The violence in Jammu and Kashmir has comparatively declined in the last two years, with overall lesser number of terrorist incidents and killings of security forces and civilians than before. More importantly, after the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, the security forces have succeeded in keeping in check mass protests and anti-state political mobilisation. Although it is a good sign, this alone cannot ensure deep political stability. To bring Jammu and Kashmir back on the path of normalcy, the decline in violence should pave the way for strengthening of democratic institutions at the grassroots level. The dominant counter-terrorism paradigms consider promotion of democracy as the best method to decrease the utility of violence perpetrated by armed organisations.1 In absence of the democratic forms of government, people can easily be swayed by radical narratives.    

Change on Ground

The government data suggests that there has been a decline in the number of terrorist incidents and that lesser number of security forces and civilians have lost their lives, since August 2019. While answering a question in the Rajya Sabha, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Nityanand Rai shared the data of the terrorist incidents and killings of civilians and security forces for the periods May 2014–August 2019 and August 2019–November 2021.2 From 5 August 2019 till 22 November 2021, the total number of terrorist incidents reported from Jammu and Kashmir are 496. In these incidents, 45 security personnel and 79 civilians lost their lives. During the same time period, precisely 841 days before the abrogation of Article 370, from 16 April 2017 till 4 August 2019, more number of terrorist incidents (843) were reported The numbers of security forces and civilians killed by terrorists during this period were 78 and 86 respectively (see Table 1).3

In the last couple of years, the security forces have also managed to curb external influence by reshaping the anti-infiltration grid. The incidents of infiltration from across the border reported after August 2019 are comparatively lesser in number. The net infiltration in 2021 till 31 October drastically came down to 28. In 2020, the net infiltration estimated was 51, and in 2018 it was 143 (see Table 2).4

In 2021, about 93 terrorist incidents were reported from Jammu and Kashmir,5 in which nearly 189 militants were killed. The number of incidents has come down and it is interesting to note that most of the militants killed last year belonged to organisations other than Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, which dominated for three decades and attracted many Kashmiri recruits. The majority of the militants killed in Jammu and Kashmir last year belonged to outfits like Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and The Resistance Front (TRF), which police claims is an offshoot of LeT and emerged after August 2019.6 There are other outfits, which, at different times, have claimed responsibility of attacks on the security forces, for instance People’s Anti-Fascist Front, United Liberation Front, Geelani Force and Kashmir Tigers which claimed the attack on a police bus in Srinagar, in which three policemen were killed.

Another interesting fact is that in the year 2021, out of the militants killed in Jammu and Kashmir, only 19 per cent were of Pakistani origin.7 This declining trend has been there since 2018.8 Before that the figure was much higher at 60 per cent. Experts believe that the dip in Pakistani terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir is because of a policy shift by Pakistan.9 Pakistan certainly cannot afford to be seen as a sponsor of cross-border terrorism while the sword of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is hanging over its head. One more possible reason behind the policy shift might be its preoccupation in Afghanistan. Will the presence of foreign terrorists increase in Jammu and Kashmir after Taliban strengthens its control over the country is an elusive question for now, because it is not clear whether Taliban is willing to do Pakistan’s bidding or not.      

Hybrid Militancy: A New Challenge

The security forces in Jammu and Kashmir believe that the biggest challenge in 2022 would be to deal with hybrid militants.10 According to police officials in Jammu and Kashmir, hybrid militants are “terrorists disguised as civilians”.11 They are not listed anywhere in police records. They carry out attacks and go back to live their normal lives which makes it difficult for the police to apprehend them.12 This is a challenge not only because they cannot be easily identified and apprehended, but also because most of the ideologically oriented people will find it convenient as there are very less risks involved in operating as a hybrid militant. All the difficulties that terrorists generally face as active members of terrorist organisations like adjusting to a military style, personal insecurity and disillusionment with group’s ideology are not involved here.

Despite the decline in infiltration from across the border, the month of October last year turned out to be the deadliest with 44 killings, including 12 armed forces, 19 terrorists and 13 civilians. The members of minority community in Kashmir and non-local labourers were selectively targeted, which led to the migration of thousands of non-locals from the valley in the first two weeks of October. The manner in which the killings took place reflected a paradigm shift on ground. The worrying factor is that most of the attacks on civilians and other soft targets were done by pistol-borne youths who are not registered as militants in the police records. This is going to be a challenge for security agencies as it won’t be possible to keep an eye on highly radicalised youths who remain deeply embedded in a society.

There is another dimension, which cannot be discounted. Militants without being part of an organisation can hardly endure for too long because any individual’s willingness to put his or her life in danger depends mostly on the capacity of the organisation. The members of any ideologically oriented organisation or a group through proper training and daily practices internalise the idea of what they stand for and fight for. Without any structured organisation and a specific narrative, recruitment strategies cannot materialise. Adil Rasheed aptly defines it as a “narrative marketplace” where it is the group or an organisation, and not an individual, which develops a narrative or “an antithesis to the prevailing philosophies of life”.13 The ideological orientation needed for taking the risk of carrying out an attack is not possible in the safe and insulated environment of a family. The terrorist organisations in general use different instruments to motivate individuals for specific actions. These include ideological appeal, selective incentive and coercion.14 Once these instruments lose their effectiveness, members begin to rethink their commitments. Based on this, it seems, the phenomenon of hybrid militancy is a result of the decline of old organisational structures. It might be a challenge for security forces for some time but it will not last for too long.

What Next

The decline in terrorist incidents and reduction in infiltration from across the border is no doubt a positive development but this alone cannot guarantee peace in Jammu and Kashmir. The figures and data cited earlier should not in any way anesthetize the Jammu and Kashmir administration and concerned security officials into believing that everything is normal. Despite the decimation of the organisational structure of terrorist organisations by security forces, the Kashmiri local youths are still motivated to join the militant ranks, albeit in lesser number. The alienation of people within Jammu and Kashmir and their willingness to take up arms should be a concern. The past experiences suggest that the external intervention without indigenous mobilisation has failed to destabilise Jammu and Kashmir. It is high time to address alienation of people by starting a democratic process so that they are able to choose their representatives and voice their concerns in a democratic manner.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counter Terrorism Strategy”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2008, pp. 78–105.
• 2. “Killings in J & K”, Response to Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 358, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1 December 2021.
• 3. Ibid.
• 4. Ibid.
• 5. Based on the data collected by the author.
• 6. Safwat Zargar, “The Resistance Front Have Claimed Responsibility for Civilian Killings in Kashmir. Who Are They?”, Scroll, 11 October 2021.
• 7. Based on the data collected by the author.
• 8. Riyaz Wani, “Pakistan Backs Off, But Kashmiri Militants Die in Greater Numbers”, Article 14, 24 March 2021.
• 9. Ibid.
• 10. Zulfikar Majid, “Hybrid Militancy Biggest Challenge for Security Agencies in 2022: J & K Police”, Deccan Herald, 31 December 2021.
• 11. Muheet Ul Islam and Pirzada Shakir, “Who are Kashmir’s ‘Hybrid Militants’?”, The Diplomat, 30 November 2021.
• 12. Ibid.
• 13. Adil Rasheed, Countering the Radical Narrative, Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2020, p. 5.
• 14. Enzo Nussio and Juan E. Ugarizza, “Why Rebels Stop Fighting: Organizational Decline and Desertion in Columbia’s Insurgency”, International Security, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2021, pp. 167–203.

China had signalled that it was upping its preparations for winter for its border troops at the India­­­–China border.1 The winter preparations were part of its efforts to signal deterrence to its adversaries by conveying its combat preparedness to prevent the possibility of skirmishes. It is also to create doubts in the adversary’s mind about the effectiveness of his forces to carry out their objectives. In this case, China’s immediate priority was to counter Indian winter preparations at the border, to prevent, in their perception, possibility of increased Indian confidence in its combat preparedness due to the upgraded logistics. The logistics required for winter stationing at high-altitude areas requires China to focus on keeping the troops warm and safe from the treacherous climate and ensuring food supply, fuel, and oxygen. According to the news reports, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is purported to have a variety of energy sources such as coal, electricity, and solar at the barracks, whereas the outposts are connected to the state grid. In addition to this, modernised food supply system and winter clothing such as rechargeable vests, knee protectors, and camouflage coats are believed to have been made available to the troops.2 Much advertised were the oxygen supply devices such as portable oxygen cylinders, generators and solid oxygen plants.3 Such supplies is possibly an indication of the issues the troops might have faced in 2020, when the Chinese troops had to be stationed in a stand-off against the Indian troops for the first time during the winter months at the India–China border areas.

The winter preparations began amid tense situation between the two countries after the 13th border talks in October 2021, conducted to resolve the stand-off at the India–China border areas, broke down. The winter preparations have to be seen in this context as both India and China felt that certain preparations were necessary to deny any military advantage to the other side, which could be used as a leverage in the negotiations. For instance, India could be responding pre-emptively to the deadlock in negotiations, on the side of caution, to prepare for the second winter stationing with heightened preparedness, and China is responding to it, or expecting a change in status-quo similar to India’s tactical actions (September 2020) to gain access to high peaks. The Global Times report explicitly stated that China was undertaking the winter preparations against any “possible Indian military aggression”4 seeking to signal deterrence and establish Chinese preparedness and reduce the advantages for any possible pre-emptive military action. The Chinese PLA perceived that they had to respond to the Indian winter storage preparations, which they thought to be “high-profile” and could considerably improve the Indian troops’ ability to sustain in the harsh climate compared to the year 2020. In particular, India’s airborne insertion exercises  conducted in November 2021 at the Eastern Ladakh was seen as a provocation because it  drew deployments from different regions of India, and also they were conducted  just before the arrival of winter.5 In the Chinese perspective, the exercise showed India’s “persistence to extend confrontation”, and “unwillingness to retreat”.6 However, while undertaking deterrence measures, the Chinese make a distinction regarding the motivation behind the Indian actions, arguing that it has to do with Indian efforts to convey to its domestic audience about its commitment to sovereignty issues (thus rhetorical) than actual security threats emanating from the Chinese side.7

While India had stocked its winter planning supplies in an effort to be better prepared,8 China’s varied winter planning logistics show a broader strategy to gain mastery over high-altitude conditions and increase combat preparedness against India. The expansion of physical infrastructure that can extend its air defence and offensive air strike capability shows increasing willingness to confront the Indian offensive capability across the border.9 Though much of it reflects the PLA’s general approach to stocking and improving its logistics for troops at high-altitude areas, such as North Xinjiang area, 10  the media attention to the Indian side reflects to some extent China’s apprehensions about the Indian border in addition to using it for deterrence signalling. At least, the PLA had assessed that the existing logistics were insufficient to cater to stocking of supplies, mostly learning from their 2020 winter stationing that inadequate winter logistics would hamper the troops to perform their regular activities and would deplete the morale of the border defence troops.

Inadequate winter logistics can lead troops to focus more on surviving the harsh climate rather than defending the border. Similarly, the PLA wants to reduce the troops’ focus on surviving the high-altitude conditions and rather expend their energies on dominating the areas to defend the border against any potential aggression. Therefore, troops merely acclimatising to high-altitude conditions is insufficient, and the PLA augmenting winter logistics is a step towards improved training and patrolling at high-altitude areas, including observing the movements of the adversary. Hence, the PLA’s focus has shifted towards training its border troops in high-altitude regions and station them at high posts, with an emphasis on getting the troops integrated to plateau conditions.

At the Indian border, the winter upgrade and the consequent signaling points to the PLA’s strategy on logistics preparation as a way to maintain advantage and reduce any insufficiencies that could affect its combat readiness. By stressing that logistics is the best way to overcome the winter maladies, the PLA is attempting to draw distinction between its preparations and India’s. As a result, the PLA is making its troops spend much longer time at high-altitude camps now with improved logistics, which they used to avoid earlier. The troops previously only focused on acclimatising to high-altitude conditions, without conditioning their training with the intention of performing combat readiness in those areas.11

Therefore, the airborne exercises and improved winter storage by the Indian army is taken with a more cautious attitude, while the PLA had been ramping up physical infrastructure before the onset of winter. The Chinese PLA believe that they have an advantage in logistics and transportation compared to their Indian counterparts. As a result, they argue that the Indian preparations are ineffective, while the deterrence signalling in contrast acknowledges that the Indian troops in their perception are better prepared than last year. Overall, the purpose of the deterrence signalling in the Chinese view, is to highlight that their  resource mobilisation capability exceeds that of India, leading it to maintain advantage at the India–China border. Similarly, the PLA’s exercises and the deterrence signalling are catered towards magnifying the loopholes in India’s logistics and transportation capabilities at the border areas. As of now, the PLA’s strategy is to exploit the gaps in India’s offensive capability at the border and strengthen its logistics and military infrastructure.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “PLA at China-India Border Has Upgraded Logistics to Brave Winter”, Global Times, 9 November 2021.
• 2. Ibid.
• 3. Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Plateau Troops Get Portable Individual Oxygen Supply Devices for Soldiers”, Global Times, 31 October 2021.
• 4. Liu Xuanzun, “Chinese Border Troops in Xinjiang Get New All-Terrain Vehicle for Winter Logistics Support”, Global Times, 25 October 2021.
• 5. “Indian Army’s High-Profile Display of Winter Border Combat Readines, Expert: Real Combat Power is Vulnerable” (印军高调展示冬季边境战备 专家：真实战力不堪一击), Xinhua, 11 December 2021.
• 6. Ibid.
• 7. “Can India Beat China with such High-Profile Operations?” (“秀肌肉”就能打败中国？印度醒醒吧！), Huanqiu wang, 15 November 2021.
• 8. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Readies Troops for Another Harsh Winter on Border with China”, Defence News, 8 November 2021.
• 9. “Tracking China’s Sudden Airpower Expansion on its Western Border”, The Drive, 16 June 2021.
• 10. “Thermal Equipment and Food Supplies for Winter Fully Prepared for Chinese PLA Soldiers in Xinjiang”, Global Times, 14 November 2021.
• 11. M. S. Prathibha, “PLA’s Western Theatre Command in Transition”, Issue Brief, MP-IDSA, 9 November 2021.

The year 2021 was challenging as well as momentous for China for several reasons. President Xi Jinping virtually re-wrote Chinese history by securing a third term and elevating himself to the stature of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.1 Meanwhile, the country struggled with slow economic growth2 due to multiple Covid-19 outbreaks, power shortages and regulatory crackdown on multiple sectors, for instance technology, real-estate and education.  Likewise at the international level, amidst challenges of international censure over Xinjiang policy3 and worsening bilateral ties with the United States (US), Europe, India, Japan, Australia and Taiwan, China alarmed the world with its advancements in warfare technology by testing hypersonic missiles4 and upholding Chinese political system as a true democracy.5 Against this backdrop, President Xi Jinping’s New Year speech was significant for the insights it offered with regard to the political objectives he aimed to achieve domestically and his vision for 2022.

Xi’s Political Objectives

In Xi Jinping’s perception, legitimacy of the “Party-state” is crucial to the stability of the regime. Therefore, since he came to power in 2012, the major objective which surfaced in his New Year addresses was sustaining a high level of political legitimacy for the “Party-state”.6  To that end, all his previous addresses focused primarily on national rejuvenation being realised by the Communist Party of China (CPC) under his leadership. For instance, the speeches began and delved at length about China’s rapid economic growth, improving living standards, technological scientific advancements, various developmental initiatives launched by the government and China’s increasing international outreach.7 More importantly, the issues were enunciated in a way to underscore the economic and socio-political vibrancy8 brought about by the government. For instance, in the 2020 New Year speech he highlighted that “significant breakthroughs” had been achieved by the state in economic, scientific and technological development due to “steady pursuit of high-quality development” and consequently everything was flourishing across the motherland.9 Similarly, in his 2021 New Year address President Xi emphatically asserted China to be ahead of other great powers in economic recovery from Covid-19. Also, heralding the completion of the 13th Five Year Plan (2016–20) he termed the government’s endeavours as aimed at implementing “high-quality development”.10 Also, in his 2020 and 2021 speeches,11 President Xi went a step ahead to create a sense of familial bond with the Party whereby he added personal accounts of inspection of developmental work and interaction with people regarding CPC’s success in eradicating extreme poverty and establishing a moderately prosperous society.12  

Likewise, in the 2022 New Year address, bolstering the Party’s image as the best institution to govern remained the primary focus.13 It is noteworthy that in Chinese political system, performance legitimacy in terms of achieving economic targets and strengthening national power is seen as a crucial means to maintain monopoly of power and Xi himself has relied on this to consolidate popular support.14 However, this year as the government itself refrained from setting an economic target in view of mounting economic uncertainties, Xi steered clear of any elaboration on China’s GDP or its economic growth. Instead, in a very veiled manner he sought to allude fears of an intensifying economic slowdown and reassure the nation about his and the Party’s resolve to tackle economic challenges.15 He began his address by stating that China was set to achieve the Second Centenary Goal16 of building a modern socialist country and that it was “developing rapidly with each passing day”. Conveying the government’s resolve, Xi recalled that the Party had an extraordinary journey in leading the Chinese people and scored “spectacular, epoch-making achievements in the past century”, and that CPC’s 100-year achievements and experience were a source of motivation and inspiration.  Furthermore, highlighting CPC’s success in delivering a moderately prosperous society, he mentioned that in future the Party will focus on “long-term perspective, remain mindful of potential risks, maintain strategic focus and determination” to rejuvenate the nation.  To enhance his image as a mass leader, Xi added that he cared about people’s concerns and strived for their aspirations.17 It was evident from the address that he not only tried to impress upon the Chinese people the centrality of CPC to Chinese polity, but also project the party as the primary engine for China’s socio-economic growth and development.

Reading the Tea-leaves

The focus on the party’s importance and achievements is hardly surprising if seen in the context of Xi seeking a third term. It is regarding Xi’s vision for the New Year that the address was particularly instructive. The address implicitly underlined his intent of directing China to look inward. Instances like tight border controls, calls for strengthening domestic socio-economic foundation, cutting down reliance on foreign technologies and imports had already created speculations about China preparing to isolate itself from the international community. The address reinforced the notion of insular attitude18 that Xi is likely to follow. The entire address pivoted on China’s domestic issues with scant reference to its foreign relations. Also, he declared that the Party should always remain “true to the original aspiration” of bringing about the rejuvenation of the nation and called for “vigorous and determined endeavour to fulfil their responsibility to history”.19 These statements combined with lack of reference to prospects of China’s further opening up or structural reforms20 underlined the shift to gravitate inwards.

Although fears of China decoupling from the rest of the world in the long run could be overblown. However, given the launch of the 14th Five Year Plan, turning inward could be a viable short-term strategy to shield against increasing international hostility while simultaneously pursuing its own path of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.21 In Xi’s understanding, a closed nationalist outlook will not only divert domestic attention away from the critical international opinion but also lead people to embrace the policy goals set by the Party.22 Moreover, before the 20th Party Congress which is likely to pave way for Xi’s third term, this phase could be used to further consolidate his hold on the Party elites and by extension on the country’s economic and social life.

Implications for China and International Community

Xi Jinping’s strategy to turn inward perhaps is triggered more by domestic exigencies than by external systemic pressure. However, the implications will be felt both domestically and internationally. On the domestic front, more stringent curbs on expression of public opinion (especially on any perceived dissent), greater internal oversight to make party cadres and private corporations adhere to the party line and nurture of party-centric nationalism, could be seen. Reportedly a communique recently released following the plenary session of China’s top anti-graft group stated that the Party will investigate disorderly expansion of capital, platform monopolies and will show “no mercy” to punish corruption, factionalism and interest groups within the Party.23 In effect, there will be more concerted efforts to curtail the influence of non-governmental entities to enable CPC to dictate the terms of business.24

Similarly, the international community and especially China’s neighbours should be prepared to deal with a more aggressive and assertive China. A major strategic implication of turning inward would be a shift to a more muscular foreign policy where Beijing could demonstrate willingness to use force in defending its perceived core national interests in the Indo-Pacific and territorial disputes. The reason simply being that Xi Jinping will be keen to project a masochist image at both home and abroad, which means that while adopting strident policies on domestic issues, the government will be determined not to appear weak in its international dealings. More importantly, due to the “dual circulation policy”25 which emphasises greater self-reliance, access to Chinese markets might become limited. Speculations are rife amongst the European business community that China could be relatively less welcoming to foreign tech and digital companies.26

President Xi Jinping’s 2022 New Year address offered just a glimpse of the policy changes that will be instituted in the New Year. The changes as they unfold will carry special significance for India due to the unresolved border dispute, overlapping geopolitical interests and economic interdependence. While post Galwan Valley crisis India hardened its strategic posture vis-à-vis China, the incoming uncertainties will necessitate New Delhi to further calibrate its China policy. First, New Delhi can capitalise on this evolving situation to attract foreign businesses exiting27 China by re-structuring its administrative and regulatory hurdles.28 Second, New Delhi should seek to diversify the China exposure by searching for alternative destination for imports, supply chain and fundraising29 and lastly strengthen its strategic partnerships with the US, Japan, European Union (EU) and Southeast Asian countries to better manage Chinese assertiveness on its frontiers and in the maritime domain.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Zoey Zhang, “China 2021 Recap: Overview of a Pivotal Year”, China Briefing, 7 December 2021.
• 2. Chinese economy grew by 4.9 per cent from July–September 2021. For more details, see Thomas Hale, Ryan McMorrow and Tom Mitchell, “China Economy Grows 4.9% in Third Quarter as Momentum Slows”, Financial Times, 18 October 2021.
• 3. “Uighurs: Western Countries Sanction China over Rights Abuses”, BBC, 22 March 2021.
• 4. Shankhyaneel Sarkar, “China Conducted Hypersonic Weapons Test, Sent Missile Around the World: Report”, Hindustan Times, 20 November 2021.
• 5. Keith B. Richburg, “Why is China Calling Itself a ‘True Democracy’?”, The Washington Post, 24 December 2021.
• 6. Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung, “Has Xi Jinping made China’s Political System More Resilient and Enduring?”, Third World Quarterly, 21 November 2021.
• 7. CAO Yicheng and GAO Wencheng, “A Corpus-Based Critical Discourse Analysis of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s New Year Message”, US-China Foreign Language, David Publishing, July 2020, Vol. 18, No.7, pp. 210–217.
• 8. Lotus Yang Ruan, “The Chinese Communist Party and Legitimacy”, The Diplomat, 30 September 2015.
• 9. “Full Text: Chinese President Xi Jinping's 2020 New Year Speech”, CGTN, 31 December 2019.
• 10. “Full Text of Xi Jinping's 2021 New Year Address”, Global Times, 31 December 2020.
• 11. No. 9, No. 10.
• 12. No. 6.
• 13. “Full Text: 2022 New Year Address by President Xi Jinping”, Xinhua, 31 December 2021.
• 14. Yuchao Zhu, “‘Performance Legitimacy’ and China’s Political Adaptation Strategy”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 6, pp. 123–140, 9 February 2011.
• 15. “China’s Xi Vows to Tackle Risks as Pivotal Political Year Begins”, Bloomberg News, 31 December 2021.
• 16. In 2012, when Xi Jinping assumed power, he laid out Two Centenary Goals: first is to establish a moderately prosperous society by 2021, and second is to build China into a modern socialist country in all respects by 2049. For more details, see Lu Ding, “China’s ‘Two Centenary Goals’: Progress and Challenge”, East Asian Policy, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 79–93, April 2016.
• 17. No. 13.
• 18. Ck Tan, , “Xi Says 2022 Party Congress will be 'Major Event' for China's Politics” Nikkei Asia, 1 January 2022.
• 19. No. 15.
• 20. “European Businesses Urge China to Open Up, Avoid Inward Turn”, Bloomberg News, 23 September 2021.
• 21. Lance Gore, “China Turning Inward? China has Always been a Civilisation Unto Its Own”, Think China, 29 November 2021.
• 22. No. 6.
• 23. “China Vows to ‘Show No Mercy’ in Battle against Big Tech Influence, Corruption”, Bloomberg News, 21 January 2021.
• 24. Michele Koh Morollo, “China’s Year of Crackdowns: Party First, Business Second”, Al Jazeera, 27 December 2021.
• 25. Alicia García Herrero, “What is Behind China's Dual Circulation Strategy”, China Leadership Monitor, 1 September 2021.
• 26. No. 21.
• 27. Amy Gunia, “Yahoo and LinkedIn Are Ditching China. Here's Why Most U.S. Businesses Are Staying Put”, Time, 5 November 2021.
• 28. “India Not Preferred Place for Firms Leaving China”, The New Indian Express, 15 February 2021.
• 29. Aditi Shrivastava, “Investors in Talks with Firms to Diversify China Exposure in Supply Chain, Funding”, The Economic Times, 27 June 2020.

On 17 January 2022, the Houthis of Yemen carried out attacks on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones, hitting the state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) oil tankers in Abu Dhabi and a construction site at the Abu Dhabi International Airport. Three people, including two Indian nationals, were killed and some others were injured in the attacks. The attacks provoked a strong response from the Saudi-led military coalition on the Houthis in the Yemeni capital Saana. Another ballistic missile attack on the UAE by the Houthis happened on 24 January, which was intercepted and destroyed by the Emirati air defence around Abu Dhabi. In response, the coalition forces launched a counter-attack and destroyed a Houthi missile launcher Al Jawf in Yemen. The UAE also claimed that it intercepted and destroyed another Houthi missile on 31 January, when the Israeli President Issac Herzog was on the first-ever visit to the country, taking place in the aftermath of the Abraham Accords signed in September 2020. 

There are several reasons why Houthis are targeting the UAE. First, the UAE supports the internationally recognised government of President Abd Raboo Mansour Hadi in Yemen and wants the Houthis to leave capital Saana in order to restore peace and stability in the country. The UAE urges a political resolution of the Yemeni crisis on the basis of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative and its implementation mechanism, as well as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2216 of 2015.1 The UAE has been a major partner in the Saudi-led military coalition that is undertaking military operations against the Houthis.

Second, in southern Yemen, the UAE has supported the secessionist movement known as the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which demands autonomy in the south and resists the Houthi advances to the region. Besides, the UAE has been supporting the Giants Brigade—a powerful armed group in the south—which has been a crucial force fighting against the Houthis and has recently taken over several territories in strategically important Shabwa and Marib governorates from the Houthis.2 The UAE’s backing of the forces in the south makes the country a natural target of the Houthis.

Third, the UAE has strategic and maritime interests in the Gulf of Aden, Strait of Bab el Mandab and the Horn of Africa. The area around the island of Socotra in the Gulf of Aden is of particular importance to the UAE, as it wants maritime security and freedom of navigation in the crucial waterways. Operating from Yemen, the Houthis have attacked ships and oil tankers of different countries, which has made the UAE wary about the maritime security in the area. On 2 January 2022, a UAE-flagged ship named ‘Rwabee’ was seized by the Houthis.  The UAE, therefore, wants the Saudi-led coalition to ensure the security of strategic waterways in the region.

The 17 January attack has further exposed the security vulnerabilities of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The drones and missiles launched from Yemen not only successfully hit the targets deep inside the UAE, violating the airspace of Saudi Arabia and the UAE but also went undetected for hundreds of kilometres.

Till now, Saudi Arabia has been the principal target of the Houthis as the latter have launched cross-border attacks using drones and missiles targeting several key infrastructures including oil facilities and airports in Saudi Arabia. Targeting the UAE at the same time further intensifies and widens the conflict. Though the UAE has been participating in the military campaign against the Houthis, it did not face any direct military attack from them as it probably has the advantage of physical distance from Yemen, which has now been breached.

The Houthi attacks on Abu Dhabi come at a time when there is considerable progress in dialogue between Iran and the UAE. The UAE had withdrawn its envoy from Tehran in 2016 expressing solidarity with Saudi Arabia after the latter’s embassy and consulate were attacked in Iran by the protesters. Recently, the UAE and Iran have started official-level talks in order to revive their relationship. In December 2021, the Emirati National Security Adviser Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan visited Iran and held talks with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi.3 Earlier, in November, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani visited the UAE and met high-level officials before the start of the fresh round of talks on the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna, and agreed to “open a new chapter” in their bilateral relations.4 These two recent visits were expected to revive the strained relationship between the two countries, but the recent attacks on Abu Dhabi has further complicated the situation. Several rounds of talks have also taken place between Saudi Arabia and Iran in order to ease the tension; and it is believed that the situation in Yemen is a key issue of discussion between the two countries. The Abu Dhabi attacks may hamper the Saudi­­­­–Iran and UAE–Iran talks which are still at a nascent stage.

The UN Security Council, in which the UAE is a non-permanent member for the 2022–23 term, has called it a terrorist attack and has unanimously condemned the attack. The UAE has also appealed to the US—of which the UAE is a key regional ally—to re-designate the Houthis as a terrorist organisation. Former President Donald Trump’s January 2021 order designating the Houthis as a terrorist organisation was revoked by President Joe Biden in February 2021. After the attacks, the US reiterated its commitment towards the security of the UAE. There are also reports suggesting that it is considering re-designating the Houthis as a terrorist group.5 To support the UAE against the Houthi attacks, the US also announced to send the guided missile destroyer USS Cole to help the UAE Navy, to deploy 5th Generation Fighter aircrafts to the region and collaborating on the air defence with the UAE.

The Houthi attacks on the UAE have widened the ambit of the ongoing war in Yemen. Such violent escalation, even after seven years of the war, has the potential to further intensify the involvement of the regional players. This will prolong the instability in and around Yemen and hinder the regional and international efforts towards establishing peace in the country.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the MP-IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “H.H. Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed: United Arab Emirates Stands Firm with the Kingdom of Arabia against any Iranian Attempts to Interfere in the Internal Affairs of the Arab States”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, United Arab Emirates, 3 October 2015.
• 2. Saeed Al-Batati, “After Liberating Shabwa Province, Government Forces Seize Control of New Areas in Marib”, Arab News, 11 January 2022.
• 3. “Iranian President Receives Delegation Headed by Tahnoun bin Zayed”, WAM, 6 December 2021.
• 4. “Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Pledges 'New Chapter' in Iran-UAE Relations”, Al-Monitor, 24 November 2021.
• 5. Jonathan Landay, “Biden Says Administration Mulling Re-designating Yemen's Houthis a Terrorist Group”, Reuters, 20 January 2022.