Hu Jintao's recent foreign visits are integral to China's foreign policy strategy of building partnerships around the world. As part of this strategy the Chinese President visited the United States, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya last month. The official Chinese position hailed these visits as an important part of the PRC's diplomatic policies. It said that China attaches considerable importance to relations with developed countries such as the United States, while at the same time giving equal importance to building up traditional friendly ties with developing countries thus injecting a new energy into South-South co-operation. This overarching strategy of building partnerships is motivated by the principal goal of maintaining a peaceful environment to support China's internal growth and domestic stability. While China's foreign policy objectives are indeed driven by domestic considerations, its proactive policies indicate a fundamental shift in its foreign policy, which is intended to create an international system favourable to itself and in which the United States would no longer be the sole super power.

Most analyses on Hu Jintao's visit to the US have portrayed it as inconclusive. On the three thorny issues from the US point of view - the North Korea nuclear impasse, the Iran nuclear programme and the US-China trade deficit - China does not seem to have relented on any. On North Korea, China seems happy with the status quo since any change in that country would affect China's domestic stability. On Iran, China does not want Tehran to go nuclear but it is opposed to any use of sanctions, which would impinge on its energy co-operation with Tehran. On the issue of trade deficit, China thinks it is "unscientific" to blame it alone and that its policies are mainly driven by the objective of peace at home.

Besides these, China maintains its own stand on other contentious issues as well - Taiwan, human rights and democracy. It staunchly vows to oppose Taiwan's secession from the mainland. For the first time on October 19, 2005, China came out with a White Paper that clarified its position on democracy by stating that democracy should evolve out of local conditions, should have local characteristics, and should cater to local needs. On human rights, China retorts back with its own criticisms of the US human rights position. China thus firmly opposes Western or US intervention and is unwilling to toe the Bush line. Instead, its foreign policy pronouncements on most contentious issues indicate that it has emerged as a confident power intent on setting its own rules in the international system.

Indeed, instead of calling itself a mere "stakeholder," as the US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick did while described China's role in the international system, the Chinese President prefers to describe his country as a "partner" in constructive co-operation. Hu Jintao stated that China and the US "shared extensive and important strategic interests in safeguarding world peace and promoting mutual development." The Chinese Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxing, hailed Hu's visit to the US as "carrying the constructive and cooperative relations between the two countries to a new stage." This new stage is marked by China's partnership with the US in promoting peace and stability in the world. China's April 2006 six-point proposal on bilateral ties with the United States underlined that "the two sides should maintain close consultation, take up challenges and strengthen communication and coordination on major international and regional issues." Hu's US visit should therefore be viewed not as aimed at achieving a breakthrough on any contentious issue but as a "crisis coping" strategy whereby China intends to play its leadership role in guiding global developments.

The elevation of China to the status of a global player is similarly evident in Hu's Afro-Asian tour to Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya right after his US visit. China is seeking to build a "strategic partnership" with Africa, which has added a new dimension to the emerging Sino-African ties. In fact, some scholars are talking about a "great game" being enacted in Africa between China and the US for access to natural resources. As opposed to the "Washington Consensus" typified by political liberalisation and economic reforms, China is seeking to create a kind of "Beijing Consensus" based on common development, strong belief in sovereignty, multilateralism and the principle of non-interference. Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former Foreign Editor of Time magazine who coined the term 'Beijing Consensus', sees its emergence in new attitudes to politics, development and the global balance of power.

Based on this consensus, Beijing unveiled an African Policy Paper on January 12, 2006 entitled 'China's African Policy,' which states that "China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached." On the issue of military co-operation, the policy paper outlined that China "will continue to help train African military personnel and support defence and army building of African countries for their own security." Hu's visits to the African nations were thus intended to advance "strategic partnerships" formulated in April 2005, broadly based on mutual political trust, mutual economic benefit and mutual assistance in international affairs. China signed twenty-eight accords with the four countries, covering politics, security, economy and trade, energy, education, health system, culture and tourism. Given that China does not dictate terms for political or economic reforms and only expects affirmation of the 'one China' policy, it is all the more welcome to African countries.

An assessment of Hu's recently concluded foreign tour suggests that China's foreign policy is essentially guided by the notion of harmonious development. It was in fact Hu Jintao who first put forward this notion at the United Nations 60th Anniversary Summit on September 15, 2005. It may be recalled that this notion has a striking similarity to the basic concepts of the controversial term - 'peaceful rise'. Chinese sources have enumerated some reasons behind the formulation of this new notion. First, it mainly germinated as a result of hegemony, which challenged peace and development of the contemporary world. Second, the idea of harmonious development is intrinsic to China's internal growth and domestic stability. Third, with this ideology in perspective, China seeks to promote its national interests. China has realised that economic strength alone would not propel it into the category of a major world power, for which purpose it should also be able to formulate rules for the international community. By formulating this notion of harmonious development, China seeks to portray itself as a responsible, confident and constructive power. Embedded in this notion are China's aspirations for a leadership role in international affairs.

China's proactive foreign policy strategy is thus aimed at not only protecting its security interests, but also at shaping its security environment conducive to its national interests and growth. This strategy seeks to build up an alternative international order, which would distinctly pose a formidable challenge to US unilateralism and global hegemony. It also provides a new vision to developing countries, which wish to move away from the US-dominated world order to an alternative international order characterised by the "Beijing Consensus". Chinese foreign policy seems to be determinedly moving towards creating such a consensus. It is to be seen how the future unravels and whether China really emerges as an alternative power centre.

During his four-day visit to the United States from April 18 to 21, 2006, President of the People's Republic of China (PRC) Hu Jintao attended a dinner hosted by Microsoft founder Bill Gates, visited the Boeing plant at Seattle, met President George W. Bush at the White House, attended a dinner hosted by US business firms like Wal-Mart, General Motors, Citigroup and Walt Disney and addressed the Yale University in New Haven. While bilateral economic and trade issues dominated this visit, an uneasy partnership is evolving between the two countries on issues related to global and regional challenges, political issues and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The context of the visit provides for some interesting insights into the dynamics of the US-China relations. Firstly, this is the first such visit by Hu after assuming all the top positions of political and military power in China. Although, American and Chinese leaders met several times at different fora, official bilateral visits have been few. US Presidents visited China 10 times: in 1972 (Nixon), 1975 (Ford), 1979 (Carter), 1984 (Reagan), 1989 (Bush Sr.), 1997 (Clinton), 1998 (Clinton), 2001 (Bush for the APEC meeting at Shanghai), 2002 (Bush), and in 2005 (Bush). High-level Chinese leaders made seven visits to the US during this period: Deng Xiaoping as Vice Premier in 1979, Premier Zhao Ziyang in 1984, President Li Xiannian in 1985, President Jiang Zemin in 2002, Premier Wen Jiabao in 2002, Hu Jintao first as Vice President in 2002 and now as President in 2006.

Secondly, China's assumption of the presidency of the United Nations Security Council in April 2006 gives it a certain leverage on issues that are a cause of discomfort for the US. These are related to Iran's nuclear programme, Sudan and human rights. While China has not used its veto power in UNSC on issues other than Taiwan, it has the potential to block any sanctions or use of force on other countries.

Thirdly, the recent period has been witness to a schism in US and Chinese policies towards the other. Chinese policy is in the process of a gradual transformation from the economy as focus to contesting, in various degrees, US "hegemony and power politics" in Asia and beyond. China has assiduously worked to build coalitions in Asia, Africa and South America to keep the US influence away and enhance its own position and leadership. Recently concluded sessions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the East Asian Summit, Sino-Russian joint exercises, and the like, point towards this direction. On the US side, high-level officials like Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld have expressed concerns on the growing Chinese military might and its possible impact on the US in Asia or other regions. A month before Hu's visit, Rice, during a trip to Australia, expressed "concern" over Chinese military capabilities. Rumsfeld criticized, at his speech in Singapore in June 2005, the Chinese defence budget hike though no country threatens China. The recent assessments of US National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defence Review advocated the necessity to follow a "hedge" strategy against a possible superpower in China. The latest strategy envisages redeployments of US assets and refurbishments at Guam and in Asia. On the other hand, reflecting the strengthening of its "engagement" policy, the US has upgraded interactions with China. The US dialogue with China has intensified, though this has been downgraded with other Asian countries. These include "senior dialogues" by Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick, Treasury Department, Departments of State and Energy in the recent period. Indeed, Zoellick, Rice and others have argued in favour of incorporating China within the ambit of US strategy if China behaves as a "responsible stakeholder in the international system."

Fourthly, in order to placate the US, China has announced multi-billion dollar deals. In general, China has followed such tactics to woo Western countries by giving "concessions" such as in business deals, releasing dissidents or announcing counter proliferation measures. Accordingly, a week before Hu's visit, China purchased nearly US$16 billion of American goods, including 80 Boeing aircraft (worth about $4.6 billion), agricultural and IT products. During his stopover at Seattle, Hu mentioned that China is planning to purchase about 2,000 planes in the next 15 years. This is probably a response to calls for bridging the Chinese trade surplus with the US worth about $202 billion in 2005. While Taiwan's Legislative Yuan is yet to clear a pending bill to buy $18 billion worth arms from the US, China appeared to be wooing the most appealing of all among US interests - multibillion dollar business deals. Also, before embarking on his US visit, Hu hosted a red-carpet ceremony to visiting Kuomintang leader Lien Chen and called for resuming "talks [with Taiwan] on an equal footing as soon as possible" and reminded him of the 1992 consensus on "one China". This is in response to Taiwan President Chen Shuibian's abolition of the national unification council in February 2006.

Eventually, the meeting between Hu and Bush was not without its usual pinpricks that characterize China's relations with the outside world. Although these were not decisive in affecting bilateral relations, they do point towards underlying tensions. The US downgraded Hu's visit to that of an official "working visit" rather than a state visit. Seventeen Taiwanese protested at Lafayette Park near the White House. Wang Wenyi, a reporter with Epoch Times, protested in the White House lawns against Chinese curbs on the Falun Gong. An announcer at the White House referred to the PRC as Republic of China. Hu, for his part, made critical references to, in his speech at Yale University, "ideological obstacles and prejudices" towards China in the United States.

Discussions between the two leaders indicated further divisions, though they both agreed to enhance bilateral trade and cooperation. Hu said that by this visit Beijing wanted "to enhance dialogues, expand common ground, deepen mutual trust and cooperation and to promote the all-around growth of constructive and cooperative China-U.S. relations in the 21st century." The two countries, according to Hu, share "important common strategic interests" including economic co-operation and trade, security, public health, energy, and environmental protection. Hu argued for a diplomatic solution to the North Korean and Iranian issues "in a manner that benefits both countries."

Though Bush supported "the emergence of China that is peaceful and prosperous, and that supports international institutions," he termed overall relations as "candid and cooperative," which reflected tensions on issues related to Taiwan, limited US access to Chinese markets, currency exchange rate reform, intellectual property rights violations, etc. While opposing any "unilateral changes in the status quo by either side" in the Taiwan Straits, Bush nudged Hu to do more on the North Korean imbroglio, institute freedom of religion, assembly and Internet. These views provide for a wide difference in the respective agendas of the two countries and reflect a certain uneasiness in managing bilateral relations that have been acquiring strategic proportions in the recent period.

The killing of Kasula Suryanarayana, an Indian telecommunications engineer working for a Bahrain based firm in the Zabul Province of Afghanistan raises important questions on the emerging challenges to India's efforts at reconstruction and stabilization of a "nascent democracy". Suryanarayana was reportedly abducted by the Taliban on April 28 and his abductors linked his safe release to the withdrawal of all Indians working in Afghanistan. Even before the Indian government's special team reached Kabul to negotiate his release, Suryanarayana's beheaded body, with apparent torture marks, was recovered on April 30 at Hassan Kariez district of Zabul, clearly indicating that the Taliban, ever defiant to international norms of engagement, had no intent to negotiate. The message they wanted to convey was one of terror and intimidation.

Suryanarayana's gruesome killing was not the first instance of an Indian falling victim to the increasing attacks on aid workers by the resurgent Taliban. In November 2005, Maniappan Kutty, a driver working with the Border Roads Organisation's project of building the Zaranj-Delaram highway, was abducted and killed by the Taliban. On November 8, 2003, an Indian telecommunications engineer working for the Afghan Wireless Company was shot dead. In 2003, two Indian engineers - P Murali and G Vardharai working on a road project in Zabul province were abducted. Their release three weeks later came about after intense negotiations by Afghan tribal leaders with the Taliban militia, which was demanding the release of 50 imprisoned militants in return for the Indian engineers. Such incidents raise concerns about the safety of Indians working on reconstruction projects in this conflict-ravaged country. Suryanaraya's killing has led to demands that the Indian government provide security to all Indian citizens working in Afghanistan. After Maniappan's killing, the strength of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) contingent in Afghanistan was augmented to about 200. New Delhi's proposal of deploying its paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel is under consideration by the Afghanistan government.

It is essential to view Suryanarayana's killing in the context of the overall deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. The US-led efforts at stabilization and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan have long been eclipsed by developments in Iraq since 2003. As a result, the resurgent Taliban is increasingly spreading its tentacles of influence. By targeting development and aid workers, they are impeding reconstruction and at the same time creating fear in the minds of Afghans. A report released by the Council on Foreign Relations provided a grim picture of Afghanistan's security as a country "challenged by a terrorist insurgency that has become more lethal and effective and that has bases in Pakistan, a drug trade that dominates the economy and corrupts the state, and pervasive poverty and insecurity." In the year 2005, about 1,600 people, including 91 US troops, were killed - almost double the total number in 2004. The trend in Afghanistan points to "Iraqisation of Afghanistan," with suicide attacks, a technique alien to Afghan culture, on the rise. Taliban-induced violence is expected to rise this summer as the British-led NATO force gradually takes over control from American troops in the south.

The resurgence of the Taliban is seen especially in areas that share a border with Pakistan. A May 3, 2006 report in the New York Times portrays a grim security situation in Afghanistan, indicating an increase in Taliban activity in provinces like Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Ghazni and Paktika. Zabul province, from where the Taliban cross into Afghanistan via Pachena and Anganay from neighbouring Quetta in Pakistan, is the main route of their movement to the southern provinces. Qalat, the provincial capital of Zabul province, is headed by the Taliban commander Mullah Assadullah. Zabul also elected Mulla Abdul Salaam Rocketi, an ex-Taliban commander, to the Afghan Parliament in September 2005. Likewise, other districts headed by former Taliban are: Dai Chopan district (Mullah Dadullah), Atghar district (Mullah Razaq), Khake Afghan district (Mullah Qahar), Arghandab and Mizan (Amir Khan Haqqani). Due to the support and sanctuary offered by Pakistan to the Taliban, President Karzai has little choice but to accommodate the "moderate Taliban" into the political mainstream through the "Reconciliation Process" and thereby maintain some measure of influence over them. Karzai, during his recent visit to Pakistan in February 2006, provided President Pervez Musharraf with evidence of Islamabad's continued patronage of the Taliban.

The increasing Indian presence in reconstruction activity (1,500 to 2,500 workers) has, however, irked Pakistan and its Afghan protégés. Pakistan has raised objections to India opening consulates in Jalalabad, Herat and Kandahar and is also opposed to India's deployment of paramilitary forces in Afghanistan along areas close to its borders. With instability challenging Islamabad's authority in Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan has concerns about "Pushtun nationalism" raising its head. In its second annual "failed states" index, Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace have categorised Pakistan as "another troubled country," which has plunged from 34th on a list of failed states in 2005 to the ninth slot this year (lower than Afghanistan, which ranks 10th in a list of 60 most vulnerable States). Pakistan's inability to quell insurgency in the Pakistan-Afghan border and internal discord are major factors that have led to Pakistan's high score on the Failed States Index.

The recent killing of the Indian engineer as well as similar incidents in the past can also be seen in the context of India's growing and favourable profile in Afghanistan. India, the largest regional donor to Afghanistan, has in the last four years pledged $650 million in a slew of projects. Apart from supplying skilled manpower, constructing roads, hospitals, power transmission lines, the Afghan parliament and other government buildings, the nature of the Indian engagement is broad-based spanning diverse sectors including economy, education, technology, infrastructure, health, education, agriculture, industry, telecommunications, information and broadcasting. During President Karzai's visit to India in April 2006 and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's earlier visit to Afghanistan in August 2005, the two countries decided to strengthen cooperation in economic development and in fighting terrorism. India's engagement with Afghanistan is vital for its ongoing battle against terrorism and curtailing the influence of terror outfits in Jammu and Kashmir - Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat ul-Jihad-i-Islami, which derive moral and material support from the trans-border Taliban-Al Qaeda nexus.

In developing a balanced policy response, India should unmistakably signal that there would be no downsizing of the Indian presence in Afghanistan. Any policy movement in that direction would be seen as a victory for the Taliban and could encourage them to indulge in further intimidation. Apart from revamping the security arrangements and sending in more paramilitary forces, India can look towards significantly expanding its assistance in the training and arming of Kabul's security forces, including the Afghan National Army and police. While maintaining its policy of not yielding to the demands of hostage takers, New Delhi needs to strengthen its capacity for information collection, risk assessment and crisis management to deal effectively with similar such crises that could well arise in future. As an important power in the region, India needs to play a key role in the reconstruction and stability in Afghanistan and also in preventing that country from remerging as a "playing ground" for regional powers and their proxies.

Nepal is witnessing relative political calm after the Maoists declared a three month ceasefire to facilitate a political solution to the insurgency, which has been marked by unabated violence, threatening peace and stability in the Himalayan Kingdom. The Maoist insurgency, which originated ten years ago in April 1996, has reached a new phase. After several rounds of unsuccessful negotiations to resolve the political crisis posed by the Maoists in the past, the current situation is characterized by anxiety and hope. The anxiety is over whether a peaceful solution can be reached. Hope arises because of the fact that there seems to be a certain convergence of interests between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists. After nineteen days of demonstrations, initiated by the political parties and supported by the Maoists, the King caved in to the spontaneity of anger expressed against his rule in the streets of Nepal. With the restoration of the suspended Parliament and swearing in of Mr. G P Koirala as the Prime Minister of Nepal, the focus has now shifted to the two main actors - the SPA and the Maoists.

There are difficult tasks in front of the new government headed by G P Koirala. The perceptible uncertainty is evident as the Maoists wait for the government's announcement regarding elections to the Constituent Assembly. The new government has made an appeal to the Maoists to shun violence and give up arms. But the situation remains tricky, with the Maoists reluctant to give up arms before any concrete political settlement. Maoist support to the political process is backed by the twelve-point agreement that they signed with the political parties in November 2005, one of which stated that the political parties would form an interim government and hold elections to a Constituent Assembly. As is evident from various statements emanating from Kathmandu, the political parties have expressed their desire to hold elections to the Constituent Assembly.

Before the forthcoming elections there are certain issues that need to be thrashed out between the SPA and the Maoists. First, the question of disarming the Maoist cadres would be important before an election takes place. The Maoists, as per the agreement, have agreed that they would put their armed cadres along with the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) under some kind of UN or any other reliable international supervision so that there could be free and fair elections. It is likely that the Maoists would not agree to complete disarmament before the elections because of the existence of a trust deficit between the parties to the conflict. Therefore in their twelve-point agreement both the political parties and the Maoists have categorically stated that they expect reliable international mediation even during the dialogue process. The Maoists need to be convinced that the government is committed to an elected Constituent Assembly. As for the SPA, it needs to be convinced that the Maoists believe in the democratic process and would accept the outcome of the elections to the Constituent Assembly and their drafted constitution. It also seems impossible that the Maoists, without a credible commitment, perhaps an international guarantee, would give up their armed wing.

The Communist Party of India and its leaders played an important role in forging an agreement between the Maoists and the SPA. They were also instrumental in convincing the Maoists to declare a three-month ceasefire. How far the Indian Communist leaders would be able to convince the Maoists to adhere to the constitutional path remains to be seen. Given their recent positive role, they could indeed play a crucial part in Nepal's unfolding political future. At the same time, the Maoists want to give peace a chance due to international pressure.

The most important issue before the Constituent Assembly would be the future role of the King. It is difficult to believe that the Palace would remain a silent spectator and accept the decision of the Constituent Assembly about its future. The King still holds immense powers under the 1990 constitution and is in a position to dismiss the government using the controversial Article 127. He will remain the Supreme Commander of the armed forces until the new constitution of Nepal is written. He is an important third party and would try to retain a certain political role instead of simply being relegated to the role of a ceremonial monarch. Both the political parties and the Maoists have indicated that the future role of the King would depend on what the people of Nepal want. The existing situation is that there is certainly a consensus among the people regarding a less intrusive monarch, though perhaps people are not yet prepared for a Republic. The Monarchy as an institution still has socio-political relevance.

There is a need on the part of the political parties and the Maoists to tread carefully. They have been able to marginalize the King and there exists popular support for their efforts to draw up a new constitution. If the negotiation proves to be a long drawn one or if the Maoists leave the constitutional path, the King's position will get strengthened. Any failure on the part of the political parties could inevitably lead to the King's assumption of power. With the SPA in the process of consolidating power, the Maoists are waiting patiently for political progress along the agreed line.

India is waiting cautiously for the next political move of the Koirala government. It is also going to watch anxiously how the SPA and the Maoists work out the necessary modalities for an election to the Constituent Assembly. At the same time India is equally apprehensive that Nepal would face a deeper political crisis if the Maoists and the SPA do not reach an understanding. This will not only impinge on the credibility of the parties as political actors but in turn would strengthen the institution of the Monarchy. It is important to ensure that the Maoists do not use the cease-fire period to strengthen their armed wing and prepare for another phase of armed struggle. The resultant instability would have grave security implications for India, which shares a 1700 km open border with Nepal.