Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
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The Indo-US Relationship: Is Diplomatic Style Important? | March 27, 2009 | Steven Hoffman | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Kanwal Sibal The presentation of Professor Steven Hoffman began by examining the question “Is diplomatic style important and what impact does it have as far as Indo-US diplomatic negotiations are concerned? Professor Hoffman began by noting that diplomatic style is important enough to deserve careful attention. During the period between 1997 and 2007, he interviewed diplomats on both sides. According to him, some practitioners pointed out that tone or style naturally ranks below substance in importance, but not always. An experienced Indian diplomat called style a “force multiplier” in Indo-US relations. When the two sides engage, they do deal with the matter of ‘how do we talk to each other?’ A former American diplomat said that diplomatic style and substance intertwine. To separate style from substance for the purpose of analysis can prove useful, but is not easy and real care must be taken in doing so. His presentation puts forward some results produced by such an effort. Professor Hoffman adopts a historical narrative that analyses change and convergence in Indian and American diplomatic practices. Change in style accordingly began in June 1998, and is still taking place today. Professor Hoffman divided his presentation into five parts. First, he described problematic practices on both sides. For instance, Americans could be overbearing, demanding, arrogant and deadline imposing, etc. and similarly the Indian side could be self-righteous and arrogant as well. Professor Hoffman got this sense after examining published sources and interviews. Secondly, he provides two historical illustrations on diplomatic style. The first being Indian foreign secretary J.N. Dixit’s diplomatic negotiations with George Bush Sr’s. administration in 1992, and second the dialogue between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott during the period 1998 to 2000. Professor Hoffman says that in diplomatic style, there is a learning process underway. In every negotiation, substance comes first and when basic parameters set in well then style matters. In the last ten years, India and the United States sustained a momentum but episodically there were problems during the negotiations on the Indo-US nuclear deal. He noted that the Obama administration is sending the right signals to carry forward the momentum built by the Bush Administration. Thirdly, Professor Hoffman describes US diplomatic practices during the George W. Bush administration and refers to US ambassador India Robert Blackwill’s statement about the adoption of a radically new diplomatic style. Blackwill had said that “America will not be a nagging nanny” and that the Bush administration does not intend to lecture India on its national interests. According to Professor Hoffman, the Ambassador’s public comments and phraseology did reflect a real ideological and policy change in Washington. Fourthly, Professor Hoffman points out that in fact India and the United States were developing a set of mutually accepted practices that may also be called rules that came into existence in the mid-2000s. Professor Hoffman pointed out the developing shared rules of engagement in Indo-US relations: No Naggy Nanny, India to be treated with respect, recognition of India’s major power status, avoidance of vitriol, and developing rules to maintain momentum in the US-India relationship, avoiding surprises from either side, shaping issues jointly, deepening and broadening the range of interaction, establishing personal relationships and institutionalizing the relationship. In the last part, Professor Hoffman puts forward his interim conclusions. Shared or common diplomatic practices make communication of substance easier, increases mutual understanding, allows each side to educate the other, enhances trust, acts as a force multiplier, and helps ease if not eliminate historical resentments paving the way for substantive mutual gains. He emphasizes that no matter how bilateral ties between India and the United States evolve during the next few years, this study makes a case that diplomatic style is important, in this particular relationship. What has been learned and gained should be maintained, and even built upon further. One may hope that a reasonably common set of guiding diplomatic practices will characterize the full range of US-India ties in the future. Points raised during the discussion
Prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Nuclear and Arms Control | India, India-US Relations, Obama Administration, United States of America (USA) | ||
A Scenario-Building Method on India’s North East: Time Horizon 2015 | March 27, 2009 | Namrata Goswami | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Prakash Singh In her presentation titled ‘A Scenario-Building Method on India’s North East’, Dr. Namrata Goswami projected the vision of a peaceful and prosperous North East India by 2015. Identifying terrorism, left-wing extremism and insurgencies as the three great internal security threats of India, she repeated Manmohan Singh’s earlier statement that growing insurgencies in the North East are caused by lack of development and externally funded terrorism. Dr. Goswami has utilized the scenario building method pioneered by Herman Kahn of RAND. She identifies the key factors/drivers which can be utilized to perceive and describe, if not predict, four future scenarios in the Northeast by 2015. Before explaining the four scenarios, Dr Goswami points out the advantages as well as disadvantages of the scenario building method. According to her, despite the fact that scenario-building is one of the most widely accepted method of bringing about some true sense of a possible future, the future based on such method still remains imagined and fictitious. While explaining the future scenario of North East India on the basis of scenario building method, Dr. Goswami offers a list of positive and negative drivers which can either lead the region on the path of prosperity or can prove as impediments in its progress. On the positive side, she points to factors like the region’s richness in natural resources, cultural heritage, the growing number of youthful population, higher level of education, influence of local communities and music in life, governance, etc. Factors like backward condition of transportation and communication, perceived feelings of neglect by New Delhi, cultural differences, rising ethnic violence, negative political culture, militarization of political culture, rampant extortion network, economic backwardness, porous international border, etc., are pointed out as negative drivers. On the basis of the above mentioned drivers, Dr. Goswami has put forward four possible scenarios of North East India by 2015. They are: Destination North East: A Touristic Paradise (a scenario based on tourism development); Island North East: Beware imagined ‘others’ (a scenario based on fear of domination and ethnic violence); Multi-Cultural North East: Liberal and Progressive (a scenario based on the success of democracy); Global North East: Looking ‘East’ with Hope (a scenario based on the success of India’s ‘Look East’ policy). Among the four, Dr. Goswami considers the first, third and the fourth scenarios as ‘ideal’ to improve the conflict ridden states of the Northeast. Points raised during the discussion of the Paper:
Prepared by Pranamita Baruah, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | Northeast India, India, Terrorism | ||
India’s Strategic Autonomy Dilemma and the Rapprochement with the United States | March 20, 2009 | Guillem Monsonis | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Rajiv Sikri The debate on strategic autonomy makes a conceptual contribution about how India as an emerging power seeks to forge a partnership with the United States. The Indian imperative is to keep a sufficient degree of autonomy in its security and military relationship with the United States. Within the framework of India-US rapprochement the dynamics of power acquisition by India clash with its effort to maintain a reasonable degree of autonomy. Consequently, the concept of strategic autonomy, which is a mutation of realism and India’s traditional non-aligned posture, can be described as a dependence control strategy aimed at safeguarding its independence in both foreign policy decision making and protecting strategic assets against American pressure. For India strategic autonomy necessitates the association between an autonomous foreign policy/security decision making capability and the preservation of material assets (both technical and economic). Strategic autonomy can only be a relative principle. Pragmatists and maximalists among India’s strategic elites agree that the concept must accept some compromises to advance larger foreign policy goals. Some pragmatists have argued that India’s deeply held notions of autonomy must move towards responsibility. If India is to rise as a great power there must be a greater emphasis on responsibility in its foreign policy. Others have contested this, noting that while autonomy is malleable so is the principle of responsibility. Maximalists argue that other great powers are unwilling and incapable of advancing India’s great power aspirations. Both maximalists and pragmatists agree that the 1998 nuclear tests by India reinforced its strategic autonomy. In this respect deterrence and autonomy are intimately linked. This was most evident during the debates about the civil nuclear deal between the United States and India. The pacifists, Indian Leftists and Nehruvians use the concept of strategic autonomy within a discursive framework characterized by an ideological anti-Americanism antagonistic to any kind of rapprochement with Washington. A strategic partnership necessarily depends on the broad convergence of interest of the two partners. The potential for a strategic partnership encompassing all security and defence issues needs a convergence of interests which is lacking given both partners’ different international status in the global power hierarchy, the security context of South Asia and the importance for India to retain its strategic autonomy. Thus despite the discourse within the United States on the transformation of the relationship, India seems to favour and negotiate a selective partnership. The necessity for a relationship with the US is understood by all decision-makers and commentators in India who prefer an ‘issue based’ partnership configured for two countries which have ‘not permanent but temporary identity of interests’. Practically, apart from avoiding any kind of alliance in the strictest sense, for New Delhi it means not to be linked with any US sponsored collective or bilateral security structure constraining India to intervene in support of its own interests. From an Indian perspective, divergent agendas with the US suggest a double necessity: to identify those divergences and exclude them from the partnership while resisting US pressure to reintegrate them. The necessity to pursue a multifaceted foreign policy and engage all major power centres is recognized by all Indian analysts. This is the surest and best way to maintain strategic autonomy. The Indian dilemma pertains to balance: the rapprochement with the US is improving faster than the partnerships with other countries such as China and Russia. The intensity and the ‘global’ ambition of the Indo-US relations are not balanced by India’s relations with other great or medium powers. A second of asymmetry insists on parallel engagements. Given the complexity and diversity of its international and security agendas, India needs to pursue multifaceted diplomacy especially vis-à-vis Russia, China and Iran. Energy supply, membership to the UN Security Council and quest to become a major player in Central Asia are among the agendas which potentially collide with US interests and require relations with alternative powers. Some scholars argue that India’s emphasis on strategic autonomy will decrease with its accession to great power status and that ‘great powers don’t speak of autonomy’. This vision seems to conceive autonomy only as a power-transition imperative and sets aside the emphasis on autonomy which manifests itself when an emerging power becomes a great power. Great powers tend to strive for maximization of their influence. For instance, the EU is today struggling to create new autonomous strategic capabilities in order to reduce its dependence on the United States. Will India become an ‘Asian France’, as one US expert asked? The major lesson of the French experience for India is that autonomy works efficiently when combined with power. France’s autonomous posture has been built as a way to keep power, not to create it. In the past India tried to pursue autonomy without sufficient power, but the growth of its power gives it more latitude. Points raised during Discussion:
Remarks made by the Chairperson Ambassador Rajiv Sikri:
Prepared by Kartik Bommakanti, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Nuclear and Arms Control | India, India-US Relations, United States of America (USA) | ||
Rationale for Performance Oriented Defence Budgeting | March 20, 2009 | Arvind Kadyan | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: V. K. Misra India’s security comes with a huge price tag. In 2009-10, the defence budget reached Rs. 1,41,703 crores, representing nearly one-seventh of total central government expenditure and 2.35 per cent of the gross domestic product. Such a huge financial outlay raises questions as to how funds are allocated and what outcomes are being achieved. Does the defence budget provide the answers? The budgeting system, in the form of Defence Services Estimates (DSE), follows ‘line-item’ budgeting. Total resources are provided in six demands for grants (catering to both the revenue and capital expenditures of the Defence Services), which in turn are subdivided into various revenue and capital items such a ‘pay and allowances’, ‘stores’, ‘works’, ‘aircraft and aero engines’, ‘naval fleet’, ‘heavy and medium vehicles’, among others. So the budget in essence does not provide information on expenditure on various capabilities or programmes that the country is acquiring to meet its security threats. Neither does the budget reflect the physical progress of various programmes on which massive investment is incurred. In other words, the intended outcome of the budget vis-à-vis security threats or the defence policy cannot be deduced from the existing system of budgeting. To move towards a visible and outcome-oriented budget, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) since 2005 has issued guidelines emphasizing the link between financial budgets and actual and targeted performance of outlays. The guidelines task the central Ministries/Departments to articulate, among others, a list of major programmes/schemes and the goals and policy framework guiding them. The main objective of the exercise is to “establish one-to-one correspondence between the (financial) budget … and Outcome Budget…” However, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), along with 30 Ministries/Departments has been ‘exempted’ from preparing outcome budget. The exempted Ministries/Departments are however ‘requested’ to prepare outcome budget for ‘internal use’ and voluntarily decide the extent to which the general public can have access to it. In the above context, the MoD has taken the initiative of formulating Defence Services Estimates, Vol. II (DSE, Vol. II), and making it mandatory for some of its institutions to prepare the outcome budget. The DSE, Vol. II, which currently is meant for “internal use” falls short of the parameters laid down by the MoF for preparing the outcome budget. It merely expands the item- or head-wise allocations made in DSE and, in addition, provides “Budget holder-wise summary sheets.” In no way does it relate the financial outlays with the intended outcomes. The major problem with the institutions that prepare outcome budgets are that their ‘outcomes’ are organisation specific and have ‘weak linkage’ with the overall plan of the MoD. Arvind Kadyan highlights a number of gaps plaguing the implementation of outcome budgeting in defence. Foremost is the lack of programme-orientation in defence budget. He argues that the identification of major programmes by “High Level Budget Holders and Top Level Budget Holders in Service Headquarters, responsible for planning of budget” would go a long way in preparing outcome budget. The programme orientation however needs suitable changes in classification of heads of expenditure, reflecting all the inputs that go into specific programmes or sub-programmes. Among others, he argues that increased use of information technology can facilitate real-time “information required for monitoring, evaluation” and for “decision-making purposes.” He suggests that considering the “extra work” that would be generated in the initial phase of the implementation of the outcome budget there is a need for a professional body with the necessary wherewithal to carry out the job. Kadyan strongly argues that Outcome budgeting is quite possible for the defence establishment, contrary to some perceptions that outcome of defence expenditure is not measurable and even if measurable its documentation may not be in the interest of the country’s security. These issues can be tracked by what he terms “attitudinal change” of concerned authorities. He says that all the information may not be placed in the public domain, as clearly articulated by the MoF. He suggests that “introduction of outcome budget is likely to be seen by the Services as an attempt to introduce a new mechanism to control budget utilisation.” For effective implementation of outcome budgeting in defence, Kadyan argues that the MoD needs to follow a ‘comprehensive approach’ covering the entire defence budget. He suggests that a tri-service institution like the College of Defence Managements (CDM), Hyderabad should ideally be entrusted with the task of developing “an overall structure” for the purpose of implementation. The ‘Budget Holders’ in the Service Headquarters (SHQs) are then required to identify outcomes against the outlays, and prepare the outcome budget, keeping in view the overall defence policy of India. While executing the outcome budget, the Programme/sub-programme Directors under the Budget Holder would need enhanced delegation of financial powers. Once the outcome budgets at the stage of Budget Holders are prepared, their consolidation could be done by the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS). Further, an independent organisation needs to be created for monitoring and evaluation of various ongoing programmes. Points raised in the discussion:
Prepared by Laxman Kumar Behera, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Defence Economics & Industry | India, Defence Budget | ||
India – Russia Strategic Dialogue: Opportunities and Challenges | March 13, 2009 to March 14, 2009 | Conference |
ProgrammeDAY 1, March 13, 2009Registration: 0930- 0945 hrs Inaugural Session: 0945 - 1030 hrs
Tea Break: 1030 - 1100 hrs Session 1 A: International Security: Indian and Russian Perspective (1100 - 1300 hrs)Chairperson: Amb. K. Raghunath
Lunch: 1300 - 1400 hrs Session 1 B: International Security: Indian and Russian Perspective (1400 - 1600 hrs)Chairperson: Amb. Rajiv Sikri
DAY 2, March 14, 2009Session 2: Regional Security Issues: Indian & Russian Perspective (0930 - 1130 hrs)Chairperson: Prof. Konstantin Khudoley
Tea Break: 1130 - 1145 hrs Session 3: Indo-Russian Partnership & Preparedness in the 21st Century (1145 - 1345 hrs)Chairperson: Shri N. S. Sisodia
Lunch: 1345 - 1430 hrs Session 4: Indo-Russian Partnership & Preparedness in the 21st Century (1430 - 1630 hrs)Chairperson: Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash
Concept Note
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Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | |||||
US Counter Insurgency Approach in Afghanistan Under Obama Administration: Does It Portend 'Change'? | March 06, 2009 | Shanthie Mariet D'Souza | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: G. Balachandran Afghanistan today appears to be teetering on the brink of failure and unending chaos. Despite the military endeavour by the United States (US) and its allies, under Operation Enduring Freedom for the last eight years, violence in 2008 increased by 40 per cent over 2007 and almost 543 percent over 2005. The Taliban-led insurgency has spread and according to an estimate almost 70 per cent of the country have become “no-go areas for security forces, government officials and aid workers” depicting a rapidly shrinking political and humanitarian space. In this context, the paper reviewed the past US counter-insurgency approaches in Afghanistan and analysed the possible impact of a new Afghan strategy. Given India’s interest in long-term stabilization of Afghanistan, this policy analysis is relevant in terms of preparing responses to the evolving scenario in that country. The central thesis of the paper was that the present initiatives in designing a new COIN (Counter Insurgency) approach for Afghanistan to usher in ‘change’ are inadequate to turn the tide. US COIN Approach under Bush administrationThe inability of the international community to stabilise Afghanistan is clearly an outcome of the inadequate and short sighted policies of George W. Bush, who embarked on the military campaign in Afghanistan with the objective of dislodging the Taliban and winning the war. The resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan depicts that the US policy under President Bush of establishing security with a ‘light footprint’ and lack of focus on ‘nation-building’ has proved to be counter productive. Moreover, at a critical juncture of Afghan stabilization efforts, the already limited resources and manpower devoted to Afghanistan were shifted to Iraq. Despite the successful completion of the Bonn process and conducting successful presidential and parliamentary elections, the political structures and the Parliament in Afghanistan are wracked by disruptive forces. Initiatives of the Obama administration: Break from the past
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Nuclear and Arms Control | Afghanistan, Counter Insurgency, Obama Administration, Pakistan, United States of America (USA) | ||
Benefits of India’s Defence Cooperation Initiatives towards the Foreign Policy Goals | March 06, 2009 | Arvind Dutta | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Arvind Gupta After the Cold War, India’s foreign relations have become multi-directional and diversified. Growing realisation that international defence cooperation can supplement diplomatic initiatives towards issues of common interests is increasingly being acknowledged the world over. New geo-strategic realities necessitate improvement of relations with the major powers, such as the US, EU, Russia, Japan and China and pursuance of an active ‘Look East’ policy in the extended neighbourhood, especially ASEAN countries. An important part of ‘Defence Diplomacy’ is defence cooperation. Defence cooperation, as an important tool of foreign policy, can be gainfully utilized to build bridges of friendship, prevent conflict, build capacity of friendly foreign nations, strengthen mutual trust and enhance security and stability in the region. Considering the intensive range of defence cooperation activities, it is considered prudent to analyse the role being played by defence cooperation activities, especially military related, towards pursuance of our overall foreign policy goals. The paper is an attempt to do this and is laid out in three parts as follows:-
India is now engaged in a wide range of activities with other friendly countries, ranging from Chile and Brazil in the Far-West to Japan and Korea in the Far-East and has concluded suitable defence cooperation agreements with over 30 countries. Defence cooperation activities are not structured and conducted in isolation but as part of a larger process. The range of defence cooperation activities comprise of strategic security dialogues that enable understanding of the participant concerns and establishing areas of common interest. Also included are goodwill visits at the level of the Service Chiefs, professional defence and military expert exchanges, military training, combined exercises, reciprocal visits of warships, observers for exercises, sports and adventure activities, disaster management and humanitarian assistance; and cooperation in UN Peace Keeping Operations. The recent period has seen increased instability and turbulence in India’s neighbourhood. With growing assertion of ‘non-state’ actors, Pakistan is passing through yet another defining phase in its history. India’s other neighbours, specifically Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, appear to be going through periods of instability, which could have spillover effects on our security. Radicalisation of domestic environment in Bangladesh, continuous inflow of illegal immigrants to North East India, cross border movement of Indian insurgent groups from Bangladesh and Myanmar, escalation of violence in Sri Lanka and effects of actions against LTTE in southern India are issues having ramifications on India’s security. While Nepal may be on the path to normalcy, possibility of collusion between the Nepal Maoists and the Indian Naxalites has serious implications on India’s security. To ensure a peaceful periphery, India has remained focused on security of sea lanes in the IOR, responding to natural disasters, stability in neighbourhood and, where feasible, capacity building of neighbouring countries to meet their internal challenges as also to contribute towards meeting common security challenges in the region. Towards this end, defence cooperation activities are facilitating regional security (through material assistance, training, building ability to operate alongside and maritime bonding); building bridges of friendship with countries in the extended neighbourhood, building bridges of friendship with key powers, projection of India as a responsible player in the global security architecture, Disaster Management and Humanitarian Relief, Peacekeeping Operations, combating sea piracy, capacity building of own armed forces, extending dividends to Defence Industry, joint R&D projects, confidence building and deterrence Some of the recommendations to make it more effective and valuable are: Formulation of Policy Guidelines, Integrated Planning, Requirement of Specialists, Improvement of Relations with West Asian Countries, Military Interaction with Pakistan Points in the Discussion
Prepared by Dr. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Military Affairs | India, Defence Cooperation, Defence Diplomacy, Defence | ||
Mr. Bolat Nurgaliev, Secretary General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation | February 27, 2009 | Round Table |
The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses organised a round table interaction with Bolat Nurgaliev, Secretary General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) on February 27, 2009. During his visit he deliberated upon important issues like the current status of the SCO, role of observer states and the question of the SCO’s expansion, economic cooperation within the framework of the organisation, and its current strategy for cooperation in the energy sector. He also dwelt on the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and its negative effect on neighbouring states. The limitations and problems faced by the SCO were also highlighted by the Secretary General. The Secretary General said that the Afghanistan issue has continued to be on the agenda of SCO meetings. Member countries have been keen to help Afghanistan because peace and stability there is in their interest. However, any physical involvement by the SCO in Afghanistan has not been contemplated so far. He informed that the SCO will shortly be organising a conference on Afghanistan in Russia as discussed in the previous SCO summit meeting. The conference would aim to assess the seriousness of the problem in Afghanistan with focus on terrorism and drug trafficking and to analyse the possible options to address the aforesaid issues. Senior government officials would be participating in this conference. India will be one of the participating countries. During the discussion, it was articulated that Afghanistan has been the play ground for India, Persia and Central Asia, where these powers have sought to establish control. Today, Pakistan wants to dominate Afghanistan. However, it was only India which can establish strong economic linkages with Afghanistan because of its economic potential. It was pointed out that trading with India will bring about economic prosperity to Afghanistan. Therefore, it is important for India and Pakistan to work together to bring stability in Afghanistan. On cooperation between the SCO and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) he said that both organisations have a working engagement. While the CSTO is mainly a military political bloc, SCO is an organisation addressing security and economic cooperation among member states. What CSTO lacks is the Chinese component. He also ruled out the possibility of the SCO turning into a military bloc. In response to a question on energy competition in the Eurasian region and SCO’s role in this sector, he said that some member states have energy resources while others are transit countries for the supply of these resources. Therefore, energy cooperation remains an important issue for SCO member countries. However, progress in the area of setting up an energy club has not achieved much success. There is a difference of opinion on the issue of how to cooperate with each other within the SCO framework. While some members want the creation of an energy club, others emphasise on formulating an SCO energy strategy. Some others are of the opinion that before formulating a regional energy strategy it would be important to formulate a national energy strategy. He said that as heads of States want to focus on the energy issue there is a possibility that in the long run SCO will be able to formulate a common energy strategy acceptable to all member states. On the speculation about the possibility of SCO+3, the Secretary General said that under the current situation this was not possible. So far the United States has been watching the activities of the SCO from a distance but has not approached it officially for any kind of engagement. As for Japan, it was not keen to be in SCO. There is a Japan-Central Asia Dialogue under which it cooperates with Central Asian countries. This was, in fact, a response to SCO activities. On the issue of expansion, he said that currently the SCO remains an open organisation. But at the same time it is undergoing a process where the criteria of including new members is being formulated. However, on the issue of observer status to new countries, their numbers would not be allowed to exceed that of full member states. He said that during the forthcoming June summit of SCO, some rules for the role of observer countries will be adopted. On India’s role in the SCO, he said that the SCO expects India to play an important role in establishing peace and security in this region. He said that India has expressed desire to participate in political, economic and security arena but not officially applied for a full membership to the SCO. He said that Turkey has shown some interest to be involved in specific projects with the SCO. Economic cooperation within the SCO framework has been the focus of member countries. Several steps have been taken up in this direction. During the Dushanbe Summit meeting an MOU on partnership relations between the Interbank Association of the SCO and Eurasian Development Bank was signed. In this context member countries have come to the stage of selecting major projects which need to be undertaken in the region. Most countries have been interested in infrastructure projects like building of roads and tunnels. It was pointed out that the SCO was close to creating a development fund. In this context it was highlighted that legal rules need to be created for any kind of financial cooperation. Highlighting the limitations and problems of the SCO, the Secretary General said that there was a need to perfect the organisational structure and continue to build political trust among member states. It was noted that some times a gap between decision making and actual implementation of projects taken up by the SCO delays the whole process. Often priority placed on national interest by individual member states creates a problem for any forward movement of the organisation. He stated that the current financial crisis will have some impact on various economic projects taken up by member countries of the SCO. Prepared by Dr. Meena Singh Roy, Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Nuclear and Arms Control | Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) | ||||
GCC’S New Avatar and Invigorating India’s Interests | February 27, 2009 | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Ishrat Aziz Even with differences among some individual member states and the hostile Gulf environment, GCC countries have still managed to maintain good relations with India. It has emerged as a successful regional organisation which has partners around the globe despite all the hurdles. In recent times, GCC has taken decisions that broaden the horizon of its engagements with the outside world, including India, both in economic as well as political fields. India should also take the opportunity provided by recent liberal moves and engage more vigorously to further enhance its interests in the region. Economic relations have been the backbone of India-GCC ties. Political and strategic relations between India and GCC have not been smooth because of a number of reasons but trade and business have continued to grow at a steady pace. Today, GCC is the second largest trading partner of India, after the United States. According to Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM), India's total trade with GCC countries is estimated at US $28 billion during 2007-08 and it could top US $40 billion by 2010. The volume of trade can be gauged from the fact that India’s total trade with GCC countries rose from $5.55 billion in 2000-01 to $23.42 billion in 2005-06. The period witnessed resilience in both exports and imports. GCC countries are also the major source of petroleum energy for India. In August 2004, India and the GCC signed a framework agreement on economic cooperation to explore the possibility of a Free Trade Area between them. Later, in November of the same year, a three-member GCC negotiating team visited India and held discussions on a broad range of issues, including the possibility of initiating negotiations towards a FTA and non-tariff barriers affecting Indian exports to the region. Despite mutually beneficial trade and business relations between India and GCC, political relations have been rather slow and lacks enthusiasm. However, India has initiated a few steps in this direction to engage GCC countries politically and strategically in a more rigorous manner. The Government of India appointed a senior diplomat Chinmaya Gharekhan as its special envoy to the Gulf region to promote cooperation in trade and investment, Information Technology, education, culture and tourism. Due to cordial relations with GCC countries, India has managed to gather the support of two countries – UAE and Oman – in its bid for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. India has been granted the status of a ‘dialogue partner’ by the GCC. India is the first from the developing world and only the fourth country after USA, European Union and Japan to have got this privilege. Despite cordial relations, there are some constraints between India and the GCC. These include continuous political support of Gulf countries for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, their provision of material support to Pakistan against India in past Indo-Pak wars, and India’s growing relationship with Israel. Points in the Discussion
Prepared by Dr. M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | India-GCC Relations, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) | |||
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking | February 27, 2009 | Sumita Kumar | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: V.G Patankar Pakistan’s self image, geographical location and history have influenced the country’s strategic thinking. In the initial years, Pakistan perceived itself to be a weak state and believed that India posed an existential threat to its security. However, Islamabad’s thinking evolved over a period of time through its experience in various wars with India, tension on the western borders, developments in communications, military doctrines, military technology and weapons systems. For instance, after its defeat in the 1971 war with India, Pakistan decided to develop nuclear weapons. Following the acquisition of a nuclear capability was acquired in 1987, nuclear deterrence became an important element of Pakistan’s strategic thinking. Similarly, Islamic jihad based on young recruits from Pakistan mosques and madrassas played an important role in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. Drivers for Pakistan’s Strategic OutlookPakistan has suffered from a small state syndrome ever since its inception. It feels a strong sense of disadvantage vis-à-vis India. Being one-fourth its territory and one-eighth of its population, Pakistan feels pressured by being in the vicinity of a much larger Hindu dominated India. Pakistan was conscious of the fact that any attack from its perceived adversaries, India to its East and Afghanistan/erstwhile Soviet Union in the West would leave it with very little strategic depth. This led Islamabad to adopt a strategy of “offensive defence” vis-à-vis India, and on the other hand to develop relations with Iran and make vigorous attempts to establish its influence in Afghanistan. The 1893 Durand Line created by the British profoundly embittered the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact in 1947, Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations because it laid claim to the Pashtun territories on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line. In 1949, a loya jirga (grand tribal assembly) convened by the Afghan government declared support for “Pushtunistan”. The jirga which affirmed the position of the Afghan government was not willing to accept the validity of agreements like the 1893 Durand Agreement, as it considered Pakistan a new state rather than a successor state to British India, and considered past treaties with the British pertaining to the status of the border as null and void. Afghanistan’s support for Pushtunistan found expression due to Pashtun nationalism, the pride stemming from Pashtun political domination of Afghanistan historically and the implicit vulnerability that characterizes Afghanistan’s landlocked geographic situation. Pakistan’s inability to establish a stable democratic system in the early years of its independence resulted in the repeated intervention of the army. Given its interest in remaining the dominant power centre it has not tolerated interference by civilian governments in matters it considers sacrosanct. Pakistan’s internal ethnic contradictions and the dominance of the Punjabis in the power structure resulted in the movement for secession in East Pakistan. At the time of independence, it was hoped that a “common faith” would help overcome any ethno-linguistic contradictions The excessive importance given by the Pakistani leadership to the views of the Ulema resulted in the gradual ascendancy of religious extremists. The Ulema have had significant influence over the Pakistani leadership Pakistan has always used its Islamic identity and therefore its links to Islamic countries as an important factor in promoting its strategic objectives. Right from the beginning Pakistan’s leadership adopted a pan-Islamic approach, became a member of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and later of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). The strategic location of Pakistan during the Cold War led to Pakistan’s alliance with the United States which determined its strategic outlook for a substantial period of history. Regime survival, Pakistan’s traditional policy paradigm of seeking leadership in the Muslim world, securing national unity through Islam and obtaining Western economic and military assistance were some of the imperatives guiding Pakistan’s behaviour. Elements of Pakistan’s Strategic ThinkingFirst, it would be pertinent to emphasize that Pakistan’s strategic thinking has been dominated by the Army because of the Army’s continuous role in government, whether direct or indirect. Second, it was therefore natural that Pakistan’s strategic thinking should have been characterised by a highly aggressive posture towards India. A number of assumptions on the part of the Pakistani leadership led it to attack India in 1965. It was believed that after Nehru’s death the potential for disintegration of India was higher, and Lal Bahadur Shastri was considered to be a weak leader. The flawed concept of “The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West” remained the basis of Pakistan’s military strategy till the surrender at Dhaka in 1971. Pakistan’s aggressive attitude was also evident from its strategy to destabilise India through covert means as in the state support for Sikh separatists through the 1980s. Since the late 1980s Pakistan has actively sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir with the help of the highly trained mujahideen who had returned from the Afghan war. The Kargil operations in 1999 were launched by the Pakistan Army with the aim of acquiring territory at Kargil in a bid to force India to solve the Kashmir problem on terms favourable to Pakistan. Third, such aggressive behaviour was also reflected in Pakistan’s dealings with Afghanistan. Concepts like strategic depth provided legitimacy for military expansionism into Afghanistan, initially by giving support to the anti-Soviet Mujahideen, and later by training and supporting the Taliban Fourth, Pakistan’s strategists have followed a doctrine of “offensive defence” given Pakistan’s size, location, and terrain along its eastern border with India. In times of crisis, Pakistan has not hesitated to be the first to resort to use of force to gain initial advantage. Fifth, though Pakistan’s belief in jihad as a weapon to achieve political goals is well known, it is interesting to note that in the late 1970's, efforts were made to interpret the Holy Quran and its relevance to war. The Quranic concept of Jihad seems to be the basis of Islamic strategic doctrine. Sixth, Pakistan has relied extensively on irregulars to help it achieve its military objectives. Seventh, Pakistan believed that it would be able to snatch Kashmir from India and “inflict a thousand wounds” on India, destabilise it or weaken it, through subconventional warfare. Taking advantage of its nuclear capability acquired in 1987, Pakistan started implementing its plan of achieving strategic goals first in Kashmir and then in the rest of India through a low-intensity conflict or proxy war. Eight, nuclear weapons constitute the most important and advanced element in Pakistan’s strategic thinking. The essential logic of Pakistan’s nuclear programme is Indo-centric. Pakistan acquired a nuclear weapons capability in 1987, as has been admitted by General Mirza Aslam Beg himself. It can be concluded that, Pakistan can claim only partial success in achieving its strategic objectives. Even recently, western leaders like David Miliband and Richard Holbrooke have been harping on Kashmir resolution as a pre-condition for peace in the region. Again, by relying on non-state jihadi organisations to fulfil their strategic objectives against India, and by reinforcing the Taliban to carry out Pakistan’s goals against Afghanistan, Pakistan has legitimised these terrorist groups to such an extent that they have become a threat to Pakistan’s own existence. Some of the issues raised in the discussion were:
The seminar was chaired by Lt Gen (Retd.) V.G Patankar. External discussants were Prof. Kalim Bahadur and Dr Ajay. D. Behera. Internal discussants were Dr. Smruti Pattanaik and Col. Ali Ahmed. Prepared by Medha Bisht, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
South Asia | Strategic Thinking, Nuclear Weapons, India-Pakistan Relations, Pakistan |