bangladesh. This has helped establish a modicum of peace in the region.
Arguably, the arrest and execution of Captain Majed – the self-confessed assassinator of Bangabandhu - is a new milestone in the history of bilateral ties. Today, India-Bangladesh ties have been completely transformed, notwithstanding the occasional irritants including the issue of illegal migration from Bangladesh. The maturity of their ties has been reflected in India recently sending its newly appointed foreign secretary, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, to Bangladesh to clear the air over the National Register of Citizenship (NRC).15 Therefore, given these developments, it is likely that the arrest and execution of one of the killers of Bangabandhu will further strengthen India-Bangladesh ties.
Meanwhile, for Bangladesh, the execution is likely to lift the morale of the pro-liberation forces while weakening that of the anti-liberation groups who were already in disarray. This portends new political dynamics in the future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The COVID-19 crisis would severely impact the four countries at the social, political, economic and humanitarian levels, as these states were already facing multi-vector exigencies at the time of the pandemic’s outbreak.
Idiomatically speaking, a ‘perfect storm’ refers to the deadliest combination of a multitude of adversities striking at the most vulnerable moment. Already reeling under endemic political crises, severe economic meltdown and a prolonged wave of popular discontent, the states of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon have been dealt a debilitating blow by the COVID-19 pandemic, which makes the aforesaid analogy unfortunately the most apposite.
Even the state of Israel is today contending with one of its most formidable security threats, as the pandemic has already infected thousands of its citizens, and has wreaked havoc on the economy with unemployment figures mounting to over 22 percent.1 The floundering state machinery and deplorable health system in adjoining Arab states — caused by years of civil strife, massive displacement of populations, rampant corruption and misgovernance — augurs ill for this area.
The Situation
As of April 20, the coronavirus had infected 1,539 people and claimed 82 lives in Iraq.2 Almost a quarter of these cases are from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). As of April 18, KRI reported 337 confirmed cases with four associated deaths and 244 recoveries.3 According to March 26 report of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), about 44 per cent female and 56 per cent male constitute the total Iraqi number,4 which has a heavier concentration among middle-aged and elderly adults.
The number of those infected by the coronavirus in Israel stood at 13,362 with 171 deaths, as of April 20.5 Meanwhile, the West Bank tally had 322 positive cases with two deaths by April 19.6 The first confirmed positive case of the pandemic was reported on February 21 in Israel, after a female citizen tested positive on her return to the country from the Diamond Princess ship from Japan.7
Since February 21, Lebanon Info Center has been disseminating official reports on the number of coronavirus cases and deaths online.. As of April 21, Lebanon reported 677 confirmed cases of coronavirus and 21 deaths.8 The Al Jazeera has reported that the number could be much higher in that country, as migrant workers without proper papers were not being tested for the virus, given the growing strain on the healthcare system.9 Similarly, Jordan had 417 confirmed cases with seven deaths by April 20.10
However, health officials in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria are wary the number of people infected with coronavirus far exceeds the official figures disclosed, and claim that militias and other non-state actors are quarantining entire communities of patients in areas outside state control.11
Meanwhile, the wave of public protests, sparked by issues of misgovernance and economic downturn, may have ebbed in the wake of government lockdown to fight the pandemic, government injunctions regarding social distancing has spurred its own set of political controversies in Lebanon. For instance, it is reported that lockdown measures are particularly harsh in Palestinian and Syrian refugee camps, as it is alleged that they are perceived to be spreaders of COVID-19 in Lebanon.12 Refugee communities are reportedly complaining that their curfew hours are only relaxed for five hours, while the general citizenry enjoys greater relaxation in the clampdown. Some observers argue that the Lebanese expatriate community is more liable to spread the virus than the refugee community.
The Response
Israel’s Institute for Biological Research has been trying its best to develop the vaccine as soon as possible. The institute recently had a “significant breakthrough in understanding the biological mechanism and qualities of the virus, including better diagnostic capability, production of antibodies for those who already have the coronavirus”.13 However, the development of the vaccine requires a series of tests and experiments that may take more time.
On March 18, Israel passed an emergency law to use mobile phone data for tracking infected citizens. Even Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s close aides tested positive for COVID-19.14 Amid shortage of protective gear and testing kits, Israel’s Ministry of Defence has taken the responsibility for the purchase of essential medical items. Even Israel’s spy agency Mossad has been included in the fight against COVID 19.15
For its part, Iraq took the politically difficult decision to close its borders with Iran on February 20 in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak.16 It only allowed returning Iraqi citizens, as the pandemic was spreading in Iran. Thereafter, the Iraqi Government closed universities, schools and even cinema halls in Baghdad on February 27 and banned large public gatherings in various cities. A country-wide lockdown, including the Kurdish region, was later imposed in mid-March until April 11.17 The Iraqi Government also banned travelers from Qatar, Germany, France, Iran, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Spain, South Korea and Thailand.18
In response to the outbreak in Iraq, Jordan restricted land and air travel with Iraq March 10 onwards. The kingdom has been screening people entering the country’s borders and airports. It has strongly enforced mandatory chest and throat examinations19 along with temperature checks at all points of entry,
On March 15, Lebanon declared a state of medical emergency given the lack of sufficient medical facilities and the government closed the airport, seaports and land entrances from March 18.20 The citizenry was instructed by the government to stay home and the army was asked to intervene by order from the Lebanese President and Prime Minister.
The Fallout
According to the Human Rights Watch, Lebanon’s medical practitioners and public officials are very worried about providing patients with urgent medical care because of the financial crisis.21 The same concern is expressed by the Jordanian and Lebanese officials.
All four states were already in the midst of a severe economic crisis when the pandemic hit, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for security forces to keep the hungry and unemployed stay at home indefinitely. Even Israel is suffering a severe economic downturn with unemployment rate crossing 20 per cent.22
For Iraq, the fall in crude prices has drained revenues for this crude exporting country that are now critical for containing the health crisis. At this point, the leadership void at the federal government level is causing a major concern.
The COVID-19 crisis would severely impact the four countries at the social, political, economic and humanitarian levels, as these states were already facing multi-vector exigencies at the time of the pandemic’s outbreak.
A surprise fallout of the pandemic has been that the European countries have announced temporary withdrawal of some of their troops from the anti-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) coalition and training mission in Iraq.23 Britain, France, Spain and Netherlands have decided to withdraw hundreds of their troops from the country, as part of a temporary pause in their missions due to the coronavirus epidemic.
In the wake of these developments, ISIS stated in its publication Al Naba (Vol. 220) on February 2, 2020 that it was an opportune time to hit Western states as, “the last thing they want today is to be struck during these trying times. The caliphate soldiers will prepare to hit them like they hit Paris, London, Brussels and [other] cities. Moreover, in some places security and medical personnel are stretched very thin so the last thing they wish is to be surprised by the mujahidin.”24
It is still early to fully analyse the deep impact of COVID-19 on the region but it is almost certain that the cumulative effect of this crisis would snowball across several strategic vectors in time and space.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Pakistan’s efforts to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak may get severely constrained due to the refusal of the ulema and religious leaders to ensure that their followers abide by the rules of the lockdown and social distancing.
The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) Pakistan held its annual gathering, starting March 11, 2020, in Raiwind, Lahore, where its Markaz is headquartered, with participation from about 80 countries. Both the federal and state governments failed to persuade the TJ to cancel the event. The five-day event was shortened to just two days because of rain, but by then the damage was already done. The first four cases reported in southern Sindh were attendees of the TJ gathering in Lahore. This was the beginning of Pakistan’s corona nightmare. Since then, as of April 20, more than 8,400 positive cases have been registered in the country, with most of the cases traced to the Raiwind congregation.1
According to the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) of Government of Punjab, as of April 19, about 1531 cases have been reported from Raiwind congregation alone.2 In Sindh, until April 2, about 94 TJ members had tested positive.3 While the exact number of coronavirus cases related to TJ is not available yet, thousands of TJ members who participated in the Raiwind congregation are still being tracked down by officials.4 The Raiwind gathering was held in the immediate aftermath of the TJ’s international annual event, held in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur, from February 27 to March 1, 2020.5 This event was attended by over 16,000 people, including 1,500 foreigners. The Ijtima (religious congregation) participants subsequently participated in Tabligh congregations in both India and Pakistan, playing a critical role in the spread of the disease in both countries.
Negligence or Helplessness?
The Imran Khan-led government initially did not take the issue of possible spread of COVID-19 seriously. The Pakistani prime minister refused to enforce a lockdown in spite of compelling reasons to do so. Instead, he urged people to maintain social distance. Interestingly, while many Pakistanis practised social distancing following government instructions and provinces went for complete lockdown, the ulema and other religious groups defied government instructions and went ahead conducting Jumma (congregational) prayers in mosques.
In order to bring religious leaders on board, Pakistan President Arif Alvi, sought a fatwa (a religious decree) from the Al-Azhar University in Egypt, an authority on Islamic injunctions, to suspend congregational prayers at mosques. In his fatwa, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar quoted the hadith (sayings of the Prophet) in which the Prophet advised his companions to offer prayers at home in case there is a strong rain, or if they were unwell and their illness could cause problems for others or lead to a pandemic.6 However, the ulema insisted that closing mosques and stopping Jumma prayers and sermons contravened the principles of Islam. According to Mufti Muneeb-ur-Rehman, the head of the government-appointed Ruet-t-Hilal Committee (tasked with spotting the new moon in Pakistan), insisted that they cannot close mosques as it was “not possible in any circumstances in an Islamic country”.7 Their stance reflected the inflexible attitude of these religious groups, driven by narrow political interests to remain relevant by anointing themselves as the protectors of faith, rather than choosing to adopt progressive interpretations of the injunctions in Islamic jurisprudence.
These religious leaders also termed the enforcement of lockdown as a Western conspiracy against Islam, indirectly supporting Imran Khan’s secular objections to the lockdown (as it would disadvantage the poor and the destitute). The ulema branded COVID-19 as a punishment (azaab) from Allah for not conforming to religious diktats and asked the common people to offer more prayers soliciting Allah’s grace in this hour of crisis. Mufti Taqi Usmani, one of the most influential religious leaders in Pakistan, a recipient of Sitara-e Imtiaz (star of excellence) in the field of public service in 2019, and Shaykh al-Hadith at Darul Uloom, Karachi, went to the extent of saying that it was “not possible to get rid of corona without asking God for forgiveness.”8
Why did the ulema in Pakistan reject the government order to close down mosques and ban Friday prayers even when the epitomes of the Islamic centres of the two sects — Sunni and Shia — Saudi Arabia and Iran, mandated and enforced such shut-downs domestically in their countries? The answer lies in the competition between various religious groups for social legitimacy at one level and between these groups and the state at another. The debate on whether the state should be allowed to prevail over the ulema on religious matters is an ongoing one in Pakistan. In the case of most other Muslim majority countries, whether they are democratic or authoritarian, it is the state which prevails over the religious groups while maintaining public order.
However, in Pakistan, both the political and religious leaderships are locked in an eternal squabble over the issue. This competition has, more often than not, pitted the state and the ulema against each other in the public sphere. The current government’s reluctance to use its authority to close mosques and reinforce its ban on Friday congregations is a manifestation of its weakness and vulnerability vis-à-vis the ulema over any issue concerning Islam. The governments have been always reluctant to take the ulema head-on. If the past is any guide, the threat of street protests issued by the ulema could have been a disturbing prospect for the government, as it would have weakened its efforts at combatting COVID-19, given the street power that religious groups command.
Military’s Role
The military in Pakistan has appropriated Islam over the past several decades and has effectively positioned itself as the principal saviour of the nation and its faith. As on several occasions in the past, this time too, the army acted swiftly to enforce a countrywide lockdown, recognising the gravity of the situation without paying much heed to either Prime Minister Khan’s ambivalence about enforcing a lockdown or the reluctance of the ulema to behave responsibly. There is a view in Pakistan that Imran deliberately encouraged the military to announce the lockdown because he knew that religious organisations would not protest against the military and, moreover, he would be spared of the wrath of the vociferous mullahs. By so doing, the Pakistani Prime Minister not only lost an opportunity to prove his mettle as a leader capable of taking strong decisions but also reconfirmed the popular perception that the civilian government in Pakistan would continue to play second fiddle to the military in all circumstances.
State on Back foot
While the government failed in its efforts to persuade religious leaders to ensure lockdown and follow social distancing norms, it is even reluctant to call out the TJ for its key role in spreading the virus in the country. Naming and shaming the TJ could invite the anger of the right-wing elements in the society, including within the government as also within the army. Over the years, TJ has infiltrated the Pakistani military and the trend has been extensively explored by Shuja Nawaz in his recently published book The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood. This started with Zia ul Haq’s Islamisation of the Pakistan military, where keeping beard, offering five-time regular prayers and spending time with the TJ were given priority over other standard criteria for promotion.9
The benign image TJ has created and the goodwill it has among religious groups could be gauged from the recent statement of late General Hamid Gul’s son, Abdullah Gul, who is associated with the pro-army Milli Yak Jehti and Difa-e-Pakistan Council and known for his pro-Jihad sentiment. Gul asserted that the media outlets were “spewing venom” against the TJ, which is “hurting sentiments of millions of people”. He called for the imposition of heavy fines on “religion-weary news anchors, producers, and all news directors …”10 A cleric in Karachi told his followers that they were “not too weak to let this one virus empty our mosques.”11 On April 3, when police tried to stop a Friday prayer congregation at a mosque in Liaqatabad, Karachi, a religious mob pelted stones and attacked officials.
Urdu Media Pitches for TJ
Over the years, since its inception in 1927, the TJ has carefully built its image as a peaceful and apolitical organisation devoted to piety and spiritual reformation. The Pakistani vernacular media, known for its conservative biases, has been particularly liberal in its praise of TJ’s activities within Pakistan and beyond. Therefore, quite predictably, apart from a few editorials and commentaries in the English language media criticising TJ for its irresponsible behaviour, the coverage of TJ’s role in spreading the coronavirus in Pakistan’s vernacular media has been rather sparse and uncritical. Instead, the Urdu media focused its attention on Shia pilgrims returning from various religious sites in Iran as the potential source of spread of virus in the country.12 These infected pilgrims, according to the vernacular media, were allowed to enter at Taftan border in Balochistan without being properly quarantined, while there was a disproportionate hullabaloo being raised over the TJ.
Conclusion
On April 5, 2020, a Chinese delegation of health experts advised Pakistan to extend the lockdown for another 28 days.13 However, the continuing religious gatherings on Fridays to offer Jumma prayers show that the religious leaders are unwilling to close mosques, even as the state is disinclined to take action against them. Moreover, the stubbornness of the TJ members who are not voluntarily disclosing their participation in the Raiwind congregation is making both social distancing and lockdown redundant. Pakistan’s efforts to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak may get severely constrained due to the religious group’s obstinacy. Their pressure on the government to keep the mosques open is also likely to increase with the advent of Ramadan (a month of fasting) starting from the last week of April. At this juncture, when the world has already witnessed more than 165,990 deaths (as of April 20),14 and 8,418 people have tested positive in Pakistan with 176 dead,15 stupidity has superseded wisdom, enhancing the COVID-19 risks in Pakistan.
Once the coronavirus reaches the third stage of community transmission, Pakistan’s health care system which is already in shambles may not be able to deal with the pandemic effectively. The country that is still struggling to combat rabies and polio due to opposition by religious fundamentalists to vaccination, would find itself in a huge crisis, unless, of course, either sanity prevails among its ulema and religious leaders to ensure that their followers abide by the rules of lockdown and social distancing, or the state enforces its writ with all the power at its command, howsoever politically risky it may turn out to be.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
While scientists all over the world are working tirelessly to find an antidote to COVID-19, the narratives doing the rounds in Pakistan – pushed and peddled by the Urdu media, accuse them of conspiring to turn this virus into a weapon to not only kill but also to alter the human psyche.
The vernacular Urdu media, both print and electronic, remains the main source of news and information for the majority of the people in Pakistan. According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 4.6 million out of over six million daily circulated newspapers in the country were Urdu dailies.1 Among the Urdu newspapers, Jang is the most circulated newspaper with a subscription of 8,50,000. Nawa-i-Waqt holds the second place with 5,00,000 subscribers, followed by Pakistan (2,79,000) and Khabrain (2,32,000). Other important Urdu dailies are Ausaf, Ummat and Jasarat. In comparison, the subscription of English language dailies is low with the top three among them – The News (1,20,000), Dawn (1,09,000) and Business Recorder (22,000) together selling less than Pakistan, which is third in the list of vernacular newspapers.2 According to another Pakistan Bureau of Statistics report, Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa have the highest number of Urdu dailies.3 Overall, out of 695 newspapers and periodicals published in Pakistan, 84 are in English whereas the corresponding number for Urdu is 514.4
Opinion pieces and editorials in Urdu dailies are mostly conservative and regressive in orientation. The meagre liberal voice, mostly in Jang but also sporadically in some other newspapers, gets drowned in the cacophony of impassioned orthodoxy peddled by a huge army of commentators who wear their sectarian/religious consciousness up their sleeves. Views of columnists writing such orthodox opinion pieces find their way into Pakistan’s collective consciousness much easily than that of the sane and reasoned observers who find it difficult to overwhelm their counterparts in the vernacular media. A report in Dawn had once noted that in Pakistan, “objectivity, balance, fairness and the right to reply are alien concepts for Urdu newspapers.”5
Given its reach among the common masses, media’s power to shape people’s perceptions remains significant.6 As Florian Zollmann points out, “the news media provide a significant portion of the information on which citizens base their political choices.”7 In Pakistan, given its outreach and wide readership, the role of vernacular media is important. It is also the reason why the Pakistan Army tries to influence Urdu media8 through both ‘envelope journalism’ and coercion.9
At a time when COVID-19 is posing a major non-conventional threat to Pakistan, it is thus pertinent to examine the line adopted by the vernacular media, especially since the government’s narrative on methods to fight such a disease is getting embroiled in an increasingly regressive religious discourse.
Reportage on Coronavirus
Like elsewhere, the COVID-19 pandemic has emerged as a major issue in Pakistan around which comments are being written and debates being held. The federal government’s approach in dealing with the issue has come under severe criticism. Prime Minister Imran Khan’s decision of not working with the opposition and asking the provinces to not enforce a complete lockdown reflects the unpreparedness of the government. Meanwhile, the country’s health system remains inadequate10 while an economic crisis looms around the horizon, as evident from an external debt of US $105 billion and currency depreciation by a whopping 30 per cent in 2019.11 Several business lobbies with vested interests are also seeking to influence the government against adopting tough measures that include a complete lockdown.12
These issues are being increasingly reflected in the editorial pages of the Urdu media. Interestingly, while the narratives in vernacular media revolve around criticising the government for its failures, several commentators have been peddling various conspiracy theories and advocating that people’s sufferings are due to God’s wrath or punishment (azab). This is particularly evident from the insistence of several ulemas on holding Friday congregational prayers, in defiance of the government’s orders. Their participation in prayers held in mosques has led to violence in Islamabad and Karachi.13
Corona a ‘God’s Punishment’
The argument that COVID-19 is God’s wrath on the people for the sins they have committed is believed by many in Pakistan. One commentator labelled the pandemic as a “test for humans, to ensure that sinful followers go back to the Allah for seeking His forgiveness for their sins”.14 Others have argued that it is time for human beings to be truthful in their acts to avoid such wraths of God. A commentator, while calling it an azab (torment or punishment) from Allah, argued that “such azabs have come upon people whenever they have committed sins and have indulged in fornication/adultery, strayed from the path of the God and became selfish (ooswaqt Allah ke azab se dochaar huye, jab un mein bigaad payada huwa, bilkhasoos jab insaan burayee aur badkari ke raste per chal nikla).”15 These comments reflect the views of some of the conservative ulema, who remain unhappy over the government’s decision to impose lockdown on mosques and stop congregational prayers.
The vernacular media has offered wide coverage to Sahabzada Peer Abdul Basheer, Chairman of Milli Yakjehti Council, who stated, “this is the moment that we should offer prayers and seek forgiveness from the God. But we have taken the opposite position and closed the doors of the God’s houses (masjids). This is like inviting the azab (suffering) from the God.”16 He asked people to pray instead.
Corona a ‘Conspiracy’
A few commentators in the vernacular media believe that coronavirus is designed to target Islam and Muslims, while others look at it as a strategy for containing China. One commentator wrote in Nawa-i-Waqt that Muslims need to recognise that there is a powerful anti-Islam and anti-Muslim lobby in the world which targets Islam/Muslims whenever it gets a chance. He further added, “The fear thus created (by the pandemic) is meant to close the holy places in Saudi Arabia and mosques across the world and in this way, (the lobby has been able) to stop five-time congregational prayers in mosques, which are integral to Islam. In the absence of any such scare, it would not have been possible to close down these places.”17
The daily Ummat, in an editorial, lashed out at the Saudis for shutting down the two holiest sites of the Muslims – Kabbah and Masjid-e-Nabawi. It raised the question: “When a big country like China can control the coronavirus, why cannot countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan do so?” The editorial further opined that “any such policy of closing masajid (mosques) can only be adopted as per the wishes of Allah or for the security of the people. However, in a situation like this, all Muslims believe that the death will come only when Allah wants it to come. They should not feel insecure to visit and pray in mosques. The prevailing fear among the rulers because of the pandemic is a sign of the decline and fall of the Ummah.”18
Domestically, the Tablighi Jamaat members have accused the government of trying to stop them from carrying out their proselytising activities, as ordained by Allah. One Jamaat leader stated that “the crime of the Tablighi members is that they invite people towards the righteous path and the government is scared of it.” According to him, the ban on religious congregations and closure of masjids are signs of God’s unhappiness. Therefore, Allah has unleashed his wrath upon the people and the only way the Muslims can overcome this situation is by collectively praying for Allah’s forgiveness. However, the government’s resolve in enforcing the lockdown is seen as a key obstacle in achieving this objective.19
Corona a ‘Biological Weapon’
The vernacular media has widely reported COVID-19 as a biological weapon. Notably, this hypothesis has been discussed in detail. For instance, a commentator alleges that “people across the world will be put in prison-like places and some of them will be incarcerated in their homes. Then 5G will be used for surveillance on humans which will meet the requirements of the post-corona world.”20 He even went on to claim that people who were earlier reluctant to take vaccines for polio will now “blindly take any medicine (or vaccine) to avoid being infected. Scientists may now invent a vaccine that would introduce gene-mutation in the people so that they would not able to differentiate between likes and dislikes and could alter their taste. It may turn human beings into slaves, operating at the order of their masters.”21
A report carried in Ummat highlighted the claims of an acclaimed American human rights lawyer and professor of international law, Francis Boyle, that the virus was invented in a laboratory and sold to China. According to the report, Boyle stated that “coronavirus is not natural but an artificial one created by scientists and was meant to be used as a biological weapon. However, the virus got leaked because of negligence.” He further claimed that “a certain technology (a technology in virology to introduce change in microbes/proteins) has been used so that the COVID-19 could be spread widely in humans.”22
Another report quoting Chinese sources blamed the United States (US) for planting the virus in China during a joint US-China military exercise in Wuhan and subsequently calling it a “Chinese Virus”.23 The commentators argued that this was a well-crafted American conspiracy to not only damage China’s reputation as a responsible actor but also to contain it.
Conclusion
It is unfortunate that while scientists all over the world are working tirelessly to find an antidote to COVID-19, the narratives doing the rounds in Pakistan – pushed and peddled by the Urdu media, accuse them of conspiring to turn this virus into a weapon to not only kill but also to alter the human psyche. Given its deep reach in Pakistani society, the country’s vernacular media is working tirelessly to promote a yet another baseless and fictitious narrative. This is being ostensibly done to hide the failure of the state to provide basic health and other facilities as well as to strengthen the hold of the religious groups in the Pakistani society. The relative silence of the Pakistani civil society, the government and even the powerful military on this crucial issue indicates the diminishing influence of the liberal constituency in Pakistan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Considering the impending financial crunch due to the Covid-19 pandemic and uncertainty about allocations in the coming years, it is unlikely that the MoD will be able to launch many new procurement programmes under the new DPP any time soon.
The 700-odd pages of the draft Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2020 contain many new ideas but make for a tedious reading and may end up making capital acquisitions more complicated. This is not to belittle the efforts that have gone into putting the document together, but to point out that the draft requires a para-by-para review of the proposed policy and procedural changes, also taking into account the comments received by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on the draft.1
The need for this exercise is twofold. One, at the policy level, it must be ensured that the proposed changes serve a distinct purpose, which is not served by, or cannot be served by modifying, any pre-existing provision. Two, at the procedural level, the provisions must be crystal clear, leaving no room for subjective interpretations, and no untied ends. The draft DPP 2020 must pass muster on these yardsticks before it is promulgated.
To illustrate, arguably the most significant change at the policy level concerns addition of several new procurement categories and alterations in the offset guidelines, both of which seem problematic. Talking about the procurement categories, their number has gone up from two in 2002 to 13 in 2020. Six of these, including a new category, are arranged in a hierarchical order with descending order of precedence.
The hierarchy comprises the Buy (Indian – Indian Designed, Developed and Manufactured), Buy (Indian), Buy and Make (Indian), Buy and Make, Buy (Global – Manufacture in India), and Buy (Global) categories. Besides these, other categories include the new Lease category with two sub-categories, Make category with three sub-categories, Innovation category, and Design and Development category.
In addition, there is the Strategic Partnership Model and the Technology Development Fund schemes. The proliferation of procurement categories could complicate the process of categorisation, not least because some of these categories have identical or similar overall objective.
The Buy (Indian – IDDM), for example, refers to “… procurement of products from an Indian vendor that have been indigenously designed, developed and manufactured …”, while the Design & Development and Innovation categories refer to procurement of “… equipment/system/subsystem/assembly/sub-assembly, major components, or upgrades thereof, to be designed, developed and manufactured by an Indian vendor …”.2
The commonality of the objective of these two categories, as evident from the italicised words in the preceding para, overlaps with the objective of the Make category which the draft DPP 2020 describes in these words: “…Projects under ‘Make’ or ‘Innovation’ category, except ‘Make III’, will essentially pertain to products involving indigenous design, development and manufacturing…’”3
With some suitable changes, it should be possible to amalgamate these three categories into one broad-based category. Similarly, going simply by their objectives and defining attributes, it should be possible to combine Buy and Make, Buy (Global – Manufacture in India) and the Strategic Partnership Model. Lesser number of more clearly defined categories, distinct from one another in purpose and content, would make the process of categorisation simpler and procurement more expeditious.
The changes made in the offset guidelines is another case in point. Apart from several somewhat inexplicable policy changes – deletion of the provision for offset banking and services as an avenue for discharging the offset obligation, just to mention two such changes, there are procedural changes which could be problematic. Take for example, offset credit on account of transfer of technology (ToT) which can now be claimed based on valuation by a recognised/certified valuation firm. This is a welcome step, but for the rider about valuation of technology.
The draft DPP says that “(i)t would be appropriate if the (technology) is transferred by the vendor to the government and it then hires the valuer jointly with the vendor” and that “(a)nother option is for the valuer to be hired by the vendor in consultation with the Government”.4 This is a potential procedural bottleneck because there is no clarity about the consequences of hiring a valuer without consultation with the government, which is otherwise not mandatory. If, on the other hand, that is acceptable to the MoD, it is not clear as to what is the objective of specifying this option.
While on the subject, it is a bit disappointing that the provisions for approval of the Indian Offset Partners (IOPs), change of IOPs, rephasing of the offset implementation schedule, etc., by the MoD have been retained. Similar controls are envisaged in relation to many other processes in the DPP. Ease of doing business requires such controls to be relaxed where the requirements to be complied with are clearly specified. Alternatively, if the MoD wants to retain the control, it would be helpful both to the acquisition personnel and the vendors if the grounds on which the permission would be granted or rejected are laid down in the DPP.
There is clearly a lot of work that needs to be done before finalisation of the draft DPP 2020, starting with attenuation of this voluminous document, which should not be very difficult. One of the seven chapters on shipbuilding and repair/refit of vessels (on which there is a separate chapter in the Defence Procurement Manual [DPM] 2009) runs into almost 200 pages. Since this is a self-contained chapter, and it is of relevance only to the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard, it could be delinked from the DPP and the DPM and notified as a separate manual.
Some attention also needs to be paid to comprehensiveness, as well as the text of the various provisions in the draft DPP, particularly the template of various undertakings, request for proposal (RfP) and the contract, which have legal implications. The Fall Clause in the RfP5, for example, requires the vendors to submit an undertaking while submitting their bids that they have not supplied the same item to any government department at a lower price, and that if it is discovered after signing of the contract that the vendor had indeed supplied the same item at a lesser price, the contract price will be lowered to that level.
A strict interpretation of the clause would mean that no vendor can ever expect to supply the same item at a higher price even if the last time it was supplied at a lower price was several years earlier. Obviously, this is not possible and, to be fair, it does not seem to be the intention underlying the standard text of this clause. This calls for modification in the text of this clause, and other similarly problematic clauses and provisions in the DPP.
It bears recalling that the DPP 2016 was amended as many as 47 times, which, among other things, points to that document having been promulgated without ironing out the rough edges. Considering the impending financial crunch due to the Covid-19 pandemic and uncertainty about allocations in the coming years, it is unlikely that the MoD will be able to launch many new procurement programmes under the new DPP any time soon.
There is, therefore, a case for deferring promulgation of DPP 2020 to the next year by which time the present draft can be thoroughly revised. Other manuals like the DPM and those followed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) can also be revised to ensure that all documents are in harmony and serve the common objective of equipping the armed forces with the latest equipment expeditiously and in a cost-effective manner.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Draft DPP 2020 needs to cut out obfuscation, repetitions, and bring out core issues for the consideration of the decision-makers in a concise and clear manner.
While most of the world is locked down to contain the spread of COVID-19, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) continues to work and make another attempt to refine the existing Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). The MoD has uploaded the latest draft of DPP 2020 on its website and comments are sought by May 8, 2020. By the year-end, after taking cognisance of all the suggestions, DPP 2020 is expected to be finalised and issued.
The DPP defines the process for capital expenditure from the annual defence allocation. For the current financial year, it is pegged at Rs. 1,18,555 Crores and is approximately one-third of capital expenditure of the Government of India. Therefore, the process of refining the DPP is significant. After the Bofors incident that rocked the nation, the DPP took a formal format in 1992. In the aftermath of Kargil Conflict, on the recommendations of the Group of Ministers, DPP took shape as a comprehensive document on capital procurements in 2002. With practical experience gained and observed inability to speed up the procurement process, it was continuously revised. Its new incarnations in 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2013 and 2016 did not deviate from the fundamental structure and process of procurement, resulting in no significant enhancement in the efficiency of capital procurements.
In the last 50 years, India, with seven per cent of global arms imports, has emerged as the largest arms importer. Saudi Arabia is a distant second with a little over three per cent of global arms imports.1 For decades, both policymakers and policy implementers have struggled to reverse the trend. The formalisation of DPP in 1992, creation of offset models in 2006 and the Strategic Partnership Model in 2016 has not changed the narrative. India continues to be the only major economy with a relatively modest defence industry. Therefore, the main aim of DPP 2020 should be to efficiently and effectively utilise capital budget allocation for modernisation of the Indian Armed Forces and simultaneously give a boost to the indigenisation of defence industry as a long-term strategic objective.
There are five foundational changes needed. First is the inherent underlying principle that to ensure financial probity, multiple checks are mandatory. A clearly annunciated flow chart, well-defined responsibilities and distinct accountability of all participants in the process are necessary for any process to be efficient. DPP in all its incarnations has lacked that and relies on individual and collective checks at multiple levels. A simple observation in the procurement process may have to be commented upon by 15 individuals before a case can move forward.2 The approach of collective responsibility has invariably allowed diminished individual accountability, which was adversely commented upon by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India in its report on Capital Acquisitions for Air Force tabled in the Parliament in February 2019. This needs to change.
The second issue is about the structure of DPP. DPP stands for Defence Procurement Procedure and this aspect needs to be the focal point. Besides covering the procurement procedure, the draft has so many other aspects related to partnerships, research and development (R&D), innovations, manufacture, offsets et al. Structurally, DPP needs segregation of R&D from the procurement procedure. All processes related to capabilities not currently available need de-hyphenation from DPP. For example, the chapter on ‘Make and Innovation’ must not be part of DPP. In any case, the preliminary procedure given in all these cases leads only to the first stage of procurement. This resets the time and process to zero and the procurement process starts ab initio. So, the elimination of these processes will de-clutter the DPP. These processes are significant for developing an indigenous ecosystem. But DPP is not the place for its germination. A separate policy and guidance document, to cover all aspects of R&D for the defence sector from innovation to design and development as articulated in draft DPP 2020, will be ideal.
The third issue is about the complexity of the process. It starts with the first stage of procurement that leads to acceptance of necessity and categorisation of the capital acquisition scheme. Based on estimated cost, every capital acquisition case is categorised at an appropriate level that defines the source and method of procurement, for example, Buy Global) or Buy and Manufacture. The types of categorisation in draft DPP 2020 is mind-boggling. In fact, with every new incarnation, DPP has added new ways for categorisation. Simply stated, the decision-maker needs to categorise the operationally required capability into two verticals - Buy or Lease. In either case, every required capability needs to be acquired or leased on a globally competitive basis to obtain the best value for money. At this juncture, it may seem contrary to 'Make in India’ goal. But it is not so in case certain clauses are added to the entire procurement process that is discussed a little later.
The fourth change needed is about the offset policy. The intention of this clause was to plough back capital expenditure on imported military hardware to initiate the indigenous defence industry. But it has not happened. In fact, offset credits and verification or accurate measure of indigenous content in various platforms remain suboptimal owing to a very complex and cumbersome process. It is well known that the offset clause adds to the final contract value. Eliminating offsets will simplify the contracting process and possibly enhance financial efficiency. But support to 'Make in India' too is mandatory for long term defence goal. A simple method can be adopted to counterbalance the removal of offset clause and energise indigenous manufacture. As all capital acquisition schemes are proposed via a global tender, a clause of part payment in Non-Repatriable Rupees (NRR) will not only support ‘Make in India’ but also assist in offsetting the notional loss by current suboptimal offset procedure. The international vendors will like to factor this aspect in their bids akin to offset clause. A simple procedure like this is likely to be more efficient than the unwieldy offset clause. The payment in NRR will have to be utilised to source equipment/services from the Indian entities. This is a simple method to ensure the requisite level of sourcing of equipment/services from India and can objectively be monitored for compliance.
Additionally, the outbreak of COVID-19 and a looming recession combined with the changing character of conflict presents an ideal time frame for India to indigenise defence industry.3 DPP 2020 must make use of the current challenges to invigorate the indigenous defence industry by making procedures simple. Will foreign vendors find loopholes in money repatriation clauses and route the money to parent company through fictitious firms in India? Some companies will definitely attempt this. But overall, this simplified process will be very effective in supporting ‘Make in India’.
Now coming back to categorisation riddle of DPP once again. Along with categorisation as Buy or Lease, the decision-maker needs to qualify the share of contract value that needs to be paid to the vendor in NRR. And this could vary between 30 to 100 per cent based on the individual case at the sole discretion of the decision-maker. Earmarking 100 per cent payment in NRR will obviously eliminate global players and this aspect needs a clear understanding by the decision-maker.
The last point is about clarity in DPP. It needs to be drafted for the decision-makers. Although size-wise even the 700-page draft DPP 2020 pales in comparison to the United States Defence Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement or Direction Générale de l'armement Instruction of France or similar procedure in the United Kingdom (UK), but in all these countries personnel operating these instructions are formally trained and stay in these departments for decades. Without any formal training and with relatively very short average tenure of two to three years in India, it is difficult for most personnel to comprehend a complex document like the draft DPP 2020. This assertion is valid for most of the personnel manning the acquisition wings of the MoD or Services Headquarters. Year after year, the CAG reports have been pointing out major and multiple procedural deviations in almost all capital procurements.
The DPP 2020 needs to cut out obfuscation, repetitions, and bring out core issues for the consideration of the decision-makers in a concise and clear manner. This can be done in case issues associated with R&D are cut off, categorisation is simplified, and clauses like offset eliminated.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The lack of international cooperation and trust deficit to tackle the COVID-19 crisis is stark. The pandemic of fear may deepen an ongoing shift towards increased anarchy reflected in ‘everyone for himself’ and could further energise the process of weakening international institutions and agreements.
It is perhaps too early to judge the scope and long-term impact of COVID-19 on the geopolitical landscape. What is not in doubt, however, is the certainty that there will be global political and strategic effects. Presently, the dominant emotion that runs across the global population is the ascendant fear that stems from the known and unknown aspects relating to the coronavirus. While it is known how the virus spreads and what its symptoms are, no known cure has been discovered nor is a vaccine likely before 12-18 months, if at all. One of the major challenges in containing its spread though is its ability to transmit, even during the incubation period. Herd immunity1 is said to theoretically provide the best available defence against the virus, but it comes at a major cost in terms of human lives and the infection quantum.
The Big Picture
Different nations have adopted diverse approaches and the jury will continue to be out as to which nations, that can, in the shortest possible time, restore and sustain normal activities while minimising mortality rates. China, South Korea, Turkey and Iran are among the few that have been able to restore a relatively better semblance of normality. Mortality rates for South Korea are the lowest, while others are closer to the global average. But what could differentiate South Korea from the rest is that it is unlikely to have achieved much herd immunity and, therefore, could be vulnerable to COVID-19 making several comebacks. Their healthcare system though is geared to speedily course through a Testing, Tracing and Treatment model. On the other hand, China, Turkey, Iran and the United States (US) may have achieved some amount of herd immunity and may, therefore, be able to normalise activities and restrict disruption to a shorter time span.
The US, meanwhile, is the worst affected country with nearly 6.4 lakhs infected and over 28,000 deaths, as of April 16. However, the worst seems to be over and some amount of herd immunity could have been created. Internal political divides in the country though have widened. President Donald Trump is being blamed for poor leadership and for reacting too late. The Trump administration is also accused of being more concerned about the economy than saving people’s lives. There has been discord between the states where the Democrats are in power and the Trump administration, with the latest being about who will lead the reopening with Trump claiming complete powers on the issue of public health and police powers inside the States.2 A $2 trillion rescue plan has been announced to help in economic recovery. There is popular resentment against China and this could inhibit the US from depending on China’s ability to supply cheap goods.
In the European Union (EU) countries and Russia, despite having efficient and well-funded public health infrastructural frameworks, the impact of COVID-19 got aggravated due to their older demographic profile. From the quantum of people infected, acquiring herd immunity is likely, though economies would be put to stress. But like China, the US and Japan, the EU has the financial capacity to launch stimulus initiatives to revive the economy. EU has already announced its revival plan.3 Russia has been dealt a double whammy by the pandemic, due to the steep drop in oil prices.
India’s COVID-19 journey seems to be relatively successful from a public health perspective but has been economically debilitating due to a nation-wide lockdown that is now programmed to last for 40 days. India’s political and scientific decisions have received widespread domestic support and have aimed to save human lives as well as prevent the nation’s fragile health care infrastructure from being overwhelmed. It was initially expected that 21 days lockdown would facilitate the containment of the virus and also provide, inter alia, the time to beef up the public health infrastructure and help in resource mobilisation and data collection. It is now planned to allow for agricultural activities and some essential manufacturing from April 20. The economy has already taken a major hit that will certainly pose major challenges for recovery. It is evident that India would require bold and innovative economic recovery plans.
It is also possible that the process of getting the Indian economy back on track may be impeded by COVID-19 making repeated comebacks. The current Indian approach is not expected to build any herd immunity and beyond a point, the spread cannot be restricted due to the density of the country’s population and limitations on public health resources. However, if official statistics are close to reality, there might be a dubious silver lining — the prolonged and abysmal living conditions of the elderly among the poor may seem to have resulted in some herd immunity.
Geo-political Implications
The uncertainty wrought by COVID-19 had added a critical layer to the turbulence in the prevailing global order. The lack of international cooperation and trust deficit to tackle the COVID-19 crisis is stark. Notably, the US has shown no inclination to play a leadership role to harness international cooperation. China has blocked discussions in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the issue. The pandemic of fear may deepen an ongoing shift towards increased anarchy reflected in ‘everyone for himself’ and could further energise the process of weakening international institutions and agreements.
Even if China emerges relatively better in economic terms over the long-term, it will have to contend with the consequences of the worldwide resentment it has generated, as it is seen as the main cause of the predicament. Even prior to COVID-19, Trump’s trade war with China was a manifestation of the narrative gaining traction domestically within the US of China’s essential malfeasance, vis-à-vis trade relations. This has been further strengthened post COVID-19.
A similar narrative is gaining strength in East Asia, ASEAN countries, India, Africa and the EU. There is a growing realisation and acknowledgement of the predatory nature of China under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. Given the above, the present pattern of over-dependence on China is likely to see a pushback from most of the major economies on account of its concomitant hazards. This may also strengthen regional and global alignments to China’s disadvantage. China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) project could face opposition to a degree where projects underway may be stalled and some abandoned.
COVID-19 has, therefore, unequivocally eroded China’s legitimacy and trust that is necessary to sustain itself as a global power. Beijing could no doubt still make future gains but that will to a significant extent depend on the US reducing its global role, a possibility very much on the cards. China’s efforts to achieve global geo-political dominance vis-à-vis the US could be further hindered if major countries shed their ambivalence regarding China, excepting Russia, perhaps, whose reliance on China may deepen. Many countries like the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and India, including regional groupings such as the EU and ASEAN, could reconsider their political and economic postures that have so far been based on accruing economic benefits as a result of cooperating with China, while at the same time conceding Beijing’s dominance. China can no doubt be expected to push back against this trend. India too must review its present equation with China though there can be no easy choices.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
As the COVID-19 cases continue to rise, the key priorities for the GCC countries are to contain the spread of the pandemic, maintain the flow of trade across their borders and preserve their economies from adverse impacts.
The COVID-19 outbreak has created a lot of concern among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. As of April 15, 2020, Saudi Arabia remains the worst affected country with 5369 confirmed cases and 73 deaths, followed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with 4933 cases and 28 deaths; Qatar with 3428 cases and seven deaths; Kuwait with 1355 cases and three deaths; Bahrain with 1528 cases and seven deaths; and Oman with 910 cases and four deaths.1 As the COVID-19 cases continue to rise, the key priorities for the GCC countries at this point are to contain the spread of the pandemic, maintain the flow of trade across their borders and preserve their economies from adverse impacts.
The GCC countries have adopted several precautionary measures to deal with the pandemic. To contain the further spread of the virus, all these countries have suspended commercial flight operations, shut the government and private sector offices, closed mosques, educational institutions, and have declared curfews and lockdowns. They have been raising awareness among the people by establishing special helplines and through media including social media and the internet. The GCC has set up a ‘joint operations room’ for exchange of information and joint coordination of the fight against the pandemic.2 As a result of these precautionary measures, the spread of the virus has been controlled to a significant extent.
The closure of the industrial and commercial activities because of the pandemic would certainly affect their economies. In their meetings, all the GCC member-states have decided to maintain seamless flow of cross-border trade in order to keep the supply of essential commodities intact at this difficult time. In order to deal with the immediate situation, all the GCC countries have announced financial stimulus packages to support their citizens, businesses and institutions.
Saudi Arabia announced financial stimulus measures of US $32 billion, which includes support for small and medium-sized businesses, banking and financial institutions.3 Keeping in view the fall in global oil prices, the kingdom has announced a five per cent cut in its 2020 budget.4 Similarly, the UAE has announced a package of US $34.45 billion to deal with the challenges emerging out of the spread of the pandemic.5 Bahrain has announced a package of US $11.38 billion to help its citizens to fight COVID-19. The Kuwaiti Government has approved an additional budget of US $1.62 billion to fight the coronavirus.6 The Central Bank of Oman announced a financial stimulus package of US $20.8 billion to provide additional liquidity to the financial institutions. Oman has now cut down the budgets of its civil, military and security agencies by five per cent. Similarly, Qatar has announced a package of US $20.6 billion for the private sector and another US $2.75 billion to be invested in the Qatar Stock Exchange.
For the GCC countries, the spread of the pandemic comes at a time of falling global oil prices. As the economies of these countries are heavily reliant on the export of oil and gas, the fall in the oil prices is going to hit them even harder. The spread of COVID-19 is affecting the energy markets as the movement of people and goods in the region and beyond have been severely restricted. Key oil importers such as China, Japan, Korea and India are facing severe difficulties due to the spread of the pandemic and thereby affecting the energy demand and supply. Global oil prices have also fallen sharply in the last two months. The dual shock of the spread of the pandemic and the fall in oil prices will have a deep impact on the economies of the oil-producing GCC states.
In the Gulf region, Iran remains the worst affected country with 74,877 confirmed cases and 4683 deaths, as of April 15.7 Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have alleged that Iran is responsible for spreading the virus in their respective countries, as it has not been stamping the passports of their nationals who are travelling to Iran. Iran has out-rightly refuted such allegations. For Saudi Arabia, “Iran bears direct responsibility” for the spread of COVID-19. It has stated that Iran not stamping the passports creates a health risk for all.8 Similarly, Bahrain has accused Iran of “biological aggression” by not stamping the passports of the Bahraini nationals who visited Iran.9 While Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have adopted an aggressive approach towards Iran over the spread of COVID-19, in contrast, other GCC member states such as Qatar, UAE and Kuwait have offered aid to Iran in the time of crisis. Omani officials too are in regular consultations with their Iranian counterparts. Such divergent approaches towards Iran over the spread of coronavirus shows the existing fissures in the organisation. On any other day, there would have been a strong and united condemnation of Iran by the GCC.
As a regional organisation, the GCC has been facing a lot of internal challenges especially since the boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain in June 2017. However, despite the existing differences, all the member countries have come forward together to fight the pandemic. At this unprecedented time, securing the health of the citizens, supporting businesses and the private sector and, at the same time, maintaining unity remains the key challenges and priorities for the GCC.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
China is too important for Pakistan’s power elite, given that their stakes are tied firmly to the success of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Similarly, China would also need dependable and loyal allies like Pakistan willing to support and disseminate the emerging Chinese narrative on COVID-19.
COVID-19, which originated in Wuhan, Hubei Province has not spared Pakistan, China’s closest strategic partner. Claiming success in containing the disease domestically, China is delivering help to Pakistan, as also to many countries around the world, to meet this rather unprecedented health crisis.
United in Crisis
Pakistan’s National Assembly praised China’s efforts against COVID-19 in a resolution passed on February 13, 2020, and lauded China’s help to Pakistani nationals stranded in Wuhan at the peak of the crisis.1 The Pakistani resolution was ‘highly’ commended by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which noted that both countries “were close neighbours with a fine tradition of helping each other”.2 President Xi Jinping also spoke to Prime Minister Imran Khan. To exhibit its solidarity with China, Pakistan President Arif Alvi visited Beijing mid-March, at the peak of the COVID crisis.3 A joint statement issued at the end of the visit applauded China’s efforts to eradicate the disease, reiterated their status as steadfast ‘iron brothers’ and pledged to uphold each other’s ‘core national interests’.4 Subsequent to the visit, the Khunjerab Pass in Gilgit Baltistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) was opened. China is transporting aid and equipment through this pass to help Pakistan fight the spread of the virus.
The Chinese Embassy in Islamabad tweeted that “at least 2 tonnes of masks, test kits, ventilators, medical protective clothes worth Rs 67 million were handed over [to Pakistani officials] at Khunjerab Pass”.5 China is also helping to set up temporary hospitals to deal with rising numbers of COVID-19 patients. Another tranche of testing kits and other equipment from China arrived in Pakistan by a special cargo flight, which also ferried Chinese specialists and health workers to execute relief measures in Pakistan.6 A special plane carrying relief equipment funded by private Chinese entities, such as the Alibaba Foundation, was also sent.7
Strategic Convergences
That China is pouring in tonnes of supplies to Pakistan in this crisis situation should not surprise many. The more than five-decade-old relationship rests on solid planks of mutual benefit and strategic convergences. While countries, including India, swiftly moved out its citizens from Wuhan when the crisis began, Pakistan chose not to evacuate its citizens — mostly about 1000 students, to avoid embarrassing China, in spite of heavy criticism at home.8 Pakistan instead insisted that the decision not to fly them back was conditioned by concerns about possible spread of the virus at home. It was also only towards the end of February that Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) suspended flights to China and Japan.9 The flight operations are expected to begin by mid-April, as per media reports.
While Pakistan’s economy has been weak, it has received external help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as friendly countries like China. COVID-19 will further weaken the Pakistani economy, necessitating further doles from friendly countries like China. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has forecast ‘headwinds’ for Pakistan in 2020, where growth rate could further descend to about 2.6 from the existing 3.3 per cent with high double-digit (11.3 per cent) inflation.10
Pakistan occupies a pivotal position in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the estimated $62 billion worth China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) being the flagship project. There are, however, speculations that COVID-19 could affect the CPEC, further giving traction to constituencies in Pakistan that remain sceptical about its feasibility and success. To dispel such scepticism, Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi has already started assuring people that the pandemic will not impact the progress of CPEC.11
Pakistani analysts like its former Ambassador to the United Nations, Abdullah Hussain Haroon, also supported the view offered by the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Zhao Lijian, that there could be an American hand behind the origin of the coronavirus pandemic. Haroon blamed the United States (US), Europe and Israel as being responsible for the spread of the virus in order to upend China’s stupendous economic growth.12 Another scientist, Ata-ur Rahman, currently heading the Task Force constituted to develop a COVID-19 vaccine in Pakistan, asserted that Wuhan was not the epicentre of the virus, and alleged that work on modification of the virus had been undertaken at a military-controlled laboratory in the US. Notably, Rahman was awarded the China International Science and Technology Cooperation Award for the year 2020 by President Xi Jinping.13
The Imponderables
While the strong bilateral relations would suggest continuation of bonhomie between the two states in the fight against COVID-19, potential hurdles remain. In the past, it has been observed that the Lal Masjid siege in 2007 presented one such tipping point, when Chinese nationals were abducted by fundamentalists in Islamabad. Even before the crisis could disrupt bilateral ties, then President Pervez Musharraf ordered the siege of the mosque housing the fundamentalist elements apparently at the behest of China.14 Similarly, recurring attacks on the Chinese workers, especially in the province of Balochistan, have the potential to sour the bilateral ties. This has not been the case so far because the army has set up special units to provide security to Chinese workers. Moreover, despite Pakistan’s Islamist leaning, it has never raised the issue of Chinese excesses against the Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang. On the contrary, Pakistan has taken summary action against Uighur militants and handed over Uighur activists operating from inside its territory to China.
Pakistan’s relations with the US, meanwhile, have been largely insulated from the rivalry between the US and China. Pakistan continues to receive help from both of them to deal with the pandemic.15
Notwithstanding all this, there is some measure of aversion against China within Pakistan. Despite curbs in the mainstream media, messages have circulated in social media holding China responsible for the pandemic. Whether this would sway public sentiments adversely vis-à-vis China or whether China offering preventive and palliative measures would help blunt such criticism, remains to be seen.
Large sections of the Pakistani society have long remained averse to vaccination drives, to counter polio for instance. There have been several attacks on health workers administering the polio vaccine, and some of them have even been killed by terrorist groups. The aversion to vaccination among the religious groups indicates that the response of the society and the state to a highly contagious pandemic like COVID-19 would be half-hearted. Compliance to strict measures requiring no gatherings in mosques for Friday prayers is patchy, further compounding the problem. The deadly outbreak has put Pakistan’s healthcare system under the scanner, increasingly seen as ‘dilapidated’, weak and unprepared to respond to emergencies.16 A severely constrained health care infrastructure has been further aggravated by budget cuts in 2019.17 Such systemic inadequacies may reduce the impact of Chinese assistance to help Pakistan fight against COVID-19.
Strategically, China is too important for Pakistan’s power elite, given that their stakes are tied firmly to the success of Chinese-funded domestic infrastructure projects. Similarly, China would also need dependable and loyal allies like Pakistan willing to support and disseminate the emerging Chinese narrative on COVID-19. In the post COVID-19 period, the world opinion could be steeply polarised against China. Whether this would constrain Pakistan’s choices and propel Islamabad to recalibrate its relations with its most trusted ally, is a moot question.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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