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Monday Morning on Capability Development Challenges in Indian Army

February 27, 2023

Monday Morning Meeting

Col. Manish Rana, SM, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Capability Development Challenges in Indian Army” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 27 February 2023. The session was moderated by Col. Rajneesh Singh (Retd.), Research Fellow. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

Capability development which is defined as a continuous process involving various stakeholders such as military planners, policymakers, procurement agencies, and industry planners holds great significance in the military domain, particularly in the context of the Indian Army's proposed acquisition of a Closed Quarter Combat (CQB) Carbine. However, impediments in the planning process and long-drawn procurement processes hamper capability development. Further, the missing collaboration and coordination among various stakeholders leads to lack of environment management and trust amongst multiple stakeholders.

The case study of CQB Carbine highlights the delays and challenges faced in its procurement due to environmental factors like a decade of defence procurement scam overdose, changes in defence procurement systems, and stakeholders' conflicting priorities. In this context, it is imperative to highlight the importance of effective collaboration and coordination among stakeholders and trust-building to expedite capability development.

Detailed Report

Colonel Rajneesh, Research Fellow, opened the session by bringing out the issues related to capability development and the budget availability for procuring new equipment for the Armed Forces. He brought out the dilemma of reduction of manpower to optimise the budget vis a vis higher allocations to Armed Forces. He also suggested alternatives like changes in doctrine, recruitment and retention, modernisation and operational responsibilities. He then handed over the floor to the speaker, Colonel Manish Rana, Research Fellow.

First and foremost, the speaker defined capability development as the process of acquiring and improving the Military's capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. It involves the identification of needs and developing strategies to meet them, ultimately resulting in the acquisition and development of new technologies, weapons systems and training programs. It was emphasised that capability development is a continuous process that can only be accomplished over a period of time. Colonel Rana observed that capability development involves a range of stakeholders, such as military planners, policymakers, procurement agencies and industry planners.

A glance at numerous write-ups on the subject suggests a shortage of funds, non-availability of indigenous capabilities, flaws in the planning process and long-drawn procurement processes are significant challenges to capability development in the Military domain. However, what needs to be more present in the academic research domain is the missing collaboration and coordination amongst various stakeholders leading to non-tangible issues of lack of environment management and trust amongst multiple stakeholders. While structurally and intent-wise, all these stakeholders are brought together to ensure the desired capability is acquired in the most efficient and time-bound manner, in practice, these stakeholders have different, at times conflicting, priorities. There needs to be effective collaboration and coordination among these stakeholders. Especially for the Armed Forces management, not used to an organisational culture based on negotiation and compromise, the environment for executing capability development becomes challenging.

The speaker highlighted his assessment of capacity building through a case study, the proposed acquisition of a Closed Quarter Combat (CQB) Carbine for the Indian Army. A CQB Carbine has an effective range of around 200 metres. It is lightweight, manoeuvrable and has a high rate of fire while having less recoil. These attributes make a CQB Carbine ideal for close combat, such as urban warfare and counterinsurgency operations in dense jungles. They would go a long way to enhance the Army's capabilities. Indian Army used World War II vintage 9 mm SMG for close-quarter battle needs until the early 2000s. Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) produced the weapon, and production stopped in the early 2000s as the same was declared obsolete.

The INSAS program started in the 80s, in which modern assault rifles, light machine guns and CQB Carbine were to be developed indigenously and inducted into the Indian Army. Colonel Manish noted that India used to manufacture WW II vintage CQB Carbines at its ordinance factories until it was declared obsolete in the 1990s. When the INSAS family of weapons were introduced, the Carbine was not found suitable, and the search for a better alternative took off.

Despite knowing in 2000 that INSAS Carbine was not suiting the bill, the Request for Proposal for a fresh weapon was only initiated in 2008. Eight to ten years to initiate a case for a personal weapon is by no standards acceptable. Furthermore, the case could not be progressed as the Services Qualitative Requirements worked out were found to be too ambitious. One needs to look at the environmental realities of that time to understand why such a simple thing took so much time to get initiated. Firstly, it is obvious that despite the INSAS Carbine being found unsuitable, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) would have tried its best to continue pushing for its induction as a lot of time and money would have been invested in the program. The go-ahead for a separate procurement would only have come after DRDO efforts to continue would have convincingly exhausted. Secondly, the time being talked of coincides with an era of defence procurement scam overdose. The memory of the Kargil coffin scam, Tehelka scam and Scorpene deal scam even today gives goosebumps to people involved in defence procurement, what to say the paralysis they would have brought into the system at that time. Thirdly, the decade of 2000 to 2010 also is remembered for large-scale changes in the Defence procurement system. The Defence Procurement Procedure manual was first introduced in 2002 and underwent numerous amendments in 2005, 2006 and 2008. It is evident that the decade lost in progressing procurement of CQB Carbine (2000- 2010) was indeed a challenging decade for defence procurements in general. Hence, more than anything else, what delayed the CQB Carbines' induction in this decade was attributable primarily to environmental factors.

In 2010, a fresh Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued for the weapon. Trials took place from 2011-14, but the case hit another wall when one of the two vendors competing for the project failed the trials due to a minor issue. Therefore only a single vendor remained. Owing to the scam hangover of the previous decade, the officials were unenthusiastic about progressing with it due to the scrutiny that it may have generated due to a single vendor, and the case was stopped. This highlights the resistance amongst stakeholders to manage environmental issues and the need for more trust.

In 2014, the honourable Defence Minister directed that considering the operational necessity of the weapon, the Defence Ministry would opt for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route from the US. Despite the Defence Minister himself taking a strong stand on the issue, the case did not progress. In 2018, a fast-track process was initiated. In this option, a weapon currently in use in another armed force can be inducted without extensive trials. Caracal, a UAE-based arms manufacturer, was chosen as the supplier, and the contract was planned to be signed in 2019, and weapons were to be delivered by 2020. However, it was again cancelled due to issues not being in the open domain, highlighting a lack of trust. One can presume that environmental factors again influenced the case. Two significant factors that could have affected the decision may be the coming of age of indigenous industry and DRDO. Indian industry, which had so far been more or less a silent spectator in the case, had started acquiring certain capabilities and, combined with the clarion call for Atmanirbhar Bharat by our Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, had got adequately vitalised to start raising the ante for indigenous procurement of CQB Carbine. DRDO also, after improving its earlier versions, started production of a Carbine, which had started getting inducted into paramilitary forces in some quantities. The speaker observed that the opacity in such procedures, as highlighted above, leads to the propagation of conspiracy theories which is not in the interest of establishment.

A fresh RFP has now been issued in 2022, and the chase for a CBQ Carbine continues, about four decades after the need for it was felt. The speaker highlighted that in capability development, more often than not, circumstances arise wherein the procurements get unduly delayed, and there seem to be no apparent reasons. As per him, the main challenge is managing environmental issues and building trust amongst various stakeholders to avoid such a situation. He highlighted that the issue, being intangible, finds little discussion in the academic field. In the end, he suggested using the Systems approach and study of Organisational Culture to avoid the recurrence of such issues in defence procurement to assist capability development.

Q&A Session

The floor was opened for questions and comments, wherein scholars from the Institute, including the Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), contributed to the discussion. He noted that the bureaucracy's insistence on following the book helps avoid misuse of authority but may delay the induction of critical capabilities in the Armed Forces. Colonel Rajneesh in his closing remarks highlighted the importance of both tangible and intangible aspects involved in the capability development process and thanked the speaker for an enlightening talk covering the complexities of procurement procedures.

Report prepared by Mr. Aayush Maniktalia, Intern, Defence Economics & Industry Centre, MP-IDSA.

Indian Army

Monday Morning Meeting on “Revival of Strategic Threats to India's Internal Security”

March 07, 2023

1000 hrs

Monday Morning Meeting

Mr. Shantanu Sinha, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, will speak on “Revival of Strategic Threats to India's Internal Security” at the Monday Morning Meeting which will be held on 13 March 2023 at 10 AM. The venue is Auditorium, Second Floor.

Dr. Adil Rasheed, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, will be the moderator.

Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai, Research Analyst, will be the rapporteur.

21st Asian Security Conference: Towards Reformed Multilateralism in the Era of Indo-Pacific

March 28, 2023 to March 29, 2023

Conference

Concept Note

The world is undergoing transformational changes. The ‘engine’ of manufacturing and growth shifted from the West to the East, primarily to East Asia in the last century. China’s opening up and reform policy led it to emerge as a primary engine of economic growth and the world’s largest trading nation. In recent years, growth and prosperity have spread to wider regions from East Asia to South East Asia, South Asia, and to the dynamic coast of Africa. The construct of Asia-Pacific as a sphere of economic dynamism in the last century has given way to the notion of Indo-Pacific, which has gained currency due to its inclusive nature, more reflective of the aspirations of people in a wider arc. Asia is a key plank of the Indo-Pacific and reflects the region’s aspiration for growth and prosperity. The future of the Asian continent is not contingent on the rise of any single great power – rather, on multiple civilisation and emerging powers that are striving to play a larger global role.

The global pandemic revealed the stresses and risks in critical supply chains. It has further fused trade and investment flows to geostrategic competition. The US and major European countries have long played a key role in Asia’s trade and economic rise as well as stability. The G20 is a forum most representative of the engagement between the US, Europe and developing countries not just in Asia but also in Africa and Latin America.

The “Asian age” or the “Asian century” in the era of Indo-Pacific is being redefined as a broader concept signalling the inevitable rise of different parts of Asia, which are home to some of the world’s most ancient civilizations. For the past two decades, if not more, Asia has re-emerged to shape global dynamics by involving many stakeholders from the extended neighbourhood of Africa, West Asia, Eurasia as well as the great powers that have a long-standing economic and security presence in different parts of Asia. According to McKinsey, Asia is expected to generate more than 50 per cent of the world’s GDP, and could account for nearly 40 per cent of global consumption, ushering in the ‘’Asian age’.

The onset of the ‘Asian Century’ —Asianization of world politics —has renewed focus on the continent and the promise it holds for the emerging global political order as Asia remains the main growth engine of the world. After all, Asia is today home to the world’s second, third and fifth-largest economies, and it is, therefore, not surprising that the power balance has shifted to Asia. There is, in fact, a repositioning of Asia with China and India emerging as dominant actors in global politics. Japan, as the world’s second-largest developed economy, is a potent power that is taking increasingly robust positions on defence and security issues. ASEAN too has emerged as one of the most dynamic regions in global economic and security paradigms. China’s exponential economic growth has aided its geopolitical rise. India has also witnessed sustained economic growth for the last three decades and is poised for an even higher rate of growth. Overall, post-Covid-19 Asia is on the path of economic recovery and Asia’s average growth stands at 6.9% according to the Asian Development Bank.

The continent’s heterogeneity in terms of its diverse culture, skilled manpower and availability of cheap labour, has made it a manufacturing hub and demonstrated its economic success. Economic growth has also brought in its own challenges in terms of ensuring macroeconomic stability, and sustainable growth as trade and investment issues are getting linked to uncertain global supply chains. As the Indo-Pacific countries strive to achieve their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), there is a growing emphasis on climate adaptation initiatives and green growth powered by green energy. However, the technologies required for energy transition are expensive and the Global South needs to find a way to make the transition sustainable with help from the developed nations.

An emerging Asia would prioritise important agendas such as access to drinking water, securing health, preserving bio-diversity, water security and water conservation and exploring opportunities in the blue economy. As climate change impacts agriculture and consequently food security, countries in the Indo-Pacific region would be compelled to focus on sustainable consumption alongside green transition.

In order to advance the SDGs in Asia, the existing digital divide needs to be bridged through uninterrupted, resilient and decentralized digital commons. China has taken a lead in offering ‘green infrastructure’ in its programme ‘infrastructure for tomorrow’ through its Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank. It has an ambitious target of providing ‘cumulative climate finance approvals of USD50 billion by 2030’.Moreover, competing for investment and market access the rising economies of Asia, i.e., India, China and Japan, are keen to invest in mega infrastructural projects as a part of their geo-economic power projection. At the same time, Asian economies have been vying for greater connectivity in a bid to integrate economies of the region. China’s ambitious and aggressive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has challenged the status quo. Connectivity has become a core facet of both competition and cooperation. While originally centred on a Eurasian connectivity construct, the BRI has pushed its geographical boundaries to incorporate the Arctic, Africa, South East Asia and Latin America as well as parts of Oceania. It has now run into challenges of debt-traps and negative perceptions. Meanwhile, the US, EU and Japan are offering more transparent and sustainable alternatives to finance the infrastructure and connectivity deficit in the Indo-Pacific.

Asian infrastructure needs are estimated to be between US$ 22.6 trillion and US$ 26 trillion until 2030. The BRI is China’s attempt to take advantage of the existing gap in investment in the infrastructure and connectivity sectors thereby accruing strategic gains. This has led Asian economies like Japan to expand their investment in connectivity projects via the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI). India, through its concept of Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) has joined Japan in building alternatives to the BRI. The US too has launched multilateral ventures like the Blue Dot Network (BDN) and the Group of Seven (G7)-linked connectivity ventures, the Build Back Better World, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Partners in the Blue Pacific with like-minded states. With the launch of its Global Gateway in 2021, the European Union (EU) has emerged as the latest player entering the infrastructure and connectivity race.

The COVID-19 pandemic has generated wide-ranging discussions among major powers on supply chain diversification and the challenges of relying on a single source of supply. As a result, Australia, Japan, and India launched the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) to diversify supply chains and build sustainable networks that are resistant to future shocks. Maritime trading nations such as India, Australia and Japan remain best placed to take the SCRI forward, along with the cooperation of the US and Europe. There also exists immense potential for these countries to work with new partners in Africa and ASEAN region. Meanwhile, China has reintroduced Health Silk Road as part of its vaccine diplomacy. As a manufacturing hub of pharmaceuticals, India has provided equitable access to vaccines to countries around the world as part of the QUAD Vaccine partnership.

A multilateral institutional framework for global digital governance architecture is needed with Asian countries as stakeholders. However, Asia’s representation in the current multilateral organisations continues to be inadequate compared to its growing significance in world politics, It is pertinent to underline the need to transform global institutions like the United Nations by creating a new framework and reforming the existing multilateral fora to reflect the current international reality.

According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), “by 2030, the prevalence of extreme poverty in the region [read Asia] is expected to drop below 1% [and the same time] about 25% of the population is projected to achieve at least middle-class status. With the shift of economic power to Asia, Asian concerns need to be reflected in the global financial order. The dominant international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, etc., need to be sensitive to the requirements of the developing nations that are keen to meet the SDGs.

One of the ways developing economies have attempted to address their concerns is to focus on minilateralism. Minilateralism has shaped new cohorts of like-minded nations to focus on micro issues that are considered important for the participating countries. Smaller groupings with similar objectives have emerged as the new and preferred mediums of strategic cooperation to advance national interests. Minilateralism focuses more on shared values and convergent interests. Such cooperation, including at the regional level, is likely to reshape the post-pandemic geopolitical order.

Multilateralism on the other hand would serve the interests of the Asian countries. This would call for the reordering of other UN-affiliated institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Health Organisation (WHO), and International Labour Organization (ILO) to reflect the essential character of the multipolar global order representing diverse interests. In addition, the reform of the international financial institutions in order to better provide finance for climate change adaptation and mitigation, infrastructure development and investments in the social sector would no doubt help the developing countries in Asia to meet the rising aspirations of their people as well as contribute responsibly to the global efforts to save the planet.

India has been a strong votary of UN reforms for many years. Speaking at the United Nations, Foreign Minister, Dr. S.Jaishankar said, “We not only need to increase stakeholdership but also enhance the effectiveness and credibility of multilateralism in the eyes of the international community and in the eyes of global public opinion. If this is to happen, member states from Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Small Island Developing States should have credible and continuing representation in the Security Council. Decisions about their future can no longer be taken without their participation.” As of now, a few veto-wielding countries in the Security Council have exercised disproportionate control over the global agenda. This has not served the interest of an equitable and level playing field for all. The current composition of the Council reflects as Dr.Jaishankar stated, “the inequities and inadequacies of the way the world currently functions”. The undemocratic structure of current multilateral organisations that privileges only a few countries who want to control global political order at the cost of the aspirations of the majority of the countries have given rise to ‘mini-laterals’ that reflect the diverse interests, which the current global structure is unable to address. India has, on numerous occasions, emphasised the need to have an honest conversation on the reform of various multilateral institutions created 75 years ago and has expressed its disappointment over the lack of progress in regard to Security Council reforms. It is also imperative that there should be policy coordination among various multilateral groupings without which it will be difficult to cater to the needs of developing and underdeveloped nations in a cohesive manner.

On 1 December 2022, India has assumed the Presidency of the G20 which represents around 85% of the global GDP, over 75% of the worldwide trade, and about two-thirds of the world’s population. It has emphasized "One Earth, One Family, One Future” in the spirit of its ancient philosophy of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam”. As the Chairperson of the grouping, India will champion the cause of the Global South and reforms. As a member of groupings such as BRICS, ASEAN, CICA, SCO, Quad, IBSA and CELAC, India would centre its efforts on ‘reformed multilateralism’ as a part of its endeavour to transform global institutions to suit the changing international power configuration in the context of the rise of the Global South.

Asia is now increasingly situated in the unfolding paradigms of the Indo-Pacific region. It is clear that regional power politics in Asia as well as their interplay with external powers will be a critical factor in determining the future of the region. In an integrated world, Asian security issues impact on the wider Indo-Pacific, and vice versa. Keeping these developments in context, the 21st Asian Security Conference aims to seek answers to the following questions:

Why are reforms of multilateral institutions important? Two major developments are transforming the multilateral system. The first is the emergence of a number of key states as influential actors in the global political system. The second is a trend towards multi-polarity that is gaining momentum.
In the global power transition, how is Asia situated in the era of the Indo-Pacific? What role can India play in this evolving paradigm?
How are Asian powers responding to the New Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI)? What will be the impact of SCRI on the evolving geo-economics of Asia?
Will cooperation on non-traditional issues such as climate adaptability and energy transition strengthen multilateral actions? Can widely agreed-on general rules be formulated to cooperate on managing the global commons and in the provision of global public goods?
What level of policy coordination is required within the complex of global institutions—such as the WHO, WTO, and the ILO—and which of these institutions should and can be reformed substantially?
How will Bretton Woods's global financial institutions adapt to the rise of Asia and alternative sources of finance for infrastructure and connectivity?
What would be the role of technology in bridging the digital divide? How to evolve a framework that will help in structuring an uninterrupted and resilient ‘digital commons’ and make technology affordable and accessible?
What mechanisms can like-minded countries in Asia and the G20 devise that will serve as solutions to the threats of an impending recession, high inflation, and interrupted supply chains?

The Conference may be divided into four academic sessions over two days. Each Session may be of two hours duration and may accommodate 4-5 papers keeping the broad theme in mind.

Programme

DAY ONE: Tuesday, 28 March 2023

0900-0930 hrs	Registration
0930-1030 hrs	Inaugural Session
0930-0945 0945-0957 0957-1025	Introductory Address: Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy Special Remarks: Shri Dammu Ravi Inaugural Address: Shri Amitabh Kant
Q&A and Group photo
SESSION – I 1030-1145 hrs Towards Reformed Multilateralism: Emerging Power Dynamics and Transforming Global Institutions Chair: Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy
Speakers
Dr. C. Raja Mohan	India and the Changing World of Multilateralism
Dr. Amelia Joan Liwe	Possibilities and Challenges of Reformed Multilateralism: A Comparative-Historical Analysis
Dr. Alireza Khoda Gholipour	Revisionism: A Logical Must or A Negative Characteristic?
Prof. Nagesh Kumar	Reforming Multilateral Trade Rules for Green Transition: Some Proposals for the G-20 Agenda
	Q&A Session
1145-1200	Tea/Coffee break
1200-1330 hrs	Session I (Continuation)
Dr. Emilio J. Zeca	Inclusive Multipolarity Towards Reformed Multilateralism: Why are Reforms of Multilateral Institutions Important?
Amb. Tsogtbaatar Damdin	A Way to New Multilateralism: from Money-Centrism to Mind-Centrism
Dr. Hassan Khannenje	Africa’s Fate, Asia’s Rise and the New Geopolitics
Dr. Surat Horachaikul	Need for Reforming and Strengthening the UN: A Thai Perspective
Mr. Tu Anh Tuan	Evolution of Vietnam's Multilateral Diplomacy: Lessons and Recommendations
	Q&A Session
1330-1415 hrs	Lunch

SESSION – II 1415-1615 hrs Geo-economics: Reforming Global Financial Institutions Chair: Prof. Manoj Pant
Speakers
Prof. Masahiro Kawai	Importance of Geo-economics: Reforming Global Financial Institutions
Prof. Tkachenko Stanislav	Crisis of Bretton Woods Two and Political Economy of Contemporary Global Financial Institutions
Prof. Jayati Srivastava	The Crisis of Global Governance and the WTO
Ms. Manisha Dookhony	Shifting Tides and Ties in Southern Indian Ocean
Mr. Vova A. Chikanda	Reform of Global Multilateral Institutions and their Impact on Africa and the Developing Countries
Dr. Samir Elsadek Mahmoudi	The Evolution of Multilateral Development Banks’ Missions and Operations
	Q&A Session
1615-1630hrs	Tea Break
SESSION – III 1630-1800 hrs Connectivity & Trade, Investment & Resilient Supply Chain Chair: Prof. Santosh Mehrotra
Speakers
Dr. Dareskedar Taye	Connectivity and the Emerging Initiatives in Asia: A Conceptual Framework
Amb. Chun Beeho	South Korea-India Connectivity and Strategic Partnership in the G20 Framework
Prof. Sanjay Kathuria	Making South Asia Count in Global Value Chains
Prof. Mustafizur Rahman	Bangladesh Perspective on the Evolving Regional Trade and Connectivity
Dr. Herrick C. Mpuku	Connectivity And Trade, Boosting Investment, Incubating Resilient Supply Chain
Mr. Yigitaliev Shukhratjon Mahamadnabievich	Special Role of India in the Interconnectivity Between Central and South Asia: A View from Uzbekistan
	Q&A Session

DAY TWO: Wednesday, 29 March 2023

0930-1000 hrs	Tea
SESSION – IV 1000-1200 hrs Multilateral Approach to Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Chair: Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha
Speakers
Prof. Huang Yunsong	Genuine Multilateralism: China's Approach on Non-Traditional Security Challenges
Dr. Medha Bisht	Emerging Agendas of Green Infrastructure and Asian Multilateraliam
Mr. Jyotiraj Patra	Addressing Climate-related Security Risks in the Indo-Pacific
Dr.Anatoly Boyashov	Climate-Security Nexus at the UN Security Council: Implications for the UN reforms, Regional Integration, and State Sovereignty
Ms.Clara Randrianjara	Multilateral Approach to Non-Traditional Security Challenges: Climate Adaptation and Mitigation: The Case of Madagascar
Mr. Felix Wandwe	Devising Multilateral Approach to Non-Traditional Security Challenges: Climate change, Mitigation and Governance
	Q&A Session
SESSION – V 1200-1330 hrs Ensuring Water, Health, Food and Energy Security Chair: Mr. Tapas Paul
Speakers
Dr.Vaibhav Chaturvedi	Pathways to India's Net-Zero Target
Prof.Umar Ibrahim Gaya	Ensuring Water, Health and Food Security: Role of Multilateral STI Ecosystem
Dr.Sumit Vij(Online)	Desecuritisation and (Re)politicisation of Transboundary Waters? Ideas from the Brahmaputra River Basin
Ms. Diana Benoit	Strengthening Multilateralism for Peace and Sustainable Development
	Q&A Session
1330-1430 hrs	Lunch

SESSION – VI 1430-1630 hrs The Digital Future and Emerging Tech Chair: Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rajesh Pant (Retd)
Speakers
Dr.Melanie Garson (Online)	Integrated Internet Internationalism
Mr.Mohammed Soliman	IP Wars in an Era of Great Power Competition
Dr. Gulshan Rai	Emerging Technologies and Challenges of Cyber Security
Dr. Hannes Ebert (Online)	Implementing Global Cyber Confidence-Building Measures
	Q&A Session
Vote of Thanks

Profiles of the Participants

Profiles of the Participants [PDF]

Registration Advertisement

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi is organising the 21st edition of its flagship event, the Asian Security Conference (ASC), on the theme “Towards Reformed Multilateralism in the Era of Indo-Pacific”. This year, the Conference is focused on developmental themes related to India’s G20 Presidency, such as reformed multilateralism, reforming global financial institutions, trade, connectivity, non-traditional security challenges and digital economy. Participation is open to faculty members in Universities, Students and Researchers in think tanks.
Interested participants can send us their details i.e., Name, Address, Educational qualification, Institutional Affiliation etc. at ascidsa2023@gmail.com. A confirmation mail will be sent after examining the details. Once confirmed, the participants interested to attend would need to pay a registration fee.
Registration fees of Rs 2000/- would cover the costs of lunches and tea. The Fee can be transferred through NEFT to MP-IDSA’s account. The Bank details will be provided with the confirmation mail.

Kindly note the last date for applying for registration is 21 March, 2023

Monday Morning Meeting on “India’s Continued Engagement with Afghanistan: Looking Ahead”

March 06, 2023

Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Vishal Chandra, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “India’s Continued Engagement with Afghanistan: Looking Forward” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 06 March 2023. The session was moderated by Dr. Ashok K. Behuria, Senior Fellow, and Coordinator of the South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Director General of MP-IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), the Deputy Director General of MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

Twenty years after being ousted from power by forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in 2021. Since taking office in 2021, the Taliban-led regime in Afghanistan has been diplomatically isolated; not a single country has yet formally recognised their government. Violence against ethnic minorities, disrespect for women's rights, and violations of civil liberties are just a few of the problems that continue to mar the Taliban's regime in Afghanistan. Moreover, internal ethnic conflict and power struggles within the Taliban, ties to terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and recurrent attacks by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) have harmed Afghanistan's security situation and put the Taliban under pressure in their own backyard. Thus the poor socioeconomic indicators as well as a worsening of security conditions point to a gloomy future. India, a vital supporter of Afghanistan's development and prosperity, has remained close to the country despite numerous challenges and has gained the respect of the Afghan people. New Delhi chose a people-centered approach meant to support the development and well-being of the ordinary Afghan citizen.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, Dr. Ashok K. Behuria offered a brief overview of how the Taliban had regrouped in rural Afghanistan and all along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions, and had returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021. Dr. Behuria added that the Taliban had faced multiple challenges since reclaiming control in 2021, including a crisis of legitimacy as well as economic and security issues. He emphasised that despite having to cope with numerous security and economic challenges, the Taliban were deftly handling the deteriorating economic situation and had made some progress in lowering the number of terrorist attacks and casualties in Afghanistan. He emphasized that despite regional and global obstacles, India should continue to support the people of Afghanistan.

Dr. Vishal Chandra began his presentation by highlighting the fact that since no government has recognised the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Taliban are working very hard to gain international legitimacy, and that other countries' were very circumspect in engaging the Taliban. The country is currently experiencing a severe humanitarian and security crisis following the Taliban taking back control of Kabul. There are 28.3 million people in need of humanitarian relief and support, 14.7 million of whom are in acute need. Among the 28.3 million people in need, 6.4 million women and 15.2 million children require immediate humanitarian help. Dr. Chandra observed that the number of persons in need has dramatically risen from 24.4 million in 2022 to 28.3 million in 2023. He pointed out that 75% of Afghanistan's total state spending was on aid and support from abroad, citing the UNDP 2022 study.

While humanitarian relief is trickling in, not quite to the satisfaction of the Taliban and the Afghan people, the country is also experiencing a serious security crisis and violent outbursts, which are being coordinated by the ISKP and other terrorist organisations. He stated that in addition to ISKP, there are other ultra-orthodox Taliban factions that either question the legitimacy of the current Taliban leadership or oppose some of its policy goals. He also informed the audience that ethnic groups that had earlier collaborated with the Taliban and coordinated operations against NATO forces (because they shared similar ideologies) were at the moment vying for control over resources, influence, and positions. However, he noted that despite the constant attacks against the Taliban regime and their patrons, the Taliban seemed to have prevented the situation from getting out of control; but it is uncertain how long Taliban will be able to maintain their control over diverse forces exercising their influence in Afghanistan. The failure of Taliban leaders to incorporate non-Pashto tribes in its administrative and policy establishment continued to be a significant obstacle for them, in addition to the ISKP threats, he said.

Despite these challenges, Dr. Chandra was of the opinion that the Taliban were trying their best to manage the economy by raising domestic taxes, particularly through customs duties, as well as through informal and conventional levies on mining, transportation, and agriculture, which have increased with a crackdown on corruption. Afghanistan also exports coal to Pakistan. The Taliban have also made it clear that their government would pose no risks to India or other nations in the region, and they have promised that their territory would not be used as a base for terrorist attacks against other countries. Mr. Vishal emphasised that the Taliban's relationships with Al-Qaeda, the TTP, and other designated militant groups, however, remained intact, and it was unclear how they were planning to maintain such relationships while pursuing international legitimacy.

Given this, Mr. Chandra said it has posed a very interesting dilemma for India whether it could engage the people of Afghanistan without engaging the Taliban. He argued that because of India's centuries-old cultural and civilizational ties to Afghanistan, there is strong sympathy among Afghan civilians for India. This has, over the years, not only helped India to acquire the trust of Afghans cutting across ethnic lines but also to maintain its neutral position despite significant political and security upheavals over the years. India's present commitment, he emphasized, was primarily focused on infrastructure, humanitarian relief, and developmental aid.

According to Dr. Chandra, India has remained the largest regional contributor of aid for Afghanistan’s development and humanitarian assistance. Since 2001, India has adopted a multi-sectoral aid strategy that includes both large and small-scale projects and covers all regions of Afghanistan. Large-scale infrastructure projects include the construction of the Afghan Parliament, the 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram, and the construction and commissioning of the Salma Dam power plant in the province of Herat.

Dr. Chandra stated that India had also been the driving force behind numerous short-term community-based development initiatives that emphasised local ownership and management and covered agriculture, rural development, education, health, and vocational training, including the renovation of Kabul's Habibia School. These community-based initiatives have a clear, immediate effect on the daily lives of the people. For instance, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) sponsors a large number of yearly long-term university scholarships for Afghan students studying in India for undergraduate and graduate degrees. India similarly offers vocational training to Afghan women and youth. India also offers initiatives to improve capacity in the areas of agricultural research, healthcare, and rural development. Recently, India provided 40,000 of wheat and 500,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccine. India, therefore, has maintained its policy of "staying the humanitarian course" in Afghanistan after the Taliban seized control again in 2021.

Dr. Chandra concluded that India had gained knowledge and experience of working in Afghanistan's challenging political and security environment over the years. Notwithstanding practical difficulties, he pointed out that India had largely been successful in dealing with Afghanistan, regardless of the ideological leanings of Afghan regimes, with the exception of the first Taliban rule (1996-2001). In addition, he stated that India does not have any parochial foreign policy goals in Afghanistan and that because India has been more responsive and adaptable to local circumstances, it has been able to preserve both trust and people-to-people ties over time. In order to continue its aid and assistance initiatives in Afghanistan, he urged India to send a humanitarian envoy to Kabul.

Comments and Questions

The floor was opened for questions and comments. The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), and scholars from the Institute contributed to the discussion. In his remarks, Ambassador Chinoy pointed out that the conflict in Ukraine has diverted attention from the Taliban, which has allowed them to consolidate their regime in Afghanistan. He stressed that there was still potential for an internal Taliban fault-line to blow up at some point, which might lead to further instability. He added that the alleged death of an ISKP commander of Kashmiri descent in Afghanistan was excellent news for India. India, he continued, must maintain its humanitarian aid efforts while keeping an eye on political and security developments in Afghanistan.

Report prepared by Dr. Mohd. Usman Bhatti, Research Assistant, MP-IDSA.

Talk by Ambassador Anil Wadhwa on "Future of India-Australia Economic Cooperation"

February 28, 2023

Talk

A talk by Ambassador Anil Wadhwa, Distinguished Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi, on “Future of India-Australia Economic Cooperation” was organised by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) on 28 February 2023 at 1100h in room number 005. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, who chaired the session, began the proceedings by briefly explaining the topic. He said that India-Australia relations were stunted for many years and revolved around cricket, commonwealth and curry. However, relations recently improved with India and Australia forging the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The development of the Indo-Pacific construct also brought the two countries closer. The New Education Policy was likely to draw Australian universities to India. There has been positive movement in economic relations between the two countries in light of the India-Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (INDAUS ECTA). Although there have been Indian investments in Australia, there exist some issues regarding the same. Commenting briefly about Australia-China relations, Ambassador Chinoy observed that there was a fractured view of the rise of Beijing in different parts of Australia, based on economic and security considerations. Setting an apt background for the speakern the Chair invited Ambassador Wadhwa to deliver the talk.

Ambassador Wadhwa started by talking about geopolitical events during and post-COVID-19 years. He spoke about aggressive Chinese actions vis-à-vis Australia in the aftermath of the Australian demand for an enquiry into the origins of COVID-19. Canberra felt let down due to the Chinese ban on Australian imports. Shipments of coal kept waiting at the ports. The big businesses involved in China felt the need to diversify to reduce dependency on Beijing. Through all these years, India-Australia relations were improving. The two countries elevated their ties to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2020. Prime Minister Narendra Modi promised Australia that India would be involved in that country’s economy. The speaker mentioned a report titled ‘An India Economic Strategy to 2035’ by Mr. Peter Varghese that focused on ten economic sectors and was limited to ten states of India. He informed the audience that the reciprocal report titled ‘Australia Economic Strategy’ (AES) authored by the speaker looked at 12 economic sectors of Australia, including futuristic areas and was not restricted to any of the provinces in that country. Further, he spoke about the Australia-India Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA), signed in April 2022 and that entered into force in December 2022.

The author of the AES spoke enthusiastically about the growing Indian diaspora in Australia. He stated that the diaspora was hard-working and controlled several boardrooms in Australia. They could act as a bridge between the two countries. Further, he highlighted the high-level exchange of visits from the two sides, including the PMs and ministers. Ambassador Wadhwa pointed out a number of bilateral initiatives that have been kicked off between the two countries. It included an Australia-India Centre of Excellence for Critical and Emerging Technology Policy; a diaspora mapping report titled “Australia’s Indian Diaspora: A National Asset - Mapping the Community’s Reach into the Australia-India Economic Relationship” Critical Minerals Investment Partnership; Future Skills Initiative; Green Steel Partnership; New and Renewable Energy Partnership; and a vast number of collaborations in diverse fields such as e-mobility, rare earth material, strategic reserve funds, science, green partnership, and infrastructure forum, among others. On the military front, he mentioned mutual logistics agreement and the four-country Malabar naval exercise as examples of substantial engagement.

Talking about INDAUS ECTA, the speaker enlightened the audience about the benefits of the deal, which gives duty-free access to goods from each country to the other. Indian companies have benefitted by investing in Australian coal. The pact has made the movement of students easier. Also, service providers such as Yoga teachers and chefs have benefitted. He said that the Albanese Government increased the quota for trained manpower. There was ample opportunity in fields of nursing, carpentry, masonry, and perimeter security, among others. Progress has been made in the research collaboration. The Mechanism for the Mutual Recognition of Qualifications has increased employability. Ambassador Wadhwa stated that Australia has immense Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) export potential that might replace countries from West Asia for India’s energy needs. By 2035, India will likely become one of Australia’s important export markets, and Australian investments in India will also likely see an uptick. The speaker said the country had kept aside billions of dollars for the commercial mining of critical minerals and the space industry, among others.

Further, Ambassador Wadhwa spoke about the Australian University campuses being set up in India. He said such universities are essential from the perspective of the Indian market. The speaker explained that the ECTA neutralised some of the disadvantages of not being part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). He said that Australia was a small market. Therefore, there was a limit to the trade. Commodities such as minerals would be very important in the future, since the country contains some of the essential critical minerals. Australia has substantial pension funds of trillions of dollars, and India’s Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme was attracting Australian investment. Regarding the Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (AI-CECA), the speaker said that it could be a bench setter for other Free Trade Agreements India is negotiating with other nations. However, the Australian dairy industry has been kept out of the negotiations. Indian agriculture has much to learn from Australia regarding the use of technology to manage agriculture efficiently.

Ambassador Wadhwa listed a number of areas of bilateral cooperation mentioned in the AES that included commodities (critical minerals like lithium, mine safety, manufacturing of mining equipment); LNG exports; construction of warships, support ships, corvettes; textile and textile design; groundwater management solutions and recycling of water; Education (training the trainers programme); space technology; collaboration in e-learning; grid technology (remotely controlled grid stabilisation); healthcare; farm and dairy production (food processing units); fintech (cloud and other technology); tourism; infrastructure development; and automobile spare components.

Following the talk, the Chair observed that India-Australia relations had come a long way in the last decade. There existed synergies with India. However, China has made exceptional inroads in Australia. There are vast numbers of Chinese students. China is buying land parcels in the country. But after trade tensions with Beijing, Australia was trying to diversify relations. Ambassador Chinoy agreed with the speaker that India had an opportunity in the automobile, Information Technology, Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises, and defence sectors. The Chair also saw the opportunity for bilateral cooperation in third countries, especially the Pacific Islands. He opined that the ECTA was a good initiative for the two countries. However, he also flagged the irritants in the relationship, such as the problem of illegal immigration and attacks by Khalistani supporters on temples.

In the ensuing question and answer session, Ambassador Wadhwa said there was distrust regarding Indian companies in Australia in the past. But now, Indian companies get contracts for various projects. Regarding Uranium export, the speaker said that India does not require uranium from Australia, and the Non-proliferation Treaty is an emotive issue in Canberra. Australia has limited capacity to go beyond Sri Lanka and participate in African affairs. Chinese media has a strong influence on media and academia. India should learn sports stadium management from Australia. The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) pact was designed to counter China in the Pacific.

Report was prepared by Mr. Niranjan Oak, Reasearch Analyst, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre.

Monday Morning Meeting on ''The Indus Waters Treaty: What is in Store?''

February 20, 2023

Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Uttam K. Sinha, Senior Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, spoke on "The Indus Waters Treaty: What is in Store?” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 20 February 2023. The session was moderated by Dr. Ashok K. Behuria, Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA. Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, senior scholars, research analysts, and interns of the institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

India has issued a notice to Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), alleging a breach of the Treaty's dispute resolution mechanisms. India has called for modifications to the Treaty's annexures and for negotiations on the issue, marking the first such request since its inception.

Detailed Report

Dr. Ashok K. Behuria commenced the session by highlighting that MP-IDSA has undertaken several studies to explore how the Treaty has functioned since its inception and the likelihood of its survival. He emphasised the need to harness the waters of the eastern rivers and noted that the 3.6 million acre feet (MAF) allowance on the western rivers remains highly underutilised. Dr. Behuria explained the graded dispute resolution mechanism under Article IX of the Treaty. He also discussed Pakistan’s objections to the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric power projects being constructed by India. He added that India has sent a notice of modification to Pakistan under Article XII (3) of the Treaty, seeking a response within 90 days. He stated that transboundary rivers should be seen as connectors, not disruptors, in bilateral relations.

With these remarks, Dr. Behuria invited Dr. Sinha to make his observations. At the outset, Dr. Sinha stated that fear, angst, manipulation and misinformation often govern the behaviour of the states on hydrological issues. He opined that as India expands its water resources footprint in the UT of Jammu and Kashmir and the Administration of UT of Ladakh, Pakistan’s captiousness will only increase. He then observed that water is an emotive issue in Pakistan’s domestic political discourse.

Dr. Sinha pointed out that to understand the present circumstances, it is pertinent to consider the history of negotiations, as well as the physiography and hydrology of the basin. He cautioned against accepting the notion of India's over-generosity in negotiating the Treaty and emphasised that the IWT is an arrangement to divide the basin rather than a water-sharing agreement. Drawing from his book Indus Basin Uninterrupted (Penguin Random House, 2021), he interestingly observed the critical role of the engineers during the Partition in the division of the canals and the allocation of the headworks to India.

In the next part of his presentation, Dr. Sinha displayed maps of the rivers to depict their flow across political boundaries. He discussed the dual context of rivers - their interlinkage with politics, society, environment, and the economy, as well as their importance in the hydropolitical security complex. Dr. Sinha observed that the basin remained unified prior to the Partition, which created a new geography. While India emphasised its geographical status as an upper-riparian state, Pakistan focused on historical usage of water, such as canal irrigation.

Through maps, the speaker showed that the Indus Basin has a drainage area of 11,65,000 square kilometres, with India accounting for 27 per cent and Pakistan for 65 per cent of the total drainage area. He opined that rivers are a technical issue and political insinuations must be avoided, and underlined that the IWT negotiations prioritised technical and engineering solutions. The speaker pointed out that the Treaty emphasises the utilisation of waters and not their control. The negotiations eventually underscored ‘water rationality’ and India effectively defended its rights on the eastern rivers. The Treaty was designed to facilitate effective water cooperation through “checks and balances”. In addition, he noted that the IWT negotiations effectively addressed not only the Punjab region, but also the Jammu and Kashmir region. Dr. Sinha discussed that the difficult terrain of the western rivers makes it challenging to achieve the target of 3.6 MAF of storage capacity. He argued that Chenab carries the potential to fulfil its storage needs.

Through various data sets, Dr. Sinha displayed the status of the irrigated areas and the hydroelectric projects under operation and construction. He added that, through the modification process, India will also communicate the issues in developing these projects. He opined that the Court of Arbitration will recognise India’s objections to the breach of the Treaty's dispute resolution mechanisms. He added that Pakistan, through its move to the arbitration court, aims to set a legal precedent for all future projects. In his conclusion, Dr. Sinha advocated for a technical resolution to the issues through a neutral expert.

Questions and Comments

Dr. Behuria discussed the potential outcomes if Pakistan chooses not to respond to India's notice. Additionally, he drew attention to responses from the popular media in Pakistan as well as the role of its domestic political turmoil.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) emphasised that despite India’s relatively small catchment area, it contributes nearly 50 per cent of the total flow due to glacial melt. He also underlined the importance of distinguishing between captive dams and run-of-the-river projects.

Mr. S.C. Saxena, Member, MP-IDSA made a query on the history of bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. He discussed the importance of technology in harnessing river potential.

Dr. Nihar R. Nayak discussed the geological structure of the basin and inquired about the consequences of the suspension of the Treaty.

Col. Manish Rana raised a query on the factors that compelled India and Pakistan to sign the Treaty and how India’s actions can impact its lower-riparian status in the east.

Col. (Dr.) DPK Pillay (Retd.) underscored the importance of harnessing rivers and the success of the Ganga canal in irrigation.

Capt. Anurag Bisen (IN) highlighted the incompetence of the World Bank in several bilateral arrangements globally. He raised the possibility of abrogating the current Treaty and setting up a new Treaty on India’s terms.

Dr. Priyanka Singh raised questions about the neutrality of the World Bank and its decision to allow two parallel dispute resolution mechanisms.

Dr. Anand Kumar discussed the financial costs of the IWT negotiations and the strategic available options for India unilaterally.

Mr. Rohith Sai Stambamkadi raised a query on the strategic implications of dams.

Commodore (Dr.) Mani Singh Mamik (Retd.), through the online chat function, inquired about the loss of agricultural and fertile land after the Partition.

In his response, Dr. Sinha highlighted that unilateral abrogation will not significantly reduce the availability of water in Pakistan. In addition, it will risk India’s international image and goodwill in the neighbourhood, and will cast doubts on its status as a responsible actor. He added that India should focus on developing the water infrastructure capacities allowed under the Treaty and clearly suggested optimising the Treaty. He added that India’s strategic approach to water issues is highly unique, as it is both a responsible upper-riparian and a concerned lower-riparian. He further noted that India’s cross-border water dependence is significantly high and reiterated the need to build water storage capacity.

The discussion ended with a Vote of Thanks by Dr. Ashok K. Behuria.

The report has been prepared by Ms. Richa Kumaria, Intern, Non- Traditional Security Centre, MP-IDSA.

Interaction with Ambassador Michael Pulch, EU’s Coordinator for Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP)

February 13, 2023

1400 hrs

Other

MP-IDSA is organising an interaction with Ambassador Michael Pulch, EU’s Coordinator for Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) on Monday, 13 February 2023 at 1400 hours in Room No. 005, Ground Floor.

Major General (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, Retd, Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA will chair the session.

4th MPIDSA-JISS Bilateral Dialogue

February 08, 2023

1000 hrs

Bilateral

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) is holding its fourth bilateral dialogue with the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), Jerusalem, on Wednesday, February 8, 2023, at 1000 hrs in the MP-IDSA Auditorium.

Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General MP-IDSA and Prof. Efraim Inbar, President JISS will lead the Dialogue on both sides. The Flyer and programme of the Dialogue are attached for your reference.

Download Programme [PDF]

Monday Morning Meeting on ”India’s G20 Presidency: Opportunity to Resume Engagement in the Arctic”

February 06, 2023

Monday Morning Meeting

Capt. Anurag Bisen (Indian Navy), Member Non-Traditional Security Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses spoke on “India’s G20 Presidency: Opportunity to Resume Engagement in the Arctic” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 6 February 2023. The meeting was moderated by Col. (Dr.) D.P.K. Pillay. Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, (Retd.) and scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion.

Executive Summary

The suspension of the Arctic Council post Russia-Ukraine conflict has resulted in the suspension of all forms of scientific cooperation with Russia. As a result of this suspension, global climate change mitigation efforts are severely impacted. India’s G-20 Presidency offers an opportunity for the G20 to strive for resumption of scientific cooperation in the Arctic.

Detailed Report

Col. (Dr.) D.P.K. Pillay introduced the topic to the audience and highlighted the implications for the Arctic. In his opening remarks, he mentioned that India’s engagements with the Arctic date back to 1920 when the country under British Dominion signed the Spitsbergen Treaty. He highlighted that the environmental transitional occurring in the Arctic has direct implications for Indian monsoons, which have the potential of impacting the country's food security. Col. Pillay then invited Capt. Anurag Bisen (IN) to make his presentation on the topic.

Capt. Anurag Bisen (IN) started his presentation by highlighting that India as Chair of the G20 Presidency could push for re-starting dialogue amongst all the Arctic States. He further highlighted that there is a need for the revival of all form of scientific cooperation within the Arctic Council as well as through all other existing mechanisms of cooperation that currently remain suspended. Capt. Bisen highlighted that post-Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, all the seven Arctic States have suspended their cooperation with Russia in the region. This includes the suspension of the Arctic Council, European Commission and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Capt. Bisen, in his presentation further mentioned that Finland and Sweden’s decision to join NATO has further enhanced complexities for regional cooperation in the Arctic. In his talk, he also highlighted major climate tipping points in the Arctic that play a crucial role in regulating global environmental conditions. He asserted that any disruptions in the thresholds of these Arctic tipping points would have grave regional and global implications. He further mentioned that the Arctic remains globally connected and that whatever happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic. Capt. Bisen also emphasized the fact that the Arctic is heating four times faster than other parts of the Earth. He mentioned that this in the near future could have challenges of sea level rise, implications for coastal habitats, soil erosion, impacts on wetlands and loss of fish, birds and other plant life. He also pointed out that since 40 per cent of the world’s population lives within 100 km of the coastline, rising sea levels are expected to flood hundreds of cities worldwide.

Capt. Bisen also explained the concept of ‘Arctic amplification’ and the role of methane in further warming the Arctic ice. He then highlighted that since the suspension of the Arctic Council, scientific research of the five Asian Observer States in the Council namely India, China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore have been significantly impacted. Capt. Bisen mentioned that though the world is facing geopolitical tussles due to the Russia-Ukraine crisis, it is difficult to neglect Russia in Arctic decision-making. He also mentioned that since Russia accounts for 53 per cent of the Arctic Ocean coastline, ignoring Russia in Arctic scientific research would not serve global scientific interests.

In the final part of his presentation, Capt. Bisen explained that scientific research in the Arctic is of great interest to India. He mentioned the scientific interlinkages between the Arctic, the Antarctic and the Himalayas and explained their importance in shaping Indian and global climatic phenomena. Citing the six pillars of India’s engagement in the Arctic as outlined in the country’s Arctic Policy document, Capt. Bisen mentioned that these clearly justify India’s approach and future intentions in the region. Moreover, he also highlighted that the theme of India’s G20 presidency i.e. Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam- the world is but one family, also finds resonance in India’s Arctic Policy. He, therefore, asserted that India through its G20 Presidency should call for resuming the existing cooperation in the Arctic. He justified his stance by further mentioning that 6 out of the 8 Arctic Council Permanent Member States, and 12 out of the 13 Observer States are part of G20 member countries. In his concluding remarks, Capt. Bisen pointed out that Environment and Climate Sustainability Working Groups in G20 could become key instruments. Lastly, he also recommended that the ‘Sherpa Track’ could also be used to expeditiously revive scientific engagements in the Arctic.

Questions and Comments

Following the presentation, Col. (Dr.) D.P.K. Pillay invited the Deputy Director General and the participants for their comments and questions.

Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) complimented Capt. Bisen for his presentation and highlighted MP-IDSA’s meeting with the Danish delegation on various Arctic issues in the past. He also mentioned that MP-IDSA has always remained at the forefront of conducting Arctic-related events. He mentioned that the institution recently in collaboration with the Ministry of Earth Sciences and NSCS conducted a one-day seminar on the Arctic. Lastly, he highlighted that the Arctic tipping points remain important for India as these bear inter-linkages with Indian Himalayas, therefore India's scientific collaboration with all the Arctic states remains extremely crucial.

Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd.) asked the speaker regarding his recent visit to Geneva and asked if this idea of restarting Arctic scientific cooperation through G20 found any traction with the representatives of the Member States there.

Ms. Ruchita Beri asked the speaker if this suspension of scientific cooperation with Russia in the Arctic was only as the result of the Ukraine crisis, or was there already developing geopolitical competition between Western Arctic States and Russia, that in the shadow of the Ukraine crisis resulted in the termination of East-West cooperation in the region.

Ms. Mayuri Banerjee made a query regarding the military exercises of States in the Arctic and how these hinder scientific cooperation in the region.

Dr. Adil Rasheed commented on the geopolitics of climate change and questioned the speaker regarding the Western States' responses if India takes a lead on such issues through its G20 Presidency.

Mr. Bipandeep Sharma commented on the issue of suspension of the Arctic Council and termination of all forms of scientific cooperation with Russia. He questioned that if the existing mechanism of cooperation through the Arctic Council fails to restart any form of cooperation with Russia, how can G20 do it differently? He further highlighted that Norway, which is going to be the next Chair of the Arctic Council in May 2023, also does not hint at restarting any form of such cooperation with Russia in near future.

Dr. Uttam Sinha complimented the speaker for his presentation and commented on the point of ‘Arctic Exceptionalism’ mentioned by the speaker in his presentation. Dr. Sinha mentioned that the concept does not exist in current times as the world has become largely interconnected. This interconnectedness is further linked to climate change, where any transition occurring in the Arctic has global linkages. Dr. Sinha further mentioned that the Arctic Council till recently remained a successful forum to address various Arctic issues and this ongoing suspension has brought it into a unique conundrum. Dr. Sinha lastly pointed out that the world need not to forget the issues of Arctic indigenous communities that are most vulnerable to climatic transitions occurring in the region.

Capt. Bisen gave a detailed explanation to all these comments and questions asked by the scholars at the Monday Morning Meeting.

Report prepared by Mr. Bipandeep Sharma, Research Analyst, Non-Traditional Security Centre, MP-IDSA.

Monday Morning Meeting on Saudi-Iran Relations: Between Continuing Friction and Frozen Talks

January 30, 2023

Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. P K Pradhan, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Recent Developments in Saudi-Iran Relations: Between Continuing Friction and Frozen Talks” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 30 January 2023. The session was moderated by Dr. Deepika Saraswat, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

Saudi Arabia and Iran are two important players in the West Asian region. Since the beginning of the Arab unrest, the relationship between both countries has further deteriorated. For Saudi Arabia, the military presence of the US in West Asia is a vital component of the regional security architecture. On the other hand, Iran opposes any external intervention in the region. Iran’s presence in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq has threatened Saudi Arabia. Its major concerns are its national security and the freedom of navigation as Iran has a significant influence over the two choke points namely, the Strait of Hormuz and Bab El Mandeb. Besides, the Iranian nuclear programme and Iran’s intervention in Yemen through Houthi forces are two key issues of rivalry between them. In 2021 and 2022, five rounds of Iraq-mediated talks were held between Iran and Saudi Arabia at the official level in Baghdad. However, the change of government in Iraq has stalled talks and tension has further deepened owing to the recent protests in Iran. Currently, the major challenges for both countries are to convert the talks into a serious and credible political dialogue and to re-establish their diplomatic relations. The reconciliatory approach shown by Iran and Saudi Arabia may de-escalate the tensions in the short and medium term which may help in bringing temporary peace and stability to the region.

Detailed Report

In her initial remarks, Dr. Deepika Saraswat stated that in the last two decades, Iran and Saudi Arabia have emerged as two important players in the West Asian region. Since the Arab uprising, both the countries found themselves on opposite sides of each other in proxy wars in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. This rivalry took a disastrous sectarian dimension over a period of time and it reached its peak in 2016. The conflict between the two further intensified with the beginning of war in Yemen. More recently, US President Joe Biden’s withdrawal of support for Saudi Arabia’s war efforts in Yemen and revival of nuclear diplomacy vis-à-vis Iran, paved a way for both the countries to de-escalate tensions between the two. However, the relations between the two have again become hostile after Iran blamed Saudi Arabia for a “media war”.

Dr. P K Pradhan started his presentation by giving a historical background of the troubled relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia. He stated that the problems between Iran and the Gulf monarchies started in 1979 when after the Islamic revolution Ayatollah Khomeini became the leader of Iran and declared to export his brand of Shia Islam to neighbouring states. This posed an immediate security challenge to the Gulf countries. This was an important factor which pushed Saudi Arabia to support Iraq in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. However, during the Iraq-Kuwait War (1990-91), Saudi Arabia supported Kuwait against Iraq. In 2003, during the US invasion of Iraq, Saudi Arabia hosted the US forces which was opposed by Iran. The outbreak of Arab uprising in the region in post 2010 period further widened the Saudi-Iranian divide.

Dr. Pradhan said that Saudi Arabia was not untouched by the Arab uprising as its Eastern province registered widespread protests. The Saudi regime alleged that Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr was instigating these anti-government protests and executed him in 2016. The execution of Nimr resulted in huge protests in Tehran. In addition, Iran also strongly condemned Saudi Arabia and threatened that the latter would “pay a heavy price” for his execution. This pushed Saudi Arabia along with some other Gulf countries to down grade its diplomatic ties with Iran.

Thereafter, Dr. Pradhan explained the regional security architecture in West Asia and highlighted the US’s vital role in providing security to Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia. The US also has a military presence in the all the six GCC countries. On the other hand, Iran says that there should not be any external power involvement in the regional security architecture of West Asia. Iran proposes a regional security architecture in the Gulf with the involvement of the regional powers only.

Dr. Pradhan mentioned that Saudi Arabia is hugely concerned about Iran’s intentions. It feels that Iran will launch attacks either directly or through proxies if the US forces withdraw from the region. Saudi Arabia along with the GCC countries has proposed the Middle East Strategic Alliance while Iran proposes Hormuz Peace Endeavour. Indeed, there is a huge difference in perception of the two countries with respect to the regional security architecture of the region. Dr. Pradhan explained the threat perception of Saudi Arabia and Iran through maps and highlighted that US military presence in the region is a threat for Iran and the presence of Iranian proxies in the countries such as Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq are threats to Saudi national security.

According to him, freedom of navigation is a major concern for Saudi Arabia as Iran has significant influence on the two choke points namely, Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el- Mandeb. If Iran disrupts the oil traffic, it would impact oil supply to Saudi Arabia. In the past conflicts, Iran has, multiple times, threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if there is any threat to its national security. In post 2015 period, Houthis have attacked Saudi oil tankers in Bab-el- Mandeb and in the Red Sea forcing Saudi Arabia to temporarily stop oil supply through Bab El Mandeb in 2018.

Iranian nuclear issue is another key point of friction between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In 2015, Saudi Arabia initially adopted a conciliatory approach towards the deal. Subsequently, Iran started intervention in the region and provided funds to terrorist organisations and other non-state actors which pushed Saudi Arabia to raise this issue with regional and international powers. It welcomed President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and also supported the “maximum pressure” policy of the US. Regarding the Iranian nuclear talks in Vienna, he said that Saudi Arabia was closely watching it. However, Saudi Arabia cannot do much about it.

Dr. Pradhan highlighted the five rounds of talks which were held between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2022 in Baghdad. The talks were held between Khalid Al-Homaidan, Chief of General Intelligence, Saudi Arabia, and Saeed Iravani, Deputy Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi played a significant role in facilitating these talks. However, now there is a power shift in Iraq which has stalled the talks between the two.

According to him, there were various factors that have contributed to facilitating talks between the two countries. Firstly, Iran and Saudi Arabia are under international pressure due to deteriorating internal security and humanitarian situation in Yemen, especially, after Joe Biden became the President of the US. Secondly, Saudi Arabia is under US pressure to end its military offensive in Yemen. Thirdly, after Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran was hopeful of reviving the deal under Biden. Lastly, war in Yemen has proved a burden on the Saudi budget whereas Iran is looking for lifting of sanctions as a result of the Vienna talks. All these factors have contributed in bringing both the countries to the negotiating table. As result of talks, the situation in Yemen has improved slightly and the parties agreed on ceasefire. Though the ceasefire could not extend, the situation has improved slightly in Yemen.

Iranian Vice-President Seyed Mohammad Hosseini met with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan on 2 January on the side-lines of the swearing-in ceremony of Brazil's President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. In addition, Foreign Ministers of the two countries met in Jordan on the side-lines of the Baghdad-II Conference on 19 December 2022. During these visits both sides emphasised the need for continuing the talks.

The recent protests in Iran have also contributed to Iran and Saudi Arabia tensions. Since the protest erupted, Iran has alleged that Saudi Arabia and Israel are behind the protests. Iran alleged that Saudi Arabia has been supporting particular media houses to spread propaganda against Iran. In addition, Saudi Arabia has also shared concerns with the US regarding possibility of a direct or indirect attack from Iran amidst protests.

While highlighting the challenges ahead, Dr. Pradhan said that converting the talks “to a serious and credible political dialogue” and “to restore diplomatic relations between two countries” continues to be a big challenge. Furthermore, the Iranian nuclear issue and crisis in Yemen also remains a big challenge for the talks. He made three observations. Firstly, the talks at present are at an embryonic stage. Second, considering the adversarial relationship between the two, achieving substantial progress would require long negotiations, mutual trust and willingness to engage in a political dialogue. Finally, the reconciliatory approach exhibited by Iran and Saudi Arabia may de-escalate the tensions in the short and medium term which may help bring temporary peace and stability to the region.

Dr. Pradhan concluded his presentation by underlining India’s approach toward the Iran-Saudi Arabia conflict. He said that India has huge stakes with both the countries and regional stability in the Gulf is in India’s interest. India has adopted a policy of neutrality and non-interference in the Saudi-Iran conflict and appealed to both the countries to resolve their differences mutually through dialogue and negotiations.

The presentation was followed by a lively Q&A session.

The Report was prepared by Dr. Jatin Kumar, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA.

Eurasia & West Asia

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DAY ONE: Tuesday, 28 March 2023

SESSION – I

1030-1145 hrs

Towards Reformed Multilateralism: Emerging Power Dynamics and Transforming Global Institutions

SESSION – II

1415-1615 hrs

Geo-economics: Reforming Global Financial Institutions

SESSION – III

1630-1800 hrs

Connectivity & Trade, Investment & Resilient Supply Chain

DAY TWO: Wednesday, 29 March 2023

SESSION – IV

1000-1200 hrs

Multilateral Approach to Climate Adaptation and Mitigation

SESSION – V

1200-1330 hrs

Ensuring Water, Health, Food and Energy Security

SESSION – VI

1430-1630 hrs

The Digital Future and Emerging Tech

Vote of Thanks

Executive Summary

Detailed Report

Comments and Questions

Executive Summary

Detailed Report

Questions and Comments

Executive Summary

Detailed Report

Questions and Comments

Executive Summary

Detailed Report

Pages

About Us

Events

Publications

Annual Conferences

Major Projects

Indian Pugwash Society

You are here

Events

Executive Summary

Detailed Report

Q&A Session

DAY ONE: Tuesday, 28 March 2023

SESSION – I 1030-1145 hrs Towards Reformed Multilateralism: Emerging Power Dynamics and Transforming Global Institutions

SESSION – II 1415-1615 hrs Geo-economics: Reforming Global Financial Institutions

SESSION – III 1630-1800 hrs Connectivity & Trade, Investment & Resilient Supply Chain

DAY TWO: Wednesday, 29 March 2023

SESSION – IV 1000-1200 hrs Multilateral Approach to Climate Adaptation and Mitigation

SESSION – V 1200-1330 hrs Ensuring Water, Health, Food and Energy Security

SESSION – VI 1430-1630 hrs The Digital Future and Emerging Tech

Vote of Thanks

Executive Summary

Detailed Report

Comments and Questions

Executive Summary

Detailed Report

Questions and Comments

Executive Summary

Detailed Report

Questions and Comments

Executive Summary

Detailed Report

Pages

About Us

Events

Publications

Annual Conferences

Major Projects

Indian Pugwash Society

SESSION – I

1030-1145 hrs

Towards Reformed Multilateralism: Emerging Power Dynamics and Transforming Global Institutions

SESSION – II

1415-1615 hrs

Geo-economics: Reforming Global Financial Institutions

SESSION – III

1630-1800 hrs

Connectivity & Trade, Investment & Resilient Supply Chain

SESSION – IV

1000-1200 hrs

Multilateral Approach to Climate Adaptation and Mitigation

SESSION – V

1200-1330 hrs

Ensuring Water, Health, Food and Energy Security

SESSION – VI

1430-1630 hrs

The Digital Future and Emerging Tech