Canada and the Republic of Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategies signal a major transformation in their respective foreign policy outlook.
Lately, the world has witnessed the geopolitical construct of the Asia-Pacific being progressively replaced by the Indo-Pacific. This has created a diplomatic domino effect with many governments shifting their focus to Indo-Pacific and articulating their strategic approach towards the region.1 As a result, major powers like the US, France and the European Union (EU) have come out with their Indo-Pacific Strategies (IPS), attempting to articulate and accentuate their economic, political and strategic interests in the region. The latest to join this list are Canada and the Republic of Korea (ROK), who unveiled their strategies on 27 November 2022 and 28 December 2022, respectively. Both the documents signal a major transformation in their respective government’s foreign policy outlook.
Canada’s Re-engagement with the Indo-Pacific
Canada identifies itself as a Pacific nation and describes the Indo-Pacific as its neighbouring region. The strategy implies that the future of the Canadian economy, trade, immigration policies, environment and security would be extensively shaped through Canada’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific region.2 But it must be noted that Canada’s attempts to engage with the region are not new. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Canadian government, led by then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, sought to play a more active role in the emerging security and economic cooperation architecture of the region. This proactive engagement continued with successive Canadian governments which even participated in the early multilateral negotiations on the South China Sea (SCS) disputes.
However, post the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Canada began to disengage from the region due to budgetary constraints and diminishing political support.3 Subsequently, Canada’s visibility and influence in the region receded as a result of which it was excluded from the East Asia Summit (EAS). Also, despite being a dialogue partner of ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Canada was not invited to be the part of ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus).4
After a prolonged period of absence, Canada’s need to re-engage with the region was brought forth by the findings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. These findings were released in 2015 in a report titled ‘Securing Canada’s Place in Asia-Pacific: A Focus on Southeast Asia’. This report recommended leading the whole country's effort to recognise the importance of the Asia-Pacific region for securing Canada’s future prosperity and seizing regional opportunities. The report underscored the need for developing and implementing a comprehensive and sustained approach to strengthening Canada’s engagement with the region.5
Accordingly, the Trudeau administration began scaling up Canada’s military, economic and diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific. In 2018, the Canadian Navy launched Operation Projection, which is an ongoing naval presence mission in the Indo-Pacific.6 On the economic and diplomatic front, Canada signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement in 2016 and began seeking membership in forums like the EAS and ADMM-Plus.
In line with these efforts, its IPS has been underpinned by a core assumption that the rising influence of the Indo-Pacific region is a once-in-a-generation shift that requires a Canadian response.7 The strategy has pledged to allocate US$ 2.3 billion for investments in five priority areas over the next five years.8 These relate to security, trade and resilient supply chains, human resources (HR), sustainable development and strategic engagement with the Indo-Pacific nations.
The strategy describes China as a disruptive global power and unequivocally makes it clear that Canada will challenge China on issues like coercion and violations of human rights. At the same time, the strategy also implies that Canada would seek to cooperate with China on issues such as climate change and nuclear proliferation. The strategy envisages a four-tier diplomatic engagement with China at domestic, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.9 In a nutshell, Canada’s IPS reflects its aspirations to re-engage with the Asia-Pacific region and regain lost ground, post its disengagement in the late 1990s.
South Korea’s aspirations to become a Global Pivot State
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin has described their IPS as the de-facto foreign policy doctrine of the Yoon administration and a new chapter in Korean diplomacy for a proactive engagement in both regional and global affairs.10 Being geographically located in a high-threat environment, Seoul has been maneuvering between Washington and Beijing with a cautious and at times ambiguous approach. Despite being a formal ally of the US under the 1953 Mutual Defence Treaty, South Korea has deep-rooted economic linkages with China which is its largest trading partner with Free Trade Agreement (FTA) since 2015. These factors had compelled the erstwhile government in Seoul led by Moon Jae-in to avoid antagonising China and accommodate its rise through a cautious posture of strategic ambiguity.11
However, observers have noted that South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy indicates the Yoon government’s clear departure from this strategic ambiguity. The strategy illustrates Seoul's strategic alignment with Washington’s IPS which is firmly rooted in preserving the rules-based international order and promoting democratic values.12 At the same time, the strategy seeks to promote a more mature relationship with China based on mutual respect and reciprocity guided by international norms and rules.13
The most significant takeaway from the strategy is that Seoul’s outlook for the Indo-Pacific is shaped by its aspirations to become a global pivot state and expand its influence beyond the Korean Peninsula. To achieve this, the strategy seeks to deepen strategic cooperation with nations across the key regions of the Indo-Pacific including Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania and East Africa.14
The strategy lays down nine core lines of effort for enhancing the strategic cooperation between South Korea and other like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific. These efforts cover cooperation in domains of maritime security, cyber security, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, energy security, management of resilient supply chains and promoting rule-based order through diplomacy.15 The strategy has been successful in reaffirming President Yoon’s efforts to adopt a more assertive and proactive foreign policy in comparison to his predecessor. At the same, the greatest challenge for the Yoon administration would be to deliver on these commitments in the face of possible Chinese pressures in the future.16
Common Threads
Through the analysis of these two strategies, certain common threads can be observed
The primacy of Strategic Depth with the US
One of the most important commonalities of both strategies is their consonance with the American strategic perspective on the region that has been bought forth in the US’s IPS released in early 2022. ROK’s strategy describes Seoul’s alliance with the US as the lynchpin for peace and prosperity in the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific.17 On the other hand, Canada’s IPS highlights Ottawa’s commitment to strengthen its engagement in the region through US-led economic and security groupings like the G7 and the Five Eyes. Also, Washington and Ottawa have been working towards establishing the Canada–US Strategic dialogue on the Indo-Pacific to synchronise their engagement in the region.18
Focus on engagement with the ASEAN
The support for ASEAN centrality and its outlook for the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) has been highlighted in both strategies. ROK’s strategy has identified the Yoon administration’s Korea–ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI) as the platform for enhancing engagement with the ASEAN.19 Canada’s strategy envisages the elevation of Canada–ASEAN relations to the level of strategic partnership and attaining membership in forums ADMM-Plus and EAS.20
Recognition of India’s Strategic Significance
The emphasis on enhancing strategic cooperation with India has been a key highlight in the IPS of not only the ROK and Canada but also the US, France and the EU. All these strategies have acknowledged India’s economic, demographic and political significance to the Indo-Pacific.
Aspirations to become a global pivot state
Pivot States have been defined as those that possess military, economic and ideational strategic assets that are coveted by great powers. A change in a pivot state’s association has important repercussions for regional and global security.21 This has been explicitly stated in ROK’s strategy where it is stated that Seoul aspires to become a global pivotal state that actively seeks to shape the geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.22 On the other hand, although not explicitly mentioned, Canada’s IPS is reflective of Ottawa’s aspirations to become a pivotal middle power in the long run through its active engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
Differences
Despite the above-elucidated common threads, the analysis of the strategies also highlights differences, as under:
The stance against a Belligerent China
Although both strategies are underpinned by their support to preserve existing rules-based order and oppose any unilateral attempts to challenge the status quo in the region, the language adopted to criticise China’s actions differs. Ellen Kim notes that ROK’s strategy has adopted a more nuanced language mindful of not antagonising China. On the other hand, Canada’s strategy has been explicit in pointing out China’s blatant disregard for international rules and norms that have caused a detrimental impact on the Indo-Pacific.23
Immigration Policies
South Korea is a small and ethnically homogenous country, and its strategy does not include a focus on immigration policies. On the other hand, Canada being a large country with a sparse population; focus on immigration policies to attract skilled manpower from the Indo-Pacific region has been a key aspect of its strategy.
Defence Cooperation with India
ROK’s strategy envisages fostering a stronger relationship with India across all areas including defence. But Canada’s strategy notably excludes the mention of defence cooperation with India but emphasises strengthening economic ties and facilitating the immigration of skilled manpower.
Conclusion
American historian Williamson Murray remarked that only great powers are capable of making grand strategies and middle or small powers can only respond to those strategies.24 This particularly holds true in the context of the IPS of both Canada and ROK which reflect their alignment with the US’s outlook for the region. At the same time, factors like geography and demography have also resulted in certain differences in their respective approaches to dealing with China and the region as a whole. However, the biggest challenge that lies ahead for both ROK and Canada is in sustaining their commitment and producing tangible deliverables that have been elucidated in their respective strategies.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Russia–Ukraine cyberwar has upended a number of existing preconceptions about cyber conflict in an active war.
The cyber conflict between Russia and Ukraine preceded the kinetic conflict by almost a month, with the first major cyber attack on 14 January 2022 knocking out over 70 Ukrainian government websites. These included websites of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Education and Science.1 Since then, even though much of the focus has been on the kinetic conflict, the cyber conflict has also continued unabated with both sides engaged in a variety of manoeuvres, from attacks on critical infrastructure to spreading misinformation.
Along the way, a number of existing preconceptions about cyber conflict in an active war scenario have been upended. Chief among them was the expectation that cyber attacks would play a decisive part in the conflict and that Russia would dominate in this domain given its superior capabilities and familiarity with the Ukrainian cyber terrain. This was especially so since its entities had been carrying out cyber attacks against Ukraine over the past decade. The resilience of Ukrainian networks in the face of these attacks has now been attributed to the very same factors, that they are familiar with the Russian cyber play book, having been at the receiving end for so long.
New variables that have made a difference in the cyber conflict have been the assistance provided, both individually and collectively, by countries backing Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. This assistance has taken the form of training, exchange of information as well as assistance in active defence. NATO, the collective security alliance, which is one of the ostensible reasons behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has been at the forefront of providing support against the cyber attacks being faced by Ukraine. Ukraine’s application for membership in the NATO Cybersecurity centre, pending since 2021, was approved in January 2023, making it one of the five non-NATO members of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE).2
The European Union has spent over 10 million euros since the beginning of the conflict to assist Ukrainian cyber defences, including setting up of a cyber lab, and providing security software and hardware to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.3 US Cyber Command has also publicly stated that it has been operating hunt forward teams in Ukraine.4 The latest US defence budget provides enhanced budgetary assistance of US$ 44 million for these teams.5 On a tangential note, the war has also reinvigorated efforts by NATO member countries to better synchronise their cyber defence efforts which has been struggling with the unique challenges of adapting collective security principles to cyber defence. Heightened activity at various levels of NATO shows a renewed vigour to tackle challenges.6
Yet another factor has been the role played by major software and cyber security companies in providing varied forms of assistance, from data to training to even monetary assistance, with Microsoft recently announcing it was providing as much as US$ 400 million to assist in cyber security efforts to Ukraine. Much of the resilience of Ukrainian websites to Russian cyber attacks has also been attributed to pre-emptive measures undertaken by Microsoft in the weeks leading up to the war with active encouragement from the US government.7 Microsoft has also published a series of reports highlighting Russian attacks on Ukraine.8 Amazon also announced that it had contributed substantially to the Ukrainian cause.9
Initiatives such as the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaboration (CDAC), a coalition of tech companies, including Avast, the Cyber Threat Alliance, LookingGlass Cyber Solutions, Mandiate, Next Peak, Palo Alto Networks, Recorded Future, Symantec and Broadcom, Threat Quotient and numerous others, have been brought together by the Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), established in 1995 by an Act of the US Congress, to work towards protecting Ukrainian critical infrastructure.10
Although the private tech companies, from Microsoft to Elon Musk’s Starlink, have stepped in to fill the gaps and vulnerabilities faced by Ukraine, this raises major questions about the dangers of over-dependence on these companies and the leverage they hold, something that holds good globally. Use of Starlink receivers, for instance, is disabled in Russian-controlled territory.11
Though there is little evidence of Russian companies playing a role in the war effort, many Russian tech companies have suffered collateral damage from the sanctions imposed on Russia as well as the internet control laws in the country. Cybersecurity company Kaspersky is among the last of the companies offering Virtual Private Network (VPN) services to halt its service while Russian internet company, Yandex, is transferring most of its businesses out of Russia to avoid sanctions.12
Another point to ponder upon is the role of state-sponsored and state-sanctioned hacking groups and individuals in the cyber conflict. Russia is home to many hacking groups which are perceived to be sponsored by the intelligence agencies. These groups have been used to disrupt critical infrastructure, steal sensitive information, and spread disinformation. Intelligence agencies such as the GRU (Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) and the FSB (Federal Security Service) have strived to maintain a furtive relationship with groups such as Killnet, seen to be responsible for many cyber attacks on Ukraine and other countries supporting Ukraine.13
This approach worked well in an era of low intensity conflict, but has come short in this current conflict because the command and control is too diversified, and the emphasis is more on disinformation and disruptive activities than achieving strategic goals. The decentralised plausible deniability approach which has been Russia’s default position with the intelligence agencies being at the fore is not an optimum set-up in a kinetic conflict situation since there is no clarity on who is exactly in charge. This has led to confusion over the strategic aims of these attacks and ineffective information diffusion to cater to the tactical and operational requirements of the military.
On the Ukrainian side, the government has encouraged the formations of the “Ukrainian IT army”, made up largely of patriotic hackers and cyber vigilante organisations from around the world. They have been engaged in similar actions directed against Russian entities.14 All these largely illegal activities can be considered a setback in the quest for setting rules of the road in cyberspace through norms of state behaviour, since these activities are being both condoned and encouraged not just by Ukraine but also by Ukrainian allies such as the United States. The NATO-sponsored The Tallinn Manual goes into great detail on how to adapt international humanitarian law to cyber activities during wartime, including distinguishing between military and civilian actors and targets but none of that seems to make a difference in the current free-for-all.
Though these cyber vigilantes by Ukraine have been put to good use, there is a huge question mark over the legality of their use in an active war situation. Much of the progress on paper of framing rules of the road for cyberspace has been rendered infructuous by these activities. In fact, the ongoing UN processes such as the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) have become sites of proxy attacks by one side against the other, and is seeping into the process itself. The decades-long process to evolve norms of state behaviour through various UN processes could possibly suffer quite a bit of collateral damage as a result of the conflict, with the opposing sides taking pot shots at each other becoming the main spectacle at these meetings. In any case, there was glacial progress being made as different blocs had begun to dig in their heels.
Whilst the final outcome of the conflict is yet to be determined, the needle has moved when it comes to certain aspects of cyber conflict. The cyber-warriors of all hues and shades will continue to carry out their operations from the shadows, however the current conflict shows that a command-and-control structure goes further in achieving strategic objectives. Mission creep is something that can only be avoided through well laid-out objectives and clearly delineated responsibilities.
Tech companies have shown their indispensability maintaining the resilience of the Ukrainian networks and critical infrastructure but, on the flip side, it has also served to highlight the vulnerabilities faced by countries in depending on the virtual monopoly of these companies in the tech space, reminiscent of the dependence on semiconductors that came to the fore in the past year. Like with semiconductors, there are few viable immediate workarounds for these dependencies. Going forward, it is likely though, that technologies and their vendors will be less seen as global public goods and will be subject to many tests of credibility and reliability.
The events so far show that cyber resilience is viable and cyberwar still remains a foggy concept. Words and phrases like holistic and whole-of-nation, and public–private partnership might have become cliches in the context of cyber security, but these are the approaches that work. International co-operation in framing rules of the road for cyberspace might be at its lowest point, in which case, there is no way to go but up. Winners and losers might be a relative term here but there are enough lessons to be learnt from the conflict.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Egyptian President Visit to India Strengthens Partnership
Ruchita Beri
February 02, 2023
India and Egypt elevated bilateral ties to that of a Strategic Partnership during the visit of President Abdel Fateh Al Sisi.
Egyptian President Abdel Fateh Al Sisi was on a visit to India from 24 to 26 January 2023. Al Sisi was in India as chief guest for the 74th Republic Day celebrations held in New Delhi. The visit coincided with both countries celebrating 75 years of establishment of diplomatic relations. It was the first time that India had invited a leader from Egypt for the ceremony. The Egyptian President had close discussions with Prime Minister Narendra Modi on bilateral, regional and global issues. A number of agreements on crucial areas were also signed between the two sides.
Why Does Egypt Matter?
The visit of Egyptian president underlines the growing importance of Cairo for New Delhi. There are several factors that highlight this intent. First, India and Egypt share a civilisational connect. Their relationship can be traced back to the ancient times. Similarly, Egypt’s strategic location at the crossroads of Africa, Asia and Europe gives it immense value. It also controls the Suez Canal, the only direct channel of global trade between waters connecting Europe with the Indo-Pacific. Approximately 12 per cent of global trade traverses through the Suez Canal.1
At the same time, Egypt has been one of India’s important trading partners in the West Asia and Africa region. The current bilateral trade between India and Egypt is around US$ 7.26 billion.2 There has been a significant interest of Indian industry in developing commercial relations with the country. Over 50 Indian companies are present in the country and the total Indian investment is over US$ 3 billion.3 They are present in diverse sectors, such as agriculture, automobile, energy and chemicals.
Egypt is also perceived as a gateway to Africa due to its strong trading links and free trade agreements across the continent. The country offers fresh opportunities to Indian private sector and industry to expand its presence in the continent. Moreover, India and Egypt are development partners within the South–South cooperation framework. Both countries also share the common viewpoint of supporting African countries’ development aspirations. During its presidency of the African Union, Egypt took some steps towards expanding development cooperation and investment with other countries on the continent. The possibilities of both India and Egypt working towards triangular development cooperation with other African countries are immense.
Finally, Egypt is an important partner of India in the multilateral arena. Both countries are the founding members of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and recognise the need for reform in multilateral institutions. India and Egypt are together as a member and dialogue partner respectively of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Similarly, they are both dialogue partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). They also have an opportunity to cooperate on matters related to global economic governance at the G20. As the President of G20, India has invited Egypt as a guest country for the summit to be held in September 2023.
President Al Sisi’s Visit: Key Takeaways
The recent visit marks the third visit of President Al Sisi to India. He had visited India earlier during the 3rd India–Africa Forum hosted by India in 2015 and subsequently for a state visit in 2016. The importance given to his visit to India is reflected by the fact that he was accompanied by a high-powered delegation comprising of five ministers and senior officials. The visit is path-breaking as India and Egypt decided to elevate the relationship to a ‘strategic partnership’ and enhance political, security and economic cooperation.
There is no doubt that both India and Egypt share similar views on a number of security issues, terrorism and cybersecurity in particular. Egypt, like India, has faced the scourge of terrorism for long. It has evolved a holistic approach to counter terrorism. This encompasses not only security solutions but also, examining the economic, cultural and ideological roots of the problem. Therefore, it was not surprising that the two leaders called for zero tolerance on terrorism. Cybersecurity is another area in which the views of the two leaders converged. A recent report suggests that in the year 2022, India was one of the most targeted countries in terms of cyber-attacks on government sector in the world.4 Similarly, Egypt has been identified as one of the 20 largest countries vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Looking at this scenario, it is important that both India and Egypt join hands to deal with this emerging challenge.
The two leaders also discussed cooperation in food and health security. The COVID-19 pandemic and the recent Ukraine conflict have impacted food and health security in countries across the world, including Egypt and India. Egypt, one of the largest importers of wheat from Russia and Ukraine, had procured wheat from India after conflict broke out between the two countries. Both India and Egypt had supported each other during the COVID-19 pandemic. India had supplied COVID vaccines to Egypt. Similarly, Cairo had sent medical supplies, including oxygen cylinders, to India.
President Al Sisi and Prime Minister Modi agreed to expand cooperation in the security sector. Defence cooperation between the two countries is not new. India has been training Egyptian armed forces officers since the 1960s. Some of the recent engagements include exchange of visits, joint exercises and defence exhibitions. During Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s visit to Egypt in September 2022, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation was signed by the two sides. President Al Sisi’s visit will hopefully lead to greater synergies in this crucial sector.
The two leaders also had wide-ranging discussion on economic matters. Egypt may allocate land to Indian industry in the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCEZ). The two sides decided to expand the bilateral trade to US$ 12 billion in the next five years.5 However, to achieve this target, India and Egypt will have to address the impediments in expanding trade. The visit ended with an exchange of five MOUs in the crucial areas of cybersecurity, information technology, culture, youth matters and broadcasting.
In conclusion, the visit of President of Egypt to India has elevated the relationship to a strategic partnership. The spate of agreements and warm chemistry between the leaders augurs well for future relations between the two leading powers in Africa and Asia, respectively.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Science diplomacy can be used effectively to address critical challenges facing the South Asian region.
At the 108th Indian Science Congress on 3 January 2023, Prime Minister Narendra Modi exhorted the scientific community to work towards meeting “the needs of the country…and give momentum to the world’s humanity”.1 The salience of science and technology (S&T) as important drivers for economic development has long been recognised. Science diplomacy and scientific collaboration, bilaterally and multilaterally, remains critically important, given the need to mitigate common challenges that transcend borders. These include economic crises, global pandemics, the climate crisis and environmental degradation. Scientific endeavours can not only act as an effective tool to engage countries, but also can accelerate global solutions to shared challenges.2
Science Diplomacy in South Asia
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), formed in 1985, identified science and technology as one of the core areas of cooperation among the member states. A Technical Committee on S&T was formed to facilitate cooperation through workshops, expert group meetings, circulation of state-of-the-art reports on different S&T sectors, training of scientists and initiating joint research and development (R&D) projects in the area of energy, food technology, remote sensing, forestry development, erosion control and mining.
Regional initiatives relating to science diplomacy in South Asia are largely absent. The SAARC Technical Committee on S&T, in fact, has not met since 2010.3 Joint research publications, which are considered an important indicator of the strength of research collaboration and its impact on different fields, are also largely absent. Most of the scientific publications of South Asian scholars are with researchers in institutions outside of South Asia, while intra-regional collaboration is relatively rare, as highlighted in the 2021 UNESCO report.
Figure 1: South Asian States Scientific Co-authorship Publication 2017–2019
On the failure to advance science diplomacy under SAARC Technical Committee of S&T, the former secretary to the Science Advisory Council to the Prime Minister of India, P.J. Lavakare, flags lack of financial resources and political will as reasons that are preventing scientists from taking initiatives.4 Similarly, Malti Goel, former adviser at the Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India, notes that “countries in this region do not see each other eye to eye, making it difficult for science diplomacy to progress.”5 Indeed, several diplomats, heads of NGOs and research institutes, international organisations and government officials from South Asian countries have said that “cross-border tensions are holding back progress in environmental policy and scientific research”.6
Scientific Cooperation amid Political Rivalry
There are several examples of scientific collaborations between countries with inimical relations. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union collaborated on space science.7 Subsequent to the US embargo on Cuba from 1961, scientific collaboration between the two countries was limited to marine sciences and health threats from infectious diseases.8 The US–Cuba engagement, though, resumed following the restoration of diplomatic ties under President Barack Obama in 2015. SESAME (Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications) in Jordan was commissioned in 2017 to foster scientific cooperation with the member states of Egypt, Cyprus, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Palestine and Turkey.9
As regards China–US research collaborations, Deng Xiaoping and Jimmy Carter signed the first formal ‘US–China Inter-governmental Science and Technology Agreement’ as far back as in 1979.10 In one of the studies on co-authored publications during 2009–2018 between Chinese and American scholars judged on three criteria, i.e., overall volume, high impact and high-technology research, it was ascertained that China has been the US’s largest collaborator since 2011. On high-impact research (82 high impact science journals compiled in Nature Index), Chinese researchers have published a total of 5,779 papers in 2009, with US researchers being the largest collaborators (on 1,516 papers). In 2018, of the total 17,044 papers Chinese researchers published, US researchers were again the largest collaborators (on 5,339 papers). On high-technology research (nuclear science and technology, remote sensing and robotics), the US was the biggest collaborator since 2009.11
US domestic policies like ‘American First’ and ‘Make America Great Again’ (by the Trump administration) coupled with rising geo-political contestations with China, though, have cast a shadow on such scientific cooperation, going forward.12 The Trump administration also reduced the budgets of many agencies like National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST), Department of Energy (DoE), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Former US science and technology adviser William Colglazier cautioned that pursuing narrow visions of national interest based on a ‘zero sum’ view of international relations rather than a notion of shared interests that require a ‘win-win cooperation’ will have negative consequences.13
Conclusion
With the backdrop of growing climate crises, the notion of a green economy has emerged as a dominant policy response for an alternative vision of growth and development. Negotiations on the transferring of green technologies for socio-economic development are taking place multi-laterally and bilaterally, at forums like COP26, Earth Summits, among others.
Though SAARC has been termed ‘ineffective’ and ‘defunct’, there is still a silver lining, where member countries can get together to resolve global challenges. Such a spirit of collaboration was evident in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, where the heads of the SAARC member states came together on 15 March 2020 and initiated a COVID-19 Emergency Fund of US$ 21.8 million.
The recently released UN report on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has drawn attention to the fact that the South Asian region is not on track to achieve any of the 17 SDGs, and the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have only exacerbated the developmental challenges in the region.14 In the midst of these perilous times, advancing ‘science’ remains a viable option of addressing global and regional developmental issues.15 Science diplomacy can therefore be effectively used to address critical challenges regionally in South Asia.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Dassault and Boeing have been aggressively pitching their excellent products to fulfil India’s naval fighter aircraft requirements.
November 2022 saw the visit of the French Defence Minister Sebastien Lecornu as well as the US Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro to India. Lecornu was in New Delhi for the Fourth India–France Defence Dialogue, where both countries decided to enhance military industrial cooperation with a focus on Make In India (MII). Apart from their interactions in New Delhi, Lecornu and Del Toro also visited Kochi, the headquarters of the Southern Naval Command, where the indigenously constructed aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, is also based. The visits of the French and the American delegations brought into focus their parallel efforts to secure the contract for equipping India’s indigenous aircraft carrier with a fighter wing.
The Indian Navy’s sole operational aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya, currently operates Mig-29K fighters. The choice of the Multi-Role Carrier Borne Fighter (MRCBF) programme to equip the INS Vikrant is between the twin-engined US Boeing F/18 E/F Super Hornet and the French Rafale Marine (M). The single-engine Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was found unsuitable for aircraft carrier operations.1 The Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued a Request for Information (RFI) for MRCBFs procurement in January 2017 for 57 fighters, which was subsequently reduced to 26 fighters to be procured via the government-to-government (G2G) route. These include eight twin-seater trainer variants and 18 single-seater variants.
Aircrafts in Contention
Both the aircrafts in contention, the Rafale and the Super Hornet, did demonstration ski-jumps at the Shore-Based Test Facility (SBTF) at INS Hansa, Goa in January and June 2022 respectively. Boeing insists that the Super Hornet is fully compliant with the requirements of India’s aircraft carriers, INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant and notes that the two-seater F/18 can also be used for land-based missions as well as a trainer aircraft.
The US aerospace major also highlights the fact that the aircraft is inter-operable with the Indian Navy’s Boeing P-81 reconnaissance aircraft. Boeing notes that the P8I is operated by three out of the four Quad countries (US, Australia and India). Two out of the four Quad countries also operate the F/18 aircraft (US and Australia).
Boeing further reiterates that the same family of engines powers the F/18 and the LCA Tejas. While the General Electric (GE) F-414 powers the F/18, the US$ 716 million contract to supply 99 GE F-404 engines to power the LCA Mk-I A fighter aircraft was signed in August 2021. The MoD had earlier in February 2021 placed an order with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for 83 LCA MK-1A jets worth Rs 48,000 crore.
Boeing further reiterates that over 800 Super Hornets and its variants have been delivered worldwide and the massive scale will enable competitive incorporation of newly developed technology. The US aerospace major’s ‘By India-For India’ sustainment programme is also expected to ensure a higher availability of aircraft for operational deployment.2
As for the other competitor, Rafale Marine, India has procured 36 Rafale aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF), the contract for which was signed in 2016. While the first aircraft was received in October 2019, all 36 were inducted by December 2022. Apart from France and India, Egypt, Qatar and Greece also operate the cutting-edge French fighter aircraft while the UAE signed a deal to acquire 80 Rafales in December 2021 and Indonesia signed a deal in February 2022 to acquire 42 Rafales.
The MRCBF options are slated to be an interim solution, before the Twin-Engined Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) project comes to fruition. The project was approved in 2020, with the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) expected to be completed by mid-2023. The aircraft will be powered by the GE F414 engines—the same engines that power the F/18s, and is expected to be inducted by 2031–32.3
Both Dassault and Boeing are also competing for the multi-role fighter aircraft (MRFA) programme of the IAF, RFI for which was issued in 2018.
French Arms Exports to India
The Rafale is the latest in a series of fighter aircraft of French origin that have been operated by the IAF. French fighter aircraft in India’s inventory date back to 1953, when the IAF acquired the Ouragans (Toofani), becoming Dassault Aviation’s first export customer. Subsequently, the IAF also procured the Jaguars (beginning from 1978) and the Mirage 2000, from 1982 onwards. India currently has more than 100 Jaguars and more than 50 Mirage 2000s (single and dual-seat versions). The Mirages were upgraded with new radars, mission computers and electronic warfare (EW) suites (from Thales) in 2011.
Prior to the 2016 Rafale G2G deal, the 2005 Scorpene deal for six submarines was another major acquisition from France. The first submarine, INS Kalvari was launched in 2015 and commissioned in 2017 while the sixth INS Vagsheer, was launched in 2022. The Scorpene and the Rafale deals accounted for India being the second biggest purchaser of French arms during 2010–20, after Saudi Arabia. While Saudi Arabia imported over Euros 9 billion from France, India imported arms worth Euros 7.2 billion.4 Egypt, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, along with Saudi Arabia and India, made up the top five importers of French arms during 2010–20. Aircraft were the major category of French arms exports during 2010–20, accounting for a quarter of all its arms exports.5
The Strengthened India–US Defence Relationship
Even as India’s arms imports from France registered a massive jump in 2010–20, and irrespective of India’s interim naval fighter choice, the India–US defence and strategic partnership has been significantly strengthened in recent times. India was designated as a Major Defence Partner in 2016. While US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to India from 1950 to 2021 amounted to US$ 13.2 billion, US$ 4.7 billion (or 28 per cent) were during the period 2017–21.6 The authorised value of US defence articles and services through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) to India has been over US$ 18 billion in the period 2010–21.7
Some of the key equipment that have been procured include transport aircrafts (Lockheed Martin C-130J; 12 inducted), multi-mission helicopters (Boeing CH-47F I Chinook; 15 inducted), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (Boeing P8-I; 11 inducted; 1 more ordered), and attack helicopters (Boeing AH-64E Apache; 22 inducted in IAF; six more ordered for Indian Army in 2020), ASW helicopters (Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky MH-60R; 24 helicopters worth US$ 2.6 bn to be inducted by 2025), heavy transport aircraft (Boeing C-17A Globemaster III; 11 inducted) and UAVs (General Atomics MQ 9 Sea Guardian; two leased).
India–US joint ventures like the Tata Boeing Aerospace Limited (TBAL), established in 2016, has supplied over 150 Apache fuselages to Boeing’s global clientele. At the India–US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue held in April 2022, both sides also pledged to ‘promote the means to encourage reciprocal participation of Indian and US vendors in each other’s defence supply chains’.8
Going Forward
If India opts for the Rafale Marine, as noted in this 9 December 2022 report9, it will highlight the continued lack of success of US fighter aircraft manufacturers to become a part of India’s inventory, despite long-standing and robust efforts. It will also signify an increasing share of European manufacturers in the Indian military aerospace market. This is in the light of the 2016 Rs 60,000 crore Rafale deal and the 2022 Rs 22,000 crore deal for 56 C-295 transport aircraft from Airbus, 40 of which will be manufactured at Vadodara by Tata Advanced Defence Systems Limited and Airbus Defence and Space. While the C-295 is a replacement for the IAF’s HS-748 transport planes, it is also being seen as a possible replacement for the 100-odd AN-32s in the IAF fleet.10
Even as the robust India–US defence and military partnership can be expected to absorb the near-term setback that could possibly flow out of India’s interim choice for naval fighter aircraft, US aircraft engine manufacturers like GE will continue to be an integral part of indigenous fighter aircraft programmes like the LCA Mk 1 and Mk 2A.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
4. During 2000–20, India’ arms imports from France amounted to Euros 8.6 billion. Over 80 per cent of all French arms imports by India during the past two decades, therefore, have been during 2010–20. See European Network against Arms Trade.
Safety Systems of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plants Complex
Aasi Ansari
December 29, 2022
Complete demilitarisation is essential to assure the full safety of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant complex, despite the significant safety design features of the facility.
On 27 February 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was alerted by Ukraine's Foreign Ministry that the Russian army was approaching the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) complex.1 Within a week, Russia informed IAEA that its military took control of the area around the Zaporizhzhia NPP.2 After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, this was the first time when the IAEA’s International Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) immediately went to the highest alert.3 The Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, warned that an accident at nuclear facilities could have severe repercussions.4
The shellings and war activities near Zaporizhzhia NPP have raised concerns in the international community about the safety and security of the nuclear reactors. Grossi termed the shellings as ‘playing with fire’ due to the risk of nuclear catastrophe.5 Concerns about the quality of the safety systems of the reactor and the ability of the reactor design to withstand missile attacks were raised. The possibility of a technological error that could lead to an accident similar to Chernobyl, or a blackout situation similar to Fukushima, were also raised.
The IAEA Director General called for restraint and reiterated the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security based on existing nuclear safety and security conventions. These are the need to maintain the physical integrity of the facilities; a functional security system and equipment; staff being able to do their duties without any pressure; availability of an off-site power supply; uninterrupted transportation and supply chain from and to the site; effective monitoring system and emergency preparedness and response measures; and reliable communication with the regulator and others.6
After Russia took control of Zaporizhzhia plant under the management of Russian state atomic energy corporation ‘Rosatom’7, staff were required to take approval from the local Russian commander to operate and maintain the power plant.8 The President of Ukrainian national nuclear energy generation company Energoatom9, informed the IAEA in March 2022 that about 400 Russian soldiers were present at the plant.10
Reports noted that the Russian army was using the plant as a cover to fire at the city.11 In the ongoing conflict, multiple arms were used at Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. For instance, on 4 March 2022, the first missile hit the ZNPP training building causing a fire.12 No radiation leakage though was detected.13 Later the fire was extinguished14 and some unexploded munition found at that training building were disposed.15 Such indiscriminate use of weapons was said to be affecting the morale and emotional state of the plant employees,16 violating the third pillar of nuclear safety and security.
The war activities have compromised other pillars of nuclear safety and security as well. For instance, the transfer of safeguards data from ZNPP was interrupted multiple times though it was re-established within few days.17 Due to the shellings, the plant’s external power supply system was damaged, a unit was disconnected from the grid, a security guard at ZNPP was injured, spent fuel storage facility sustained damages in its walls, but there was no damage to the spent fuel container nor was any radiation leakage detected.18
After Russian shellings became frequent, the Ukrainian government requested the IAEA and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to redouble their efforts.19 In response, the IAEA delivered monitoring equipment to ZNPP offered by Australia and France, which are among 12 of IAEA’s ‘Response and Assistance Network ’ (RANET) countries. The IAEA also delivered more than 160 radiation measurement devices and protective equipment, including masks, gloves, full-body suits, among others.20
While shellings near Zaporizhzhia do involve serious risks, they may not result in an accident like Chernobyl or Fukushima. The Chernobyl accident happened due to insignificant understanding and lack of safety technology.21 The reactors of Chernobyl NPP did not have a containment building.22 Modern reactors like Zaporizhzhia are designed with protection against events such as aircraft crashes, fire, explosions, flood, and extreme meteorological conditions, etc.23 The reactors of Zaporizhzhia have 1.2 meters thick concrete shell and are designed to withstand explosions and crash of an airplane.24 Thus, it can be said that the containment building should be able to resist missile attacks.
Other than the reactor, the spent fuel storage facility contains liquid and solid waste which can cause potential radiation hazard, if damaged. However, after multiple shellings at Zaporizhzhia plant, the spent fuel container was not damaged and the cooling system has been good enough to maintain the temperature and radiation level under control.25
Without external power, the reactor as well as the spent fuel storage might lose the cooling system. Therefore, multiple power supply systems are needed. If the external power supply is disconnected for cooling water to circulate, the loss of power could result in an accident like Fukushima. There are three back-up power supply of 330 kV and three off-site power lines of 750 kV connected to a nearby thermal power plant in case the back-up power supply gets disconnected.26 Even if the reactor is shut down, it still requires electricity to maintain the reactor temperature, hence backup power and off-site power supplies are crucial for nuclear safety.27
If the external sources of power supply are lost, then the nuclear plant has to depend on emergency diesel generators. This situation has been occurring time and again during the conflict.28 When the plant lost the power for cooling system, it first relied upon the power generated by the plant itself and then on back-up power line linking to the grid through the nearby thermal power plant.29 There are 20 diesel generators on site and nine of them are operating (as of November 2022) to provide power to all the six reactors and ensure the safety of the plant.30 These diesel generators have enough power to operate up to 15 days without any external power supply.31 The reactor had to rely on diesel generator multiple times through the conflict but every time the emergency diesel generators started automatically and operated till the back-up power was available. 32
The IAEA was not able to visit ZNPP since the conflict began but on 1 September 2022, experts, as part of the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ), were finally able to arrive at the Zaporizhzhia NPP.33
After 20 November 2022, there has been no shelling on the site per se but there has been shelling in the nearby areas. Zaporizhzhia NPP has been reconnected to the off-site power through a 750 kV external power line and a 330 kV back up line.34 An additional 330 kV power line as a back-up is being repaired, as informed to the IAEA by Rosatom.35 On 31 October 2022, four of the six reactors were kept under cold shutdown which requires less energy for cooling and the other two reactors are under hot shutdown, which allows them to supply heat to the nearby city.36
In conclusion, it can be said that Zaporizhzhia NPP has better and proven technology with multiple safety systems and multiple power supply, along with a strong containment building that is designed to withstand terrorist attacks and crash of an airplane.37 Despite the ongoing military activities, the IAEA has been inspecting the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facilities and has stated that no radiation leakage has been detected in those facilities. Nonetheless, the complete demilitarisation of Zaporizhzhia NPP is essential to assure the full safety of the plants.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The efficacy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure will depend on the member-states’ ability to focus on countering terrorism concerns while managing their divergent regional interests.
As Chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation-Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (SCO-RATS) during 2021–2022, India repeatedly stressed on the destabilising regional and global consequences of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. India hosted the council meeting of SCO-RATS in New Delhi on 14 October 2022, where the members of the group agreed to take joint measures to counter terrorist threats from Afghanistan.1 In its meeting at Samarkand in September 2022, the SCO decided to prepare a standard list of terrorist, separatist and extremist groups to provide an operational basis for effective counter-terrorism measures.2
Background
China, Russia and the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Shanghai in 1996 and agreed on the ‘Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field in the Border Area’ for resolving outstanding border issues and developing mutual trust. The Shanghai Five was renamed as the SCO in June 2001 with the addition of Uzbekistan. India and Pakistan acceded to the organisation in 2017, and Iran’s accession process will be completed in 2023. Afghanistan, Belarus and Mongolia have ‘Observer’ status, and the Dialogue Partners are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, Nepal, Turkey and Sri Lanka.3
The SCO also established an Afghanistan Contact Group in 2009, which was revived in 2018 to develop mechanisms for a “peaceful, stable and economically prosperous state, free from terrorism and extremism”.4 The commitment to tackle the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism is part of the very first convention adopted by the SCO on 15 June 2001.5 The 20-year Programme of Multilateral Trade and Cooperation only came later in September 2003.
SCO-RATS came into being with the ‘Agreement on Regional-Terrorist Structure between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ on 7 June 2002, pertinently after 9/11. Its working bodies are the Executive Committee (EC) and the Council, with the EC based at Tashkent, while the secretariat is in Beijing.6
The objective of the SCO-RATS is to create a practical organisational, legal and regulatory framework for effective cooperation along with the member states and incorporate relevant legal acts into their practices and national legislation. The primary task of SCO-RATS is to maintain a databank and facilitate information sharing of terrorist organisations and individuals, aiding and abetting terror activities amongst the member states.
The SCO-RATS’ capacity-building mechanisms include joint annual anti-terrorist exercises, cooperation between competent bodies, anti-terrorist structures, and border services of the member states.7 Targeted work also takes place in improving the interoperability of each of these national units. The group later agreed on dealing with the flow of narcotics and arms as drug smuggling is the major source of funds for terror outfits in the region.8 Border patrolling exercises between the member states play an essential role in this regard.
The Joint Working Group of Experts within the SCO-RATS constantly works towards curbing online terrorist propaganda. SCO-RATS also works towards cooperation with international and other regional organisations such as the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UN-CTED), United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Interpol, Eurasian Group on Combatting Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States Anti-Terrorism Centre (CIS-ATC). An annual RATS International Scientific and Practical Conference also happens every year to further international cooperation against terrorism.9
Regional Terrorism Concerns
The attacks that followed the Taliban takeover by IS-KP on minorities, women and children,10 and the neutralisation of al-Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri through a US drone strike in July 2022 inside the Afghan capital of Kabul confirm the concerns of the member states of SCO and the world at large that Taliban’s continuing ties with al-Qaeda are now undeniable. IS-KP is an affiliate of the Salafi Daesh, whereas the Taliban is Deobandi. Both are puritanical but differ in their approach to jihad, takfir, and sharia, making them compete for influence. The rise of IS-KP during this critical phase of political transition in Afghanistan, challenging the domestic legitimacy of the Taliban, is not only a worry for them but a significant security threat to the region and the wider world.
Terrorist attacks in Pakistan have increased by 51 per cent since the Taliban swept across Afghanistan.11 The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a jihadi-insurgent group that owes its allegiance to the Taliban, is a product of Pakistan’s fiddling with terrorism that has come back to haunt them. Therefore, the already porous western border has become even harder to manage. For China, East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) has been the only reason to venture into counter-terrorism and lead the formation of SCO along with Russia. ETIM is an Uyghur Muslim jihadi-insurgent group that operates in the Xinjiang autonomous region of China.
Taliban has always been one to support, provide shelter, and assistance to those who belong to their creed, and to vouch for any assurances stating otherwise is a grave mistake.12 In December 2022, IS-KP attacked a hotel frequented by Chinese businesspersons in Kabul.13 Their growing presence in Afghanistan is sure to become a hurdle to China’s aspirations in the country. IS-KP undertook a suicide attack on the Russian embassy in Kabul in September 2022, where two diplomats lost their lives.
Russia has always been the security provider in Central Asia through the CSTO, whose operational scope cannot address the root of terrorism in the region. That makes it even more important to improve counter-terrorism cooperation within the SCO.14
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in Uzbekistan, and Jamaat Ansarullah (Tajik Taliban) are the major jihadi-insurgent groups in Central Asia. Recently, IS-KP fired rockets into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan from Afghan territory.15 The Tajik Taliban, like the TTP, is a Taliban affiliate that foments terror in Tajikistan with explicit approval from them.16 There are also fears that IMU might gain some ground betwixt all this chaos.
Drug trafficking has been the primary source of funding for terror outfits in the region. It has become extremely tough for neighbouring states to control the outflow of opium-based drugs from Afghanistan.17 India is highly concerned about a spill over of terrorist activities to Jammu and Kashmir, where there is a rise in cases of drug trafficking. It is increasingly becoming a matter of concern in the socio-political scenario of Jammu and Kashmir.18
Regional Geo-strategic Dynamics
Central Asia as a region is vital for a more comprehensive Eurasian connectivity, and the region is what holds the SCO together. The organisation's membership now comprises all the regional powers, and increasingly the fault lines between individual member states are getting even more profound. The divergence of interests among member states is bringing a stalemate regarding matters of strategic importance, making it hard to move forward with any agenda at hand.19
The admission of India and Pakistan as permanent members of the organisation in 2017 brought the political complexities of the sub-continent to the SCO table. Central Asia is part of the extended neighbourhood of India and its ‘Look North’ strategy. China’s ambition to become the sole catalyst for trade on the continent through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is at odds with India’s vision for the region, be it the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) or the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Doklam and Galwan border crises have added to regional tensions.
Russia too, considers Central Asia as its sphere of influence. The accession of a regional power such as Iran will also affect the organisation's workings, whose interests may sometimes not align with the organisation.These developments will potentially become a hurdle towards fruitful cooperation in Eurasia's increasingly hostile geopolitical and geo-economic environment.20
Central Asian states realise the eventuality of geopolitical competition between Russia and China. India can anchor Central Asia’s interests and share its expertise on counter-terrorism from within the SCO framework. For India, the lack of geographical contiguity to the region makes a peaceful, stable Afghanistan free of terrorism and radicalism very important for transforming ‘Look North’ into ‘Act North’. Russia is preoccupied with the Ukraine war, and China is undergoing an economic slump. India can take advantage of the situation and ramp up its relations with Central Asian states through the SCO and address its Afghanistan Conundrum through its Afghanistan Contact Group rather than directly talking to the Taliban for the time being. At the same time, India can leverage good relations with Russia to help it manoeuvre through the China–Pak maze.
Conclusion
The cauldron of rising terrorism and drug trafficking is a security threat to all the member states. The prospect of terrorist organisations that work against the integrity of India, China, Pakistan and the Central Asian nations finding a haven in Afghanistan is always a concern. Converging on counter-terrorism will help address those concerns and secure everyone’s geo-economic interests. Terrorism emanating from Afghanistan threatens the security and economic interests of all the member states of SCO alike, China’s BRI or any other initiatives by India for South-Central Asia connectivity and cooperation.
SCO-RATS is the best-suited forum to address such shared security concerns. The addition of its relatively new members also has the potential to boost its operational scope, and it will only need to bolster its efforts on an already well-established mechanism. The new member states, can, for instance, be incorporated in border patrol exercises in Central Asia. They can take measures to create a joint anti-terror military structure. They can also work towards devising a de-radicalisation programme for Central Asia considering the common Turkic past and culture. The member states of the SCO must adhere to the ‘Shanghai spirit’, give up unilateral approaches vis-à-vis the Taliban regarding security concerns and must unite to tackle terrorism, separatism, and extremism in the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
European Sky Shield Initiative: Reinforcing Europe’s Air Defences
Swasti Rao
December 28, 2022
The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) seeks to develop a common air and missile defence system to defend NATO and European airspace.
The Ukraine war has reset Europe’s equation with Russia in an irrevocable manner. It has united a seemingly fractured European leadership and provided NATO’s waning presence in the region with an unprecedented expansion and capability boost.
The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) is the latest military upgrade to come out of NATO’s security doctrine. A Letter of Intent (LoI) was signed on 13 October 2022 by Defence Ministers of the 14 NATO countries and Finland (in the process of becoming a NATO member)1 to boost Europe’s short, medium and long-range air defence capabilities. Spearheaded by Germany, the objective of this initiative is to develop a common air and missile defence system to defend NATO and European airspace. Of the 15 signatories, the three Baltic States and Finland share borders with Russia, while Romania, Slovakia, Hungary share a border with Ukraine.
In the backdrop of the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, this initiative is an attempt by NATO and its allies to bolster NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATO IAMD).2 NATO IAMD is the defensive component of the alliance’s Joint Air Power, which aims to ensure the stability and security of NATO’s airspace by coordinating, controlling and exploiting the air domain. It has developed into a highly flexible and highly responsive network of interconnected national and NATO systems comprised of sensor, command and control assets and weapons systems.3 The new European Sky Shield Initiative adds to the NATO IAMD through a jointly developed missile defence system which relies on previously developed technology and interoperability between the signatories.
The Context
NATO’s Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană highlighted threat posed by Russia for regional security, as displayed in the indiscriminate missile attacks on Ukraine.4 He stated that commitment between the allied countries "is even more crucial" today than ever due to the recent launch of Russian missiles towards Ukraine.5 Moscow’s precision strikes on military and infrastructure facilities across Ukraine that followed the attack on the Crimean Bridge on 8 October 2022 have been particularly unnerving.6
A month later, stray missiles fell on Polish territory that were later found to be ‘misses’ by Ukraine in intercepting Russian air attacks. Such incidents do scratch the vulnerabilities of NATO’s air defences.7 There has been a growing realisation across NATO members to plug the gaps which can lead to a dangerous escalation if left unattended. It must be noted that while more advanced Western air defence missiles are designed to destroy themselves if they miss their target, several of older Soviet missiles do not have such a mechanism. That could be how the stray, Ukraine-launched-but-Russian-made missiles landed on Polish territory killing two people.
Germany’s Reinvigorated Military Outlook
The Russian war in Ukraine has brought several overhauls in Germany’s military outlook.8 Spearheading the ESSI is yet another significant milestone.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz first touted the idea of integrating various European systems into a common Europe-wide defence system during a speech at Prague in August this year.9 He had argued that the EU-27 need to protect themselves with a solution that would guarantee safety against potential attacks from Russia. In fact, Scholz went as far as proposing the idea of a combined European army, a policy earlier advocated by France but Germany was then sceptical of.10 Scholz pushed the idea for a central military command system with the eventual goal of an EU headquarters. He had also added that it was necessary to build EU's military capabilities in a way that would complement the NATO.
Scholz’s announcement for joint military capabilities also comes alongside speeding up deliveries of the IRIS-T air defence systems to Ukraine.11 It seems that by committing to the development of important yet missing capabilities in NATO through the ESSI,12 Berlin wants to compensate for its reluctance to send substantial military aid to Ukraine. Germany also wants to strengthen its own air defence capabilities. Bundeswehr currently only has about 12 medium range upgraded Patriot batteries but no other short or long range capabilities.13
Germany is of the view that an anti-ballistic missile defence system will be more cost effective when purchased jointly. By listing the IRIS-T SLM short-range air defence system (manufactured by Diehl Defence) as one of the three components of the ESSI, the Scholz government is also aiming to promote the German arms industry.14 The other two possible components of the ESSI project that have been listed so far are the Israeli-US Arrow-3 exo-atmospheric anti-ballistic missile defence system and the US PATRIOT medium-range system.15 The focus on US and German made systems seems to be one of the reasons why other leading defence industrial powers in Europe have not joined the programme as yet.
Does ESSI reflect a united NATO?
While the ESSI does reflect a further bolstered NATO’s air deterrence and defence to its east, it does not yet show the participation of other NATO members like France, Spain, Poland and Italy. Countries with their own robust air defences that are already inter-operable with that of NATO’s existing NATO IAMDs have also steered clear of this project. Spain, for example, already has anti-missile shielding equipment interoperable with NATO’s.
France’s absence despite being a major European power is particularly conspicuous. So is the absence of Poland, a frontline state in the ongoing war in neighbouring Ukraine.
One of the reasons why France has not joined the initiative could be as a result of prioritising the interests of French defence industrial complex. In the future, if the listed components of ESSI would aim to include, for example, the French SAMP/T system,16 Paris might be more inclined to join the initiative. It would provide a boost to France’s military industry. Like Germany, France too has been criticised for lagging in sending military support to Ukraine.
Macron’s recent announcement that Paris will be sending short range air defences to Kyiv is seen as compensating for the lack of military support so far.17 Co-incidentally, Macron’s announcement came on the same day as NATO announced its ESSI initiative. Both France and Germany have had a traditional policy of engaging Russia.18 Despite fully supporting the sanctions and EU wide policies towards disengaging from Russia, the two European powers are seen as more mindful of not isolating it totally.19
Poland, under the Wisla air defence programme, has already been developing military industrial cooperation with the United States since 2018.20 Poland’s Narew short range air defence programme with UK is underway since 2021.21 With such multi-billion dollars’ worth of joint defence programmes with the US and the UK, there seems to be little appetite in Warsaw right now to join the ESSI.
Cyprus, Ireland and Malta are also not expected to join the integrated air defence as they are not part of NATO. However, close cooperation without formal joining may be expected as momentum picks up.
However, some of the participating countries like the Baltic states are developing their own air defence programmes and for them, ESSI could be an opportunity to complement existing capabilities and acquire new ones.22
Conclusion
The ESSI, for now, demonstrates a concrete objective for bolstering NATO’s air defences in a cost-effective manner. Under German leadership, this initiative will boost a hitherto non-military stature of Germany within the EU. While the ESSI is directly triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO’s insufficient air defences along its eastern front have been a matter of deliberation within the East European members of the alliance. The ESSI may expand later with the inclusion of new members. A modern, inter-operable and coordinated air defence will enhance NATO IAMD’s capabilities, provided jointness and coordination are prioritised over other differences of opinion among the prominent European states.23
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Political Change in Malaysia: A Harbinger of Hope?
Mohammed Shoaib Raza
December 27, 2022
Anwar Ibrahim’s ascent to power could prove advantageous for dealing with Malaysia’s fractious domestic dynamics as well as for furthering the country’s foreign policy goals.
Malaysian society and politics is marked by racial and religious polarisation. Political parties have frequently exploited this for their purposes which has led to social unrest and the malfunction of governments at multiple times. However, Anwar Ibrahim's ascent to power, which ended his career's dry spell in the wake of turbulent political events in Malaysia, offers a glimpse of optimism for the nation's social and political climate. In the run-up to the country’s 15th general elections, the period was marked by political uncertainties, which included a hung parliament with no party having a clear majority to form the government. Ibrahim Anwar's Pakatan Harapan was in the lead with 82 seats but fell short of a majority by 30 MPs. It was finally supported by UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) to form a coalition government after being chosen by King Al-Sultan Abdullah Sultan Ahmad Shah.1 The coalition government, though, will have to deal with Malaysia's many issues, ethnic polarisation being the most prominent one.
Socio-Political Landscape of Malaysia
Malaysia has witnessed severe divisions due to the social and political ambitions of both nationalists and Islamists.2 The country’s democracy has been constrained for decades due to the injustices imposed by sectarian ideas of race and religion.3 Ethnic Malays, who are primarily Muslims, belong to indigenous communities who collectively account for around 70 per cent of the nearly 33 million people. Of the remaining, 23 per cent and 7 per cent are ethnic Chinese and Indians respectively. The multi-cultural makeup of Malaysian society has been a key foundation for political mobilisation.
Due to Pakatan Harapan's multi-religious and multi-ethnic configuration, it was believed that racial and religious tensions would reduce when it unexpectedly defeated the ethnocentric Barisan Nasional (headed by UMNO) in the 2018 elections, ending the party's 60-year rule. However, Mahathir Mohamad’s leadership did not bring any significant change vis-à-vis racial and religious conditions in the country. Notwithstanding his criticism of discrimination against Western countries over minority-related issues, Mahathir Mohamad was unable and unwilling to put aside racial politics and work on substantive reforms.4 This was exacerbated further by the coming together of Malay nationalists of UMNO with their Islamist rival Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), stirring up divisive issues for their own political needs.
Race-based Politics
In recent years, Malaysia has seen a surge in polarisation over issues related to race and religion. Previously, a significant anti-ICERD (International Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination) demonstration took place in Malaysia in 2018. Consequently, the government decided not to ratify a crucial UN anti-discrimination treaty meant to abolish all types of racial discrimination and advance interracial understanding. Both UMNO and PAS opposed the plan, arguing it would harm the rights of the majority of Malays. Human rights NGO Pusat KOMAS’ report titled, ‘Malaysia Racial Discrimination Report 2021’ suggests that ‘despite a fair amount of inclusive policies and verbal assurances that sought to incorporate the spirit of inclusivity, unity, and respect among all Malaysians, such initiatives were never implemented and governing leaders utilized the same racial rhetoric, to maintain their power’.5
Although Anwar's coalition Pakatan Harapan's 36 per cent seat share may be enough to create a government, it also reveals the predominance of racial and religious problems. The conservative, largely Malay Muslim alliance headed by Muhyiddin Yassin, which comprises the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), was in second position. The Discrimination Report published by Pusat KOMAS points out that racial and religious politics accounts for the largest share of discrimination (at 28 per cent) while other incidents of discrimination include racial and religious provocation (23 per cent), racial discrimination in the education sector (11 per cent), racism in other sectors (11 per cent), racial discrimination in the business sector (6 per cent), xenophobia (13 per cent), and racism in the media and internet (8 per cent).6 The dominancy of race and religion-related issues can also be gauged through the victory of the conservative PAS, which often pushes nationwide implementation of sharia. The party won 49 of the 222 seats and thus emerged as the single largest party.
Reason for Optimism
Now that Pakatan Harapan is in power under the leadership of Ibrahim Anwar, his major concern will be to deal with Islamists and to tread with race-related issues carefully. Although he was the dynamic firebrand youth leader who started Malaysia's Islamic youth organisation (ABIM), a lot has happened since then. His career underwent a significant change when he joined the government-run UMNO party in 1982 under the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad. Anwar swiftly rose as he was appointed to several government ministerial positions, including deputy prime minister, finance minister and education minister. He was also imprisoned on various charges which are largely considered as politically motivated reasons.
Anwar has frequently and boldly criticised religious and racial fanaticism, and detested the divisive and racial politics of Malaysia pointing to the potential impact on integrity of the society. Post-elections, Anwar has already emphasised on his ambition of establishing a powerful administration that can concentrate on the economy and is ‘more inclusive in terms of race, religion, or region’.7
Even as economic, social and political cleavages remain, Anwar Ibrahim's arrival heralds a new era of optimism and change—so long as he doesn't get caught up in racial politics to further his political ambitions and re-embarks on his own "Reformasi" campaign, a social, economic, and political upheaval initiative that he started in 1998.
Implications for the Region and India
Though Anwar has assumed the Malaysian premiership for the first time, he has been in higher echelons of Malaysian politics for decades and has often expressed his views regarding international politics and external affairs. Anwar's recent interviews provide an early cue that some significant continuity will, most likely, exist in his government's foreign policy. Anwar has indicated that he will pursue a neutral and non-aligned foreign policy vis-à-vis US–China contestations and would refrain from militarisation in disputed marine zones, along with supporting multilateralism.8 The China–Malaysia relationship meanwhile continues to be strong, with booming trade and increased bilateral ties and military cooperation despite contentions over the South China Sea issue.9
Malaysia is crucial to India's Act East Policy as well as its wider economic, defence and other bilateral concerns. Both have a long history of friendship and close ties, and there have been many summit-level discussions and gatherings along with an ‘Enhanced Strategic Partnership’ as well as joint military drills like Harimau Shakti, whose 2022 iteration just ended. Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) make up one of the world's largest communities in Malaysia, at 8 per cent of the total population (2 million). India and Malaysia collaborate to defend air and maritime freedom in the South China Sea in addition to intelligence sharing and collaboration on regional counterterrorism efforts.
The relationship between the two nations, however, appears to have soured somewhat in recent years as a result of remarks made by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad over Kashmir and other domestic issues of India. Apart from this, the granting of permanent residency to Zakir Naik in Malaysia dented the relations further. Zakir Naik is accused of inciting hatred through his provocative lectures, supporting terrorism, and money laundering. He managed to elude Indian law enforcement agents and is currently wanted for extradition. However, Anwar Ibrahim in 2019 supported action against Naik. He also strongly detested Naik’s communal remarks that created social unrest in Malaysia.10
Anwar Ibrahim is expected to be more cooperative towards India as compared to his predecessors and will potentially prove amicable towards the geo-economic and geo-political goals of India. He has not only developed close ties with Prime Minister Narendra Modi but has also affirmed India’s importance as a key strategic partner along with the US, ASEAN and Europe. Currently, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is among the top contenders to supply Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) to the Royal Malaysian Air Force. In 2021–2022, Malaysian imports of Indian products stood at US$ 6,995.04 million whereas the Indian imports of Malaysian products was around US$ 12,424 million.11 Amidst the increased cooperation in defence and commerce between both countries, Anwar has already expressed his desire to strengthen the ties further.12
Although the long-term impact of the new electoral mandate remains to be seen, the prospects of Anwar Ibrahim’s rule appear comparatively advantageous not only for domestic politics but also for foreign policy objectives and regional stability.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy with constitutional monarchy where the king has the power to nominate whoever he thinks will be supported by the majority.
2. Bridget Welsh, “Malaysia’ Political Polarization: Race, Religion, And Reform”, in Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue (eds), Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia: Old Divisions, New Dangers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 August 2020.
The Indian media exhibited a very negative assessment of the 20th CPC Congress and of Xi Jinping’s third term.
The 20th CPC Congress was extensively covered in Indian media.1 An analysis of editorials of select English national dailies, chosen on the basis of their readership, brings to fore three themes in the media’s views on the 20th CPC Congress—Xi Jinping’s emergence as the most authoritarian leader of all times; the implication of Xi’s continuing rule on China; and challenges India could face from China’s assertive foreign policy and military modernisation.
Xi Jinping as China’s most dictatorial leader
Xi’s centralisation of power constituted the dominant theme in the newspaper editorials. The Times of India editorial headline termed Xi Jinping as the ‘new emperor’ who rules supreme whereas The Hindu published an editorial titled ‘One man rule: On Xi Jinping’s firm grip on Chinese politics’.2 The Indian Express in its editorial stated that Xi Jinping weaponised the anti-corruption movement to eliminate all the opponents, developed a surveillance state, dismantled collective leadership, concentrated power in his hands and promoted personality cult.3
Similarly, The Hindu argued that Xi engineered a clean sweep and complete domination that is unprecedented in Chinese politics because even Mao Zedong at the height of his power had to contend with rival power centres.4 Two of Xi’s actions were projected as evidence of his authoritarian streak; first was Xi’s negation of the ‘collective leadership’5 principle of the Party by breaking the presidential term limit and forming6 a Politburo and its Standing Committee consisting entirely of his loyalists.7 The second related to the removal of Hu Jintao in public view before the voting on Party resolutions.8 Both the actions demonstrated the prevalence of one-man rule in China and elimination of all intra-party resistance.
Delving deeper into editorial coverage of this aspect, it could be discerned that the Indian media perceives Xi Jinping as an ideologically driven leader. He is bent on reversing the few liberalising policies introduced by his predecessor to entrench CPC’s control with him at the top. In effect, the 20th Party Congress showcased the power wielded by Xi Jinping and the developments at the event were a prelude to more challenging times in India–China bilateral ties.
Implication of Xi’s third term for China
The Indian media painted a grim picture of the implication of Xi’s continuing as president of China. In its editorial, ‘Eyes on Beijing’, The Telegraph opined that in 1980s, the CPC by instituting term limits and collective leadership had created an effective safeguard against personality cults and policy excesses.9 However, Xi Jinping’s breaking down of old party structures will result in creating a succession void and could set the stage for a contest among different power groups within the party in subsequent years. Moreover, China’s economic growth could further suffer as Xi is unlikely to change course on his policies of crackdown on multiple sectors of the Chinese economy and the zero-Covid policy. The editorial concluded that Xi Jinping’s centralisation of power will not make China stronger but could render the world more unsafe.
TheTribune commenting on Xi Jinping’s goal of military modernisation suggested that the Chinese economy could come under more pressure as Beijing will remain focused on military and security issues, despite economic woes.10 The Indian Express contended that Xi’s third term has nothing new to offer except for greater political controls at home and further privileging of state against market.11 It went on to warn that Xi Jinping’s unchecked power will inevitably lead to political hubris and costly policy blunders.
The Indian media’s discussion of China’s domestic issues in the context of Xi’s third term is noteworthy for two reasons. It conveyed to the readers that contrary to the narrative that Xi Jinping’s leadership will deliver national rejuvenation to China, it has landed the country in a ‘mess’ in reality. Secondly, it also tried to underline to its readers the weakening of Chinese political system (apparent in Xi’s unopposed centralisation of power) which in the long-run could render China more unstable and fragmented.
Security challenge for India
Along with rapid military modernisation, Xi’s third term will be marked with more assertive stance on foreign policy issues. This in itself constitutes a major security challenge for New Delhi as India will encounter a more belligerent China. For instance, The Telegraph warned that India and other countries having a territorial dispute with China will need to watch out as Xi Jinping in his third term could feel mandated to take bolder decisions on foreign policy issues.12 Pointing towards the urgent need of achieving jointness of three services under the supervision of Chief of Defence Staff, The Tribune contended that People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s modernisation overdrive makes it incumbent on Indian armed forces to raise their battle preparedness.13
Further, The Times of India and the Hindustan Times urged the government to adopt a comprehensive strategy to tackle the ‘bristling dragon’.14 They urged New Delhi to ‘steel itself’15 and redouble efforts to boost domestic economic strength, remain socially cohesive, upgrade defence preparedness and cement strategic partnership with like-minded countries. In this context, TheIndian Express’s response is noteworthy. It published two editorials on the same day titled ‘Delhi will have to work harder, a lot faster to blunt the challenge from Xi’s China to India’s interests’ and ‘Indigenising defence production is a good idea whose time has come’.16 Although both differed in content, they demonstrated editorial emphasis on strengthening India’s military power vis-à-vis China while upgrading India’s defence manufacturing sector as a long-term strategy against China. While the sense of suspicion and threat perception is in tandem with Indian media’s previous approach towards China, a notable point was that it did not foresee betterment of relations or possibility of close economic cooperation in the near future.
Conclusion
The Indian national media exhibited a very negative assessment of the 20th CPC Congress and more importantly of Xi Jinping’s third term. Some of the prominent causes of this negative evaluation could be China’s refusal to restore the pre-June 2020 status quo along the disputed border, its hostility towards India’s deepening ties with the US, Beijing’s repeated blocking of India’s effort to blacklist Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups and individuals and increasing aggressive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region.
Considering the national media’s editorial coverage of the 20th CPC Congress, three policy suggestions emerge. First, in order to understand the future foreign policy trajectory of the Chinese state, it is necessary that India closely follows China’s domestic developments. This is because Beijing often engineers tension outside to divert public attention from domestic issues. Second, India should also keep up the momentum of modernising military infrastructure along the disputed border to be able to counter Chinese pressure and expansionism. Finally, besides developing strategic ties with major powers, New Delhi should also work to modernise its domestic defence industry. This will not only help New Delhi to gradually reduce dependence on arms export but will also greatly amplify the military’s capability to manage security challenges from China.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1.The Times of India is a leading English newspaper with over 15 million readers, followed by The Hindu which has over six million readers. The Indian Express, The Tribune, The Telegraph and Hindustan Times share over one million of readership each. For details see Tanushree Basuroy, “Leading English Publications in India 2018-2019 By Readership”, Statista, 19 March 2021.
Canada and the Republic of Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategies signal a major transformation in their respective foreign policy outlook.
Lately, the world has witnessed the geopolitical construct of the Asia-Pacific being progressively replaced by the Indo-Pacific. This has created a diplomatic domino effect with many governments shifting their focus to Indo-Pacific and articulating their strategic approach towards the region.1 As a result, major powers like the US, France and the European Union (EU) have come out with their Indo-Pacific Strategies (IPS), attempting to articulate and accentuate their economic, political and strategic interests in the region. The latest to join this list are Canada and the Republic of Korea (ROK), who unveiled their strategies on 27 November 2022 and 28 December 2022, respectively. Both the documents signal a major transformation in their respective government’s foreign policy outlook.
Canada’s Re-engagement with the Indo-Pacific
Canada identifies itself as a Pacific nation and describes the Indo-Pacific as its neighbouring region. The strategy implies that the future of the Canadian economy, trade, immigration policies, environment and security would be extensively shaped through Canada’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific region.2 But it must be noted that Canada’s attempts to engage with the region are not new. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Canadian government, led by then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, sought to play a more active role in the emerging security and economic cooperation architecture of the region. This proactive engagement continued with successive Canadian governments which even participated in the early multilateral negotiations on the South China Sea (SCS) disputes.
However, post the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Canada began to disengage from the region due to budgetary constraints and diminishing political support.3 Subsequently, Canada’s visibility and influence in the region receded as a result of which it was excluded from the East Asia Summit (EAS). Also, despite being a dialogue partner of ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Canada was not invited to be the part of ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus).4
After a prolonged period of absence, Canada’s need to re-engage with the region was brought forth by the findings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. These findings were released in 2015 in a report titled ‘Securing Canada’s Place in Asia-Pacific: A Focus on Southeast Asia’. This report recommended leading the whole country's effort to recognise the importance of the Asia-Pacific region for securing Canada’s future prosperity and seizing regional opportunities. The report underscored the need for developing and implementing a comprehensive and sustained approach to strengthening Canada’s engagement with the region.5
Accordingly, the Trudeau administration began scaling up Canada’s military, economic and diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific. In 2018, the Canadian Navy launched Operation Projection, which is an ongoing naval presence mission in the Indo-Pacific.6 On the economic and diplomatic front, Canada signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement in 2016 and began seeking membership in forums like the EAS and ADMM-Plus.
In line with these efforts, its IPS has been underpinned by a core assumption that the rising influence of the Indo-Pacific region is a once-in-a-generation shift that requires a Canadian response.7 The strategy has pledged to allocate US$ 2.3 billion for investments in five priority areas over the next five years.8 These relate to security, trade and resilient supply chains, human resources (HR), sustainable development and strategic engagement with the Indo-Pacific nations.
The strategy describes China as a disruptive global power and unequivocally makes it clear that Canada will challenge China on issues like coercion and violations of human rights. At the same time, the strategy also implies that Canada would seek to cooperate with China on issues such as climate change and nuclear proliferation. The strategy envisages a four-tier diplomatic engagement with China at domestic, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.9 In a nutshell, Canada’s IPS reflects its aspirations to re-engage with the Asia-Pacific region and regain lost ground, post its disengagement in the late 1990s.
South Korea’s aspirations to become a Global Pivot State
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin has described their IPS as the de-facto foreign policy doctrine of the Yoon administration and a new chapter in Korean diplomacy for a proactive engagement in both regional and global affairs.10 Being geographically located in a high-threat environment, Seoul has been maneuvering between Washington and Beijing with a cautious and at times ambiguous approach. Despite being a formal ally of the US under the 1953 Mutual Defence Treaty, South Korea has deep-rooted economic linkages with China which is its largest trading partner with Free Trade Agreement (FTA) since 2015. These factors had compelled the erstwhile government in Seoul led by Moon Jae-in to avoid antagonising China and accommodate its rise through a cautious posture of strategic ambiguity.11
However, observers have noted that South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy indicates the Yoon government’s clear departure from this strategic ambiguity. The strategy illustrates Seoul's strategic alignment with Washington’s IPS which is firmly rooted in preserving the rules-based international order and promoting democratic values.12 At the same time, the strategy seeks to promote a more mature relationship with China based on mutual respect and reciprocity guided by international norms and rules.13
The most significant takeaway from the strategy is that Seoul’s outlook for the Indo-Pacific is shaped by its aspirations to become a global pivot state and expand its influence beyond the Korean Peninsula. To achieve this, the strategy seeks to deepen strategic cooperation with nations across the key regions of the Indo-Pacific including Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania and East Africa.14
The strategy lays down nine core lines of effort for enhancing the strategic cooperation between South Korea and other like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific. These efforts cover cooperation in domains of maritime security, cyber security, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, energy security, management of resilient supply chains and promoting rule-based order through diplomacy.15 The strategy has been successful in reaffirming President Yoon’s efforts to adopt a more assertive and proactive foreign policy in comparison to his predecessor. At the same, the greatest challenge for the Yoon administration would be to deliver on these commitments in the face of possible Chinese pressures in the future.16
Common Threads
Through the analysis of these two strategies, certain common threads can be observed
The primacy of Strategic Depth with the US
One of the most important commonalities of both strategies is their consonance with the American strategic perspective on the region that has been bought forth in the US’s IPS released in early 2022. ROK’s strategy describes Seoul’s alliance with the US as the lynchpin for peace and prosperity in the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific.17 On the other hand, Canada’s IPS highlights Ottawa’s commitment to strengthen its engagement in the region through US-led economic and security groupings like the G7 and the Five Eyes. Also, Washington and Ottawa have been working towards establishing the Canada–US Strategic dialogue on the Indo-Pacific to synchronise their engagement in the region.18
Focus on engagement with the ASEAN
The support for ASEAN centrality and its outlook for the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) has been highlighted in both strategies. ROK’s strategy has identified the Yoon administration’s Korea–ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI) as the platform for enhancing engagement with the ASEAN.19 Canada’s strategy envisages the elevation of Canada–ASEAN relations to the level of strategic partnership and attaining membership in forums ADMM-Plus and EAS.20
Recognition of India’s Strategic Significance
The emphasis on enhancing strategic cooperation with India has been a key highlight in the IPS of not only the ROK and Canada but also the US, France and the EU. All these strategies have acknowledged India’s economic, demographic and political significance to the Indo-Pacific.
Aspirations to become a global pivot state
Pivot States have been defined as those that possess military, economic and ideational strategic assets that are coveted by great powers. A change in a pivot state’s association has important repercussions for regional and global security.21 This has been explicitly stated in ROK’s strategy where it is stated that Seoul aspires to become a global pivotal state that actively seeks to shape the geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.22 On the other hand, although not explicitly mentioned, Canada’s IPS is reflective of Ottawa’s aspirations to become a pivotal middle power in the long run through its active engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
Differences
Despite the above-elucidated common threads, the analysis of the strategies also highlights differences, as under:
The stance against a Belligerent China
Although both strategies are underpinned by their support to preserve existing rules-based order and oppose any unilateral attempts to challenge the status quo in the region, the language adopted to criticise China’s actions differs. Ellen Kim notes that ROK’s strategy has adopted a more nuanced language mindful of not antagonising China. On the other hand, Canada’s strategy has been explicit in pointing out China’s blatant disregard for international rules and norms that have caused a detrimental impact on the Indo-Pacific.23
Immigration Policies
South Korea is a small and ethnically homogenous country, and its strategy does not include a focus on immigration policies. On the other hand, Canada being a large country with a sparse population; focus on immigration policies to attract skilled manpower from the Indo-Pacific region has been a key aspect of its strategy.
Defence Cooperation with India
ROK’s strategy envisages fostering a stronger relationship with India across all areas including defence. But Canada’s strategy notably excludes the mention of defence cooperation with India but emphasises strengthening economic ties and facilitating the immigration of skilled manpower.
Conclusion
American historian Williamson Murray remarked that only great powers are capable of making grand strategies and middle or small powers can only respond to those strategies.24 This particularly holds true in the context of the IPS of both Canada and ROK which reflect their alignment with the US’s outlook for the region. At the same time, factors like geography and demography have also resulted in certain differences in their respective approaches to dealing with China and the region as a whole. However, the biggest challenge that lies ahead for both ROK and Canada is in sustaining their commitment and producing tangible deliverables that have been elucidated in their respective strategies.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Russia–Ukraine cyberwar has upended a number of existing preconceptions about cyber conflict in an active war.
The cyber conflict between Russia and Ukraine preceded the kinetic conflict by almost a month, with the first major cyber attack on 14 January 2022 knocking out over 70 Ukrainian government websites. These included websites of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Education and Science.1 Since then, even though much of the focus has been on the kinetic conflict, the cyber conflict has also continued unabated with both sides engaged in a variety of manoeuvres, from attacks on critical infrastructure to spreading misinformation.
Along the way, a number of existing preconceptions about cyber conflict in an active war scenario have been upended. Chief among them was the expectation that cyber attacks would play a decisive part in the conflict and that Russia would dominate in this domain given its superior capabilities and familiarity with the Ukrainian cyber terrain. This was especially so since its entities had been carrying out cyber attacks against Ukraine over the past decade. The resilience of Ukrainian networks in the face of these attacks has now been attributed to the very same factors, that they are familiar with the Russian cyber play book, having been at the receiving end for so long.
New variables that have made a difference in the cyber conflict have been the assistance provided, both individually and collectively, by countries backing Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. This assistance has taken the form of training, exchange of information as well as assistance in active defence. NATO, the collective security alliance, which is one of the ostensible reasons behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has been at the forefront of providing support against the cyber attacks being faced by Ukraine. Ukraine’s application for membership in the NATO Cybersecurity centre, pending since 2021, was approved in January 2023, making it one of the five non-NATO members of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE).2
The European Union has spent over 10 million euros since the beginning of the conflict to assist Ukrainian cyber defences, including setting up of a cyber lab, and providing security software and hardware to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.3 US Cyber Command has also publicly stated that it has been operating hunt forward teams in Ukraine.4 The latest US defence budget provides enhanced budgetary assistance of US$ 44 million for these teams.5 On a tangential note, the war has also reinvigorated efforts by NATO member countries to better synchronise their cyber defence efforts which has been struggling with the unique challenges of adapting collective security principles to cyber defence. Heightened activity at various levels of NATO shows a renewed vigour to tackle challenges.6
Yet another factor has been the role played by major software and cyber security companies in providing varied forms of assistance, from data to training to even monetary assistance, with Microsoft recently announcing it was providing as much as US$ 400 million to assist in cyber security efforts to Ukraine. Much of the resilience of Ukrainian websites to Russian cyber attacks has also been attributed to pre-emptive measures undertaken by Microsoft in the weeks leading up to the war with active encouragement from the US government.7 Microsoft has also published a series of reports highlighting Russian attacks on Ukraine.8 Amazon also announced that it had contributed substantially to the Ukrainian cause.9
Initiatives such as the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaboration (CDAC), a coalition of tech companies, including Avast, the Cyber Threat Alliance, LookingGlass Cyber Solutions, Mandiate, Next Peak, Palo Alto Networks, Recorded Future, Symantec and Broadcom, Threat Quotient and numerous others, have been brought together by the Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), established in 1995 by an Act of the US Congress, to work towards protecting Ukrainian critical infrastructure.10
Although the private tech companies, from Microsoft to Elon Musk’s Starlink, have stepped in to fill the gaps and vulnerabilities faced by Ukraine, this raises major questions about the dangers of over-dependence on these companies and the leverage they hold, something that holds good globally. Use of Starlink receivers, for instance, is disabled in Russian-controlled territory.11
Though there is little evidence of Russian companies playing a role in the war effort, many Russian tech companies have suffered collateral damage from the sanctions imposed on Russia as well as the internet control laws in the country. Cybersecurity company Kaspersky is among the last of the companies offering Virtual Private Network (VPN) services to halt its service while Russian internet company, Yandex, is transferring most of its businesses out of Russia to avoid sanctions.12
Another point to ponder upon is the role of state-sponsored and state-sanctioned hacking groups and individuals in the cyber conflict. Russia is home to many hacking groups which are perceived to be sponsored by the intelligence agencies. These groups have been used to disrupt critical infrastructure, steal sensitive information, and spread disinformation. Intelligence agencies such as the GRU (Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) and the FSB (Federal Security Service) have strived to maintain a furtive relationship with groups such as Killnet, seen to be responsible for many cyber attacks on Ukraine and other countries supporting Ukraine.13
This approach worked well in an era of low intensity conflict, but has come short in this current conflict because the command and control is too diversified, and the emphasis is more on disinformation and disruptive activities than achieving strategic goals. The decentralised plausible deniability approach which has been Russia’s default position with the intelligence agencies being at the fore is not an optimum set-up in a kinetic conflict situation since there is no clarity on who is exactly in charge. This has led to confusion over the strategic aims of these attacks and ineffective information diffusion to cater to the tactical and operational requirements of the military.
On the Ukrainian side, the government has encouraged the formations of the “Ukrainian IT army”, made up largely of patriotic hackers and cyber vigilante organisations from around the world. They have been engaged in similar actions directed against Russian entities.14 All these largely illegal activities can be considered a setback in the quest for setting rules of the road in cyberspace through norms of state behaviour, since these activities are being both condoned and encouraged not just by Ukraine but also by Ukrainian allies such as the United States. The NATO-sponsored The Tallinn Manual goes into great detail on how to adapt international humanitarian law to cyber activities during wartime, including distinguishing between military and civilian actors and targets but none of that seems to make a difference in the current free-for-all.
Though these cyber vigilantes by Ukraine have been put to good use, there is a huge question mark over the legality of their use in an active war situation. Much of the progress on paper of framing rules of the road for cyberspace has been rendered infructuous by these activities. In fact, the ongoing UN processes such as the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) have become sites of proxy attacks by one side against the other, and is seeping into the process itself. The decades-long process to evolve norms of state behaviour through various UN processes could possibly suffer quite a bit of collateral damage as a result of the conflict, with the opposing sides taking pot shots at each other becoming the main spectacle at these meetings. In any case, there was glacial progress being made as different blocs had begun to dig in their heels.
Whilst the final outcome of the conflict is yet to be determined, the needle has moved when it comes to certain aspects of cyber conflict. The cyber-warriors of all hues and shades will continue to carry out their operations from the shadows, however the current conflict shows that a command-and-control structure goes further in achieving strategic objectives. Mission creep is something that can only be avoided through well laid-out objectives and clearly delineated responsibilities.
Tech companies have shown their indispensability maintaining the resilience of the Ukrainian networks and critical infrastructure but, on the flip side, it has also served to highlight the vulnerabilities faced by countries in depending on the virtual monopoly of these companies in the tech space, reminiscent of the dependence on semiconductors that came to the fore in the past year. Like with semiconductors, there are few viable immediate workarounds for these dependencies. Going forward, it is likely though, that technologies and their vendors will be less seen as global public goods and will be subject to many tests of credibility and reliability.
The events so far show that cyber resilience is viable and cyberwar still remains a foggy concept. Words and phrases like holistic and whole-of-nation, and public–private partnership might have become cliches in the context of cyber security, but these are the approaches that work. International co-operation in framing rules of the road for cyberspace might be at its lowest point, in which case, there is no way to go but up. Winners and losers might be a relative term here but there are enough lessons to be learnt from the conflict.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India and Egypt elevated bilateral ties to that of a Strategic Partnership during the visit of President Abdel Fateh Al Sisi.
Egyptian President Abdel Fateh Al Sisi was on a visit to India from 24 to 26 January 2023. Al Sisi was in India as chief guest for the 74th Republic Day celebrations held in New Delhi. The visit coincided with both countries celebrating 75 years of establishment of diplomatic relations. It was the first time that India had invited a leader from Egypt for the ceremony. The Egyptian President had close discussions with Prime Minister Narendra Modi on bilateral, regional and global issues. A number of agreements on crucial areas were also signed between the two sides.
Why Does Egypt Matter?
The visit of Egyptian president underlines the growing importance of Cairo for New Delhi. There are several factors that highlight this intent. First, India and Egypt share a civilisational connect. Their relationship can be traced back to the ancient times. Similarly, Egypt’s strategic location at the crossroads of Africa, Asia and Europe gives it immense value. It also controls the Suez Canal, the only direct channel of global trade between waters connecting Europe with the Indo-Pacific. Approximately 12 per cent of global trade traverses through the Suez Canal.1
At the same time, Egypt has been one of India’s important trading partners in the West Asia and Africa region. The current bilateral trade between India and Egypt is around US$ 7.26 billion.2 There has been a significant interest of Indian industry in developing commercial relations with the country. Over 50 Indian companies are present in the country and the total Indian investment is over US$ 3 billion.3 They are present in diverse sectors, such as agriculture, automobile, energy and chemicals.
Egypt is also perceived as a gateway to Africa due to its strong trading links and free trade agreements across the continent. The country offers fresh opportunities to Indian private sector and industry to expand its presence in the continent. Moreover, India and Egypt are development partners within the South–South cooperation framework. Both countries also share the common viewpoint of supporting African countries’ development aspirations. During its presidency of the African Union, Egypt took some steps towards expanding development cooperation and investment with other countries on the continent. The possibilities of both India and Egypt working towards triangular development cooperation with other African countries are immense.
Finally, Egypt is an important partner of India in the multilateral arena. Both countries are the founding members of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and recognise the need for reform in multilateral institutions. India and Egypt are together as a member and dialogue partner respectively of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Similarly, they are both dialogue partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). They also have an opportunity to cooperate on matters related to global economic governance at the G20. As the President of G20, India has invited Egypt as a guest country for the summit to be held in September 2023.
President Al Sisi’s Visit: Key Takeaways
The recent visit marks the third visit of President Al Sisi to India. He had visited India earlier during the 3rd India–Africa Forum hosted by India in 2015 and subsequently for a state visit in 2016. The importance given to his visit to India is reflected by the fact that he was accompanied by a high-powered delegation comprising of five ministers and senior officials. The visit is path-breaking as India and Egypt decided to elevate the relationship to a ‘strategic partnership’ and enhance political, security and economic cooperation.
There is no doubt that both India and Egypt share similar views on a number of security issues, terrorism and cybersecurity in particular. Egypt, like India, has faced the scourge of terrorism for long. It has evolved a holistic approach to counter terrorism. This encompasses not only security solutions but also, examining the economic, cultural and ideological roots of the problem. Therefore, it was not surprising that the two leaders called for zero tolerance on terrorism. Cybersecurity is another area in which the views of the two leaders converged. A recent report suggests that in the year 2022, India was one of the most targeted countries in terms of cyber-attacks on government sector in the world.4 Similarly, Egypt has been identified as one of the 20 largest countries vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Looking at this scenario, it is important that both India and Egypt join hands to deal with this emerging challenge.
The two leaders also discussed cooperation in food and health security. The COVID-19 pandemic and the recent Ukraine conflict have impacted food and health security in countries across the world, including Egypt and India. Egypt, one of the largest importers of wheat from Russia and Ukraine, had procured wheat from India after conflict broke out between the two countries. Both India and Egypt had supported each other during the COVID-19 pandemic. India had supplied COVID vaccines to Egypt. Similarly, Cairo had sent medical supplies, including oxygen cylinders, to India.
President Al Sisi and Prime Minister Modi agreed to expand cooperation in the security sector. Defence cooperation between the two countries is not new. India has been training Egyptian armed forces officers since the 1960s. Some of the recent engagements include exchange of visits, joint exercises and defence exhibitions. During Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s visit to Egypt in September 2022, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation was signed by the two sides. President Al Sisi’s visit will hopefully lead to greater synergies in this crucial sector.
The two leaders also had wide-ranging discussion on economic matters. Egypt may allocate land to Indian industry in the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCEZ). The two sides decided to expand the bilateral trade to US$ 12 billion in the next five years.5 However, to achieve this target, India and Egypt will have to address the impediments in expanding trade. The visit ended with an exchange of five MOUs in the crucial areas of cybersecurity, information technology, culture, youth matters and broadcasting.
In conclusion, the visit of President of Egypt to India has elevated the relationship to a strategic partnership. The spate of agreements and warm chemistry between the leaders augurs well for future relations between the two leading powers in Africa and Asia, respectively.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Science diplomacy can be used effectively to address critical challenges facing the South Asian region.
At the 108th Indian Science Congress on 3 January 2023, Prime Minister Narendra Modi exhorted the scientific community to work towards meeting “the needs of the country…and give momentum to the world’s humanity”.1 The salience of science and technology (S&T) as important drivers for economic development has long been recognised. Science diplomacy and scientific collaboration, bilaterally and multilaterally, remains critically important, given the need to mitigate common challenges that transcend borders. These include economic crises, global pandemics, the climate crisis and environmental degradation. Scientific endeavours can not only act as an effective tool to engage countries, but also can accelerate global solutions to shared challenges.2
Science Diplomacy in South Asia
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), formed in 1985, identified science and technology as one of the core areas of cooperation among the member states. A Technical Committee on S&T was formed to facilitate cooperation through workshops, expert group meetings, circulation of state-of-the-art reports on different S&T sectors, training of scientists and initiating joint research and development (R&D) projects in the area of energy, food technology, remote sensing, forestry development, erosion control and mining.
Regional initiatives relating to science diplomacy in South Asia are largely absent. The SAARC Technical Committee on S&T, in fact, has not met since 2010.3 Joint research publications, which are considered an important indicator of the strength of research collaboration and its impact on different fields, are also largely absent. Most of the scientific publications of South Asian scholars are with researchers in institutions outside of South Asia, while intra-regional collaboration is relatively rare, as highlighted in the 2021 UNESCO report.
Source: UNESCO Science Report 2021, Paris (Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities are excluded).
On the failure to advance science diplomacy under SAARC Technical Committee of S&T, the former secretary to the Science Advisory Council to the Prime Minister of India, P.J. Lavakare, flags lack of financial resources and political will as reasons that are preventing scientists from taking initiatives.4 Similarly, Malti Goel, former adviser at the Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India, notes that “countries in this region do not see each other eye to eye, making it difficult for science diplomacy to progress.”5 Indeed, several diplomats, heads of NGOs and research institutes, international organisations and government officials from South Asian countries have said that “cross-border tensions are holding back progress in environmental policy and scientific research”.6
Scientific Cooperation amid Political Rivalry
There are several examples of scientific collaborations between countries with inimical relations. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union collaborated on space science.7 Subsequent to the US embargo on Cuba from 1961, scientific collaboration between the two countries was limited to marine sciences and health threats from infectious diseases.8 The US–Cuba engagement, though, resumed following the restoration of diplomatic ties under President Barack Obama in 2015. SESAME (Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications) in Jordan was commissioned in 2017 to foster scientific cooperation with the member states of Egypt, Cyprus, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Palestine and Turkey.9
As regards China–US research collaborations, Deng Xiaoping and Jimmy Carter signed the first formal ‘US–China Inter-governmental Science and Technology Agreement’ as far back as in 1979.10 In one of the studies on co-authored publications during 2009–2018 between Chinese and American scholars judged on three criteria, i.e., overall volume, high impact and high-technology research, it was ascertained that China has been the US’s largest collaborator since 2011. On high-impact research (82 high impact science journals compiled in Nature Index), Chinese researchers have published a total of 5,779 papers in 2009, with US researchers being the largest collaborators (on 1,516 papers). In 2018, of the total 17,044 papers Chinese researchers published, US researchers were again the largest collaborators (on 5,339 papers). On high-technology research (nuclear science and technology, remote sensing and robotics), the US was the biggest collaborator since 2009.11
US domestic policies like ‘American First’ and ‘Make America Great Again’ (by the Trump administration) coupled with rising geo-political contestations with China, though, have cast a shadow on such scientific cooperation, going forward.12 The Trump administration also reduced the budgets of many agencies like National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST), Department of Energy (DoE), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Former US science and technology adviser William Colglazier cautioned that pursuing narrow visions of national interest based on a ‘zero sum’ view of international relations rather than a notion of shared interests that require a ‘win-win cooperation’ will have negative consequences.13
Conclusion
With the backdrop of growing climate crises, the notion of a green economy has emerged as a dominant policy response for an alternative vision of growth and development. Negotiations on the transferring of green technologies for socio-economic development are taking place multi-laterally and bilaterally, at forums like COP26, Earth Summits, among others.
Though SAARC has been termed ‘ineffective’ and ‘defunct’, there is still a silver lining, where member countries can get together to resolve global challenges. Such a spirit of collaboration was evident in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, where the heads of the SAARC member states came together on 15 March 2020 and initiated a COVID-19 Emergency Fund of US$ 21.8 million.
The recently released UN report on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has drawn attention to the fact that the South Asian region is not on track to achieve any of the 17 SDGs, and the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have only exacerbated the developmental challenges in the region.14 In the midst of these perilous times, advancing ‘science’ remains a viable option of addressing global and regional developmental issues.15 Science diplomacy can therefore be effectively used to address critical challenges regionally in South Asia.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Dassault and Boeing have been aggressively pitching their excellent products to fulfil India’s naval fighter aircraft requirements.
November 2022 saw the visit of the French Defence Minister Sebastien Lecornu as well as the US Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro to India. Lecornu was in New Delhi for the Fourth India–France Defence Dialogue, where both countries decided to enhance military industrial cooperation with a focus on Make In India (MII). Apart from their interactions in New Delhi, Lecornu and Del Toro also visited Kochi, the headquarters of the Southern Naval Command, where the indigenously constructed aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, is also based. The visits of the French and the American delegations brought into focus their parallel efforts to secure the contract for equipping India’s indigenous aircraft carrier with a fighter wing.
The Indian Navy’s sole operational aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya, currently operates Mig-29K fighters. The choice of the Multi-Role Carrier Borne Fighter (MRCBF) programme to equip the INS Vikrant is between the twin-engined US Boeing F/18 E/F Super Hornet and the French Rafale Marine (M). The single-engine Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was found unsuitable for aircraft carrier operations.1 The Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued a Request for Information (RFI) for MRCBFs procurement in January 2017 for 57 fighters, which was subsequently reduced to 26 fighters to be procured via the government-to-government (G2G) route. These include eight twin-seater trainer variants and 18 single-seater variants.
Aircrafts in Contention
Both the aircrafts in contention, the Rafale and the Super Hornet, did demonstration ski-jumps at the Shore-Based Test Facility (SBTF) at INS Hansa, Goa in January and June 2022 respectively. Boeing insists that the Super Hornet is fully compliant with the requirements of India’s aircraft carriers, INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant and notes that the two-seater F/18 can also be used for land-based missions as well as a trainer aircraft.
The US aerospace major also highlights the fact that the aircraft is inter-operable with the Indian Navy’s Boeing P-81 reconnaissance aircraft. Boeing notes that the P8I is operated by three out of the four Quad countries (US, Australia and India). Two out of the four Quad countries also operate the F/18 aircraft (US and Australia).
Boeing further reiterates that the same family of engines powers the F/18 and the LCA Tejas. While the General Electric (GE) F-414 powers the F/18, the US$ 716 million contract to supply 99 GE F-404 engines to power the LCA Mk-I A fighter aircraft was signed in August 2021. The MoD had earlier in February 2021 placed an order with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for 83 LCA MK-1A jets worth Rs 48,000 crore.
Boeing further reiterates that over 800 Super Hornets and its variants have been delivered worldwide and the massive scale will enable competitive incorporation of newly developed technology. The US aerospace major’s ‘By India-For India’ sustainment programme is also expected to ensure a higher availability of aircraft for operational deployment.2
As for the other competitor, Rafale Marine, India has procured 36 Rafale aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF), the contract for which was signed in 2016. While the first aircraft was received in October 2019, all 36 were inducted by December 2022. Apart from France and India, Egypt, Qatar and Greece also operate the cutting-edge French fighter aircraft while the UAE signed a deal to acquire 80 Rafales in December 2021 and Indonesia signed a deal in February 2022 to acquire 42 Rafales.
The MRCBF options are slated to be an interim solution, before the Twin-Engined Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) project comes to fruition. The project was approved in 2020, with the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) expected to be completed by mid-2023. The aircraft will be powered by the GE F414 engines—the same engines that power the F/18s, and is expected to be inducted by 2031–32.3
Both Dassault and Boeing are also competing for the multi-role fighter aircraft (MRFA) programme of the IAF, RFI for which was issued in 2018.
French Arms Exports to India
The Rafale is the latest in a series of fighter aircraft of French origin that have been operated by the IAF. French fighter aircraft in India’s inventory date back to 1953, when the IAF acquired the Ouragans (Toofani), becoming Dassault Aviation’s first export customer. Subsequently, the IAF also procured the Jaguars (beginning from 1978) and the Mirage 2000, from 1982 onwards. India currently has more than 100 Jaguars and more than 50 Mirage 2000s (single and dual-seat versions). The Mirages were upgraded with new radars, mission computers and electronic warfare (EW) suites (from Thales) in 2011.
Prior to the 2016 Rafale G2G deal, the 2005 Scorpene deal for six submarines was another major acquisition from France. The first submarine, INS Kalvari was launched in 2015 and commissioned in 2017 while the sixth INS Vagsheer, was launched in 2022. The Scorpene and the Rafale deals accounted for India being the second biggest purchaser of French arms during 2010–20, after Saudi Arabia. While Saudi Arabia imported over Euros 9 billion from France, India imported arms worth Euros 7.2 billion.4 Egypt, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, along with Saudi Arabia and India, made up the top five importers of French arms during 2010–20. Aircraft were the major category of French arms exports during 2010–20, accounting for a quarter of all its arms exports.5
The Strengthened India–US Defence Relationship
Even as India’s arms imports from France registered a massive jump in 2010–20, and irrespective of India’s interim naval fighter choice, the India–US defence and strategic partnership has been significantly strengthened in recent times. India was designated as a Major Defence Partner in 2016. While US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to India from 1950 to 2021 amounted to US$ 13.2 billion, US$ 4.7 billion (or 28 per cent) were during the period 2017–21.6 The authorised value of US defence articles and services through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) to India has been over US$ 18 billion in the period 2010–21.7
Some of the key equipment that have been procured include transport aircrafts (Lockheed Martin C-130J; 12 inducted), multi-mission helicopters (Boeing CH-47F I Chinook; 15 inducted), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (Boeing P8-I; 11 inducted; 1 more ordered), and attack helicopters (Boeing AH-64E Apache; 22 inducted in IAF; six more ordered for Indian Army in 2020), ASW helicopters (Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky MH-60R; 24 helicopters worth US$ 2.6 bn to be inducted by 2025), heavy transport aircraft (Boeing C-17A Globemaster III; 11 inducted) and UAVs (General Atomics MQ 9 Sea Guardian; two leased).
India–US joint ventures like the Tata Boeing Aerospace Limited (TBAL), established in 2016, has supplied over 150 Apache fuselages to Boeing’s global clientele. At the India–US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue held in April 2022, both sides also pledged to ‘promote the means to encourage reciprocal participation of Indian and US vendors in each other’s defence supply chains’.8
Going Forward
If India opts for the Rafale Marine, as noted in this 9 December 2022 report9 , it will highlight the continued lack of success of US fighter aircraft manufacturers to become a part of India’s inventory, despite long-standing and robust efforts. It will also signify an increasing share of European manufacturers in the Indian military aerospace market. This is in the light of the 2016 Rs 60,000 crore Rafale deal and the 2022 Rs 22,000 crore deal for 56 C-295 transport aircraft from Airbus, 40 of which will be manufactured at Vadodara by Tata Advanced Defence Systems Limited and Airbus Defence and Space. While the C-295 is a replacement for the IAF’s HS-748 transport planes, it is also being seen as a possible replacement for the 100-odd AN-32s in the IAF fleet.10
Even as the robust India–US defence and military partnership can be expected to absorb the near-term setback that could possibly flow out of India’s interim choice for naval fighter aircraft, US aircraft engine manufacturers like GE will continue to be an integral part of indigenous fighter aircraft programmes like the LCA Mk 1 and Mk 2A.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Complete demilitarisation is essential to assure the full safety of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant complex, despite the significant safety design features of the facility.
On 27 February 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was alerted by Ukraine's Foreign Ministry that the Russian army was approaching the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) complex.1 Within a week, Russia informed IAEA that its military took control of the area around the Zaporizhzhia NPP.2 After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, this was the first time when the IAEA’s International Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) immediately went to the highest alert.3 The Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, warned that an accident at nuclear facilities could have severe repercussions.4
The shellings and war activities near Zaporizhzhia NPP have raised concerns in the international community about the safety and security of the nuclear reactors. Grossi termed the shellings as ‘playing with fire’ due to the risk of nuclear catastrophe.5 Concerns about the quality of the safety systems of the reactor and the ability of the reactor design to withstand missile attacks were raised. The possibility of a technological error that could lead to an accident similar to Chernobyl, or a blackout situation similar to Fukushima, were also raised.
The IAEA Director General called for restraint and reiterated the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security based on existing nuclear safety and security conventions. These are the need to maintain the physical integrity of the facilities; a functional security system and equipment; staff being able to do their duties without any pressure; availability of an off-site power supply; uninterrupted transportation and supply chain from and to the site; effective monitoring system and emergency preparedness and response measures; and reliable communication with the regulator and others.6
After Russia took control of Zaporizhzhia plant under the management of Russian state atomic energy corporation ‘Rosatom’7 , staff were required to take approval from the local Russian commander to operate and maintain the power plant.8 The President of Ukrainian national nuclear energy generation company Energoatom9 , informed the IAEA in March 2022 that about 400 Russian soldiers were present at the plant.10
Reports noted that the Russian army was using the plant as a cover to fire at the city.11 In the ongoing conflict, multiple arms were used at Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. For instance, on 4 March 2022, the first missile hit the ZNPP training building causing a fire.12 No radiation leakage though was detected.13 Later the fire was extinguished14 and some unexploded munition found at that training building were disposed.15 Such indiscriminate use of weapons was said to be affecting the morale and emotional state of the plant employees,16 violating the third pillar of nuclear safety and security.
The war activities have compromised other pillars of nuclear safety and security as well. For instance, the transfer of safeguards data from ZNPP was interrupted multiple times though it was re-established within few days.17 Due to the shellings, the plant’s external power supply system was damaged, a unit was disconnected from the grid, a security guard at ZNPP was injured, spent fuel storage facility sustained damages in its walls, but there was no damage to the spent fuel container nor was any radiation leakage detected.18
After Russian shellings became frequent, the Ukrainian government requested the IAEA and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to redouble their efforts.19 In response, the IAEA delivered monitoring equipment to ZNPP offered by Australia and France, which are among 12 of IAEA’s ‘Response and Assistance Network ’ (RANET) countries. The IAEA also delivered more than 160 radiation measurement devices and protective equipment, including masks, gloves, full-body suits, among others.20
While shellings near Zaporizhzhia do involve serious risks, they may not result in an accident like Chernobyl or Fukushima. The Chernobyl accident happened due to insignificant understanding and lack of safety technology.21 The reactors of Chernobyl NPP did not have a containment building.22 Modern reactors like Zaporizhzhia are designed with protection against events such as aircraft crashes, fire, explosions, flood, and extreme meteorological conditions, etc.23 The reactors of Zaporizhzhia have 1.2 meters thick concrete shell and are designed to withstand explosions and crash of an airplane.24 Thus, it can be said that the containment building should be able to resist missile attacks.
Other than the reactor, the spent fuel storage facility contains liquid and solid waste which can cause potential radiation hazard, if damaged. However, after multiple shellings at Zaporizhzhia plant, the spent fuel container was not damaged and the cooling system has been good enough to maintain the temperature and radiation level under control.25
Without external power, the reactor as well as the spent fuel storage might lose the cooling system. Therefore, multiple power supply systems are needed. If the external power supply is disconnected for cooling water to circulate, the loss of power could result in an accident like Fukushima. There are three back-up power supply of 330 kV and three off-site power lines of 750 kV connected to a nearby thermal power plant in case the back-up power supply gets disconnected.26 Even if the reactor is shut down, it still requires electricity to maintain the reactor temperature, hence backup power and off-site power supplies are crucial for nuclear safety.27
If the external sources of power supply are lost, then the nuclear plant has to depend on emergency diesel generators. This situation has been occurring time and again during the conflict.28 When the plant lost the power for cooling system, it first relied upon the power generated by the plant itself and then on back-up power line linking to the grid through the nearby thermal power plant.29 There are 20 diesel generators on site and nine of them are operating (as of November 2022) to provide power to all the six reactors and ensure the safety of the plant.30 These diesel generators have enough power to operate up to 15 days without any external power supply.31 The reactor had to rely on diesel generator multiple times through the conflict but every time the emergency diesel generators started automatically and operated till the back-up power was available. 32
The IAEA was not able to visit ZNPP since the conflict began but on 1 September 2022, experts, as part of the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ), were finally able to arrive at the Zaporizhzhia NPP.33
After 20 November 2022, there has been no shelling on the site per se but there has been shelling in the nearby areas. Zaporizhzhia NPP has been reconnected to the off-site power through a 750 kV external power line and a 330 kV back up line.34 An additional 330 kV power line as a back-up is being repaired, as informed to the IAEA by Rosatom.35 On 31 October 2022, four of the six reactors were kept under cold shutdown which requires less energy for cooling and the other two reactors are under hot shutdown, which allows them to supply heat to the nearby city.36
In conclusion, it can be said that Zaporizhzhia NPP has better and proven technology with multiple safety systems and multiple power supply, along with a strong containment building that is designed to withstand terrorist attacks and crash of an airplane.37 Despite the ongoing military activities, the IAEA has been inspecting the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facilities and has stated that no radiation leakage has been detected in those facilities. Nonetheless, the complete demilitarisation of Zaporizhzhia NPP is essential to assure the full safety of the plants.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The efficacy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure will depend on the member-states’ ability to focus on countering terrorism concerns while managing their divergent regional interests.
As Chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation-Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (SCO-RATS) during 2021–2022, India repeatedly stressed on the destabilising regional and global consequences of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. India hosted the council meeting of SCO-RATS in New Delhi on 14 October 2022, where the members of the group agreed to take joint measures to counter terrorist threats from Afghanistan.1 In its meeting at Samarkand in September 2022, the SCO decided to prepare a standard list of terrorist, separatist and extremist groups to provide an operational basis for effective counter-terrorism measures.2
Background
China, Russia and the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Shanghai in 1996 and agreed on the ‘Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field in the Border Area’ for resolving outstanding border issues and developing mutual trust. The Shanghai Five was renamed as the SCO in June 2001 with the addition of Uzbekistan. India and Pakistan acceded to the organisation in 2017, and Iran’s accession process will be completed in 2023. Afghanistan, Belarus and Mongolia have ‘Observer’ status, and the Dialogue Partners are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, Nepal, Turkey and Sri Lanka.3
The SCO also established an Afghanistan Contact Group in 2009, which was revived in 2018 to develop mechanisms for a “peaceful, stable and economically prosperous state, free from terrorism and extremism”.4 The commitment to tackle the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism is part of the very first convention adopted by the SCO on 15 June 2001.5 The 20-year Programme of Multilateral Trade and Cooperation only came later in September 2003.
SCO-RATS came into being with the ‘Agreement on Regional-Terrorist Structure between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ on 7 June 2002, pertinently after 9/11. Its working bodies are the Executive Committee (EC) and the Council, with the EC based at Tashkent, while the secretariat is in Beijing.6
The objective of the SCO-RATS is to create a practical organisational, legal and regulatory framework for effective cooperation along with the member states and incorporate relevant legal acts into their practices and national legislation. The primary task of SCO-RATS is to maintain a databank and facilitate information sharing of terrorist organisations and individuals, aiding and abetting terror activities amongst the member states.
The SCO-RATS’ capacity-building mechanisms include joint annual anti-terrorist exercises, cooperation between competent bodies, anti-terrorist structures, and border services of the member states.7 Targeted work also takes place in improving the interoperability of each of these national units. The group later agreed on dealing with the flow of narcotics and arms as drug smuggling is the major source of funds for terror outfits in the region.8 Border patrolling exercises between the member states play an essential role in this regard.
The Joint Working Group of Experts within the SCO-RATS constantly works towards curbing online terrorist propaganda. SCO-RATS also works towards cooperation with international and other regional organisations such as the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UN-CTED), United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Interpol, Eurasian Group on Combatting Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States Anti-Terrorism Centre (CIS-ATC). An annual RATS International Scientific and Practical Conference also happens every year to further international cooperation against terrorism.9
Regional Terrorism Concerns
The attacks that followed the Taliban takeover by IS-KP on minorities, women and children,10 and the neutralisation of al-Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri through a US drone strike in July 2022 inside the Afghan capital of Kabul confirm the concerns of the member states of SCO and the world at large that Taliban’s continuing ties with al-Qaeda are now undeniable. IS-KP is an affiliate of the Salafi Daesh, whereas the Taliban is Deobandi. Both are puritanical but differ in their approach to jihad, takfir, and sharia, making them compete for influence. The rise of IS-KP during this critical phase of political transition in Afghanistan, challenging the domestic legitimacy of the Taliban, is not only a worry for them but a significant security threat to the region and the wider world.
Terrorist attacks in Pakistan have increased by 51 per cent since the Taliban swept across Afghanistan.11 The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a jihadi-insurgent group that owes its allegiance to the Taliban, is a product of Pakistan’s fiddling with terrorism that has come back to haunt them. Therefore, the already porous western border has become even harder to manage. For China, East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) has been the only reason to venture into counter-terrorism and lead the formation of SCO along with Russia. ETIM is an Uyghur Muslim jihadi-insurgent group that operates in the Xinjiang autonomous region of China.
Taliban has always been one to support, provide shelter, and assistance to those who belong to their creed, and to vouch for any assurances stating otherwise is a grave mistake.12 In December 2022, IS-KP attacked a hotel frequented by Chinese businesspersons in Kabul.13 Their growing presence in Afghanistan is sure to become a hurdle to China’s aspirations in the country. IS-KP undertook a suicide attack on the Russian embassy in Kabul in September 2022, where two diplomats lost their lives.
Russia has always been the security provider in Central Asia through the CSTO, whose operational scope cannot address the root of terrorism in the region. That makes it even more important to improve counter-terrorism cooperation within the SCO.14
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in Uzbekistan, and Jamaat Ansarullah (Tajik Taliban) are the major jihadi-insurgent groups in Central Asia. Recently, IS-KP fired rockets into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan from Afghan territory.15 The Tajik Taliban, like the TTP, is a Taliban affiliate that foments terror in Tajikistan with explicit approval from them.16 There are also fears that IMU might gain some ground betwixt all this chaos.
Drug trafficking has been the primary source of funding for terror outfits in the region. It has become extremely tough for neighbouring states to control the outflow of opium-based drugs from Afghanistan.17 India is highly concerned about a spill over of terrorist activities to Jammu and Kashmir, where there is a rise in cases of drug trafficking. It is increasingly becoming a matter of concern in the socio-political scenario of Jammu and Kashmir.18
Regional Geo-strategic Dynamics
Central Asia as a region is vital for a more comprehensive Eurasian connectivity, and the region is what holds the SCO together. The organisation's membership now comprises all the regional powers, and increasingly the fault lines between individual member states are getting even more profound. The divergence of interests among member states is bringing a stalemate regarding matters of strategic importance, making it hard to move forward with any agenda at hand.19
The admission of India and Pakistan as permanent members of the organisation in 2017 brought the political complexities of the sub-continent to the SCO table. Central Asia is part of the extended neighbourhood of India and its ‘Look North’ strategy. China’s ambition to become the sole catalyst for trade on the continent through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is at odds with India’s vision for the region, be it the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) or the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Doklam and Galwan border crises have added to regional tensions.
Russia too, considers Central Asia as its sphere of influence. The accession of a regional power such as Iran will also affect the organisation's workings, whose interests may sometimes not align with the organisation. These developments will potentially become a hurdle towards fruitful cooperation in Eurasia's increasingly hostile geopolitical and geo-economic environment.20
Central Asian states realise the eventuality of geopolitical competition between Russia and China. India can anchor Central Asia’s interests and share its expertise on counter-terrorism from within the SCO framework. For India, the lack of geographical contiguity to the region makes a peaceful, stable Afghanistan free of terrorism and radicalism very important for transforming ‘Look North’ into ‘Act North’. Russia is preoccupied with the Ukraine war, and China is undergoing an economic slump. India can take advantage of the situation and ramp up its relations with Central Asian states through the SCO and address its Afghanistan Conundrum through its Afghanistan Contact Group rather than directly talking to the Taliban for the time being. At the same time, India can leverage good relations with Russia to help it manoeuvre through the China–Pak maze.
Conclusion
The cauldron of rising terrorism and drug trafficking is a security threat to all the member states. The prospect of terrorist organisations that work against the integrity of India, China, Pakistan and the Central Asian nations finding a haven in Afghanistan is always a concern. Converging on counter-terrorism will help address those concerns and secure everyone’s geo-economic interests. Terrorism emanating from Afghanistan threatens the security and economic interests of all the member states of SCO alike, China’s BRI or any other initiatives by India for South-Central Asia connectivity and cooperation.
SCO-RATS is the best-suited forum to address such shared security concerns. The addition of its relatively new members also has the potential to boost its operational scope, and it will only need to bolster its efforts on an already well-established mechanism. The new member states, can, for instance, be incorporated in border patrol exercises in Central Asia. They can take measures to create a joint anti-terror military structure. They can also work towards devising a de-radicalisation programme for Central Asia considering the common Turkic past and culture. The member states of the SCO must adhere to the ‘Shanghai spirit’, give up unilateral approaches vis-à-vis the Taliban regarding security concerns and must unite to tackle terrorism, separatism, and extremism in the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) seeks to develop a common air and missile defence system to defend NATO and European airspace.
The Ukraine war has reset Europe’s equation with Russia in an irrevocable manner. It has united a seemingly fractured European leadership and provided NATO’s waning presence in the region with an unprecedented expansion and capability boost.
The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) is the latest military upgrade to come out of NATO’s security doctrine. A Letter of Intent (LoI) was signed on 13 October 2022 by Defence Ministers of the 14 NATO countries and Finland (in the process of becoming a NATO member)1 to boost Europe’s short, medium and long-range air defence capabilities. Spearheaded by Germany, the objective of this initiative is to develop a common air and missile defence system to defend NATO and European airspace. Of the 15 signatories, the three Baltic States and Finland share borders with Russia, while Romania, Slovakia, Hungary share a border with Ukraine.
In the backdrop of the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, this initiative is an attempt by NATO and its allies to bolster NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATO IAMD).2 NATO IAMD is the defensive component of the alliance’s Joint Air Power, which aims to ensure the stability and security of NATO’s airspace by coordinating, controlling and exploiting the air domain. It has developed into a highly flexible and highly responsive network of interconnected national and NATO systems comprised of sensor, command and control assets and weapons systems.3 The new European Sky Shield Initiative adds to the NATO IAMD through a jointly developed missile defence system which relies on previously developed technology and interoperability between the signatories.
The Context
NATO’s Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană highlighted threat posed by Russia for regional security, as displayed in the indiscriminate missile attacks on Ukraine.4 He stated that commitment between the allied countries "is even more crucial" today than ever due to the recent launch of Russian missiles towards Ukraine.5 Moscow’s precision strikes on military and infrastructure facilities across Ukraine that followed the attack on the Crimean Bridge on 8 October 2022 have been particularly unnerving.6
A month later, stray missiles fell on Polish territory that were later found to be ‘misses’ by Ukraine in intercepting Russian air attacks. Such incidents do scratch the vulnerabilities of NATO’s air defences.7 There has been a growing realisation across NATO members to plug the gaps which can lead to a dangerous escalation if left unattended. It must be noted that while more advanced Western air defence missiles are designed to destroy themselves if they miss their target, several of older Soviet missiles do not have such a mechanism. That could be how the stray, Ukraine-launched-but-Russian-made missiles landed on Polish territory killing two people.
Germany’s Reinvigorated Military Outlook
The Russian war in Ukraine has brought several overhauls in Germany’s military outlook.8 Spearheading the ESSI is yet another significant milestone.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz first touted the idea of integrating various European systems into a common Europe-wide defence system during a speech at Prague in August this year.9 He had argued that the EU-27 need to protect themselves with a solution that would guarantee safety against potential attacks from Russia. In fact, Scholz went as far as proposing the idea of a combined European army, a policy earlier advocated by France but Germany was then sceptical of.10 Scholz pushed the idea for a central military command system with the eventual goal of an EU headquarters. He had also added that it was necessary to build EU's military capabilities in a way that would complement the NATO.
Scholz’s announcement for joint military capabilities also comes alongside speeding up deliveries of the IRIS-T air defence systems to Ukraine.11 It seems that by committing to the development of important yet missing capabilities in NATO through the ESSI,12 Berlin wants to compensate for its reluctance to send substantial military aid to Ukraine. Germany also wants to strengthen its own air defence capabilities. Bundeswehr currently only has about 12 medium range upgraded Patriot batteries but no other short or long range capabilities.13
Germany is of the view that an anti-ballistic missile defence system will be more cost effective when purchased jointly. By listing the IRIS-T SLM short-range air defence system (manufactured by Diehl Defence) as one of the three components of the ESSI, the Scholz government is also aiming to promote the German arms industry.14 The other two possible components of the ESSI project that have been listed so far are the Israeli-US Arrow-3 exo-atmospheric anti-ballistic missile defence system and the US PATRIOT medium-range system.15 The focus on US and German made systems seems to be one of the reasons why other leading defence industrial powers in Europe have not joined the programme as yet.
Does ESSI reflect a united NATO?
While the ESSI does reflect a further bolstered NATO’s air deterrence and defence to its east, it does not yet show the participation of other NATO members like France, Spain, Poland and Italy. Countries with their own robust air defences that are already inter-operable with that of NATO’s existing NATO IAMDs have also steered clear of this project. Spain, for example, already has anti-missile shielding equipment interoperable with NATO’s.
France’s absence despite being a major European power is particularly conspicuous. So is the absence of Poland, a frontline state in the ongoing war in neighbouring Ukraine.
One of the reasons why France has not joined the initiative could be as a result of prioritising the interests of French defence industrial complex. In the future, if the listed components of ESSI would aim to include, for example, the French SAMP/T system,16 Paris might be more inclined to join the initiative. It would provide a boost to France’s military industry. Like Germany, France too has been criticised for lagging in sending military support to Ukraine.
Macron’s recent announcement that Paris will be sending short range air defences to Kyiv is seen as compensating for the lack of military support so far.17 Co-incidentally, Macron’s announcement came on the same day as NATO announced its ESSI initiative. Both France and Germany have had a traditional policy of engaging Russia.18 Despite fully supporting the sanctions and EU wide policies towards disengaging from Russia, the two European powers are seen as more mindful of not isolating it totally.19
Poland, under the Wisla air defence programme, has already been developing military industrial cooperation with the United States since 2018.20 Poland’s Narew short range air defence programme with UK is underway since 2021.21 With such multi-billion dollars’ worth of joint defence programmes with the US and the UK, there seems to be little appetite in Warsaw right now to join the ESSI.
Cyprus, Ireland and Malta are also not expected to join the integrated air defence as they are not part of NATO. However, close cooperation without formal joining may be expected as momentum picks up.
However, some of the participating countries like the Baltic states are developing their own air defence programmes and for them, ESSI could be an opportunity to complement existing capabilities and acquire new ones.22
Conclusion
The ESSI, for now, demonstrates a concrete objective for bolstering NATO’s air defences in a cost-effective manner. Under German leadership, this initiative will boost a hitherto non-military stature of Germany within the EU. While the ESSI is directly triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO’s insufficient air defences along its eastern front have been a matter of deliberation within the East European members of the alliance. The ESSI may expand later with the inclusion of new members. A modern, inter-operable and coordinated air defence will enhance NATO IAMD’s capabilities, provided jointness and coordination are prioritised over other differences of opinion among the prominent European states.23
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Anwar Ibrahim’s ascent to power could prove advantageous for dealing with Malaysia’s fractious domestic dynamics as well as for furthering the country’s foreign policy goals.
Malaysian society and politics is marked by racial and religious polarisation. Political parties have frequently exploited this for their purposes which has led to social unrest and the malfunction of governments at multiple times. However, Anwar Ibrahim's ascent to power, which ended his career's dry spell in the wake of turbulent political events in Malaysia, offers a glimpse of optimism for the nation's social and political climate. In the run-up to the country’s 15th general elections, the period was marked by political uncertainties, which included a hung parliament with no party having a clear majority to form the government. Ibrahim Anwar's Pakatan Harapan was in the lead with 82 seats but fell short of a majority by 30 MPs. It was finally supported by UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) to form a coalition government after being chosen by King Al-Sultan Abdullah Sultan Ahmad Shah.1 The coalition government, though, will have to deal with Malaysia's many issues, ethnic polarisation being the most prominent one.
Socio-Political Landscape of Malaysia
Malaysia has witnessed severe divisions due to the social and political ambitions of both nationalists and Islamists.2 The country’s democracy has been constrained for decades due to the injustices imposed by sectarian ideas of race and religion.3 Ethnic Malays, who are primarily Muslims, belong to indigenous communities who collectively account for around 70 per cent of the nearly 33 million people. Of the remaining, 23 per cent and 7 per cent are ethnic Chinese and Indians respectively. The multi-cultural makeup of Malaysian society has been a key foundation for political mobilisation.
Due to Pakatan Harapan's multi-religious and multi-ethnic configuration, it was believed that racial and religious tensions would reduce when it unexpectedly defeated the ethnocentric Barisan Nasional (headed by UMNO) in the 2018 elections, ending the party's 60-year rule. However, Mahathir Mohamad’s leadership did not bring any significant change vis-à-vis racial and religious conditions in the country. Notwithstanding his criticism of discrimination against Western countries over minority-related issues, Mahathir Mohamad was unable and unwilling to put aside racial politics and work on substantive reforms.4 This was exacerbated further by the coming together of Malay nationalists of UMNO with their Islamist rival Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), stirring up divisive issues for their own political needs.
Race-based Politics
In recent years, Malaysia has seen a surge in polarisation over issues related to race and religion. Previously, a significant anti-ICERD (International Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination) demonstration took place in Malaysia in 2018. Consequently, the government decided not to ratify a crucial UN anti-discrimination treaty meant to abolish all types of racial discrimination and advance interracial understanding. Both UMNO and PAS opposed the plan, arguing it would harm the rights of the majority of Malays. Human rights NGO Pusat KOMAS’ report titled, ‘Malaysia Racial Discrimination Report 2021’ suggests that ‘despite a fair amount of inclusive policies and verbal assurances that sought to incorporate the spirit of inclusivity, unity, and respect among all Malaysians, such initiatives were never implemented and governing leaders utilized the same racial rhetoric, to maintain their power’.5
Although Anwar's coalition Pakatan Harapan's 36 per cent seat share may be enough to create a government, it also reveals the predominance of racial and religious problems. The conservative, largely Malay Muslim alliance headed by Muhyiddin Yassin, which comprises the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), was in second position. The Discrimination Report published by Pusat KOMAS points out that racial and religious politics accounts for the largest share of discrimination (at 28 per cent) while other incidents of discrimination include racial and religious provocation (23 per cent), racial discrimination in the education sector (11 per cent), racism in other sectors (11 per cent), racial discrimination in the business sector (6 per cent), xenophobia (13 per cent), and racism in the media and internet (8 per cent).6 The dominancy of race and religion-related issues can also be gauged through the victory of the conservative PAS, which often pushes nationwide implementation of sharia. The party won 49 of the 222 seats and thus emerged as the single largest party.
Reason for Optimism
Now that Pakatan Harapan is in power under the leadership of Ibrahim Anwar, his major concern will be to deal with Islamists and to tread with race-related issues carefully. Although he was the dynamic firebrand youth leader who started Malaysia's Islamic youth organisation (ABIM), a lot has happened since then. His career underwent a significant change when he joined the government-run UMNO party in 1982 under the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad. Anwar swiftly rose as he was appointed to several government ministerial positions, including deputy prime minister, finance minister and education minister. He was also imprisoned on various charges which are largely considered as politically motivated reasons.
Anwar has frequently and boldly criticised religious and racial fanaticism, and detested the divisive and racial politics of Malaysia pointing to the potential impact on integrity of the society. Post-elections, Anwar has already emphasised on his ambition of establishing a powerful administration that can concentrate on the economy and is ‘more inclusive in terms of race, religion, or region’.7
Even as economic, social and political cleavages remain, Anwar Ibrahim's arrival heralds a new era of optimism and change—so long as he doesn't get caught up in racial politics to further his political ambitions and re-embarks on his own "Reformasi" campaign, a social, economic, and political upheaval initiative that he started in 1998.
Implications for the Region and India
Though Anwar has assumed the Malaysian premiership for the first time, he has been in higher echelons of Malaysian politics for decades and has often expressed his views regarding international politics and external affairs. Anwar's recent interviews provide an early cue that some significant continuity will, most likely, exist in his government's foreign policy. Anwar has indicated that he will pursue a neutral and non-aligned foreign policy vis-à-vis US–China contestations and would refrain from militarisation in disputed marine zones, along with supporting multilateralism.8 The China–Malaysia relationship meanwhile continues to be strong, with booming trade and increased bilateral ties and military cooperation despite contentions over the South China Sea issue.9
Malaysia is crucial to India's Act East Policy as well as its wider economic, defence and other bilateral concerns. Both have a long history of friendship and close ties, and there have been many summit-level discussions and gatherings along with an ‘Enhanced Strategic Partnership’ as well as joint military drills like Harimau Shakti, whose 2022 iteration just ended. Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) make up one of the world's largest communities in Malaysia, at 8 per cent of the total population (2 million). India and Malaysia collaborate to defend air and maritime freedom in the South China Sea in addition to intelligence sharing and collaboration on regional counterterrorism efforts.
The relationship between the two nations, however, appears to have soured somewhat in recent years as a result of remarks made by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad over Kashmir and other domestic issues of India. Apart from this, the granting of permanent residency to Zakir Naik in Malaysia dented the relations further. Zakir Naik is accused of inciting hatred through his provocative lectures, supporting terrorism, and money laundering. He managed to elude Indian law enforcement agents and is currently wanted for extradition. However, Anwar Ibrahim in 2019 supported action against Naik. He also strongly detested Naik’s communal remarks that created social unrest in Malaysia.10
Anwar Ibrahim is expected to be more cooperative towards India as compared to his predecessors and will potentially prove amicable towards the geo-economic and geo-political goals of India. He has not only developed close ties with Prime Minister Narendra Modi but has also affirmed India’s importance as a key strategic partner along with the US, ASEAN and Europe. Currently, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is among the top contenders to supply Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) to the Royal Malaysian Air Force. In 2021–2022, Malaysian imports of Indian products stood at US$ 6,995.04 million whereas the Indian imports of Malaysian products was around US$ 12,424 million.11 Amidst the increased cooperation in defence and commerce between both countries, Anwar has already expressed his desire to strengthen the ties further.12
Although the long-term impact of the new electoral mandate remains to be seen, the prospects of Anwar Ibrahim’s rule appear comparatively advantageous not only for domestic politics but also for foreign policy objectives and regional stability.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Indian media exhibited a very negative assessment of the 20th CPC Congress and of Xi Jinping’s third term.
The 20th CPC Congress was extensively covered in Indian media.1 An analysis of editorials of select English national dailies, chosen on the basis of their readership, brings to fore three themes in the media’s views on the 20th CPC Congress—Xi Jinping’s emergence as the most authoritarian leader of all times; the implication of Xi’s continuing rule on China; and challenges India could face from China’s assertive foreign policy and military modernisation.
Xi Jinping as China’s most dictatorial leader
Xi’s centralisation of power constituted the dominant theme in the newspaper editorials. The Times of India editorial headline termed Xi Jinping as the ‘new emperor’ who rules supreme whereas The Hindu published an editorial titled ‘One man rule: On Xi Jinping’s firm grip on Chinese politics’.2 The Indian Express in its editorial stated that Xi Jinping weaponised the anti-corruption movement to eliminate all the opponents, developed a surveillance state, dismantled collective leadership, concentrated power in his hands and promoted personality cult.3
Similarly, The Hindu argued that Xi engineered a clean sweep and complete domination that is unprecedented in Chinese politics because even Mao Zedong at the height of his power had to contend with rival power centres.4 Two of Xi’s actions were projected as evidence of his authoritarian streak; first was Xi’s negation of the ‘collective leadership’5 principle of the Party by breaking the presidential term limit and forming6 a Politburo and its Standing Committee consisting entirely of his loyalists.7 The second related to the removal of Hu Jintao in public view before the voting on Party resolutions.8 Both the actions demonstrated the prevalence of one-man rule in China and elimination of all intra-party resistance.
Delving deeper into editorial coverage of this aspect, it could be discerned that the Indian media perceives Xi Jinping as an ideologically driven leader. He is bent on reversing the few liberalising policies introduced by his predecessor to entrench CPC’s control with him at the top. In effect, the 20th Party Congress showcased the power wielded by Xi Jinping and the developments at the event were a prelude to more challenging times in India–China bilateral ties.
Implication of Xi’s third term for China
The Indian media painted a grim picture of the implication of Xi’s continuing as president of China. In its editorial, ‘Eyes on Beijing’, The Telegraph opined that in 1980s, the CPC by instituting term limits and collective leadership had created an effective safeguard against personality cults and policy excesses.9 However, Xi Jinping’s breaking down of old party structures will result in creating a succession void and could set the stage for a contest among different power groups within the party in subsequent years. Moreover, China’s economic growth could further suffer as Xi is unlikely to change course on his policies of crackdown on multiple sectors of the Chinese economy and the zero-Covid policy. The editorial concluded that Xi Jinping’s centralisation of power will not make China stronger but could render the world more unsafe.
The Tribune commenting on Xi Jinping’s goal of military modernisation suggested that the Chinese economy could come under more pressure as Beijing will remain focused on military and security issues, despite economic woes.10 The Indian Express contended that Xi’s third term has nothing new to offer except for greater political controls at home and further privileging of state against market.11 It went on to warn that Xi Jinping’s unchecked power will inevitably lead to political hubris and costly policy blunders.
The Indian media’s discussion of China’s domestic issues in the context of Xi’s third term is noteworthy for two reasons. It conveyed to the readers that contrary to the narrative that Xi Jinping’s leadership will deliver national rejuvenation to China, it has landed the country in a ‘mess’ in reality. Secondly, it also tried to underline to its readers the weakening of Chinese political system (apparent in Xi’s unopposed centralisation of power) which in the long-run could render China more unstable and fragmented.
Security challenge for India
Along with rapid military modernisation, Xi’s third term will be marked with more assertive stance on foreign policy issues. This in itself constitutes a major security challenge for New Delhi as India will encounter a more belligerent China. For instance, The Telegraph warned that India and other countries having a territorial dispute with China will need to watch out as Xi Jinping in his third term could feel mandated to take bolder decisions on foreign policy issues.12 Pointing towards the urgent need of achieving jointness of three services under the supervision of Chief of Defence Staff, The Tribune contended that People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s modernisation overdrive makes it incumbent on Indian armed forces to raise their battle preparedness.13
Further, The Times of India and the Hindustan Times urged the government to adopt a comprehensive strategy to tackle the ‘bristling dragon’.14 They urged New Delhi to ‘steel itself’15 and redouble efforts to boost domestic economic strength, remain socially cohesive, upgrade defence preparedness and cement strategic partnership with like-minded countries. In this context, The Indian Express’s response is noteworthy. It published two editorials on the same day titled ‘Delhi will have to work harder, a lot faster to blunt the challenge from Xi’s China to India’s interests’ and ‘Indigenising defence production is a good idea whose time has come’.16 Although both differed in content, they demonstrated editorial emphasis on strengthening India’s military power vis-à-vis China while upgrading India’s defence manufacturing sector as a long-term strategy against China. While the sense of suspicion and threat perception is in tandem with Indian media’s previous approach towards China, a notable point was that it did not foresee betterment of relations or possibility of close economic cooperation in the near future.
Conclusion
The Indian national media exhibited a very negative assessment of the 20th CPC Congress and more importantly of Xi Jinping’s third term. Some of the prominent causes of this negative evaluation could be China’s refusal to restore the pre-June 2020 status quo along the disputed border, its hostility towards India’s deepening ties with the US, Beijing’s repeated blocking of India’s effort to blacklist Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups and individuals and increasing aggressive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region.
Considering the national media’s editorial coverage of the 20th CPC Congress, three policy suggestions emerge. First, in order to understand the future foreign policy trajectory of the Chinese state, it is necessary that India closely follows China’s domestic developments. This is because Beijing often engineers tension outside to divert public attention from domestic issues. Second, India should also keep up the momentum of modernising military infrastructure along the disputed border to be able to counter Chinese pressure and expansionism. Finally, besides developing strategic ties with major powers, New Delhi should also work to modernise its domestic defence industry. This will not only help New Delhi to gradually reduce dependence on arms export but will also greatly amplify the military’s capability to manage security challenges from China.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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