For politicians, diplomats and military leaders alike, the Russo-Ukraine War has been most instructive. As we look back, while several old military beliefs and strategies have stood the test of this war, others stand challenged. Each of these perspectives are likely to be coloured by individual country’s past experience and outlook, yet these are important enough to reflect on the Ukrainian war. On its part, the Ukrainian state seems to be doing all things right. By leveraging its strong national will and societal resilience, the Ukrainian military’s ingenuity and battlefield dynamism, the steady sourcing and induction of the right war-fighting technologies, and ensuring a regular supply of munitions and logistic wherewithal, the Ukrainians have spelt out the blueprint for fighting future wars. The Russians have struggled to leverage their superior war waging potential to achieve the initial war aims and objectives, thereby resulting in frequent change of the war plans and theatre level leadership.

A key learning from the Ukrainian war is that weaker states today can afford to stick their neck out, provided ideologically or strategically aligned bigger powers are willing to commit long-term support to them. Above all, the power of crowdsourcing budgetary support, technology, training, and logistic wherewithal, while at war, has emerged as an important lesson in this war. If this is partly true, the idea of non-alignment or un-alignment as a state’s external policy might well become detrimental to fight successful wars in future.

An analytical framework is perhaps required to explain the lessons of this war and analyse its impact on the future of warfare. Money, men, machines, and material (4Ms) is possibly a suitable construct to study this war. Warfare will always remain an interplay of these four vital components, and any significant deficiency in any of these components can impact the war-fighting capabilities of the state, and in turn, the military outcomes in field.

Firstly, the Ukrainian war has given a new meaning to military budgeting and expenditure. In this war, interestingly, budgeting the war effort has become a collective endeavour for nations with the same ideological belief or interests. The West, led by the US, has demonstrated that the threats to its values can coalesce like-minded countries to put their money on the table or create a piggy bank to budget the cost of war. Till date, approximately US$ 50 billion worth of support from several Western countries has come to the aid of Ukraine. The total aid to Ukraine is several times its domestic capacity to sustain the war.

This corporatisation of the war effort by Western powers, whatever their individual motives might be, has demonstrated that today even a weaker party to the war can stand up to a great power, and fight. This raises a few issues. One, military budgets in the future could well carry a virtual value, buttressed by the defence networks and collaboration pacts drawn up by a country, globally or regionally. Two, as money will flow in from different states displaced globally, the utilisation of it is likely to be driven by the ideological proclivities of the donor states. And three, this might prompt like-minded states to look at the creation of a global fund for security, akin to NATO’s two percent pledge, to meet unforeseen threats and challenges. Money matters in war, but whose money, will have a little meaning in future wars.

Secondly, this war has been particularly instructive on the military ingenuity and resolve demonstrated by the Ukrainian armed forces in deterring rapid Russian advances. The community-sizing of war by Ukraine demonstrates how a state leverages its political will and societal resilience to alter military outcomes. The Ukrainian military has been most successful in integrating its civilians into an effective territorial force. Further, by leveraging its citizenry on social media, Ukraine has expanded its strategic reach and influence, which is symbolic of the role of societal culture in the future of warfare. As Mick Ryan, a well-known military commentator argues, while machines might be important, unlike men, they do not plan, fight or win wars.

Thirdly, the Ukrainian state also seems to be doing well in acquiring the right war-fighting technologies that provide their armed forces with a decisive military advantage. Initially, the Javelins and Stingers, then HIMARS, and now tanks, and possibly fighter aircraft, point towards the right choice of technology. The Ukrainians have demonstrated an extraordinary acumen to meld technologies obtained from diverse sources, with little training and logistical support on the battlefield. Moreover, the Ukrainians have been smart to never look at weapon platforms in isolation, without taking into account where and when these and other complementing capabilities have to be employed. Military technology will always matter on the battlefield, but which ones, along with which other technologies, will be most important in these new-age wars.

And fourthly, the fact that for Ukraine, a steady supply of war-fighting material in terms of munitions, spare parts, and a surge in industrial capacities has emerged as another crucial factor in winning a war. The fact that Western countries are drawing down on their own stocks of munitions to support Ukraine, in a way, highlights the sheer importance of uninterrupted supply of war-fighting material in long-drawn wars. This war is replete with examples of what happens when a nation tries to fight a war without fully considering the impact of logistics and sustainment. Munition and material are the new oil for war; you need it more than ever before, at industrial scales, and no less.

 

In the coming months, the Ukrainian war will be shaped by the evolving balance of military power between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine will benefit from new hardware inductions, including battle tanks, infantry vehicles, air defence systems and long-range munitions supplied by Europeans and the United States. Russia could also be expected to substantially ramp up its production capacities and match the Ukrainians in numbers, if not in quality. In the meantime, Ukraine will have to cope with a new Russian offensive. As civilian casualties mount, availability of conscripts deplete and the war-fighting wherewithal exhausts, the incentive to find a battle-winning strategy will only grow. While there are several important contributory factors to a successful war fighting strategy, it is always the terrain and territory, where soldiers will have to fight to win or loose, where territorial sovereignty will be preserved or lost, and where the leaders would recalibrate or standby their objectives to accept the outcomes of war.

Thus far, Russia has not abandoned its war objectives, in the belief that its sheer size and military wherewithal matters. But then, Russia lacks the capability to defeat Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine with a steady supply of weapons arms, lacks the combat power to push back the Russian forces from its territory. A military stalemate could well emerge. The prospects of a stalemate might then open doors to negotiations. Enormous death and destruction in this war, the risk of nuclear escalation, and the economic disruptions caused by the conflict might expedite this prospect.

Till the time the parties to conflict decide to cease fire, the ongoing corporatisation of war effort in Ukraine will continue to escalate and shape the character of this war. 

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

India was among the first responders to the February 2023 earthquake that killed tens of thousands of people in Turkiye and caused widespread destruction. India’s quick response to the humanitarian crisis in Turkiye and Syria reinforced its demonstrated capacities to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) beyond its region.  India has become a net provider of development assistance and has become a first responder in many a humanitarian crises, while at the same time declining offers of overseas aid or assistance for disasters within the country.

The country has great capacities in some of the essential machinery needed for such humanitarian interventions and development assistance. It has an extremely responsive and capable armed forces who have proved their competence in terms of quick and timely delivery of aid, in natural disasters at home and abroad. The grouping of the navies of four countries viz. US, Japan, Australia and India, collectively responded to the crisis when the Asian tsunami struck in December 2004. This grouping of countries was subsequently recognised as the QUAD by late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007.

It is not just in humanitarian assistance or food programmes that India has the capacities. India’s pharmaceutical industry responded remarkably during the COVID-19 pandemic and the intent to assist the poor and needy was evident in the Vaccine Maitri initiative. It is worthwhile to recall Indian pharmaceutical industry’s role in the delivery of medicines worth less than dollar a day for treatment for AIDS with a dash of defiance against the global pharma industry wedded to patent and profit.

As the economy grows and India's armed forces grow in their logistics and strategic reach, this capability will be further enhanced. There is a vast pool of trained doctors and paramedical personnel and a strong pharmaceutical industry backed by research and development. India has proven reputation in forecast and information technology. This has tremendous potential in the context of managing preparedness, inventory, logistics and actual delivery of aid. It also contributes to communication and rolling updates from the field.

Above all, India has desisted from needless aggression towards others and has been a proponent of peaceful global co-existence. This gives it the right pedigree to intervene and assist. There is an adherence to international rules-based order respecting the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in all its humanitarian assistance programmes. There have been only two instances when India violated the national sovereignty of the recipients—in East Pakistan in 1971 and Sri Lanka in 1987, when India air dropped humanitarian aid to the besieged Tamil population in Jaffna.

Humanitarian aid and development assistance is an acknowledged soft tool in international relations and diplomacy. Much of India's development assistance and aid pertains to its neighbourhood, with recipients being Bhutan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. India has committed over US$ 3 billion to Afghanistan which continues beyond the regime takeover by Taliban. India has built a fully functional hospital, a huge dam, all-weather roads connecting the ends of Afghanistan and even the Afghan Parliament.

Humanitarian/development assistance can provide sufficient power of recall in the public eye and add value to bilateral ties. There is no doubt that when things are done correctly, the goodwill generated for the donor nation is tremendous. Very often, the country intervenes with the best of interests at heart. But the mechanism of delivery is entrusted with recipient governments and depends on the efficiency of their agencies. This is also a delicate balance and one that requires careful handling, for excess intent and recall can spoil the principle of humanitarian engagement, and too little of intent and recall can make it mere charity devoid of any practical value. A case in point relates to how the media overplayed the aid assistance in the aftermath of the earthquake that struck Kathmandu in April 2015. There has to be a planned management to achieve specific or desired outcome.

For a country of its size and stature, India surprisingly does not have a dedicated aid agency. As early as 1952, India deployed the Indian Aid Mission in Nepal which became Indian Cooperation Mission. The India Development Initiative (IDI) had a short life-span from 2003 to 2007. Currently, the Development Partnership Administration (DPA) of  Ministry of External Affairs set up in 2012 handles both Development Assistance and HADR.  Lines of Credit (LOCs) are disbursed under the Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEAS) set up in 2005. Capacity-building training programmes are conducted under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme set up in 1964 and through grants and loans as well as bilateral grant assistance projects.

Given this background, India had a first mover advantage which perhaps needs to be recouped. China created its own version of the EXIM bank to finance overseas initiatives based on India’s model and today that agency has far greater overseas reach. A specialised India International Development Cooperation Agency (IIDCA) was announced in the 2007 budget speech by then Finance Minister P. Chidambaram. However, this didn’t take off subsequently. It is pertinent to note that in 2018, the China International Development Cooperation agency became operational.

There is a need for India to establish an autonomous agency on the lines of US Agency for International Development (USAID) to execute overseas development assistance programmes. There is a need for cross-cutting cooperation and collaboration and supervision for such initiatives. An autonomous agency can also move beyond government-driven engagements and become more plural and diverse to include private sector medical and educational services, philanthropic organisations and civil society, more effectively.

The proposed Indian aid agency can also effectively engage, cooperate and collaborate with international humanitarian organisations. Such cooperation can also help develop expertise, and enhance best practices and insights. India currently collaborates bilaterally with other agencies like World Food Programme and countries like US, Japan and EU. There have been rare instances when India has delivered aid through agencies like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

There is no doubt that achievement of developmental goals for poverty and health, tackling terrorism/environmental concerns/pandemics is possible only through collaboration with multilateral agencies like World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Western agencies also can learn from India’s experience in tackling its myriad problems and from its domestic initiatives like AADHAAR, Ayushman Bharat, CoWin app and UPI.

Most Western nations, OECD countries, Japan and China have annual allocations to international agencies. India also contributes to over 150 international bodies, which has been rising steadily. India has adopted a strictly non-political and principled approach to humanitarian assistance. The government must focus on how India can play a leadership role in reshaping the global order and define its role in the evolving humanitarian regime in keeping with India’s core belief expressed in the G-20 theme—One Earth, One Family, One Future—as expressed in the ancient verse.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, at the 9th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus in Cambodia in November 2022, expressed the hope that the “ongoing negotiations on the Code of Conduct [COC] on the South China Sea [SCS] will be fully consistent with international law, in particular, UNCLOS [The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] and should not prejudice the legitimate rights and interests of nations not a party to these discussions”.1 Historical and current events back India's apprehensions.

Indonesia, currently holding the rotating presidency of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and China, on 22 February 2023 announced their intention to intensify their efforts to negotiate the COC.2 The SCS has been an area of contested disputes, as various nations claim its islands and waters. China's growing military presence in the region has caused global concern. Some of the world's most heavily trafficked shipping lanes can be found in the waters of the SCS.

The overlapping claims on the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the SCS have become a significant source of regional tensions and instability. China, in particular, has been asserting its sovereignty over nearly the entire SCS, claiming historical rights and referring to the ‘nine-dash line’, encompassing over 1.3 million square miles. Efforts to address contentions through negotiations and international arbitration have been slow and complicated.

China’s exaggerated claims have been a significant reason for a hostile regional environment. Philippines brought the issue to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.  The court ruled essentially in favour of the Philippines and invalidated China's claims to most of the South China Sea. The tribunal declared that China's historical rights claim to the waters had no legal basis under UNCLOS. 3 The tribunal also found that China's actions in the region, including building of artificial islands and interfering with fishing and oil exploration, violated the Philippines' sovereign rights.4 However, China rejected the ruling and continues to assert its territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Is China eager to resolve the issue?

Despite Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang endorsing ASEAN’s strategic autonomy and agreeing to expedite negotiations for a Code of Conduct, the situation on the ground suggests a different reality. China seems determined to expand the existing islands and construct other artificial islands in the region, including military installations, ports and airstrips. China claims sovereignty over most of the sea, while other countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan have their territorial claims.

The ASEAN proposed a regional code of conduct to resolve territorial claims in the SCS. After years of negotiation with ASEAN, a non-binding Declaration of Conduct was agreed upon in November 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The DOC aimed to promote peace, stability, and cooperation in the South China Sea region by providing a framework for managing disputes. It called upon the parties to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability. It urged for respecting the freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea in accordance with international law.

Regional conflict resolution was expected to benefit significantly from this critical milestone. However, China occupied more islands and resorted to military activities. In August 2017, another document, the 'Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text'5 (SDNT), proposed to establish a basis for the adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. This was structured on the basis of the 2002 adopted framework.6 Experts suggest that given that the draft code was non-binding in nature, it is a ‘limited document’.

The 2017 adopted framework had the ‘so-called’ intention to make an effective COC in a mutually agreed timeline. In November 2017, at the 20th ASEAN-China Summit, China proposed to complete COC negotiations by 2021.7 However, this intention has yet to see the light of day. Recent events and satellite images suggest that China is seizing new land in the South China Sea.8 Analysts note that China seeking control over the SCS is part of its plan to ‘pursue regional hegemony'.9  Moreover, while most of the ASEAN member states appear to support the COC as legally binding, China has been opposing the binding nature of the COC.10

The latest meeting between the Chinese and Indonesian Foreign Ministers on 22 February 2023 does not mention when the next phase of negotiations will occur. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China stated that China “will work with other ASEAN countries to fully and effectively implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), [and] advance the consultations on a code of conduct in the South China Sea at a faster pace.”11

The COC is often seen as a way for China to delay an agreement on SCS contentions, given its preference to deal with each ASEAN member state at the bilateral level, even as it proactively alters the situation on the ground.12 China has fully armed at least three (Mischief Reef, Subi Reef and Fiery Cross) of its controlled islands.13 It seems an opportune moment for Beijing to resume talks on a regional code that upholds Chinese demands and advances its economic interests. However, this may come at the cost of both ASEAN member states regional interests and the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

China has hindered ASEAN's attempts to reach a binding agreement for over 27 years. Despite the optimistic statements and assertions, there are still concerns that the negotiations between ASEAN and China regarding a COC will continue to be prolonged and evasive.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Amid Aggressive Moves by China, Rajnath Singh Seeks Free, Open Indo-Pacific", Hindustan Times, 24 November 2022.
• 2. Stanley Widianto and Ananda Teresia, “China, ASEAN to Intensify Negotiations on South China Sea Code”,
  
   Reuters, 22 February 2023.
• 3. "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea", United Nations, 1982.
• 4. “In The Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, An Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII To The 1982 United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea” , Permanent Court of Arbitration, 12 July 2016, p. 42.
• 5. Ian Storey, “Assessing the ASEAN-China Framework for the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea”, ISEAS Perspective, No. 62, 2017.
• 6. Carl Thayer, "A Closer Look at the ASEAN-China Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct", The Diplomat, 3 August 2018.
• 7. “Overview of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations”, ASEAN Secretariat Information Paper, April 2020.
• 8. P.J. Heijmans, “In Satellite PICS, Proof of China's Fresh Land Grab in the South China Sea", NDTV, 21 December 2022.
• 9. Maria Adele Carrai, Jennifer Rudolph and Michael Szonyi (eds), The China Questions 2: Critical Insights Into US-China Relations, Volume 2, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2022, p. 235.
• 10. Fu Ying and Wu Shicun, South China Sea: How We Got to this Stage, Oxford University Press, UK, 2020, p. 704.
• 11. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on February 23, 2023”, Spokesperson's Remarks, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 23 February 2023.
• 12. Minh Phuong Vu, “First Stalled, Now at Full Sail: China's Rush Toward a South China Sea Code of Conduct”, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 8 March 2023.
• 13. Jim Gomez and Aaron Favila, “US Admiral Says China Fully Militarized Isles”, Associated Press, 22 March 2022.

The shooting down of the alleged Chinese spy balloon over the United States (US) airspace has exacerbated already strained relations between Washington and Beijing. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken called the incident an “unacceptable violation of US sovereignty and international law” and underscored that such an “act must never again occur”1 during the meeting with the Chinese State Councilor and Director of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Foreign Affairs Office Wang Yi on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on 18 February 2023. Earlier, Blinken cancelled a scheduled visit to Beijing in February 2023 in view of the balloon controversy.

Yi termed the US act of downing the balloon “an abuse of the use of force and violation of customary international practice and the International Civil Aviation Covenant”.2 China has maintained that the balloon had strayed into the US airspace due to Force Majeure, and insisted that Beijing strictly follows international law and respects all countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.3 Rather, China has made counter-charges against the US for violating Chinese airspace “over ten times without authorisation from China”4 with the help of high-altitude balloons.

Although there has been a spate of incidents—at least four, so far—involving unknown aerial objects being shot over the US–Canadian airspace in the past fortnight, the balloon that was shot down on 4 February 2023 stands out. One, because the identity of the balloon has been ascertained, and China has owned up to the same. China is calling it a civilian airship used for meteorological research purposes.5 Two, the balloon was floating over Billings in the US state of Montana, home to the Malmstrom Air Force base and several sensitive nuclear missile sites. Three, the balloon size was huge compared to the other three objects, and the balloon had the capability to manoeuvre.

Decluttering the Mystery

The following things are crystal clear when analysing the statements from the US and China. First, China has exploited the discrepancy in international law vis-à-vis airspace sovereignty. The US claimed that the Chinese balloon violated its airspace. According to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, ‘every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory’.6 However, there is no mention of the upper limit of air sovereignty. What is beyond the grey area is that the sovereignty claim of the country is not applicable in outer space. Nevertheless, Beijing’s use of the term Force Majeure—an inability to fulfil the contract—establishes that China had accepted deviation from international law.

Second, the recovered payload from the balloon strongly suggests that it was more than just a civilian meteorological research airship. The antennas in the balloon indicate that it was equipped for collecting intelligence signals.7 However, the US did not elaborate on what data the balloon could have relayed back to Beijing. Further, the Chinese balloon was fitted with solar panels, which could have aided the propulsion system. Thus, the Chinese claim that the balloon was an innocent civilian airship falls flat.

Third, the timing of the incident is interesting because it happened very close to Secretary Blinken’s visit to China, which could have been the first visit by an US Secretary of State since 2018. This is in line with China’s habit of testing the opponent’s resolve before or during high-level meetings. India is no stranger to this pattern. In 2014, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers breached the territorial integrity of India in the Chumar sector of the Union Territory of Ladakh while President Xi Jinping was on an official visit to India. Similarly, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang, Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao’s visits to India in 2013, 2010 and 2006 respectively, were preceded by border provocations.

Thus, the alleged spy balloon over the US airspace could be an attempt by China to make a statement about its growing capabilities. However, it can be discerned that China had not considered the possibility of exposing its alleged surveillance programme and the subsequent cancellation of Blinken’s visit. The incident only reaffirmed Washington’s resolve to simultaneously tackle the Chinese challenge at the diplomatic and military levels.

Fourth, the lack of transparency on the Chinese part vis-à-vis the actors involved in the balloon episode raises more questions rather than giving answers. The US was quick to sanction six Chinese aerospace firms associated with the alleged spy balloon programme. The US justified the move by alleging a threat to national security. The Biden administration also alleged that the manufacturer of the balloon had a close relationship with the Chinese military, and that surveillance balloons were operated out of Hainan, the southernmost province of China.

China opposed the sanctions calling them “illegal” and “unilateral”.8   Beijing claimed the US allegations were part of the broader information warfare waged by Washington. However, the Chinese government had no answer to the question about the entity the balloon belonged to. It evaded questions about the flight path or the destination of the balloon.9 Thus, the opacity about the entire operation—whether the balloon was operated by a private entity or a government entity, what kind of data it was collecting—gives credence to the US operation to down the balloon. Moreover, Beijing has enacted domestic laws to systematically access private-sector data, which diminishes the difference between the government and private entities being involved in the balloon saga.

Fifth, both the US and China have attempted to expand the scope of the allegations to involve more countries in the controversy, thus taking the incident beyond the bilateral ambit. The US claimed that China’s spy balloon programme was spread across five continents and over 40 countries were the victim of Chinese surveillance activities.10 The victims consisted of the close allies and partners of the US, including those from the Indo-Pacific region.11 According to the reports, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman briefed around 150 diplomats sharing information about China’s alleged surveillance balloon programme.12

Similarly, China took on the US, alleging that since May 2022, the US had flown multiple high-altitude balloons circling over the globe. Going further, Beijing reminded the world how the US National Security Agency had spied on leaders of US allies and partners. It claimed that Pentagon used high-altitude balloons “to track hypersonic strategic cruise missiles being developed by China and Russia”.13 Thus, in a broader contest for dominance of the present world order, both countries are trying to score points by getting as many countries on their side as possible.

Lessons for India

Looking at the US–China balloon row, New Delhi must draw its lessons. The incident shows that the significance of age-old methods like balloon surveillance has not been reduced in the era of high-tech satellites and drones. Balloons have advantages over satellites. They can hover over a place for a longer time and get clearer images due to their proximity to the ground. Thus, New Delhi should learn from the US shortcomings and guard its airspace—especially the near space between 20 km and 100 km—minutely.

Secondly, while the row is not over, allegations are flying freely from both sides about surveillance programmes being run by each other over friends and enemies alike. Thus, India should be extremely conservative while allowing foreign entry into critical infrastructure. In this regard, New Delhi has already decided to become atmanirbhar, and the country should redouble efforts in that direction.

Finally, the balloon episode has highlighted that the US-led world order is being challenged by an emerging China. On the one hand, Beijing is trying to confine India to the South Asian strategic box by periodically resurrecting border issues and by helping its all-weather ally Pakistan. On the other hand, for the past 30 years, the US-led order in the Indo-Pacific has benefitted India strategically. Thus, going ahead, India should continue to make pragmatic choices in the pursuit of its national interests.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with People’s Republic of China (PRC) Director of the CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office Wang Yi”, U.S. Department of State, 18 February 2023.
• 2. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson on the China-US Engagement”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 19 February 2023.
• 3. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks on US Announcement of the Postponement of Secretary of State Blinken’s Visit to China”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 4 February 2023.
• 4. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on February 13, 2023”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 13 February 2023.
• 5. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks on the Unintended Entry of a Chinese Unmanned Airship into US Airspace Due to Force Majeure”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 3 February 2023.
• 6. “Convention on International Civil Aviation – Doc 7300”, United Nations, Ninth Edition, 2006.
• 7. Matthew Lee and Eric Tucker, “US Says China Balloon Could Collect Intelligence Signals”, The Associated Press, 10 February 2023.
• 8. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on February 13, 2023”, no. 4.
• 9. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on February 15, 2023”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 15 February 2023.
• 10. “Department Press Briefing – February 13, 2023”, U.S. Department of State, 13 February 2023.
• 11. “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby, February 13, 2023”, The White House, 13 February 2023.
• 12. “US: Chinese Balloon Is part of Large Spying Program”, Voice of America, 8 February 2023; Ellen Nakashima, Shane Harris, John Hudson and Dan Lamothe, “Chinese Balloon Part of Vast Aerial Surveillance Program, U.S. Says”, The Washington Post, 7 February 2023.
• 13. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on February 14, 2023”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 14 February 2023.