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Monday Morning Meeting on “Sheikh Hasina’s Visit to India and India-Bangladesh Relations” July 01, 2024 Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Anand Kumar, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA, made a presentation on “Sheikh Hasina’s Visit to India and India-Bangladesh Relations” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 1 July 2024. The session was chaired by Dr. Om Prakash Das, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA. The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and other IDSA scholars participated in the discussion.

Executive Summary

The meeting focused on Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India. The visit focused on enhancing collaboration in terms of defence cooperation, trade and commerce, frontier technologies including civil nuclear, oceanography and space technology. Both nations reiterated their commitment for a free, open, inclusive, secure, and rule-based Indo-Pacific region.

Detailed Report

Dr. Om Prakash Das convened the meeting by highlighting the significance of Sheikh Hasina’s visit on 21-22 June 2024, which was her first bilateral visit since being re-elected in January 2024, and also her second visit to India within a month following her attendance at Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s oath-taking ceremony. This visit was notably significant as it was the first state visit after Prime Minister Modi's re-election for a third consecutive term.

Dr. Anand Kumar began his presentation by emphasising the importance of bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh and their mutual desire to guide the relationship into a new era of future-oriented partnership. Dr. Kumar outlined Sheikh Hasina’s visit to China in coming times, ongoing foreign currency crisis in Bangladesh and PM Hasina’s aim to ensure the continuous supply of essential commodities which are essential for maintaining political stability in Bangladesh, as the possible reasons for her visit.

Dr. Kumar informed the audience about the outcomes of the visit, marked by the signing of ten Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) and thirteen announcements. Economic and trade cooperation between the two countries saw significant strides, with agreements to commence negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and Bangladesh offering two Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to India in Mongla and Mirsharai. Dr. Kumar highlighted that while trade and commerce between India and Bangladesh have seen significant improvements, there remains limited engagement in defence industrial cooperation. India proposed defence industrial cooperation to modernise the Bangladesh Armed Forces, and an agreement was signed to train 350 Bangladesh police officers.

Dr. Kumar pointed out that transit and connectivity were major themes, with India expressing its intent to expand connectivity in physical, energy, and digital forms. MoUs were signed between the railways of both countries. According to Dr. Kumar, an important development was India's agreement to provide transit facilities for Bangladeshi goods to Nepal and Bhutan via Indian railways. Dr. Kumar drew attention to the agreements signed on energy and digital connectivity, including a pact between the National Payment Corporation of India (NPCI) and Bangladesh Bank to launch Unified Payment Interface (UPI) in Bangladesh. Further collaboration in frontier technologies was agreed upon, including civil nuclear, oceanography, and space technology.

Humanitarian issues were prominently discussed, with the renewal of an MoU between the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the Ministry of Disaster Management for disaster relief. Additionally, India introduced e-Visas for Bangladeshi medical patients seeking treatment in India. On regional and diplomatic issues, Dr. Kumar noted the commitment of both nations for a free, open, inclusive, secure, and rules-based Indo-Pacific region. He informed about India’s commitment of continued support for resolving the Rohingya crisis. Dr. Kumar discussed the ongoing Teesta river issue and marked it as important to the extent that it can affect bilateral relations. He further informed that the Ganges Water Treaty, signed in 1996, is being renewed by mutual consent, with a technical team established to conduct groundwork.

Dr. Kumar reiterated the Indian Government’s commitment to strengthen the country's relations with its neighbours by highlighting remarks made by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar on Sheikh Hasina’s visit. The presentation concluded by acknowledging the mutual efforts of both nations to strengthen bilateral ties by ensuring that their relationship remains "future ready."

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy appreciated the detailed presentation by Dr. Kumar. He addressed several key challenges in bilateral ties by pointing out the prevailing sentiment among the Bangladeshi people regarding limited access to the Indian market. Amb. Chinoy queried the way forward to address this issue. He highlighted the complexities of dealing with smugglers in the border areas, often armed and travelling in large numbers at night, and the unwillingness of the Bangladeshi side to address these issues. Additionally, he raised concerns about the illegal entry of both Bangladeshis and Rohingyas into India, questioning the extent of India’s responsibility, given that it is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

During the Q&A session, Dr. Kumar responded to the question about Bangladeshi access to the Indian market by noting the interests of Indian businessmen must also be considered, necessitating detailed groundwork for a balanced approach. Addressing the question about West Bengal’s stance on water issues, Dr. Kumar explained the complexities surrounding the Teesta river, citing significant water usage upstream and Chinese involvement in reservoir construction. He suggested that India could assist Bangladesh in building reservoirs to mitigate Chinese influence, utilising the existing US$ 7 billion credit line, majority of which is still not used.

Gp. Capt. R.K. Narang inquired about the relative ease for Bangladeshis to set up companies in India compared to the challenges faced by Indian businesses in Bangladesh and the persistence of anti-India sentiments. Dr. Kumar attributed these sentiments to historical factors and the growing influence of Gulf-based Islamist ideology.

Mr. Arvind Khare, Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA, inquired about West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s opposition to water discussions between India and Bangladesh without the State's consultation, questioning if her concerns align with national objectives. Dr. Kumar stated that while consultation with the state government is desirable, foreign policy matters come under the central government.

Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA, mentioned the strategic importance of the Chittagong-Kolkata train route and the launch of the e-Suvidha Portal for border trade, highlighting the logistical advancements. She also said that Sheikh Hasina’s visit to China should not be seen as detrimental to India’s interests given the significant Indian investments.

Report prepared by Puspa Kumari, Intern, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.

Roundtable Discussion on India-Iran Relations: Chabahar and Recent Developments in Iran June 11, 2024 Round Table

On 11 June 2024, a Roundtable Discussion on “India-Iran Relations: Chabahar and Recent Developments in Iran” was organised at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA). The discussion was chaired by the Director General, MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy. The Speakers were Ambassador Yashvardhan Kumar Sinha, former Central Information Commissioner, Ambassador Gaddam Dharmendra, Dean, Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service (SSIFS), Ministry of External Affairs, and Dr. Deepika Saraswat, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA.

Executive Summary

The strategic importance of the Chabahar Port is crucial in strengthening India-Iran cooperation and enhancing regional connectivity. The Port’s development is central to India’s endeavors to establish a reliable trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), with Chabahar Port as a crucial link, holds immense significance. The recent long-term contract between India’s India Port Global Ltd (IPGL) and Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organisation (PMO) underscores India’s commitment to furthering the port’s development and operations. Despite U.S. sanctions, the Chabahar Port’s operational viability has been facilitated through sanctions waivers, enabling the shipment of essential commodities like wheat and pulses from India to Afghanistan. Iran remains a close regional partner for India, particularly in enhancing connectivity and economic cooperation with Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Detailed Report

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy made opening remarks at the roundtable discussion. He provided a comprehensive overview of the close India-Iran bilateral relations, emphasising their importance and evolving dynamics. He highlighted the historical context, noting Iran’s support for India at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) against Pakistan’s attempt for a resolution on human rights violations.

Amb. Chinoy underscored the significance of the development of the Chabahar Port as a cornerstone of Indo-Iranian cooperation. He referenced the 2016 bilateral agreement worth US$ 85 million for Phase-I development of the Shahid Beheshti Port. A long-term 10-year contract signed in May 2024 between India Port Global Ltd (IPGL) and Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organisation (PMO) was highlighted. This agreement, involving an Indian investment of approximately US$ 120 million, aims to develop further and operate the port, demonstrating India’s commitment to enhancing regional connectivity and economic cooperation.

The importance of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) was emphasised, with Chabahar Port as a crucial link to Central Asia and Eurasia. Amb. Chinoy illustrated the Port’s operational significance by citing the shipment of 2.5 million tons of wheat and 2,000 tons of pulses from India to Afghanistan, facilitated by U.S. sanctions waivers. He noted that India’s position regarding connectivity with Afghanistan aligns with the U.S. vision. Amb. Chinoy also mentioned the geopolitical implications of the joint naval exercises conducted by Iran, Russia, and China in the Gulf of Oman in the Western Indian Ocean, outlining potential ramifications for India’s critical interests in the region.

Ambassador Yashvardhan Kumar Sinha provided a historical overview of India’s relations with Iran, emphasising the deep-rooted cultural and historical ties between the two nations. Amb. Sinha noted that in 2002 when Iranian President Khatami offered Chabahar port development to India, there were discussions in India of the strategic importance of Chabahar. The progress on India’s involvement in Chabahar gathered momentum in 2011-12. He recalled the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Iran during the 16th NAM Summit in August 2012, when an action plan on Chabahar was discussed, which later provided the basis for the 2016 Chabahar Agreement.

Amb. Sinha emphasised the significant importance of the Chabahar Port for India, particularly in light of India-Pakistan adversarial relations, which have hindered direct overland connectivity, one exception being India’s wheat shipment to Afghanistan under the World Food Programme going through Karachi. He also elaborated on the financial arrangements between India and Iran, noting that the Reserve Bank of India had an arrangement with the Central Bank of Iran to open Rupee accounts with the UCO Bank, facilitating smoother financial transactions between the two countries.

Amb. Sinha noted that Chabahar is geographically closer to India and Central Asia than Bandar Abbas, making it a more strategic and accessible option for reaching Afghanistan and Central Asia. Additionally, he observed that quick development of transport infrastructure, especially roads linking to Chabahar, has taken place. He also mentioned India’s construction of the Zaranj-Delaram Highway connecting to the Garland Highway in Afghanistan. On a comparative note, he noted that the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan imperils the prospects of Gwadar as a trans-shipment hub. He noted that other partners of India will have the opportunity to utilise this infrastructure, thereby enhancing regional cooperation.

Ambassador Gaddam Dharmendra stated that Iran has been at the centre of multiple developments, especially following the 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas on Israel. He noted that Iran has been linked to various actors, including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. Additionally, he discussed the role of Egypt and the U.S. in the Israel-Hamas conflict. Amb. Dharmendra provided a detailed overview of the functioning and power dynamics of multiple power structures operating in Iran under the Supreme Leader, specifically emphasising the increasing role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in various domains, from politics to economy.

Amb. Dharmendra outlined the recent progress in bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, highlighting efforts to bridge long-standing geopolitical divides and China’s role as a guarantor of the process. He elaborated on Iran’s forward defence strategy, which involves using a decentralised network of non-state actors to secure its homeland. Iran has achieved significant success in training and mobilising these actors. However, while Iran has the capability to initiate escalatory dynamics, it lacks the power to dominate such escalations. This was exemplified in the recent attack on Israel, where approximately 300 drones and missiles were launched. Despite this, Iran’s influence remains substantial but not overwhelming in terms of maintaining prolonged dominance in conflict scenarios.

Amb. Dharmendra also discussed the strained relations between Iran and the European Union, particularly in the context of the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. Following this withdrawal, Iran has gradually undermined nearly all provisions of the JCPOA, including dismantling surveillance cameras and limiting access to inspectors, which has resulted in complicated relations with Europe. He also observed that Iran’s nuclear latency acts as a deterrent against potential Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Dr. Deepika Saraswat remarked that the 2016 Chabahar Agreement and the latest long-term contract exemplify India’s commitment to maintaining strong ties with Iran, driven by enduring strategic logic. She argued that both countries share a common strategic and security environment in South-West Asia. She noted that Pakistan’s obstructionism gives certain inexorability to Iran’s gateway role. Dr. Saraswat noted that, unlike the United States, India views Iran as a regional partner with which it would seek to engage on the basis of convergence of interests.

Dr. Saraswat noted that despite significant developments in Iran-China relations, particularly after the Iran-China 25-year agreement, India would not like to see Iran fall into China’s geopolitical orbit. She also discussed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration-led “Look East” doctrine, which emerged in 2005. This doctrine emphasised Iran’s pivot towards the East, diversifying its international partnerships beyond traditional Western allies. Dr. Saraswat underscored Iran’s historical importance in fostering North-South connectivity since the completion of the Trans-Iranian railway in 1938. She specified that under the Look East doctrine, Iran positioned itself as an ‘Asian country,’ prioritising geoeconomic considerations over the conflict-ridden geopolitics of the Middle East.

Dr. Saraswat discussed that Iran’s geopolitical thinking had been shaped by its historical experience in the great game between Britain and Russia, leading to a quest for independence and a nuanced understanding of imperialist geopolitics. Dr. Saraswat emphasised Iran’s self-perception as a regional power, actively engaged in countering the U.S. in the Persian Gulf while also viewing Russia and China as strategic counterweights to the U.S. Iran’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in July 2023 has shown Iran’s approach towards multilateralism. However, she noted that despite these alliances, Iran maintains its identity as a civilisational state and does not consider itself a junior partner to Russia and China. Moreover, Iran is cautious about China’s increasing dominance in Central Asia, a sentiment shared by India as well. She also briefly spoke of the competitive dynamics between Iran and Pakistan in inter-regional connectivity between Central and South Asia.

Comments and Questions

Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, asked about Iran’s deteriorating economy and its options to navigate challenges. Dr. Ashok K. Behuria, Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA, shared his views on the Baloch rebellion in both Pakistan and Iran and its repercussions. He suggested that India’s anxiety about China-Pakistan nexus needs to be commensurate with India’s broader strategic vision. Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research Associate, MP-IDSA, remarked on the need to study the technological progress of non-state actors and inquired about the multifaceted role of various authorities in the election of Iran’s new President. Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA, posed questions regarding sector-specific investments in Iran and the Taliban’s proposal to invest in the Chabahar project. Dr. P. K. Pradhan, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA, asked about evolving bilateral trade amid the potential for closer Iran-Saudi Arabia relations.

All three speakers comprehensively responded to these comments and questions.

Report prepared by Mr. Abhishek Yadav, Research Analyst, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.

Interaction with Delegation from the French Institute for Advanced Studies in National Defence (IHEDN) May 27, 2024 Other

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised an interaction with a delegation from the French Institute for Advanced Studies in National Defence (IHEDN) on “India-France Bilateral Relations” on 27 May 2024. The interaction was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and attended by scholars from the Europe and Eurasia Centre, Defence Economics and Industry Centre, and Military Affairs Centre of MP-IDSA.

Executive Summary

The event provided a comprehensive overview of India-France Bilateral relations. It delved into historic ties of the two nations while also simultaneously analysing the current state of affairs and future prospects of developing this strategic partnership further. Diplomatic and defence ties between India and France, the current state of global affairs including violent clashes in Europe, West Asia, and the building up of tension in the Asian waters were discussed. Mention was made of French support towards India’s inclusion in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent membership, its decision to continue trade with India even when the west planned on boycotting India owing to its first successful nuclear weapon test. France has also been a crucial pillar in India’s journey of reducing Russian dependency for military imports. India has been a natural partner of France in the Indo-Pacific owing to its shared values and interests. It is a reliable and trustworthy ally which seeks to further deepen ties.

Detailed Report

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA delivered the opening remarks. He began by formally welcoming General Benoît Durieux, Director General, IHEDN and the French delegation to India. He mentioned the defence and strategic cooperation between India and France with an emphasis on cooperation in the maritime theatre, deepening defence and security ties, and greater convergence on many defence platforms. He mentioned that India would be happy to engage with the French over joint ventures, joint research and development projects, technology transfers for crucial defence systems, and alike. This could help the countries in their shared agenda of the fight against terrorism. Trilateral Cooperation for Development in Africa is another aspect where India and France can work together with a third African country in Africa. Such an arrangement can harness historical ties that French have with the continent along with India’s goodwill which has been increasing with the African countries.

Amb. Chinoy highlighted the current state of global affairs, which is governed by great power contestation. The US and China are caught in a tussle of trying to prove their supremacy over the other. Russia and Ukraine are engaged in war since February 2022. Post COVID-19 pandemic the world is witnessing a disruption in global supply chains and an increase in debt distress levels, especially in developing countries. The world is also witnessing certain non-state actors strengthening their hold on crucial points on the map. For instance, the Houthis have managed to get a stronghold on certain areas of Yemen which leaves them in control of crucial chokepoints like the Bab-al Mandab Strait. Simultaneously, there has been a spike in the piracy cases around that region. This reflects that if non-state actors were to get control of other chokepoints, we could witness an increase in the nature and number of disruptive issues around that area.

Amb. Chinoy mentioned that social media is yet another sector which has been growing exponentially. It has become a new frontier on a battlefield which is constantly evolving and affecting those who are far away from it. The battle of narratives is being fought ferociously on online platforms to try and control the mindset of global citizens. Greater number of countries are seeking multipolarity, reformed multilateralism and issue based alignments. In today’s globalised world, decoupling is not an option but it is very important to be able to de-risk policies and supply chains.  The concept of de-risking was first introduced by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. De-risking from China is vital for Europe as China has managed to link its geo-economic interests with geopolitics when dealing with other countries, be it allies or others.

In conclusion, Amb. Chinoy highlighted the need to reform our multilateral systems. He underlined the condition of the post World War II institutions aimed at maintaining peace and preventing another world war. It was mentioned that post cold war there has been no real adjustment made to ensure fair representation of the developing countries in structures such as the UNSC, multilateral banks and institutions. In this major power contestation the 7Ts of trade, technology, territory, terrorism, tenets (narratives), trust and transparency provide a frame of reference.

General Benoît Durieux, Director General, IHEDN commenced his address by thanking MP-IDSA for the hospitality. He mentioned that this was the first time that IHEDN decided to send such a large delegation to India, comprising 103 members. This was a natural choice for the French which reflected the strong partnership between the two countries. He drew parallels between India and France and pointed out that both the countries value multilateralism. What India means by multilateralism is what France’s idea of ‘not aligned’ is. There is a difference of terminology but the meaning of the terms is the same. Both India and France are global voices, meaning that when they have something to say at a global stage, the others listen. Both are nuclear power wielding countries which behave responsibly and do not threaten the use of nuclear weapons on those who do not align with their views. For France, diplomacy and democracy are very significant aspects. It upholds democratic values above all else.

Speaking of defence institutions, General Durieux said that it is important for military institutions and foreign policy institutes to understand the reasons as to why military force is employed. It matters how decision makers view defence and political issues and at times we may observe a slight overlap between the two. Climate crises is one such instance where the scale of threat is ever changing based on new developments. Not only this, new technological tools like artificial intelligence (AI), cyberspace, and drones will change our society and we will have to wait and watch for the kind of impact it has in the long run. General Durieux urged both the countries to work tirelessly towards the reality of their strategic partnership.

General Durieux concluded by saying that it is the duty of think tanks to engage and develop partnerships at the institutional level to exchange ideas and thoughts. He also mentioned an upcoming French Institute by the name of ‘French Defence University’ which will be an association of 23 research institutions focused on military education and training. He extended an invitation for a delegation from MP-IDSA led by Amb. Sujan Chinoy, to participate in the second edition of the Paris Defence and Strategy Forum scheduled in March 2025, before concluding his remarks.

Amb. Sujan Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA was the first speaker on the panel and he spoke on “Evolving Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific”. He began by discussing India’s core strategic outlook which reflected the teachings of Gandhi and Buddha and deeply cherishs India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as cornerstones of its economic growth. India has its own set of challenges but it has never aggressed against other nations as the first mover. In the Indo-Pacific, China’s rapid rise has been somewhat disruptive. It has not been able to adjust to the global rise of other countries and the world too has not been able to adjust to China’s rapid rise in Asian waters. China has benefitted immensely from the current world order but it is unhappy that the reigns of agenda-setting are still in the hands of the West.

Amb. Chinoy highlighted the criticality of the Indo-Pacific and how the concept evolved from the old terminology ‘Asia-Pacific’. Earlier economic development was restricted to certain pockets in south-east Asia but with time, this has spread. Thereby, the term Indo-Pacific being more inclusive. Speaking of international waters, Amb Chinoy also explained the cruciality of various chokepoints in maritime trade routes like the Bab-al-Mandab, Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Sunda Strait amongst others. If control of these points were to fall in the hands of non-state actors, it would make things very complicated for the states. Groupings like the Quad were also mentioned by the Amb. Its re-birth since 2017, when it was elevated from Senior Official/Minister level dialogue to Summit level. Malabar exercises and Quad partners’ individual bilateral exercises also found mention.

Indo-Pacific is a strategically important geolocation which also harbours the waters around the Quad countries but here China’s increased presence is witnessed in Micronesia and Polynesia. It has overlapping claims with many countries regarding the Nine- Dash Line. It is involved in illegal fishing, building artificial islands and has been threatening Taiwan with frequent sorties without having ruled out the option of use of force yet on Taiwan. There is increasing support in favour of Taiwan but powers like the United States still maintain an ambiguous stand on the issue of supporting Taiwan over China. Beijing has made inroads into ASEAN and made several ASEAN countries dependent on it, thereby fracturing any possible consensus to stand united in the face of the dragon.

Amb. Chinoy stated that all major powers are present in the Indo-Pacific.  India is a peninsular country with a vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Its vision for the Indo-Pacific was well defined by the Prime Minister in 2018 as an “open, stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific Region”. SAGAR and its extension- SagarMala project- are aimed at linking India’s inland ports and waterways to global shipping. India is also an observer in Australian Naval exercises, apart from being a participant in some. Concluding his remarks, Amb. Chinoy highlighted the 7 pillars of the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and the role of Japan, Australia, France, Singapore and Indonesia as important partners of India in different pillars of this programme.

Dr. Swasti Rao, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA was the second Speaker on the panel and she spoke on “Evolving Dimensions of India-France Bilateral Ties”. She began by congratulating the IHEDN delegation for successfully hosting the International Session for the Indo-Pacific (SIIP) 2023 in Paris. She pointed out that India has a 2+2 mechanism with its close allies like Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and others but not with France. The reason being that India and France are natural allies who have managed to build close ties even without such a mechanism. This speaks volumes about the bond of trust between the two countries but the real question is where does this trust come from. It primarily flows from two major documents signed by the Indian and French leadership. First is ‘Horizon 2047 Roadmap’ signed during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Paris as the Chief Guest for the Bastille Day celebrations on 14 July 2023. Second is the ‘Defence Industry Roadmap’ signed during President Macron’s visit to India as the Chief Guest for the 75th Republic Day on 26 January 2024.

The Horizon 2047 Roadmap will coincide with the centenary of India’s independence, the centenary of diplomatic relations between India and France, and 50 years of the strategic partnership. These documents mention the bilateral defence industrial collaboration; bilateral, trilateral and triangular cooperation; and outlines the comprehensive matrix of engagement between the two. France has proved to be India’s true ally time and again. Dr. Rao recalled that in 1998 when the west imposed sanctions on India for conducting nuclear weapons tests, France did not abide by those sanctions. It continued to engage with India on its own terms. Another instance is the US built Tarapur reactors where US was supplying fuel until complications arose due to the non-proliferation issue. It was France which came to India’s aid and supplied nuclear fuel until 1992.

Highlighting India’s role in the globalised world today, Dr. Rao mentioned India as the indisputable leader of the Global South. France is focused on the developmental agenda in the Indo-Pacific, which India often misses to take note of. Agence France Trésor, the French agency responsible for managing the State's finances, is fully committed to it. She also mentioned India and France together tackling global issues like climate change, poverty and welfare policies, especially in third world countries. The trilateral developmental cooperation between India and France in Africa is a classic example of this.

Dr. Rao mentioned space cooperation as a significant aspect of India-France bilateral ties. It is rooted in history similar to defence cooperation and can be traced back to 1960s. Joint space collaboration between Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the French National Space Agency (CNES) has resulted in two world class space missions. CNES has also opened a permanent liaison office in Bengaluru.  India and France have held two space dialogues and France is the third country with which India has held space dialogues after US and Japan.

To conclude, the collaboration and cooperation between India and France is at a high point and according to Dr. Rao this can be taken forward by focusing on bilateral ties, encouraging people to people relations, resuming work on projects like the Jaitapur Nuclear power plant which have been stuck for a while now.  

Dr S. Samuel C. Rajiv, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA spoke on “India-France Defence Industry Cooperation”. He noted that in the past decade India was France’s top defence export destination and France was India’s second highest defence supplier after Russia. India was the biggest arms export market for Russia, France, and Israel from 2014-2023. France’s share in global arms exports in 2019-23 stood at 11 per cent, making it the second biggest exporter of arms globally for the first time, after the United States and ahead of Russia, China and Germany. Dr. Rajiv highlighted that aircrafts and ships were the top category of weapons exports, followed by missiles, sensors and engines.

Dr. Rajiv then highlighted some key aspects relating to French defence companies in India. The first company to find mention was Dassault Aviation. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was the first export customer of Dassault Aviation in 1953 when it ordered the Ouragans/Toofani aircrafts. India also secured the Mirages and Rafale jets. The naval version of the Rafale has also been selected by India for its aircraft carrier air wing. He noted that India selected the French fighter despite stiff competition from Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet. India will be the first country outside France to field both land and naval versions of the Rafale.

Dr. Rajiv noted India’s acquisition of Scorpene submarines (from the Naval Group) with the sixth expected to be commissioned later this year. Safran has been present in India since the last 65 years and 75 per cent of the Indian aircrafts and helicopters use Safran engines comprising equipment like the Inertial Navigation Systems, with the latter co-developed with Indian public sector companies like BEL, with contributions from DRDO as well. Thales also has a significant presence with more than 2,000 employees and joint ventures with many Indian companies. It provides significant components for the Rafale jets. Dr. Rajiv pointed out that 16 per cent of the total offset contracts (by number) are being executed by French companies.

Highlighting key trends, Dr. Rajiv noted that Indian military aircraft imports have witnessed increased imports from European manufacturers like Dassault and Airbus in recent times while imports from Russia have declined. He highlighted that India’s defence engagement with strategic partners such as France will increasingly take place in the backdrop of the ongoing defence transformation with defence indigenisation and domestic procurement being key focus areas. He noted that India’s defence budgets have seen adequate allocations to cater to defence modernisation needs. At the same time, he noted that India’s defence budgets are less than 2 per cent of its GDP.

In conclusion, Dr. Rajiv highlighted key aspects of the India-France Horizon 2047 document in which both countries have pledged to build sovereign defence capabilities together as well as cooperate in co-development and co-production of advanced defence technologies.

Q&A Session

This session comprised of questions from the IHEDN delegation, relating to a range of themes associated with India-French relations and current geopolitical relations and tensions across the globe.

First question was regarding the Indian perspective on closer Russia - China relations as a result of the Russia - Ukraine conflict, considering that India has its own set of issues with China. To this Amb. Chinoy responded by saying that Russia - China relations have had their ups and down and in fact quite a bit of Chinese socialist culture is borrowed from the USSR. Historically, it was the Soviet Union that taught China the ways and means of doing business. The closeness of Russia - China ties is not only a concern for India but also the western powers but it is only expected given the current global scenario. For Russia, it is more of an alliance of convenience as they do not seem very happy playing second fiddle to China. 

Second question was regarding India’s reliance on Russian oil, weapons and arms and how that could be impacted by a deeper China - Russia nexus. Amb. Chinoy responded to this by saying that India is buying oil from Russia just like China and the others are. Even Japan is buying nearly 10 per cent of its natural gas from Russia. Fuel trade is essentially governed by the price factor and if any other country was to offer a cheaper price for oil to India, it would not hesitate to buy from them. Buying Russian oil makes economical sense given the high demand in the Indian market. India is one of the top 5 economies in the world with a steady projected rise to reach new heights. It needs affordable energy to meet daily requirements and it is not self-sufficient in oil. Hence, the oil trade from Russia.

Next question was regarding India’s position in the multi-aligned world and the pros and cons of it. Amb. Chinoy responded by emphasising India’s strategic autonomy and how it plans on maintaining its indigenous strategic thinking, its culture and the choice of what to do and what not to do. The new India today is not going to take orders from other countries, rather it wants to exercise its independent choice and strategic autonomy. The soldiers of Indian origin fighting on the side of the UK in the world war on European soil did not have a real choice but to do as ordered by the imperialists. The non-alignment movement (NAM) was founded to let nations take their own decisions and not be influenced by any of the blocs during the Cold War. Many of the Global South countries were also a part of it since 1961.

Amb. Chinoy recalled the India - China War, when India requested weapons from the US (even though some shipments arrived late) in exercise of its strategic autonomy, notwithstanding its non-aligned policy. Another instance cited by Amb. Chinoy was the 1971 India-Pakistan War when US sent its 7th fleet to the Bay of Bengal to intimidate India but it did not give into any kind of pressure. India took its own decision to conclude a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR. Every single time that India has faced war on any of its borders, it was left to defend itself on its own. This highlights the fact that territorial integrity and sovereignty need to be maintained at all costs.

Next question from the floor was in connection with India’s role in the Global South, with regard to BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and also about the new world order that India seeks to build. Amb. Chinoy responded by highlighting that India’s per capita GDP is unlikely to decline anytime soon. India as a member of the Global South is a given. It wants to be a positive representative of the region, a friend. According to Amb. Chinoy, BRICS does not have much of a future even though today it comprises 30 per cent of the global GDP which is around 30 trillion USD.  He even referred to the recent expansion of BRICS and how the organisation might face issues with the commodity economy given the volatility involved. This became evident when China faced problems while dealing with financial sectors like banking and having to bail them out. Speaking of harmony and convergence, Amb. Chinoy pointed out that G20 is one such global structure which can serve as a platform to converge views from different geographies of the world. G7, European Union, African Union, the P-5 and the BRICS are all a part of the G20. There are no veto powers in the grouping and it is fully functional. It’s a dream team.

Subsequent questions were around the current Taliban regime in Afghanistan and India’s take on this, and the Russia - Ukraine conflict, as to what will lead to an Indian military intervention in Ukraine. The query was addressed by stating that India’s military intervention in Ukraine is a far-fetched idea. Regarding Taliban’s presence in Afghanistan, Amb. Chinoy mentioned that Taliban’s presence in Afghanistan is a peculiar situation. Social policies and welfare schemes have certainly come under scrutiny since Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan. Freedom and education of women and girls has been severely curtailed. Given the regional dynamics, we can only hope that Afghanistan does not become a safe haven for terrorist outfits again.

The last two queries were regarding decarbonisation and green development of the developing economies, and India’s priorities with regard to reform of multilateral structures. Addressing the former question, Amb. Chinoy highlighted the role played by sectors like electric vehicles and lithium-ion batteries in helping developing countries deal with their growing energy demands in a clean fashion. The developmental finance promised by the developed countries is crucial to green transformation of the Global South but this funding is yet to reach the developing markets.

With regard to reforms of multilateral structures, Amb. Chinoy emphasised the permanent membership of the UNSC. It was formed in 1945, but since then the world has changed a lot and the membership (non-permanent) of the organisation was only expanded once. He recalled the debates at ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) from 1961-65 resulting in a one – time expansion of the UNSC’s non-permanent membership but since then, nothing has been done. It is not only the UNSC but also the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and Bretton Woods structures which need to be reformed. Even the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) quota of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been amended only once around 2009. Amb. Chinoy pointed out that India’s SDR quota is lower than the UK, even though its GDP is more than that of the UK. SDRs have not kept pace with time. Greater finance should be made available to people and the likes of hybrid finance need to be promoted, especially among the developing countries.

After concluding the Q&A session, Ambassador Chinoy thanked General Benoît Durieux, Director General, IHEDN, the French delegation, and the audience for a fruitful engagement.

Report has been prepared by Ms. Anandita Bhada, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Report of Monday Morning Meeting on China-Russia Relationship: A Greater Alignment? June 24, 2024 Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. M.S. Prathibha, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) spoke on “China-Russia Relationship: A Greater Alignment?” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 24 June. The session was moderated by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA. MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting.   

Executive Summary

The growing cooperation between China and Russia visible at the international level has evoked considerable discussion regarding the extent of strategic alignment between the two countries as they perceive considerable strategic and economic pressure from the West. Dr Prathibha in her presentation underlines the factors motivating China-Russia cooperation, the extent of cooperation between the two countries and finally the challenges to greater alignment between Russia and China.

Detailed Report

The session opened with introductory remarks from Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh. Deliberating on the long history of Sino-Russia relations and its trajectory he observed that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a watershed event. Following Crimea’s annexation, Russia’s reliance on China deepened in an unprecedented way because of US-led sanctions. Bilateral ties further advanced in 2020 and in 2022 a few days before the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the two countries declared a ‘no-limits partnership’. Dr. Singh noted that although China and Russia are not treaty bound allies, the West views them as such. However, delving deeper, differences over a range of issues are perceptible including Russia’s limited support to Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Further, questions remain about the depth of their partnership and the extent of their cooperation on geopolitical issues vis-à-vis the West. For instance, China did not recognise Russia’s annexation of Crimea and has been very careful in its support for Russia in order to avoid disruption of economic and diplomatic ties with Europe. Moreover, with regard to military cooperation, although the number of joint exercises is increasing, there is little interoperability between the militaries of the two countries. Also, Moscow has been reluctant to export sensitive military technology to Russia. Highlighting the differences between Russia and China’s perception of the world order, he queried if Russia-China cooperation is driven by anti-US sentiment and whether the seeming closeness between Russia and China will have any implications for India.

Dr. M.S. Prathibha in her presentation explained the factors motivating China-Russia cooperation, the extent of cooperation between the two countries and finally the challenges to greater alignment between Russia and China.

Dr. Prathibha noted that there is a surge of interest regarding Russia-China relations, following the signing of the joint communique where they declared a no-limits partnership. The joint statement implying that there are no forbidden areas of cooperation between the two countries led observers in the West to conclude that Moscow and Beijing are likely to remove the previous constraints that impinged on bilateral cooperation. Apprehensions about unrestrained cooperation deepened as China aligned its position with Russia on the Ukraine crisis in the UN, refused to condemn Moscow’s actions and Chinese media openly supported Russian narratives. Further, increase in Russia’s exports to China, naval exercises in South China Sea and Sea of Japan solidified the perception of growing strategic coordination between the two countries on the world stage.

Turning to factors underpinning Russia-China cooperation, Dr. Prathibha noted that strategic and development interests, highlighted in the 2024 China-Russia joint talks are the two major factors driving cooperation between the two countries. She explained that strategic interests referred to limiting US primacy in international affairs to give Russia and China more manoeuvrability. Developmental interests are focused on accelerating economic development through access to modern and strategic technologies. She added that it is a strategic choice on the part of Russia and China to develop bilateral ties; first, both countries perceive that the West is bent on denying them access to strategic technologies required for economic modernisation. Accordingly, the two countries are looking into collaboration on sensitive and emerging technological domains. Second on the economic front, while Russia is desperately looking for imports, Chinese companies are also interested in tapping into the Russian market.

With regard to whether China and Russia are really cooperating, Dr. Prathibha explained that there are indications of the two countries cooperating in the strategic and economic domain. For instance, China and Russia are planning to work closely to jointly expand the influence of BRICS and the SCO as a counter to US-led organisations. Also, China has become an economic lifeline to Russia by exporting dual use components. At the same time, Beijing is using considerable influence to support Moscow while maintaining its neutrality. Additionally, China and Russia are moving to cooperate in Central Asia to stabilise the region and enhance its economic potential through BRI and other Russian led initiatives. Similarly, they are also looking into ways of implementing the pre-2030 plan which aims to modernise industrial supply chains between the two countries. In this context, it is noteworthy that the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation in the New Era’ plan is a long-term view which extends till 2049.

Discussing whether the growing cooperation indicates alignment, Dr. Prathibha noted that there are historical and structural challenges to strategic alignment between the countries. She observed that throughout history, China and Russia have been imperial and hegemonic rivals. China holds the historical memory of losing territory to Russia and considers the latter to be an expansionist power. On the other hand, current China-Russia cooperation is happening because of deterioration in China-US relations. Therefore, if China and US relations improve, the urgency from Chinese side to cooperate with Russia might reduce. She added that there is considerable mistrust on the Chinese side vis-à-vis Russia and cooperation with Moscow is dictated primarily by norms of Chinese foreign policy rather than any feeling of kinship. Furthermore, the Chinese view is that the US is traditionally more willing to make concessions to improve bilateral ties. In contrast, Russia is less accommodating, making concessions only when compelled by pressure or threats, rather than as a gesture of goodwill.

Dr. Prathibha concluded her presentation by stating that there could be greater coordination on the political and economic side to face Western pressure and formulate mutually favourable industrial policies respectively. However, historical and structural factors will limit cooperation at least from the Chinese side.

Q&A Session

The presentation was followed by a Q&A Session. Deputy Director General Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele queried about China’s reaction to Russia-North Korea cooperation and Russia’s stance in a possible conflict on Taiwan Straits. One of the scholars queried about the possibility of renewed competition between Russia-China and the US in Central Asia. Reflecting on Chinese mistrust towards Russia, another scholar asked about Russia’s perception of Chinese expansionist tendencies and extent of Sino-Russian cooperation on military technology.

During the Q&A session it was observed that Russia-China cooperation is not directed at India and Russia is unlikely to allow China to have a veto over its foreign policy. However, it is in India’s interest to deepen India-Russia relations by adding more pillars to bilateral ties.

Report prepared by Ms. Mayuri Banerjee, Research Analyst, East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.

East Asia China, Russia-China Relations
Lecture by Ambassador Harsh Shringla on “Developmental Priorities and India’s Neighbourhood: View from Darjeeling” May 31, 2024 Speeches and Lectures

Under MP-IDSA’s Eminent Persons Lecture Series, Ambassador Harsh Shringla delivered his lecture on “Developmental Priorities and India’s Neighbourhood: Views from Darjeeling” on 31 May 2024. The Session was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the MP-IDSA attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

The lecture highlighted the evolving global landscape, characterised by shifting power dynamics and the limitations of existing global institutions in addressing modern challenges effectively. It underscored India's emerging role as an advocate for the Global South, drawing from the Speaker's extensive experience in the Ministry of External Affairs. The discussion emphasised the importance of adopting a comprehensive foreign policy approach that balances regional development with international diplomacy, considering the intricate interplay between local and global factors.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, the Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy welcomed Ambassador Harsh Shringla to MP-IDSA. He highlighted Amb. Shringla’s diplomatic career including as the Chief Coordinator for India's G20 Presidency. He invited Amb. Shringla to share his perspectives on regional developmental challenges, the future of India’s neighbourhood and India’s emergence as a voice for the Global South, particularly in the context of India’s G20 Presidency.  

Amb. Harsh Shringla began by expressing gratitude for being invited to share his insights. He acknowledged the importance of engaging in discussions on foreign policy and developmental challenges. He emphasised that the world is navigating through very uncertain times, which necessitates a thoughtful consideration of significant shifts in global leadership and influence. He added that these shifts contribute to rebalancing of economic growth and manufacturing power, with countries like China rising in prominence and altering the traditional global power dynamics away from the United States and Europe.

Amb. Shringla also discussed the implications of this rebalancing on global governance, questioning the ability of existing institutions like the United Nations and global financial organisations to effectively address the challenges of the 21st century. He highlighted the lack of effectiveness in global governance, attributing it to a lack of diversity and equity within key institutions. For instance, he noted the deadlock in the United Nations Security Council and the limited capabilities of the World Bank, which lacks the resources and military backing to address issues effectively. He added that the developing countries often find themselves disproportionately affected by these global shifts, facing high prices for essential goods, increasing economic disparity, and severe impacts of climate change.

Amb. Shringla further highlighted the evolution of India's foreign policy over the past 20-30 years. India has transitioned from primarily responding to global initiatives to leading and devising solutions based on its own ideas and traditions. He emphasised the success of UPI under the Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) initiative, noting that 40 percent of global digital transactions take place in India. Additionally, India administered over 2 billion COVID-19 vaccines worldwide, starting with its neighbours, through both grants (Vaccine Maitri) and commercial schemes.

The Speaker also touched upon the importance of maintaining peace and stability in global conflicts. He highlighted India's balanced approach, avoiding direct involvement in wars while promoting diplomatic resolutions. He cited Prime Minister Modi's stance on global cooperation, underscoring the principle of "Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam" (the world is one family) as a guiding philosophy for India's foreign policy.  He discussed India's strategic approach during the recent global conflicts and crises. According to Amb. Shringla, India has consistently preferred a multipolar world order, projecting itself as a pole rather than aligning with any so-called bipolar or unipolar order. He underlined that purchasing discounted Russian oil helped stabilise domestic prices and contributed to global market stability. This action demonstrated India's ability to navigate complex international situations while adhering to sanctions and maintaining economic stability, he added.

While expressing the need to move towards renewable energy, Amb. Shringla stated that India has the potential to meet 80% of its energy requirements through renewable sources. He underscored that this shift would benefit both the economy and environment, positioning India as a leader in global climate mitigation efforts. He stressed the importance of voluntary and individual lifestyle changes to achieve environmental sustainability, advocating policies that promote modest and efficient utilisation of resources. Amb. Shringla highlighted that India's proactive foreign policy has evolved to focus on global initiatives and solutions.

The discussion highlighted the development challenges in West Bengal due to the contested dynamics between the TMC-led State Government and the BJP-led Central Government. Despite the central government’s intentions, state-level politics and demographic shifts hinder effective development. This scenario emphasises the need to reconcile regional aspirations for autonomy with the central goal of fostering development. He underlined that the security situation in the Northeast remains complex, with unresolved grievances and the influence of neighbouring countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh, directly impacting India's border states and complicating regional stability and development. He concluded by stating that India’s Foreign Policy must address these cross-border influences, as the conflict in Myanmar and instability in Bangladesh have significant repercussions within India. Collaborating closely with regional authorities and considering local sentiments for autonomy and development is crucial.

Questions and Comments

The Director General, Amb. Chinoy thanked Ambassador Shringla for his remarks.

The Q&A session offered an in-depth look at India's strategic priorities, touching on the intricacies of India-US relations, India's firm pursuit of its national interest, as well as regional security and economic development. He also observed that there is a systemic imbalance at the global level, contributing to conflicts and unrest in the Middle East, Ukraine, and other parts of the world. Therefore, equilibrium is required in the international system.

Amb. Shringla provided responses to all the questions. The session emphasised the need for pragmatic diplomacy to navigate the global landscape, uphold India's strategic autonomy, and promote multipolarity. The interaction concluded with a formal Vote of Thanks to the Speaker by the Director General.

The Report has been prepared by Ms. Sneha M., Research Analyst, South Asia Centre.

Growing India-Denmark Ties May 29, 2024 Speeches and Lectures

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a lecture by H.E. Ambassador Freddy Svane, Ambassador of Denmark to India under the Eminent Persons Lecture Series on “Growing India-Denmark Ties” on 29 May 2024. The interaction was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and attended by the Institute’s scholars.

Executive Summary

The event provided a comprehensive overview of the India-Denmark Green Strategic Partnership. It delved into bilateral ties of the two nations while also analysing the future prospects to further develop this strategic partnership. Ambassador Sujan Chinoy highlighted his shared diplomatic experiences with Ambassador Freddy Svane in Japan and India. He praised Amb. Svane's understanding of India and India’s partnership with Denmark, emphasising the significance of their bilateral ties. Amb. Svane discussed the historical relations between India and Denmark, the 75-year milestone of their partnership, and the importance of strategic autonomy for India. He elaborated on the 5Ss of their partnership: scale, skills, strength, speed, and sustainability, also mentioning the potential for collaboration in areas beyond the green partnership, such as defense and the Arctic. He also highlighted Denmark's defense posture post-Russia-Ukraine crises and expressed willingness to collaborate with India. The Q&A session covered aspects including Denmark's wind energy sector, defence collaboration, the Russia-Ukraine crises, possibility of limestone trade, deep-sea fishing, and the future of data, minerals, and green transitions.

Detailed Report

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA delivered the opening remarks. He began by welcoming Ambassador Freddy Svane to MP-IDSA and fondly recalled their common tenure in Tokyo from 2015-2018 as Ambassador of India to Japan and Ambassador of Denmark to Japan, respectively. Amb. Svane is the only ambassador to have held two tenures as Danish Ambassador to India (2010-2015 and 2019- current) as well as to Japan (2005-2008 and 2015-2019). Amb. Chinoy spoke about Amb Svane’s familiarity with India. He mentioned Indian Prime Minister Modi’s 3S formula and said that skill, scale and speed should define India- Denmark relations.

Amb. Chinoy also highlighted the improvement witnessed in India- Denmark bilateral relations in recent years and requested him to share his views on bilateral ties, Green Strategic Partnership, and emerging scenarios in the Arctic region amongst others. He said that the Green Strategic Partnership has emerged as a crucial aspect in India- Denmark relations and this has been evident from various high level visits in the recent past. The trade and investment statistics seem to suggest that the full potential has yet to be realised. He expressed hope that this would pick up pace in coming times. With this he invited Amb. Svane to deliver the lecture.

 H.E. Amb. Freddy Svane commenced the lecture by mentioning the biggest diplomatic victory- the India Denmark Green Strategic Partnership. He quoted Denmark’s current demographic figures and the advent of Danish people 400 years ago to what is now called Tamil Nadu in November 1620 as traders, not colonisers. He mentioned the historical fabric trade between the two regions and a recent event in Denmark to commemorate that. In 2024 India-Danish partnership has reached the milestone of 75 years, which had started with building strategies to manage trade ties with India.

Amb. Svane recalled his last posting in India when he was invited by a private company to inaugurate an industrial plant in Gujarat and how he met the then Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi in 2011. He credits that particular bilateral meeting as the starting point of India’s green partnership with Denmark. He also highlighted the west’s pattern of dictating to other countries what to do but reiterated that Denmark has no such intentions vis-a-vis India or the west. It does not want to teach or preach to others. He mentioned the increasing investments coming to India and that India is not only the largest market in terms of size but also a democratic country with its own rights and sovereignty. Giving the Danish perspective Amb. Svane said that it is best if India exercises its strategic autonomy rather than join a specific camp and tow that line.

Amb. Svane underscored that the green strategic partnership is based on the 5Ss of scale, skills, strength, speed and sustainability. India has the Scale which is reflected in its capacity and capability; Denmark has the necessary technological Skills; Strength of this partnership comes from affordability and resilience, which are unique to the Indian developmental agenda; Speed is required in achieving the goals laid out for climate change and SDGs; and lastly, Sustainability is crucial, which is why Copenhagen would be willing for joint collaborations beyond the green partnership to include sectors like defence, Arctic and critical minerals. Science is the sixth S which will be added in the next meeting as innovation is the key to Indo-Danish relations.

Amb Svane mentioned what comprises the Kingdom of Denmark- Denmark, Greenland, and Faroe Islands- where foreign policy and defence is managed by the capital seat in Copenhagen. Greenland is approximately ¾ the size of the Indian subcontinent but inhabits a small population of around 60 thousand. It caught global attention when the vast ice sheets across the island began to melt, giving rise to unexplored reserves of resources, critical minerals, and trade routes. Since Denmark is a founding member of the Arctic Council, its vision is greatly defined by the values dear to Danish people. Amb. Svane went on to mention the critical role played by Denmark in ensuring India’s addition as an observer state to the Arctic Council in 2013 and how the then Deputy NSA of India discussed India’s arctic vision with him. The conversation revolved around resources and critical minerals found in Greenland but India was very much interested in scientific engagement at that time.  It was involved in ice cold drilling, R&D and other procedures. Amb. Svane emphasised that Denmark wants to give India as much role in Arctic as possible owing to the reality of climate change.

On the defence front Amb. Svane recognised that historically Denmark has fought many wars and lost them all. Post cold war, it chose to close down the military installation in Greenland. The naval base there was put up for auction and its biggest bidder was an Australian company. This was very surprising as Australia is geographically distant from Greenland but it was later discovered that this firm had some Chinese connections. Similarly, Chinese involvement has recently increased in tenders for building airports and critical infrastructure too.

Concluding his remarks, Amb. Svane commented on Indian interests in Denmark, which are evident from several visits of its new Ambassador to Greenland and Faroe Islands. Deep sea fishing and mining are significant issues that India has to deal with. As of now there are no fish left in the strait separating India from Sri Lanka. Denmark has the required technology for it and Faroe Islands have the experience of dealing with issues like deep sea fishing. Cooperation in such fields could prove useful for both the parties. Democratic dialogue in India is strong. There is no yardstick to measure democracy but each country has its own set of issues and situations.

Q&A Session

Amb. Chinoy thanked Amb. Svane for his insightful remarks and opened the floor for questions. Scholars of MP-IDSA asked diverse questions ranging from Denmark’s promising wind energy sector, India-Denmark defence collaboration, the Ambassador’s views on Russia-Ukraine crises, high limestone reserves in Denmark and its possible trade with trade, and the kind of collaboration possible with India over deep sea fishing.

Amb. Svane answered the questions, commencing with the one on renewable energy. He mentioned the oil crises of 1970s and how the governments were left to fend for alternate sources of energy. Denmark had researchers and scientists working on the R&D needed for this. Denmark had the first mover’s advantage amongst the European nations, especially in wind energy. Today 75 per cent of its electricity comes from renewables. For the critical minerals required in wind turbines, Denmark relies on China, which is known for mining and processing these critical minerals. The current Danish Government having stopped mining as it is environmentally degrading, leaves the question of mineral procurement unanswered. What can be done to access certain minerals if their mining is under the monopoly of one country?  In fact, in India too most of the work related to wind turbines is being done by China and not surprisingly these installations are mostly India’s near critical infrastructure. Last 7 GW of commissioned turbines were given to Chinese companies. What most people do not realise is that those managing the software in these systems also have access to the data that the software constantly collects. This is one of the reasons why US has become vary of China’s inroads in the cyber and technology sector and has put in place certain legislations to minimise that damage.

Answering the question on defence procurement, Amb. Svane said that Denmark is re-arming itself post the Russia Ukraine crises, in accordance to the NATO norms. It would be great to collaborate with allies like India in this regard. Copenhagen is open to all kinds of possibilities to re-build its defence industry. With regard to Russia-Ukraine crises, Amb. Svane reiterated that he does not want to preach or teach anybody. He mentioned that Denmark is sending F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine alongside helping them out in aid and other matters. India’s stand on the crises was a tough one for Amb. Svane to explain to the west but he referred to the 1962 India - China war when India was left to fend for itself as no help from the west arrived when India needed it. According to Amb. Svane, Denmark understands the reasons for Indian dependence on Russian arms and ammunitions and would be happy to help India diversify in this sector. He even praised the recent increase in India-Russia oil trade and how this helped keep market prices of oil under control. The real threat recognised in the region was China. If India could somehow keep China under control, Denmark would do all that it can to help India diversify its supply chains which are currently dependent on China.

Concluding the Q&A round, Amb. Svane responded to the query on limestone trade by mentioning that the top most traded item from Europe to India is waste. It is indeed a sad state of affairs that India buys tonnes of scrap metal and e-waste from Europe but if this can be replaced by other items including limestone, that would be beneficial for both the parties. Lastly the issue of deep sea fishing was addressed. The Danish Ambassador said that Faroe Islands have proven capabilities and knowledge on this matter as well as on the issue of deep sea mining. The future is about data, minerals and green transitions, all of which are sensitive aspects of critical development, especially for certain sectors like defence, cyber, and IT amongst others.

After concluding the Q&A session, Amb Chinoy thanked H.E. Amb. Freddy Svane, Ambassador of Denmark to India and the audience for a fruitful engagement.

Report has been prepared by Ms. Anandita Bhada, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Monday Morning Meeting on 46th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting: Key Takeaways June 10, 2024 Monday Morning Meeting

Mr. Bipandeep Sharma, Research Analyst, Non-Traditional Security Centre, Manohar Parrikar IDSA (MP-IDSA), made a presentation on “46th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting: Key Takeaways” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 10 June 2024. The Session was moderated by Comdt. M. Srivastava, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and other scholars of the Institute attended the meeting.

Executive Summary:

India successfully hosted the 46th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) and the 26th Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) meeting from 20-30 May, 2024 at Kochi. Key discussions focused on Antarctic Tourism, bio-security measures to combat avian influenza, issues related to Emperor penguins, and utilizing renewable energy in Antarctica. The successful hosting marks India's growing role in Antarctic affairs and its dedication to scientific collaboration and environmental stewardship in the region.

Detailed Report:

Comdt. M. Srivastava introduced the Speaker and set the stage by introducing the audience to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM). He mentioned that ATCM meetings consist of representatives of the Consultative parties, the non-consultative parties, observers such as the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), Commission for Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) and invited experts like the International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO). Comdt. Srivastava pointed out that India became a consultative party to the Antarctic Treaty in 1983.  Comdt. Srivastava noted that the ATCM serves as an important forum for exchanging information and discussions on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica. He stated that during the ATCM, a meeting of the Committee for Environment Protection (CEP) is also conducted. India had earlier conducted the 30th ATCM and 10th CEP in 2007 at New Delhi. The 46th ATCM and 26th CEP was hosted by India at Kochi between 20 to 30 May 2024. He highlighted that the recent initiatives by India such as the Antarctic Act 2022 and its support for protecting the Antarctic Environment by designating East Antarctica and the Weddell Sea as MPAs (Marine Protected Areas) shows its active involvement in Antarctica.

Mr. Bipandeep Sharma commenced his presentation by explaining the Antarctic Treaty System. He highlighted India’s proactive diplomacy and success in hosting the ATCM-46 and CEP-26 meeting. Mr. Sharma mentioned that the participation of parties in ATCM and CEP meetings witnessed the reaffirmation of the Antarctic Treaty (1959) and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid Protocol, 1991). He highlighted  ATCM and CEP to be crucial global forums for Antarctic affairs. Mr. Sharma mentioned that this year ATCM witnessed the creation of an additional working group which discussed the development of a ‘tourism framework’ for Antarctica. Mr. Sharma pointed out that CEP-26 discussed and addressed multiple issues that contributed to the implementation of the Environmental Protocol in Antarctica. He further highlighted that some of the priority issues highlighted in CEP 26 included issues of climate change and their implications for Antarctic Sea ice; environmental impact assessment of major activities in Antarctic; protection of the Emperor penguin, and developing of an international framework for environmental monitoring in Antarctica. Mr. Sharma mentioned that as per the CEP recommendations this year, Parties adopted 17 revised and new management plans for ASPAs (Antarctic Specially Protected Areas) and several modifications and additions to the list of Historic and Monument sites were undertaken. In his presentation, Mr. Sharma highlighted that in ATCM-46 serious efforts to increase parties focus towards renewable energy use and to ensure robust implementation of biosecurity measures to minimise the risks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in the Antarctic were prioritised.

Commenting on India’s part, Mr. Sharma pointed out that the inaugural remarks at 46th ATCM were made by Shri Kiren Rijiju the then Union Minister of Earth Sciences, who was accompanied by Ambassador Pavan Kapoor, Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs and Dr. Shailesh Nayak, former Secretary of MoES and Director, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru. Mr. Sharma highlighted that India’s traditional philosophy of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (one Earth, one family, one future) resonated well in India’s inaugural remarks. He further pointed that India’s plans of setting up of a new Antarctic research station, Maitri-II were also discussed in these initial remarks. He highlighted that India informed the parties regarding its future plans of submission of comprehensive environmental evaluations for establishing Maitri-II in Antarctica.

In the final part of his presentation, Mr. Sharma highlighted the need for enhancing collaboration and cooperation between Indian and other like-minded countries in the Antarctica. He further pointed that there is need for promoting interdisciplinary research in polar regions by engaging Indian higher institutes of excellence in research from both scientific and social science domains. Mr. Sharma pointed that India needs to prioritise its efforts in fast-track construction/acquisition of polar infrastructures of which construction/acquisition of an independent Indian Polar Research vessel remains most important. Lastly, he stressed that Indian representation in all future ATCM and CEP meetings, needs to have polar domain experts from both scientific and policy spheres. This would further enhance India’s position in negotiating and raising India’s view point on matters of scientific and broader national interests in future ATCM and CEP platforms.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy complimented Mr. Bipandeep Sharma for providing a detailed account of ACTM-46 and CEP-26 meetings. He pointed that in the age of Anthropocene, the Antarctic region remains vulnerable to multiple human induced transformations. Ambassador Chinoy in his remarks also questioned the basis of territorial claims of different states in the region. He further highlighted that India needs to prioritise the development of independent polar infrastructures to meet the country’s long term national interests in the region.

Mr. Tatsat Pati, Intern, made a query regarding the role of CCAMLR in the Antarctic region. He also asked the Speaker about the use of unmanned systems in undertaking various activities in extreme Antarctic climatic conditions.

Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang, asked the Speaker to comment on the status of India’s planned Polar Research Vessel.

Mr. Bipandeep Sharma gave detailed remarks to all the questions and comments raised.

Report prepared by Ms. Dorothy Vaanmalar C., Intern, Non-Traditional Security Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.

Monday Morning Meeting on Alignments and Realignments in Armenian Foreign Policy since the Velvet Revolution June 03, 2024 Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), made a presentation on “Alignments and Realignments in Armenian Foreign Policy since the Velvet Revolution” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 3 June 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Rajorshi Roy, Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director-General, MP-IDSA and other scholars of the Institute attended the session.

Executive Summary

The global arena is in flux due to the conflicts across the Middle East, Europe, and the Caucasus, creating widespread instability. This has revived great power competition and fostered realignments between global and regional actors. The same can be seen in the Eurasian region with the – Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. Owing to these developments, in recent years, Armenia has contemplated various options for alignments and realignments in its foreign policy.

Detailed Report

Dr. Rajorshi Roy, in his opening remarks, provided an overview of the 2018 Velvet Revolution in Armenia, which saw widespread protest against the government, leading to the overthrow of the then President turned Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan and the coming of the current Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan. However, Pashinyan today, faces increasing scrutiny and criticism for his policy decisions taken regarding Armenia’s shared border with Azerbaijan. Dr. Roy stressed the importance of Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia’s history and the formation of its national identity. In the last year, Armenia has lost the entirety of the Nagorno-Karabakh region to Azerbaijan. This has given rise to massive criticisms and protests in Armenia against Pashinyan domestic policies. The ongoing geostrategic contestations in Eurasia have led to new alignments and realignments, Armenia being no exception. It has sought to strengthen its strategic autonomy and multi-vector policy by engaging with regional and extra-regional powers beyond Russia and China.
Dr. Jason Wahlang commenced his presentation giving a brief overview of the recent conflicts in the Eurasian region, namely the Ukrainian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, and how these developments have led countries recalibrating and recalculating their alliances with regional powerhouses, attracting attention from various global powers and organisations. In recent years, Armenia has undergone a profound political transformation – transforming from a presidential system to a parliamentary one. This monumental change, saw former President Serzh Sargsyan assume the role of the Prime Minister leading to widespread protests within Armenia. These protests were led by various civil society groups and the then–opposition member and journalist, Nikol Pashinyan – who later became the Prime Minister. This domestic shift in political leadership, coupled with regional defeats to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from 2020 onwards, has prompted a reassessment of Armenia’s security and foreign policy architecture, underscoring the magnitude of the transition and its implications.

Regarding Armenia’s foreign policy Dr. Wahlang noted, that like most post-Soviet spaces, Armenia follows a multi-vector foreign policy known as the “complementarianism” foreign policy. This complementarianism necessitates pursuing a multi-vector policy, equilibrium-seeking diplomacy, and balancing ties with all regional and international stakeholders. This policy helps Armenia emphasise its partnerships not just with the West but also with Iran and India, while maintaining strong relations with Russia.

Dr. Wahlang emphasised that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been omnipresent in regional geopolitics since the final years of the Soviet Union. Post the Soviet collapse it became a constant deterrent to permanent peace in the region and is deeply connected to Armenia’s foreign policy as well. This influence is visible in Armenia’s policy with its neighbours Azerbaijan and Türkiye, and with regional powers like Russia and European powers like France, and vice versa. One prominent example can be France's recent recognition of the Republic of Artsakh (the Armenian name of Nagorno-Karabakh). The policy has shifted with the current dispensation under Nikol Pashinyan and the recent defeats, especially with the leadership’s attempts to find perpetual peace.

According to Dr. Wahlang, the Armenian diaspora plays an important role in its foreign policy, apart from playing a crucial role in the Armenian quest for genocide recognition. Their presence in major countries such as Russia, France, the USA, and India has been able to push some of the agenda of the Armenian state and also better relations with Yerevan.  One such example is the role of pressure groups such as the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) and Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), present in the United States and France, and how they help shape good relations of the countries with Armenia.
Dr. Wahlang noted that the current leadership’s attempts to find a long-term solution to peace, particularly by delimitating the border, have not been received positively by the Armenian public. Protests against the regime in Armenia have been linked to the government's foreign and neighbourhood policy, i.e., Azerbaijan. The local populace within Armenia is active and has coordinated protests in the past regarding Armenia’s policies, particularly on Azerbaijan. Thus, the domestic situation does relate to foreign policy and impacts the popularity of the leadership.

Dr. Jason further explained Armenia’s foreign policy in four phases. First, the “Rise of Un-Sovietised Nationalistic Foreign Policy after 1991”, under President Levon Ter Petrosyan. This policy was based on the first war of Nagorno-Karabakh, wherein the leadership tried to establish Armenia’s own image by shedding its former Soviet image. However, it still maintained strong relations with Russia. The second phase focused on “Shift in the Nature of Foreign Policy towards Multi-Vectorism”, under President Robert Kocharyan. During this time, there were attempts to create a feeling of diversification which also included trying to improve relations with European nations. The third phase saw “Disconnect between European Aspirations and Security-driven Russian/Eurasian Constraints”, under President Serzh Sargsyan. During this phase Armenia joined Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) instead of furthering improved relations with Europe. The fourth phase is “Diversification due to Rising Geopolitical and Regional Complexities”, under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Under his leadership, Armenia tries to engage with countries of the West, and countries like Iran and India.

Focusing on current developments within the Armenian State, Dr. Jason stated that the current protests against Armenia’s political leadership led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan have gained great prominence. According to Dr. Wahlang, the domestic populace has been more active in this protest as compared to the previous demonstrations. This is because the delimitation process would transfer territory from Armenia to Azerbaijan and is being seen as a compromise on Armenian sovereignty. The Armenian leadership, on the other hand, is attempting to find a solution for perpetual peace in the region. The main effort is based on the Armenian leadership's focus on the Crossroads of Peace Project, which aims to connect the neighbourhood through various connectivity projects and, in return, bring about peace in the region.

As mentioned before, Armenia is trying to diversify its relations with various major powers. Dr. Jason highlighted that the Armenia-Russia relationship is based on three key sectors – security, economy, and natural resources. Russia is the security provider and the main arms importer of Armenia and has long been Armenia’s principal supplier of weapons and ammunition. In recent times, due to Russia’s pre-occupation in Ukraine, there have been certain issues, like Russia’s inability to meet the demands for the supply of arms. Moreover, the presence of the 102nd military base in Gyumri and the presence of Russian troops protecting the borders near adversarial neighbours such as Türkiye and Azerbaijan show the relevance and importance of the security and military aspects in this relationship. Dr. Wahlang pointed out that both nations are economically linked, with about 40 per cent of the Armenian economy being dependent on Russia.       Moreover, Russia dominates the gas distribution outlets in Armenia, with Gazprom Armenia owning all the gas distribution infrastructure. Russia also has a monopoly over grain and petroleum products. In 2023, the trade volume between the two nations reached a record high of USD 4.16 billion, the highest since the Soviet collapse.

However, the two former Soviet Republics’ leaderships have been at loggerheads with one another since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, with the Armenians accusing Russia of not supporting and not providing assistance to them. This clash is due to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation’s (CSTO’s) inability to involve itself in both Nagorno-Karabakh and when Armenian territory was under threat. This has led to Armenia suspending its participation in CSTO and even threatening to leave the organisation altogether. Despite these disagreements, the two leaders have maintained contact and made attempts to bring about solutions.

Dr. Wahlang noted that the European Union (EU) has sought to increase its presence and carve a space of its own in Armenia. There have been significant attempts to strengthen this partnership, like Armenia joining the European Union Eastern Partnership and the signing of the Armenia–EU Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017. There have also been discussions in Armenia about joining the EU, particularly after the War in Karabakh, but these discussions have not moved forward. He also highlighted that the EU is Armenia's second-largest trade partner after Russia. Moreover, in the recent conflict with Azerbaijan, the EU has been proactively trying to forge a peaceful solution. These steps have been seen positively by Armenia.

With regard to Armenia’s relations with France, Dr. Wahlang pointed out that France has been Armenia's second-largest foreign investor since 2016, totalling €229 million. Its investments are primarily in agri-food, water and banking sectors. In recent times, this relationship has been further strengthened by the growing defence cooperation, which includes the sale of air defence systems, radars and sensors. Apart from Defence, Armenia has gained support from France in Nagorno-Karabakh, including aid for looking after the refugees.

Emphasising Armenia's relationship with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, Dr. Wahlang noted that they have a history of conflicts and discontent. Türkiye’s constant and unwavering support for Azerbaijan since the start of the first Nagorno-Karabakh conflict till current times has been seen as further evidence of Armenia's anti-Türkiye stance. Moreover, Türkiye’s military and drone support for Azerbaijan became a decisive factor in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. There has, however, been a change in approach, with attempts at peace-building, including the opening of the Armenian-Türkiye border after thirty years to supply aid to Türkiye during a major earthquake in 2023. The new leadership in Armenia under Pashinyan is attempting to find permanent peace in the region through new avenues of diplomacy and connectivity.

According to Dr. Wahlang, Armenia and Iran are important allies, with both sharing a border and common interests and threats. Iran is important for Armenia in connectivity projects, including assisting and cooperating with India. Armenia, Iran and India have also recently met for trilateral cooperation. Given Armenia’s landlocked status, its terminal in Chabahar Port could help assist Armenia in connecting with the world. He emphasised that with Armenia attempting to diversify its foreign policy and resource allocation, Iran can be a good option. However, Iran's fractured relationship with the West and Armenia's diversification attempts towards the West could become a stumbling block for long-term cooperation.

With regard to Armenia-India relations, Dr. Wahlang stated that the two nations share a historical relationship, with trade being the base for it in the past. Armenia has also long supported India's territorial integrity and sovereignty on the issue of Kashmir. The two nations share a robust defence relationship as well. In recent years, India has decided to appoint its own defence attaché to Yerevan. When it comes to defence trade, India has exported the Swathi weapon-locating radar system and Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, as well as anti-tank munitions and artillery guns. Additionally, the two nations have scope for cooperation in the field of Information Technology and pharmaceuticals.  The only deterrent in the relationship is the lack of connectivity.

Lastly, Dr. Wahlang concluded his presentation by emphasising that Russia is still a prominent player in the region, and it may view the Armenian attempts at diversification towards Europe negatively. He also stressed that considering the gains to both sides, India could emerge as a long-term partner to Armenia.

Comments and Questions

Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, complimented Dr. Wahlang on his comprehensive presentation highlighting the complexity surrounding Armenia’s geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic situation. He pointed out that this is the first time in the history of Azerbaijan that all the territories historically claimed by them are under their control. He stressed that Armenia finds itself in a dilemma as its traditional supporter, Russia, is not able to do much. This raises concerns about Armenia exploring other options and the obstacles involved in it. Regarding relations of Iran and Türkiye, Amb. Chinoy stressed on their influence in the region. He also mentioned the memorial for the Armenian Massacre in Isfahan, highlighting Iran’s sympathy for the Armenians. He noted that it is important to look at Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel and the US, predicated on oil and gas pipelines, and their traditional relations with Türkiye.

Dr. Swasti Rao, enquired about Russia’s weapons supply to Azerbaijan, value of connectivity with countries like Georgia and how Azerbaijan could impact the future of India-Armenia relations.

Gp Capt. (Dr.) RK Narang (Retd.), enquired about the payment process of the weapons trade between India and Armenia.

Dr. Wahlang responded to the comments made by the Director General and the questions raised by MP-IDSA scholars.

Report has been prepared by Ms. Anusua Ganguly, Intern, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA.

Monday Morning Meeting on Security and Defence Cooperation between India and Poland May 27, 2024 Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Patryk Kugiel, Senior Analyst for South Asia at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw, made a presentation on “Security and Defence Cooperation between India and Poland” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 27 May 2024. The Session was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director-General, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA). Scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion.

Executive Summary

The people of India and Poland have shared cordial relations since historical times. In 1942, Maharaja Digvijaysinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja established the Polish Children's Camp in Jamnagar-Balachadi, offering refuge to Polish children. During World War II, Polish and Indian soldiers fought together in various battles, prominent among which was the Battle of Monte Cassino. Not only do both the countries have a history in defence cooperation over the last 70 years, but also have a shared future in the defence sector.

Detailed Report

Dr. Patryk Kugiel commenced his presentation by highlighting the glorious past of Poland-India relations in the defence sector. During the Cold War era, Poland was the seventh largest supplier of arms to India and India was the second largest market for Polish arms export, showcasing very intensive cooperation between both the countries. In 1989, Poland entered into a complex transition in political, economic and strategic dimensions. This led to the rearrangement of Poland’s foreign policy from East to the West, in turn bringing about change in its strategic defence partners. The Polish defence sector and heavy industries underwent remarkable restructuring and privatisation as well. These developments transitioned Poland from an arms exporter (of Soviet equipment) to arms importer (from the West). Dr. Kugiel highlighted that from 1991, the Indian economy also started to transition and so did its defence sector. During this time India remained heavily dependent on Russia for arms supply, but in the subsequent years, India has also started to diversify its imports, by opening markets to supplies from USA, France and Israel, among others.

Dr. Kugiel highlighted that during the last three decades there have been many attempts to revive defence cooperation. For instance, in 1998 India bought 22 TS-11 Iskra jet trainers and 44 WZT- 3 Armoured Recovery Vehicles (ARVs); in 2002, 88 WZT (ARVs) and fire control DRAWA-T systems. Furthermore, in 2003 the countries signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement and in 2004 a Joint Working Group (JWG) on defence cooperation was established. Moreover, the Defence Wing of the Indian Embassy in Warsaw was reopened on 8 May 2024, with Brigadier Satish Trivedi's accreditation to Poland's Ministry of National Defence.

Dr. Kugiel emphasised that the war in Ukraine has complicated relations, but can also be seen as a new opportunity in India-Polish cooperation in the defence sector. He highlighted the changes that have taken place in the Polish defence sector since the war i.e., urgent replacement of Russian military equipment, modernisation of armed forces (through a spike in defence budget and investment in domestic industry) and increased international cooperation. There have also been changes in the political dimensions, as Poland has now become a frontline state and is a key member of NATO. He also stressed on the Weimar Triangle between France, Germany and Poland emerging as a new engine for European cooperation and integration.

Regarding India’s defence sector, Dr. Kugiel raised the following strategic questions. Is Russia a reliable supplier? Is Russian equipment the best? Is the Russia-China axis emerging? Is the overdependence on Russia in sync with India’s strategic economy? He also highlighted the following strategic implications for India i.e., replacement of Russian/post-Soviet equipment which might impact the modernisation and development of the domestic defence industry in India.

Dr. Kugiel emphasised that both countries have potential for cooperation in the defence sector, mainly in three areas - modernisation of post-Soviet equipment, experience of ready-made products (such as Krab howitzer, Piorun and Grom man-portable air-defense systems, Grot rifles), and co-development and co-production of new weapons system (Borsuk Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle). However, according to Dr. Kugiel, this cooperation between Poland and India faces the challenge of lack of trust and mutual understanding. There is lack of clear understanding on the requirement, rules and procedures of procurement. Additionally, there is uncertainty about whether the existing resources and technologies are sufficient for the mass-production of weapons required in current times.

In his concluding remarks, Dr. Kugiel provided recommendations to meet these challenges and obstacles. For the rebuilding of mutual trust and understanding in defence cooperation he suggested that there is a great need for dialogue between the policymakers such as the National Security Advisors (NSA), the countries should focus on the revival of the JWG on defence, match major arms producing companies for co-production projects and find solutions to the issues in the Bumar contract. He stressed on the need to address the existing knowledge gap between the procedures of procurement in both the countries, suggesting detailed studies to examine the potential of joint projects. This would help in strengthening military dialogues with the exchange visits of military personnel and academicians. There is also a need to revive joint bilateral and multilateral military exercises. He emphasised on the need for maximisation of resources to address these deficiencies together and intensify partnership in major arms fairs.

Comments and Questions

Amb. Sujan Chinoy thanked Dr. Kugiel for his recommendations on advancing the bilateral relationship and defence cooperation between India and Poland.  He stressed the need to encourage Polish companies to participate in Indian trade fairs and also the Indian defence industrial corridors. He also emphasised the possibilities of investing in the Indian defence sector as it has been opened for 100 per cent foreign direct investment (FDI), stating the example of ‘Saab’ – becoming the first global defence company to secure an approval for a 100 per cent FDI project in the defence corridor in Uttar Pradesh to manufacture the Carl-Gustaf rocket systems. Amb. Chinoy agreed on the need for increased dialogue at different levels. Regarding overdependence on Russia, he pointed out that Indian imports from Russia have come down from 70 per cent to about 36 per cent and that overdependence is a thing of the past. Commenting on the Russia-China axis, Amb. Chinoy said that the two countries are coming closer against the primacy of the West in the current international order in terms of agenda setting and not against India.

Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.), commented on the changing landscape of the Indian defence industry in the last decade and the development of niche technologies by Indian companies.

Dr. Swasti Rao, enquired about how India could improve its exports to Poland, and asked the Speaker to share his views on the geopolitical development of the Weimar Triangle and its role in Ukraine’s and Europe’s security at large.

Dr. Rajorshi Roy, questioned about NATO’s overtures to India, and Dr. Kugiel’s assessment on how India would react to these overtures.

Dr. Rajiv Nayan, enquired about Poland’s import of military equipment from South Korea.

Dr. Samuel C. Rajiv, enquired about Polish and European export efforts post the war in Ukraine.

Dr. Patryk Kugiel responded to the comments and the questions raised by the MP-IDSA Scholars.

Report has been prepared by Ms. Anusua Ganguly, Intern, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA.

Lecture by H. E. Dr Philipp Ackermann, Ambassador of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany on “Challenges in Europe and Indo-German Partnership” May 22, 2024 Speeches and Lectures

On 22 May 2024, the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a lecture by His Excellency Dr. Philipp Ackermann, Ambassador of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, under the Eminent Persons Lecture Series. The topic of the lecture was “Challenges in Europe and Indo-German Partnership”. The event was chaired by the Director General, Ambassador Sujan R Chinoy.

Executive Summary

The conflict in Ukraine has impacted the European continent including Germany. Germany has attempted to diversify its partners, which has ensured a reduction of its dependence on Russia. When it comes to India, Germany's relationship with India has gained prominence, and it will continue to grow in the long term.

Detailed Report

The session began with the opening remarks from the Director General, MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy who underscored the pivotal role of Germany as a critical player in the European Union and one of India’s most important strategic partners. He highlighted the various high-level dialogues that have taken place, including the visits of India’s Prime Minister to Germany in 2022 and the German Chancellor's reciprocal visit in 2023, which have significantly bolstered bilateral ties. There has been a rise in trade and investment between the two nations. Germany's foreign policy towards China was mentioned with a particular focus on the term de-risking, which is the recent focal point of the policy regarding China in Europe. Amb. Chinoy said that Germany is concerned about issues such as climate change, and illegal immigration and asked about the perspectives of the various political parties and ideologies.

Ambassador Dr. Philipp Ackermann began his talk by proposing that he would present a few key messages and five points regarding the topic. The first key point is that Europe faces challenges but in the last couple of years has shown resolve to overcome them. On the migration challenge, he stated that Europe is very popular among migrants, and migration is encouraged, but illegal migration from various nations is an issue. This has led to certain insecurities and ensured that a rise of the far right has become possible, which would be visible in the results of the upcoming European elections. Germany has an ageing population, so there is a need for migration. Germany has also signed a migration partnership with India and with the consent of the state and centre, is recruiting skilled labour for Germany from India. He emphasised the need to legalise and channel legal migration while ensuring that illegal migration is brought down.

The second challenge is the economic shock Germany suffered in the last two years due to the war in Europe. This support has been costly but it is a price that needs to be paid to support Ukraine. Ukraine is close to Germany, and the war has changed the texture of the European security structure and affected the cohesion of the European Union. Germany thought that any security structure in Europe could not be possible without Russia. Various avenues have been set up to deal with Russia, including the Russia-NATO Council. Russia's reactions at present and its approach in 2014 have changed the mindset within Europe, and now the focus is on building a resilient security structure against Russia. The main reason for this is to ensure that Russia does not invade any other countries in Europe. Russia has a clear appetite to have more territory.

The second key point of concern is the Russia-Ukraine war. If Russia is not shown the limits of its actions, it will continue. Russian President Vladimir Putin has an expansionist mentality. NATO's eastern front is not very strong and its deeper integration into the larger security structure is required to prevent any other aggression. Putin has miscalculated the unity of Europe, and Ukraine cannot be left alone, and its territory allowed to be taken away by Russia. The war has impacted the world, particularly in the energy sector. Germany paid the price since 50 per cent of its gas came from Russia, but now, after diversification, no gas comes from Russia.  India has felt the impact of the war on various sectors, including fertilisers, gas, and oil.

The third key point is the India-Germany Partnership. India has gained a new weight in Germany’s foreign policy. India’s position is much higher, and the German Government has seen a need for like-minded partners. India's democratic ethos and non-expansionist character are similar to what Germany feels. India and Germany have a sound strategic partnership, and the two nations can focus on all the areas of cooperation. Certain avenues include start-ups, academic research, and energy (hydrogen); the governments also want to intensify this cooperation. The inter-governmental consultations, which will happen in October 2024, would further strengthen the collaboration. Germany and India have cooperated in the sustainability of smart cities, biodiversity and trade. Already there are 2200 Indo-German companies who have invested in both the countries and there is hope for more investments.

The fourth key point is based on defence cooperation. There has been evident growth and a step forward in this area. Progress has been made in delivering military equipment, systems, arms, and supplying of aircraft. Joint exercises, capacity building, and information sharing have increased. In August 2024, for the first time, fighter jets would be sent by Germany to participate in Tarang Shakti Phase 1 exercise in Coimbatore. In October 2024, a German frigate would come to Goa and exercise with the Indian Navy. The two defence ministries share a strong relationship. This was underscored by the visit of the German Defence Minister in June 2023 and the signing of various tenders during that visit.

The fifth key point is focused on the Indian Ocean. Protecting international borders and oceans for free navigation is essential. We must keep the lines of communication in the open seas as safe as possible. Germany wants to promote a rules-based order protecting free and open trade. Germany and India can try to minimise the security challenges in the Indian Ocean together. China’s aggressive behaviour in the Indian Ocean concerns how China is attempting to expand its influence. For Germany, China is a partner and a competitor; when it comes to politics, it is considered a systemic rival.

Questions and Comments

Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy inquired about Chinese Influence Operations in Europe, including Germany. Secondly, he asked whether Germany sees China as a long-term or immediate threat? Lastly, he asked whether Germany's understanding of the rules-based order collides with their experience with China’s approach to a rules based order.

Ambassador Dr. Phillip Ackermann replied that China has firmly pushed its policy in academic institutions in recent years. This is done to shape and form an understanding of how China functions. In the case of a policymaker influenced by China, he gave an example of an individual who was a Chief of Staff of a Member of Parliament. Therefore, it shows how strongly China has influenced decision-making and policy-making. When it comes to cyberspace, the Russians participate more actively. For Germany, China and Russia are a threat as influence operators.

Dr. Swasti Rao asked if Germany believes in a de-risking policy vis-a-vis China and, if so, what steps should be taken. The Speaker answered that de-risking means encouraging and recommending the private sectors to de-risk. Germany cannot force them to not go to China; this was done with Russia, but it was easier since Russia is not an important economy. German companies have diversified and have begun focusing on the Asian arena, including India. Many German companies want to set up shop in India. German companies see India more as a brain than a muscle; therefore, the focus is more on investing in Rand D, technology and development sector.

Grp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele asked about German investments in the technology and space arena.

The Speaker emphasised that Germany is lagging behind in space, and the French are ahead. India needs to cooperate in this sector.

Dr. Rajorshi Roy asked about the European assessments of a scenario of a defeated Russia and its impact on regional security and stability.

The Speaker focused on the possibility that a period of frozen conflict would arise if the war did end, and he felt it wouldn't end very soon. They would still need to deal with Russia. Russia did attack a sovereign country, and Russia did take 20 per cent of the land; this act cannot be accepted. The history of the First World War shows that humiliation was not a good option for better relations after the war ended. The priority is to support Ukraine in its legitimate fight to protect its territorial integrity.  

Ms. Anandita Bhada enquired about how Germany plans to reduce dependence on China in the renewable energy sector. Secondly, with Germany's attempts at energy diversification, whether Germany is looking at other energy partnerships soon?

The Speaker answered that we are much more diversified in the energy sector in the current period, and Germany is not dependent only on one source of energy. Germany gets its gas from Norway, the Gulf, etc. It has become a mixed basket.

Dr. Jason Wahlang asked how Germany sees the rise of the right-wing in the European Parliament. Secondly, how much influence does the Alternative for Germany party have in the Western side of Germany when it comes to immigration debates?

The Speaker stated that there will be a rise of right-wing parties in the European Parliament for many reasons. The far right is not as powerful as it seems; its percentage is about 15-16 percent. On the immigration question, Germany does not think immigration is a bad thing; they do not want illegal immigration. Twenty percent of German individuals have at least one non-German parent.

Dr. Rajiv Nayan enquired about the different perceptions of terrorism in India and Europe.

On the topic of terrorism, the Speaker explained that India has its own experience and Germany has its own. In this globalised world, there is a need to compare whether, for example, the Khalistan issue is taken more seriously only in India or other nations as well. Intelligence sharing is important, and there is a need to find ways to cooperate.

Ms. Shruti Pandalai asked whether China's relationship with Germany limits its national policy in the Indo-Pacific. Secondly, how could a change in the White House's leadership impact the future of the Trans-Atlantic alliance?

The Speaker opined that Germany was considered the least popular country in Europe in the first tenure of the Trump leadership. With any change in leadership in the United States of America, Germany would still find a way to work and function with this relationship.

Dr. Prashant Singh enquired about the perceived disunity between the United States and Europe regarding trade and investment with China.

The Speaker stated that Europe and Germany are wholly localised economies compared to the United States of America. It would appear that the de-risking has reduced German engagement with China.

Captain Sunil Tyagi, Centre for Air Power Studies, asked whether Russia would shift its attention to Georgia and Moldova after the Ukraine War.

Ambassador Dr. Philip Ackerman stated that Russia has, in a way, played with Georgia and Moldova. He feels that both countries can be seen as candidates for membership in the European Union, but their conflicts are very different.

The report has been prepared by Dr. Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA.

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