The Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, has indicated a fresh calculus on defence and a move towards building up more deterrence in the form of pre-emptive capability. 1 With an almost certainty of it fuelling a regional arms race, the proposition is particularly difficult as its compatibility with the war renouncing Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution will always be questionable. The proposition will also be expensive as it would require aircraft and, more importantly, missile-based strike capability comprising a varied arsenal of missiles, causing the traditionally one per cent GDP constraint on defence spending to be violated which Prime Minister Abe reportedly is willing to negotiate.2

The pacifists have for long successfully resisted the idea of any pre-emptive offensive doctrine for Japan, citing the spirit of Article 9. Acquiring nuclear weapons or any weapon of mass destruction (WMD) has never been on the cards. A public poll recently conducted by The Japan Times shows that the majority of the people remain opposed to the idea with 69 per cent voting against any amendment to the war renouncing Article 9 of the constitution.3

It may be noted that Japan had renounced war as a means of settling disputes after the end of World War-II. This conviction has since been strongly held and ingrained in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.4

Post World War-II, the island nation of Japan has followed a spear and shield understanding with the United States (US) for its external defence, wherein the Japanese Self-Defence Forces would act as the shield defending against or blunting the aggression and the US would provide the punitive offensive element against the aggressors to subvert the threat completely or take it to its logical conclusion. The US has permanently stationed approximately 54,000 troops and several weapon systems, including naval and airforce components, in Japan pursuant to the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960. Both nations observe the status of forces agreement for the US Forces stationed in Japan.

Besides, the US has also provided a layered ballistic missile shield comprising ship-based Aegis missile system (for exo-atmospheric mid-course interception of incoming ballistic missiles) and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) land-based missile system (for their short-range interception). Further augmentation to the ballistic missile shield with Aegis Ashore missile system (land-based version of the Aegis missile system) has been on the cards with increasing missile threat. Japan has already ordered US$ 1.7 billion worth of missiles from the US. The cost of maintaining the US forces and the missile system is borne by both countries; however, the Japanese share has been increasing over the years.

Since the 1990s, there has been a growing debate in Japan about the efficacy of the abovementioned security arrangement with the US, particularly in view of increased proliferation and blatant development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by its traditional rivals, North Korea and China. Japan also has some conflict of interest with Russia over territorial issues and the relations between them are not all that cordial with the occasional show of military overtures and a separate mention of the fact in Japan’s defence white paper of 2020.5

One of the main causes of concern for Japan has been the rising belligerence, assertiveness, and confrontational attitude of China over East China Sea islands (claimed by both the nations). China also often subtly brandishes its missile arsenal of which it is estimated to have sizeable numbers in intermediate-range categories.  Reconstitution of the 2nd Artillery Brigade of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a separate force named PLA Rocket Force (missile force) indicates China’s intention to further bolster its missile capabilities.

Similarly, the increasing number of missile tests under the current North Korean regime has also added to Japan’s security concerns. The enhanced capability of the North Korean missiles makes early detection and interception more difficult, thereby posing new challenges for information gathering, early warning, and interception preparedness of Japan.6 The ballistic trajectory in two of such tests in 2017 passed over the islands of Japan with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, warning of more such tests in near future,7 forcing Japan to consider reviewing its defence doctrine.

A section of the political leadership in Japan has been of the view that with the advancing offensive capability of the adversaries, sole reliance on the US missile shield is not enough and the nation needs to acquire a pre-emptive strike capability. The current missile shield does not offer credible protection against highly advanced hypersonic missiles/weapons (high speed and manoeuvring), low trajectory missiles (with short flight times) and cruise category of missiles (both terrestrial and air-launched). The present consideration is to acquire a pre-emptive strike capability to hit the ballistic missiles sites when the attack against Japan appears imminent – to prevent the missile launches.

In fact, the defence-related policies of Japan have been undergoing transformation since the first decade of the current millennium.  It was largely effected by China’s growing military capabilities and assertiveness in the region. The transformation began with the establishment of a ministry of defence with the approval of the Japanese Diet on January 9, 2007.8 Higher defence management was also revamped with the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) and development of the National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2013.9 Major highlights of its journey in the last two decades are collated in its annual defence white papers.

The current firmness in the idea of pre-emptive strike capability against missile threats seems to have been borne out of compulsion of the prevailing situation in the region, though since 2010, the Japanese forces have adopted a Dynamic Defence Capability doctrine not bound by purely defence concepts. In 2018, they started on the development of Multi-Domain Defence Force, however, all this while they have continued to evade the pre-emptive strike aspect. With the advancement of weapons technology, the adequacy of the current missile defence based on anti-ballistic missiles is increasingly being questioned. In that line of thought, Japan has suspended its plan to acquire the Aegis Ashore despite the progress made towards its acquisition.

Japan’s quest for pre-emptive strike capability indicates a major shift in its defence doctrine. Given the worsening regional security environment, Japan does not seem to have much choice.  Reference to the pre-emptive aspect may have so far evaded Japan’s annual defence white papers, but conjectures of its inevitability are rife in media. It is only a matter of time before Japan takes up such an offensive defence doctrine carrying a high possibility of conflict initiation/escalation with it.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Provisional Translation of Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe”, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, June 18, 2020 (Accessed July 23, 2020); and Brad Glosserman, “Japan's strike options assume new urgency”, The Japan Times, June 22, 2020 (Accessed July 08, 2020). Earlier, on March 30, 2017, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga had stated in a press conference that a proposal on pre-emptive strike capability submitted by the Liberal Democratic Party (Prime Minister Abe’s party) was under serious consideration. See “Provisional Translation of Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary (Excerpt)”, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, March 30, 2017 (Accessed July 23, 2020).
• 2. Brad Glosserman, no.1.
• 3. “69% oppose change to Japanese Constitution's war-renouncing Article 9, poll shows”, The Japan Times, June 22, 2020 (Accessed July 12, 2020).
• 4. “The Constitution of Japan”, Chapter II – Renunciation of War, Article 9, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (Accessed July 08, 2020).
• 5. “2020 Defense of Japan”, Defence White Paper Digest, Japan Ministry of Defense,2020 (Accessed July 09, 2020).
• 6. Ibid
• 7. Jesse Johnson, “North Korean missiles again flying over Japan ‘only a matter of time,’ experts say”, The Japan Times, January 02, 2020 (Accessed July 09, 2020).
• 8. Kishore Kumar Khera, “Japan’s Self-Defense Forces: A Decade after Reorganisation”, Journal of Defence Studies, 12 (4), October-December 2018, pp. 57-83.
• 9. Ibid.

The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) that emerged from Wuhan in China in December 2019 has engulfed almost every country in the world. Critics accuse the Chinese Government of hiding information and mishandling the deadly virus. Some countries, led by the United States (US), have even called it the “Chinese virus”.1 They have also accused the World Health Organisation (WHO) of collaborating with China and providing misinformation about the spread of the virus. However, most of the countries have avoided getting into the politics of it. The European Union (EU) had to tone down its report on China’s state-backed “global disinformation campaign” on the issue, as it feared that China might retaliate by withholding the much-needed medical supplies.2 The West Asian (or the Middle East) countries too have largely stayed out of the blame game and remain neutral.

With the US revitalising its domestic petroleum production through fracking and reducing dependency on the West Asian sources, it is likely to be a relatively less valuable customer than China. Today, Beijing is one of the region’s lead trade partners, importing about 40 per cent of its crude from the countries in West Asia.3 Furthermore, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the capacity to invest and build infrastructure in developing countries, including in the health and education sector, have heightened the expectations among countries of the region. They view China as a potential source for diversifying their revenue streams amid apparent US retrenchment.

Besides, the way China has managed to control the outbreak and move towards economic recovery – while the European powers and the US and Russia have struggled – makes it a more attractive development partner amid the ongoing pandemic. The West Asian countries have in general been supportive of China especially as it struggled to contain the spread of the virus. On several occasions, the Burj Khalifa tower in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was lit up with China’s national flag and the slogan “Wuhan Jiayou” (stay strong, Wuhan).4 Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait had initially donated medical supplies worth millions to China.5 In a surprising move, Turkey even ordered its local factories that normally manufactured clothing to produce antibacterial suits for supply to China.6

Meanwhile, in order to regain trust and portray itself as a benign pillar of international cooperation, China has resorted to soft diplomacy including in West Asia. Beijing is helping countries in the region to strengthen their healthcare infrastructure and has also provided medical and humanitarian supplies.

Seizing the Opportunity

President Donald Trump’s unilateral decision to withdraw US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, and the subsequent adoption of a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, has provided Tehran with an opportunity to strengthen its ties with Beijing to escape global economic isolation. Iran considers China as one of its few trade outlets and a powerful ally in the international community. Whereas for China, Tehran is singularly crucial for strengthening BRI in the region.7

Iran was among the first countries to express its sympathies and send millions of medical masks to China.8 It also strongly condemned international criticism of the WHO and what it considered as groundless accusations against China.9 This speaks volumes about the nature of the relationship between the two countries. 

The coronavirus soon unleashed havoc in Iran, making it the worst-affected country in the region. As of June 30, 2020, there were 227,662 confirmed cases and 10,817 deaths officially reported in the country.10 China expressed its support by supplying humanitarian goods and services,11 which assumes symbolic significance as the US attempts to bar Iran’s request for a $5 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).12 China had also asked the US to ease sanctions on Iran, stating that they hamper Tehran’s ability to respond to the humanitarian crisis within the country and also makes it difficult for the United Nations (UN) and other international relief organisations to deliver aid.13

Similarly, Turkey, the second worst-hit country in the region, with 199,906 confirmed cases and 5,131 fatalities as of June 30,14 too has been looking to strengthen its strategic ties with China through trade and investment, and security and defence cooperation.15  Given the tensions with the European Union (EU) and the US, and also to reduce its reliance on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Turkey has been looking for increased economic and political cooperation with other major powers like Russia and China. For Beijing, Turkey’s strategic location renders it a vital component in BRI’s global framework.  At present, China provides essential supplies and other services including video conferencing between the medical experts of the two countries to share their experiences. Turkey is also reportedly using a “special drug” sent by China for patients suffering from the virus, cutting their time in intensive care from 11-12 to four days.16

However, the issue of Chinese treatment of its Turkic-speaking Uyghur Muslim population could continue to pose a challenge for the China-Turkey bilateral ties. It is reported that Uyghurs and other Turkic communities in China’s mass detention camps have limited or no access to healthcare or sanitation, leaving them extremely weak from malnutrition. This puts them at a much higher risk of infection from the virus.17 However, for now, both countries appear to be dealing with this issue amicably, keeping in mind their respective interests.

China has been helping the West Asian countries that have limited capacity to manufacture essential medical supplies. Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine have been provided ventilators, facemasks, swabs, test kits and protective gears for their doctors and paramedics. China has reportedly vowed to resist any attempts to cut off these exports.18

In Iraq, which has the world’s fifth-largest oil reserves and a strategic geopolitical location, China seems to have found the key as regards its aim to dominate trade across Asia and Europe. Iraq also serves as a bridge between Chinese shipping lanes in coastal countries like Israel, Turkey and several Gulf states.19 China has built a new Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) laboratory in Baghdad and has sent medical experts to the country to help contain the pandemic.20 The joint fight against COVID-19 will likely enhance cooperation and strengthen their strategic partnership.

The COVID-19 challenge has also provided China with an opportunity to further strengthen its ties with one of the US’ closest allies, Israel. Beijing has sent shipments of medical supplies21 and has fostered a partnership with Israel’s SmartAID healthcare company to set up laboratories and boost testing capacities in West Bank and Gaza to around 3,000 tests per day.22  Israel is a strong and technologically the most advanced country in the entire region. It remains a potential partner for China in areas like research and development, infrastructure projects, and science and technology. However, its stronger alliance with Washington limits its ties with Beijing despite cooperation on COVID-19. The US has expressed concerns about possible security consequences of increased cooperation between Israel and China.23 In the past, such concerns had forced many Israeli companies to withdraw from dealing with Chinese firms.24 China’s inflammatory rhetoric on Israel’s annexation of the Palestinian territories may become a source of tension in the future. Recently, the Chinese envoy to Israel stated that “all illegal acts” and “unilateral initiative aimed at legalizing settlement should be stopped immediately.”25 Though the Israeli Government did not issue an immediate response, it may not stay quiet in the long run. 

In the wake of COVID-19, China is also collaborating with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. For example, China and Saudi Arabia have signed a deal worth more than $264 million in which China agreed to provide nine million testing kits and build at least six major laboratories in Saudi Arabia to increase its capacity to test 50,000 people per day for coronavirus.26 Moreover, China has expressed sincere gratitude to the UAE for protecting the health of its nationals during the outbreak.27 The country hosts more Chinese nationals than any other country in the Gulf region. Beijing has also provided medical and humanitarian assistance to Abu Dhabi. It is planning to run clinical trials, without naming the vaccine, on the COVID-19 patients in the UAE in future.28 Interestingly, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are close allies of the US in the region.

In this time of crisis, when the US is engaged in dealing with several domestic issues, it seems to have little time for its allies and partners. President Trump’s public attitude towards America’s traditional allies in the region has not been entirely commensurate to their status. Meanwhile, China, with its deep pockets and alternative policy approaches, has been proactive in filling the space, challenging the American hegemony in world affairs. Beijing’s non-interference policy is a bonus for the leaders in the region.

Conclusion

China needs allies and markets to expand its economy. The COVID-19 crisis has given it an opportunity to further engage the West Asian countries where basic health infrastructure has been seriously affected by the pandemic. Providing medical assistance especially to conflict-prone countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine is part of China’s new soft diplomacy in the region, which is being heavily publicised by the Chinese state media’s Arabic-language outlets active in the region.29

China is also using the BRI ports and corridors to provide medical support to the countries in the region, for instance, the railway routes connecting Shanghai to Tehran and also Port Khalifa in Abu Dhabi. China has touted this as the “Health Silk Road”.30 It was in December 2015 when China’s National Health Commission first issued the guidelines for this initiative. Under the “Health Silk Road”, Beijing aims to improve health cooperation with the BRI countries. The objective is to increase the supply of Chinese drugs and other medical products across the globe. It also seeks to send health professionals to provide technical assistance and conduct training programmes in developing countries, and fund construction of hospitals and support capable pharmaceutical companies in building factories abroad.31 Countries like Iran, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could become much-valued pieces of this project.

In the Chinese perception, Israel is considered as the bridge to the US.32 Similarly, Turkey is the gateway to Europe and countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pivot countries in China’s global partnership network.

However, in West Asia, efforts to retain China’s attention reveals deeper insecurities about maintaining a relationship that is still fragile but considered as significant in times of COVID-19. While countries in the region will continue to follow a multi-vector foreign policy to expand their revenue streams, they are least likely to view China as a power that can replace the US in the region. China’s soft diplomacy in West Asia, particularly in times of pandemic, is more or less a way to improve its global image and recast itself as a responsible actor at relatively low cost, rather than a sign of any deeper commitment towards the region.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. See Donald J. Trump, Twitter Post, March 17, 2020, 4:21 AM.
• 2. Stuart Lau, “EU toned down report on Chinese disinformation after Beijing threatened ‘repercussions’, diplomatic sources say”, South China Morning Post, April 25, 2020.
• 3. “Factbox: Asia region is most dependent on Middle East crude oil, LNG supplies”, Reuters, January 08, 2020.
• 4. “Burj Khalifa lights up in red to show solidarity with China over coronavirus”, The Indian Express, February 04, 2020.
• 5. “Wang Yi Speaks by Phone with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani of Qatar”, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 01, 2020; and “Interview: Kuwait donates 3 mln USD medical supplies to China for fighting Covid-19: Chinese ambassador”, Xinhua, March 11, 2020.
• 6. “Turkish factory comes to China’s aid in Covid-19 fight”, Hurriyet Daily News, March 02, 2020.
• 7. China has invested around $3 billion to establish a high-speed rail connection linking Tehran, Qom and Isfahan; Kermanshah and Khosravi; and Tehran, Hamedan and Sanandaj. Beijing is also providing an additional $1.5 billion to electrify the Tehran-Mashhad trunk line. See Li Tianyang, “Belt & Road Initiative expands China-Iran cooperation”, China Daily, January 25, 2019.
• 8. Yang Sheng and Leng Shumei, “China returns favor with face masks, knowledge”, Global Times, March 01, 2020.
• 9. “Wang Yi Speaks by phone with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif”, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 15, 2020; “Iran Condemns US Move to Halt Funding to WHO”, Iran Front Page, April 15, 2020; and “Iran condemns US’ coronavirus blame game against China”, Mehr News Agency, May 16, 2020.
• 10. “Health Ministry Confirms 147 New Deaths Caused by COVID-19”, Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, June 30, 2020.
• 11. Zhang Hui, “China sends medics to Iran for virus control”, Global Times, February 29, 2020; and “China’s helps to Iran against coronavirus are unforgettable: Health Min Spox”, Iran Press, April 06, 2020.
• 12. Ian Talley and Benoit Faucon, “U.S. to Block Iran’s Request to IMF for $5 Billion Loan to Fight Coronavirus”, The Wall Street Journal, April 07, 2020.
• 13. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on March 16, 2020”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, March 16, 2020.
• 14. “Turkey's coronavirus caseload nears 200,000”, Daily Sabah, June 30, 2020.
• 15. “Stronger Turkish-Chinese strategic cooperation to support global stability”, Daily Sabah, July 03, 2020.
• 16. “Turkey using ‘special drug’ from China to treat coronavirus patients”, TRT World, March 23, 2020.
• 17. Munawwar Abdulla,“Coronavirus: China's Xinjiang camps are a neglected high-risk area and should be closed”, Hong Kong Free Press, February 08, 2020.
• 18. “China publishes timeline on Covid-19 information sharing, int'l cooperation”, Xinhua, April 06, 2020.
• 19. Daniel J. Samet, “China, Not Iran, Is the Power to Watch in Iraq”, The Diplomat, October 30, 2019.
• 20. “Chinese-Built Lab Inaugurated In Baghdad To Contain Covid-19”, Outlook India, March 25, 2020.
• 21. “China sends 12 million masks to Israel to fight coronavirus”, Jerusalem Post, April 12, 2020.
• 22. “With Approval From Israeli And Palestinian Authorities, BGI And AID Genomics Announce Emergency Covid-19 Testing Lab In Gaza”, PR Newswire, April 06, 2020.
• 23. Ivan Levingston,“U.S. Official Warns Israel About Chinese Investors Amid Crisis”, Bloomberg, May 03, 2020.
• 24. “Trump said to warn PM security ties could suffer due to Israel-China relations”, The Times of Israel, April 14, 2020.
• 25. “China welcomes efforts of Israel, Palestine in fighting Covid-19”, Xinhua, March 31, 2020.
• 26. “Chinese firm cooperates with Saudi Arabia to build six Covid-19 testing labs”, Global Times, April 27, 2020.
• 27. “UAE Foreign Minister Commends China’s Outbreak Response and Contribution”, China Daily, April 11, 2020.
• 28. “UAE launches world’s first phase III clinical trial of inactivated COVID-19 vaccine”, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation, June 24, 2020.
• 29. Mohammed Al-Sudairi, “Public Messaging’s Role in Shaping the Global Narrative of Coronavirus Outbreak”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, March 02, 2020.
• 30. “WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at high-level video conference on Belt and Road International Cooperation”, World Health Organisation, June 18, 2020.
• 31. “Major health exchange and cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative”, National Health and Family Planning Commission of the PRC, December 18, 2015.
• 32. Israel’s former ambassador to China, Matan Vilnai, once stated that “We are important for them (China), because they see us as a bridge to America.” The Chinese “are convinced that we can influence inside the U.S. on things that will serve China.” See “Israel’s International Relations: Israel-China Relations”, The Jewish Virtual Library, A Project of The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise (AICE).

On June 2, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed into law the country’s new nuclear strategy, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.”1 This is the first time that Kremlin has publicly released a strategic nuclear planning document. While largely in sync with Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine, the new six-page document, nevertheless, sheds light on the Kremlin’s nuclear rethink. This includes the rationale for a more robust nuclear deterrence and conditions that may entail the launch of nuclear weapons, including their ‘first use’.

Against the backdrop of these developments, several pertinent questions arise about the nature of Russia’s new nuclear strategy, the timing of its release, and the message it seeks to convey to its adversaries and allies alike.

A Recalibrated Strategy

Russia’s 2020 nuclear doctrine seeks to balance the rhetoric of using nuclear weapons with the document’s core emphasis on the strategy being ‘defensive by nature’. Russian nuclear weapons are viewed primarily through the prism of maintaining a credible deterrence against potential adversaries. It calls upon the Kremlin to leave no stone unturned to increase the nuclear threshold before contemplating the deployment of nuclear weapons as a last resort. In this context, the document’s focus on ‘inevitability of retaliation’ and inflicting ‘guaranteed unacceptable damage’ blends in with the widely acknowledged principles of nuclear deterrence.2

The strategy identifies six key ‘risks’ to Russia and its allies posed by Moscow’s adversaries which have the potential to translate into ‘threats’ that warrant ‘nuclear deterrence’. Some of the notable dangers include the build-up of nuclear forces and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and the deployment of missile defence including cruise and ballistic missiles in areas contiguous to Russia. In recognition of the new frontiers of modern-day warfare, the document also highlights the spectrum of threats emanating from the deployment of “missile defence assets and strike systems in outer space” as well as “non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directional energy weapons.”3 It reaffirms the view that Russian nuclear deterrence remains anchored in the triad of land, sea and air-based nuclear forces.

While the document does not single out Russia’s adversaries yet its tone and tenor clearly points to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as Moscow’s principal opponent. As stated in the document: “The Russian Federation implements its nuclear deterrence with regard to individual states and military coalitions (blocs, alliances) that consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary and that possess nuclear weapons and/or other types of weapons of mass destruction…”4

Interestingly, a paragraph under the section ‘essence of nuclear deterrence’ gives credence to the Western allegations of Russia having an ‘escalate to de-escalate strategy’ anchored in the use of tactical nuclear weapons to tip the balance in favour of Moscow. The nuclear document states that “In the event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or its allies”.5 On its face value, this can be interpreted as leaving the door open for Russia’s limited use of tactical nuclear weapons in a battle fought with conventional arms. However, the devil always lies in the details. The fact that this paragraph falls under the section ‘general provisions’ and not ‘conditions for the transition to the use of nuclear weapons’ highlights its nuanced underplay. Notably, the fallout of a nuclear conflict, albeit a limited one, in Russia’s periphery is unlikely to spare the Russian borderlands. It is, therefore, likely that the wording of this section, while upping the ante, has been deliberately kept ambiguous – a key hallmark of deterrence – to keep a conventionally superior opponent guessing about Russia’s next lethal move in the battle chessboard.

Arguably, ambiguity is the strength of this document. This is also reflected in the wording of the definition of ‘allies’ and ‘WMDs’. It is not clear if Russia will come to the aid of its allies and which allies will these be.    

Crucially, the nuclear strategy outlines four scenarios which may result in Russia launching its nuclear weapons. While maintaining an element of continuity with the 2014 Military Doctrine which justifies their usage in the event of a nuclear and WMD attack on Russia, the three additional premises raise the stakes further by bringing into equation the concept of ‘first strike’. These conditions include the receipt of reliable data on the launch of ballistic missiles targeting Russia and an existential threat to the country emanating from conventional weapons. Similarly, an attack against critical governmental or military sites that undermines Russia’s nuclear response can also trigger nuclear retaliation. This likely brings a massive cyber-attack, designed to cripple the Russian nuclear infrastructure, into the Kremlin’s ‘first use’ matrix.         

Timing and Signalling of Strategy

The timing of the release of the nuclear strategy may be attributed to Russia’s ongoing competition and confrontation with the West. Their rivalry in the nuclear theatre is particularly borne out by the recent collapse of landmark arms control agreements including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Open Skies treaties. The future outlook of even the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), formally known as ‘Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms’, considered a cornerstone of the United States (US)-Russia strategic stability, appears bleak. The US has already signalled the possibility of walking away from it.6 This American sentiment is anchored in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) which highlights Moscow’s ‘repeated violations’ of the strategic weapons control architecture.7

Notably, for Russia, these exclusive arms negotiations with the US have been a recognition of its position as a key pole in global affairs. They have intrinsic leverage in Moscow’s ties with the US. These negotiations not only help Moscow project itself as a responsible global actor but also negate the perception of it being isolated on the global stage. With the New START Treaty due to expire in February 2021, time could be running out for Russia to salvage the Treaty. The new nuclear strategy could be Russia’s last roll of the dice to force the US back to the negotiating table. Russia’s pressure tactics appear to have had an incipient effect as Washington has invited Moscow for nuclear talks, scheduled to be held in June 2020, after months of dithering.8   

Today, nuclear weapons are Russia’s proverbial insurance against Western conventional military superiority. In this context, the core security stakes for Moscow have never been higher, especially at a time when the US has upped the ante by outlining its intentions of modernising its nuclear arsenal.9 This may erode the nuclear parity between the two strategic competitors who have increasingly viewed each other as an adversary. As such, the new nuclear document conveys Russia’s determination to maintain the existing nuclear equilibrium with the US. Failure of the upcoming talks could open up the prospect of a new arms race between the world’s two biggest nuclear powers unchained by strategic arms control agreements.

Moreover, given the US attempts to contain Russia in its neighbourhood, the nuclear document also highlights Russia’s red lines which, if breached, may lead to nuclear retribution. These ostensibly include NATO’s build-up in Eastern Europe, military exercises in Russia’s periphery, installation of missile defence and development of outer space weapons. The reference to ‘protecting Russia’s territorial integrity’ likely signals the non-negotiable status of Crimea. Arguably, this strategy seeks to overcome Russia’s perceived power asymmetries and vulnerabilities. The document, therefore, can be seen through the lens of Russia’s strategic communication with the US, at a time when prospects of negotiations are fast depleting.

Notably, Russia’s red lines put NATO’s East European members in Moscow’s nuclear crosshairs. The Kremlin would likely have factored in its nuclear doctrine the frayed trans-Atlantic partnership which has led European countries to question the reliability of the US security umbrella. Perhaps, by raising the nuclear stakes, Russia is seeking to tap the latent European fear of abandonment, which has led the European Union (EU) to focus on achieving greater self-reliance and strategic autonomy, and build a détente with the European continent. The Kremlin could also be signalling the potential NATO members of the nuclear threats that lurk in the membership of the military alliance. On the contrary, the document, while not being the Holy Grail, may end up strengthening the prevailing Russophobia in the West.   

Interestingly, the nuclear document has reaffirmed the evolving Russia-China entente. Over the last few years, there has been a growing understanding between Moscow and Beijing over each other’s core security concerns. This sentiment was aptly reflected in the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s response to Moscow’s new nuclear strategy. The spokesperson stated that “China respects and understands Russia's efforts to safeguard its national security interests”. Highlighting their shared global apprehensions, the spokesperson, in an oblique reference to the US, went on to add that “rising unilateralism and hegemonism in international strategic security is having a severe impact on global strategic equilibrium and stability”.10

Notably, the US had labelled both Russia and China as ‘revisionist powers’ and ‘strategic rivals’ in its 2018 National Defence Strategy and 2017 National Security Strategy.11 Nevertheless, given the chequered Sino-Russian history, lingering suspicions of each other and with balance of current ties tilting towards China, the core message of Moscow’s nuclear deterrence and ‘first use’ is unlikely to have been lost on Beijing. The fact remains that China continues to quantitatively and qualitatively improve both its nuclear and conventional arsenal while its military budget dwarfs Russia’s. At its current pace, the strategic military parity between them might not be too distant in the horizon. 

Summing Up

Overall, Russia’s new nuclear strategy is both a tactical and a strategic document. There are elements of ambiguity as well as the postulation of clear red lines. This could be seen as a calculated move that leaves the door open for adversaries to recalibrate their strategies while giving Russia the scope to manoeuvre the ongoing turbulence in its ties with the US. It can even open up new avenues of strategic negotiation between the world’s two most formidable nuclear powers. For now, a nuclear conflict between them may not be inevitable. However, in the current hostile climate, there is no gainsaying of the dangers of a nuclear flashpoint lurking in the background.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Об Основах государственной политики Российской Федерации в области ядерного сдерживания” (Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence), President of Russia, June 02, 2020 (Accessed June 03, 2020). For the English version, see “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”, Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation of June 02, 2020, No. 355, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, June 08, 2020 (Accessed June 22, 2020).
• 2. Ibid.
• 3. Ibid.
• 4. Ibid.
• 5. Ibid.
• 6. “Trump Will Withdraw From Open Skies Arms Control Treaty”, The New York Times, May 21, 2020 (Accessed June 15, 2020).
• 7. “Nuclear Posture Review”, U.S. Department of Defence, February 26, 2018 (Accessed June 15, 2020).
• 8. “Trump Envoy to Begin Nuclear Talks with Russia as Key Treaty Hangs in the Balance”, The Washington Post, June 10, 2020 (Accessed June 15, 2020).
• 9. “Trump Administration Discussed Conducting First U.S. Nuclear Test in Decades”, The Washington Post, May 22, 2020 (Accessed June 15, 2020).
• 10. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, June 03, 2020 (Accessed June 15, 2020).
• 11. See “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America”, U.S. Department of Defence, 2018; and “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, The White House, December 2017 (Accessed June 16, 2020).

Commercial negotiations are virtually the last stage in the long-drawn capital procurement process. Negotiations are conducted with the lowest bidder or L1 by a Contract Negotiation Committee (CNC), which is mandated to submit its report within six weeks of the deliberations beginning in purchases from single vendors, and in 18-26 weeks if there are multiple potential suppliers.1 

It is widely accepted that negotiations take an inordinately long time, so the question is whether it is possible for these negotiations to be concluded swiftly?

To put the issue in perspective, a vendor is invited for price negotiation only after carrying out:

1. Technical, staff and commercial evaluations to ensure that the intended offer complies with all the relevant terms stipulated in the Request for Proposal (RfP);
2. Field evaluation trials (FET) to ensure that the proffered equipment meets the stipulated performance parameters; and
3. Cost comparison with other bidders who too qualify to ensure that the price quoted by the vendor being invited for negotiation is the lowest.

With all compliances so ensured, the only major issue that remains to be discussed is the ‘reasonability’ of the price quoted by L1, where it varies from the benchmark price determined before the commercial bids are opened. It inevitably follows, or should follow, that in instances where the quoted price is within the benchmarked amount, there is no need for negotiations. To persist would merely be to belabour something already established.

This is borne out by DPP 2016 which states that where the price quoted by the vendor is found to be within the benchmark price, “there should be no need to carry out any further price negotiations”.2

The DPP’s provision further states that the RfP “in multi-vendor cases should clearly lay down that no negotiations would be carried out with the L1 vendor once the reasonability of the price quoted by the vendor is established”3 (emphasis added).

There is no reason why similar logic should not also apply in single-vendor cases. In practice, however, negotiations are held in practically all the multi-vendor and single-vendor cases because several issues, other than reasonability of price, are left unresolved at the pre-CNC stages. These are only taken-up during the CNC deliberations.

Consequently, negotiations are not confined only to haggling over the price, but also extend to other commercial issues like the release of advance and ‘milestone-related’ payments.

Extended time is also spent on determining technical issues such as inspection and acceptance test procedures, warranty, engineering support packages and delivery schedules. At times, foreign vendors tend to seek changes in certain standard clauses of contract4 related to legal matters and arbitration, or inclusion of ‘limitation of liability clauses’ 5 which intrinsically are not a part of the prescribed contract template.

But they do so, notwithstanding the fact that there is no indication whatsoever in the RfP that such issues would be negotiable at a later stage. It is also not uncommon for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to seek new add-ons within the price quoted by the vendor, especially if the vendor does not agree to lower the price. In short, it is like getting a bigger bang for the buck at the same price, akin to a bargain basement buy.

Taking all these shortcomings into account it is small wonder that negotiations tend to be stretched over extended periods. It is this ambivalence about what should, and what should not, be negotiable at the CNC stage that is the crux of the problem and the ensuing delays. Finetuning negotiation protocols and limiting the scope of negotiations should, in all likelihood, result in rapid conclusion of negotiations and contract finalisation.

Following are some tentative ideas on how this can be achieved:

Firstly, vendors should be encouraged to give specific inputs whilst responding to the Request for Information (RfI), on assorted aspects of the proposed acquisition, which they would like the MoD to consider. This could concern difficulty in meeting indigenous content requirement, delivery schedules, stage payments or addition to/deletion of/modification of any clause in the standard contract document.

The MoD should seriously consider these prospective inputs before seeking the Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) and drafting the RfP. If considered necessary, MoD can hold consultations with the vendors at this stage through videoconferencing.

Secondly, it should be made clear in the RfP that its contents have been finalised after considering all inputs provided by the vendors and accordingly its terms and conditions fall broadly into three categories:

1.     Contractual clauses, like those concerning law, arbitration, force majeure (to be exhaustively listed in the RfP) which will be non-negotiable.
2.     Terms requiring definitisation during the evaluation process. These could include issues like acceptance test trial, inspection, and delivery schedule, which can be finalised between the vendor and the user directorate/inspection organisation at the pre-CNC stage. There is no special advantage of deferring them for discussion in CNC.
3.      Price and any other issues – to be clearly specified and quantified – which will be negotiable in the CNC meeting, if required.

Thirdly, the MoD should be open to the idea of amending the RfP if it emerges during the pre-bid meeting and that not doing so could result in an impasse at a subsequent stage or, worse, breakdown of negotiations. This, of course, will need a sea-change in approach as currently all pre-bid meetings are invariably inflexible on the parameters of the RfP, however technologically ambitious it may be.

Fourthly, the agenda for the CNC meeting should be prepared in consultation with the vendor, limiting it to the negotiable issues in keeping with the RFP terms. Presently, the agenda is generally prepared by the MoD for internal consumption but adopting the former approach will give both sides the opportunity to be prepared for discussion. Calling upon the vendor to justify his price too should become a standard practice. All definitised agreements reached between the vendor and the technical authorities at the pre-CNC stage can be taken on record by CNC without any further discussion.

It also needs to be ensured that those participating in such meetings have the authority to take on-the-spot decisions, making it possible to conclude negotiations in continuous back-to-back sittings. All minutes of these meetings should be prepared immediately, authenticated by the negotiating parties and shared with the vendor. The minutes should be self-contained as this will help in submission of the CNC report immediately after completion of the negotiations, an activity which presently takes long.

The protocol suggested above will, of course, need refining but it could help in expeditious contract negotiation conclusion. Some steps, like pre-RfP and pre-bid meetings, can also be conducted through videoconferencing to save time. All this will, however, work only if greater attention is paid to developing costing, benchmarking and negotiating skills on the part of officials concerned, than has been the norm so far.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. See Broad Time Frame for Procurement Activities, Appendix H to Chapter II, in “Defence Procurement Procedure 2016”, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, p. 101.
• 2. Ibid. Chapter II, Para 79, p. 26.
• 3. Ibid.
• 4. Ibid. Para 44, Schedule 1 to Chapter II – RFP Format, p. 114.  According to DPP 2016, the bidder is required to accept the standard clauses regarding agents, the penalty for use of undue influence and integrity pact, access to books of accounts, law, and arbitration, which are later to be incorporated in the contract.
• 5. This clause typically limits the vendor’s exposure to the amount of potential damages if a lawsuit is filed against it. For more information, see “What are Limitation of Liability Clauses in Contracts”, UpCounsel.