Malaysia’s so-called multi-ethnic harmony was deeply shaken when the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf) organised in Kuala Lumpur the largest ever mass protest against the ‘marginalisation’ of ethnic Indians as a consequence of the government’s ‘discriminatory’ policy. The incident has clearly exposed Malaysia’s political class of creating and favouring a unified trans-racial community called Bangsa Malaysia (‘Malaysian race’). The federal Constitution accords special privileges to these Bumiputera and this is not for the first time that the problems of unfair treatment towards the ethnic Indians have come to the centrestage. The Malaysian Police had targeted IT professionals of Indian origin in March 2003 on grounds of checking illegal immigration. In fact, ethnic tensions had previously erupted as early as December 1969 when over a 100 people were killed in clashes between the Malays and the Chinese. This prompted Dr Mahathir to launch a New Economic Policy in 1971 and a determined effort to encourage the Bumiputeras and raise their share in the economy – at the cost of the ethnic Chinese and the Indians. Samy Vellu of the Malaysian Indian Congress had served as the Works Minister in the Mahathir cabinet and was the sole representative of the ethnic Indian community.

The demonstration comprising about 10,000 people was heading towards the British High Commission to submit a memorandum seeking to appoint a counsel to represent the Indian community in a class action suit. The memorandum called for an emergency UN resolution condemning the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of ethnic Indians and urged the UK to lead a global condemnation of Malaysia’s ‘atrocities’ against the Indians. The Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, who also holds the Internal Security portfolio, taking grave exception to the memorandum indicated the government would not hesitate to use the Internal Security Act to prevent demonstrations. Some 88 ethnic Indians were arrested on November 28.

Indians constitute 8 per cent of the population in Malaysia totalling 1.8 million and of whom about 90 per cent are Tamils. But in proportion to their number they control very little wealth. In contrast, the Chinese constitute about 25 per cent of the population and the majority Malays roughly 60 per cent. Although there are a large number of Indians as doctors and lawyers; they are a far greater number ‘under-represented’ in other sectors.

It would be unrealistic to expect India to remain unaffected by the current developments. Malaysia’s institutionalised policy of discrimination towards the Indian Diaspora (mostly Tamils) is bound to create pressure on the Centre from its coalition partner in Tamil Nadu to respond in a forceful manner. Not surprisingly, Hindraf leader P. Watythamoorthy met Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi on December 2 to lobby for the cause of the Malaysian Indians. The Indian government needs to be sensitive to the problems and concerns of its diaspora especially in Southeast Asia and unflinchingly take a principled position. During the freedom struggle leaders like Subhash Chandra Bose sought their cooperation and now a ‘Rising India’ with its newfound economic musclepower can ill-afford to ignore its economic diaspora.

India’s economic ties with Malaysia have been an intrinsic part of its Look East policy. The two share many common multilateral forums such as ASEAN and the WTO and are at the forefront of taking up the cause of the developing world. Like Malaysia, India believes that the WTO should not introduce non-trade issues into trade negotiations. Both countries will begin negotiating the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) in January 2008. This will give an impetus to trade and investment between the two. India has an unfavourable balance of trade with exports to Malaysia at $1.3 billion and imports at $5.3 billion. The total trade is expected to rise to $16 billion by 2012. Malaysia is the second biggest ASEAN investor in India and has made a total direct investment of about $143 million in the period August 1991 to July 2007. Given the strong economic connect, India should not only powerfully voice and stand for the welfare of the ethnic Indian community but also assert influence over the Malaysian government to effectively address the problem.

While India’s experience of shaping a plural democracy may serve as a model, Prime Minister Badawi’s own statement bears recalling: “What is important is that the government has to be fair to all because if we concentrate only on one group, others will complain.”

The Maoists continue to advance their violent campaign to capture political power through armed revolution. In the current year, till October 31, 571 lives have been lost in Maoist violence. Another 12, including two civilians and 10 personnel of the Mizo Battalion, were killed in an ambush on November 29 near Konta in Chhattisgarh. Correspondingly, the state response has been inadequate in containing the Maoists’ campaign and their influence. Strikingly various authorities continue to hold a widely divergent perception of the spatial spread of the Maoist movement. For example, replying to an unstarred question number 320 in the Rajya Sabha, on November 21, 2007, Minister of State (MoS) for Home Affairs Sriprakash Jaiswal said 91 districts in 11 States were affected by Maoist violence. On the other hand, the former Governor of Chhattisgarh, Lt Gen KM Seth said in an interview to a website a few months back: “I would like to share that currently from the figures I have been able to obtain, 256 districts have been declared as [N]axalite affected districts…” The MHA, one can reason, would like to underplay the spatial spread of the Maoists and one can equally argue that the Minister concerned was speaking merely of the number of districts in which Maoist violence was reported, and not of those in which the rebels have an influence –– intense to marginal. However, such variance in the figures is not only odd but misleading and explains the lack of a concerted approach to resolve the violence.

The MoS also said in his response that 11 States were Maoist affected. On can recall the statement of the then Cabinet Secretary, BK Chaturvedi, who while speaking at the annual Conference of Chief Secretaries, in New Delhi, on April 20 said that a total of 182 districts across 16 States were affected to varying degree. Facts and figures yet again collide. Of course the CPI (Maoists) would like to maintain that their influence is widespread, and their propaganda machine leaves no stone unturned in doing so. For example, Sonu –– who earlier used the alias Bhupathi –– whose actual name is Mallojula Venugopal and is the in-charge of the Dandakaranya Special Zone Committee (DKSZC) said in an interview published in People’s March, a Maoist mouthpiece, in July 2007: “… our party has a presence in 17 States…”

Similarly during 2005 and 2006 a series of contradictory statements were made. In March 2005, the Minister of State said in the Lok Sabha that “126 districts in 12 states are affected by Naxal violence/influence in varying degrees”. On the other hand, while replying to the debate on Demands for Grants for his Ministry, the Home Minister said in the Lok Sabha on May 22, 2006: “I have personally collected data... only 50 districts are affected.” The then Home Secretary, VK Duggal had his own version. He insisted on July 3 while addressing probationers at the National Police Academy, Hyderabad, that Maoist activity was noticed in merely “6.5 states to be precise.” Barely a month before the Home Minister’s reply in the Lok Sabha, the Prime Minister said on April 13, 2006 while inaugurating the second meeting of the Standing Committee of Chief Ministers of Naxalite-affected States, the Naxalite movement “has now spread to over-160 districts”.

The habit of taking a less grave view of the intensity of the Maoist movement is not unique to the UPA government. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, too, held a similar view. In November 2003, speaking at a meeting of the Coordination Committee of Naxalite affected States, the then Home Secretary said Naxalite violence affected 55 districts in 9 states. Less than a year later, in an official note circulated at a meeting of Chief Ministers of Naxalite-affected States on September 21, 2004 the MHA disclosed that 125 districts in 12 states were affected by Naxalite violence. For those who closely watch the Maoist movement, and are familiar with its trajectory and dynamics, it is strikingly clear that the figures have been botched-up, because the number of affected districts could not have shot up by 70 in 10 months.

In fact, in the absence of any information on the methodology followed by the MHA in determining how a district is classified as affected, or any informed debate on its scientific validity, observers of the Maoist movement outside the government are, thus, at a loss to understand the same.

To keep people ill-informed, bestow upon them the comfort of a sense of courage and confidence, as well as deceive the enemy, is one thing, but getting trapped in one’s own tales of deception is disastrous. It is high time that the MHA, and the various departments, understand the enormity of the situation and squarely addresses the Maoist problem, which the Prime Minister described more than once as the ‘single largest threat’ to India’s internal security.

President Pervez Musharraf’s claim that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are safe as long as he is in charge has raised widespread speculation about the safety of Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. Musharraf’s statement comes at a time when Pakistan is going through one of its worst period of domestic instability. While the Pakistani Army is ostensibly portrayed as the least corrupt institution within Islamabad, most of the officers are radically Islamized having links with terrorist organizations like the Jamaat-i-Islami, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen, Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen and Jaish-e-Mohammed. These groups share similar ideology with the Al Qaida and pro-Talibans. The Nuclear Threat Initiative in its latest commissioned report, ‘Securing the Bomb 2007’ has identified armed jihadi groups operating in POK having merged with Al Qaida and, as the report claims, have demonstrated their willingness to use nuclear weapons. The Pakistani Army having total control over the country’s nuclear weapons and increasingly getting indoctrinated by the Al Qaeda can spell cataclysmic circumstances not only for India but also for the entire world.

The above contention has been disputed by many who regard the Pakistani Army as a safe bet. However, facts present a contrary view. President Musharraf has faced seven known assassination attempts in which military officers were involved. In a New York Times report of May 28, 2004, Pakistani military and intelligence officers were suspected of plotting to kill Musharraf. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, Ron Suskind in his book The One Percent Doctrine has penned that Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the suspected mastermind of the 9/11 attacks was arrested in the “safe house” of a serving Pakistani military officer having close links to Jamaat-i-Islami. Reports further indicate the illegal trafficking of nuclear material and technology by AQ Khan was known to the Pakistani Army since the nuclear arsenals were under its control. The decipherable links between the Pakistani Army in charge of nuclear weapons and terrorist groups undoubtedly poses grave threat to the country’s nuclear security. These evidences starkly reflect the incompetence of the Army to ensure the safety and security of its nuclear assets. Musharraf’s assurances to the international community about the efficiency of the Pakistani Army in securing its nuclear weapons should thus be viewed with scepticism.

The extremist organisations angered over the US-led war on terror and the consequent operations along the West Pakistan border are incessantly targeting the rank and file of the Pakistani Army to undermine support for Musharraf and weaken his position. With questionable loyalties within the army and sympathetic overtures to the cause of extremist groups, Musharraf can hardly vouch in favor of the Army to undertake responsibility for protecting Pakistan’s nukes.

Pakistan has in place a C2 (command and control) system for its strategic forces based on C4I2SR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance) since February 2000. However, doubts exist over the technical capabilities of the C4I2. There is also a general understanding and acceptance that there cannot be any foolproof C2 system as indicated by the recent unauthorised loading of six advanced cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads on a US-based B-52 bomber that was flown for more than three hours over several states.

Pakistan asserts that its warhead cores are physically separated from its detonation components. Concurrently, Islamabad claims that its weapons can be assembled quickly implying that though the weapons are de-mated, they are nonetheless collocated close to each other in an estimated six storage sites as reported by the Washington Post on November 11, 2007. Terrorist groups with proven intent can take advantage of the proximity and secure vital components like nuclear trigger devices. The physical security of Pak nukes gets further eroded when the nuclear devices and materials are transported from their original storage sites for routine testing and upgrading. Nuclear weapons and components held in extreme secrecy will become visible during such movements to an informed observer who can predict quite confidently the deployment sites of weapons.

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals face considerable threat from its scientific community as well. As documented evidences indicate, Pakistan’s top nuclear scientists – Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed met Al Qaeda members on two occasions in 2000 and in 2001 and shared sensitive nuclear secrets. In the face of these dangerous revelations, the US responded with tens of millions of dollars worth of equipment ranging from helicopters, night-vision goggles, intrusion detectors and ID systems to help Pakistan secure its nuclear material, warheads and laboratories. However, the infamous AQ Khan Nuke-mart once again revealed the vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

The US has categorically stated that Pakistan’s stockpile is safe. US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice’s statement, “We have noted the problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it….” in a January 2005 Congressional hearing is far from reassuring. By all counts, it appears that Washington is confident about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and does not foresee any grave consequences. But that the nukes can fall into unauthorised hands is a possibility that cannot be brushed aside. Unlike the US nuclear weapons that are based upon the sophisticated Permissive Action Links (PALs), a system which has two separate electronic operators that requires enter codes to arm and launch nuclear warheads, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are physically separated, i.e., the trigger is isolated from the weapon. However, they are no guarantees that the Pakistani nuclear custodians with jihadi outlook will simply switch allegiances and pass the sensitive materials that they guard to terrorists groups.

The US claims of “contingency plans” to safeguard Pakistan’s nukes are also contentious. The plans at best refers to the hope that the Pakistani military officials will cooperate with Washington to exterminate any imminent threat. But this is merely a hope which can be always belied. Noteworthy enough, this cooperation lacks adequate trust and understanding between the Americans and the Pakistanis. The US has limited knowledge about the location of the arsenal that they have offered to protect. More so, Pakistan has refused US experts any direct access to the six bunker sites where the Pakistani nuclear arsenal of an estimated 50 nuclear bombs is located. Any attempt by the US to take control of these weapons would make the situation further complicated. This creates sufficient grounds of concern for the safety of Pakistan’s nukes in the world particularly in India because of the proximity in distance and rising terrorism.

The US must refrain from conceding to face value assurances from Pakistan about the security of their nuclear arsenal. Several notable non-proliferation institutions have raised legitimate concerns about the dangers involved over loose nukes from Pakistan. The NTI in its report, ‘Securing the Bomb 2007’ has highlighted the presence of pro- Al Qaeda armed terrorist groups operating in Pakistan. The Pakistan Security Research Unit (University of Bradford) in its report dated November 18, 2007 has reiterated the inherent vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s nuclear security arrangements. With the deteriorating political situation persisting within Pakistan, the military can be stretched thin if the protest level rises and be unable to safeguard its nuclear assets.

After dilly-dallying for a long period Bangladesh finally signed the Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) network agreement on November 9, 2007 at the UN headquarters in New York. With this 20 of the 28 countries under the network have joined the agreement. India signed the agreement on June 29, 2007. The remaining eight countries have yet to sign citing "procedural" and "technical" reasons, rather than disagreement about the project. Bangladesh failed to sign the agreement earlier as the previous BNP-Jamaat alliance government was undecided on the issue. However, the country became part of TAR six month after the interim cabinet decided to join the cross border network.

The TAR project, conceived by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), would connect Bangladesh rail system to the proposed 81,000 km network stretching from Europe to East and South-East Asia including India. With Bangladesh eventually joining the network, attention has now focused on another project, the Asian Highway Network, which is of great significance to India. If Bangladesh signs the agreement it would go a long way in helping India to get transit rights. Dhaka’s reluctance to offer transit facility has been a sore point in Indo-Bangladesh bilateral relations.

According to the UN, this is one of the three pillars of the Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development (ALTID) project, endorsed by the UNESCAP Commission in 1992, along with the 141,000km Trans-Asian Highway and facilitation of regional land transport projects. TAR will immensely benefit Bangladesh. It will connect the country to its two leading trading partners – China and India. Its bilateral trade with India is about 2 billion USD. TAR will help in transportation of goods and people from Bangladesh and India. Bangladesh will also benefit as trans-shipment of goods at land border may not be required. It will save cost and make goods cheaper in Bangladesh. A large number of Bangladeshis travel from that country to India for various reasons. A suitable train communication will further increase people to people contact.

TAR will also be useful in case some significant investment takes place from India in Bangladesh. Several proposals including that of Tatas are in the process of negotiations with the Bangladesh government. In case these proposals fructify, TAR will help in transportation of minerals and finished goods between the two countries. Transportation of goods through railway is safer, quicker and pollution free. This mode of transport is preferable given the inadequate port facilities in South Asia and unsafe sea-lanes. The region as a whole will also greatly benefit from the growing Asian trade. Countries like Bangladesh will further benefit as a transit point between China and India - two fastest growing economies of the world.

TAR will help Indian industries by making Indian products more competitive. But India would have a small advantage in comparison to Bangladesh. Bangladesh has agreed to TAR because it does not give transit facility to India. The Rail network enters Bangladesh from three directions from the Indian state of West Bengal and exits through a single gateway in the east at Gundhum, Myanmar. The routes go through industrial centres in the north and south-west of the country, run through the capital's outskirts of Joydevpur and into Chittagong. It is obvious from the routes that despite having three entry points in West Bengal, the only available exit point is in Myanmar.

Bangladesh has not approved a similar Asian Highway Network (AHN) Agreement out of long-held concerns that the super-highway would act as an Indian transit corridor since both entry and exit points fall in this country. Bangladesh is hoping for an alternative AHN route, which would follow similar India-Bangladesh-Myanmar entry and exit point plan. For this reason, the earlier BNP-led coalition government passed up the opportunity to join the AHN within the deadline of December 2005. But the expectation of Bangladesh to have an alternate route through Myanmar has little chance of fulfillment. Myanmar is reportedly wary of allowing AHN to pass through its Muslim-populated territory in Arakans region where its own administration is weak.

Bangladesh’s apprehension over signing the AHN agreement, fearing it would be reduced to an Indian corridor, is misplaced. By merely signing the TAR or AHN agreement, Bangladesh will not be forced to grant its transit facility to other countries. All member countries in the network will have to first enter into bilateral agreements for using the network, both for passengers and goods.

In any case the main purpose of these agreements is to boost regional cooperation and trade. Given the advantages, several Bangladeshi experts feel that Dhaka’s rigid position should not come in the way of this cooperation. Dr Rahmatullah, former director responsible for AHN at UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), feels that the Bangladeshi effort to avoid India is “illogical” as that country geographically surrounds Bangladesh. According to him the economic gains from the present AH route, even with both entry and exit points in India, are overwhelming. He strongly feels that the proposal of Bangladesh to go for the non-existent alternative Myanmar route is an "illogical proposition." Instead, he is of the view that Bangladesh should aggressively pursue the Kunming Initiative to connect Dhaka with the Chinese city of Kunming through Myanmar.

It was hoped that the end of the Cold War will bring to completion projects like TAR and AHN. Unfortunately, this failed to materialise as Asian countries remained embroiled in their conflicts and tensions. Just to spite India, the BNP-led coalition government disregarded the opportunity to join AHN. The decision of the caretaker government led by Fakharuddin Ahmed to sign the TAR agreement may prove useful if it is supplemented by a similar approach towards the Asian Highway Network. The caretaker government of Bangladesh has been generally friendly towards India, while the earlier governments blamed India for its ‘big brotherly’ attitude. Most of the decisions of the caretaker government are those which are domestically free from controversy. Moreover, these decisions are likely to benefit Bangladesh more than India as is the case with TAR. India would be happy to facilitate TAR and make Bangladesh enjoy innumerable benefits. At the same time India would like its eastern neighbour to sign the Asian Highway agreement so that the maximum benefits of these networks can be utilized.