Events

The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses organised a Round Table on the forthcoming “Sixth IBSA Summit” on May 21, 2013. The discussion chaired by the DG, IDSA, Dr. Arvind Gupta, intended to evaluate IBSA's achievements and performance over the last decade, since its inception in 2003. The participants in the round table included H.E Mr. Carlos Duarte, Ambassador of Brazil to India, Mr. Mark Reynhardt, Counsellor, South African High Commission, Ambassador Rajagopalan, Ambassador Deepak Bhojwani, Dr. Ash Narain Roy, Institute for Social Science, Prof. Abdul Nafey, JNU, Dr. Sachin Chaturvedi, RIS and Ms. Ruchita Beri, IDSA.

Following is the summary of the points highlighted by the speakers:

• The year 2013 marks the tenth anniversary of IBSA as a formal group. IBSA began as a group of three large developing democracies that had witnessed high economic growth in the past decade. The speakers noted that the IBSA grouping is very much trans-regional and represents the changing world order and the basic debates and issues of the developing world.
• Democracy and development are important themes for these countries and these countries are capable of providing development assistance in real terms in the form of sectoral cooperation among the working groups and through the IBSA Trust Fund. The IBSA Trust Fund is a very important aspect of South-South cooperation. It has managed to do well despite its minimal resources and is making a difference in some of the developing countries, especially in Africa. There was a general consensus among the speakers on the need for strengthening and streamlining the IBSA Trust Fund. A major problem of this fund has been the non-expenditure of a large amount of money contributed by the member countries.
• The Round Table highlighted the relevance of IBSA in the light of the emergence of BRICS grouping. IBSA precedes BRICS and there are no grey areas in IBSA like those in BRICS; IBSA is a unique forum where all its members are developing, pluralistic, multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual and multiracial in nature. Since they are two different entities altogether, IBSA and BRICS cannot be compared. The speakers added that IBSA is a group of like-minded countries with very little baggage while BRICS have shown signs of some internal differences among members. It was also argued that while BRICS is a geopolitical grouping, IBSA is a geo-economic grouping.
• At the international level, IBSA countries have exhibited a desire of acting together under the umbrella of multilateral organisations. They cooperate a great deal at the UN; for example, IBSA countries abstained in the UNGA Resolution on Syria as it had not taken their suggestions into consideration. There was consensus among the speakers that the UNSC should be expanded to enable the presence of IBSA at the high table.
• At its tenth anniversary it is time to re-energise the Working Groups and streamline them in order to make them more effective. While on one hand, there has been a qualitative and quantitative leap in intra-IBSA trade over the last decade, on the other hand, bilateral trade between IBSA countries and China has almost tripled. Therefore, there is a large scope for improvement here. There was also a suggestion of speeding up the process of Preferential Trade agreement (PTA) with Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) to enhance trade among IBSA countries. A Free Trade Area in the future could also be envisioned.
• It was also argued that the academic capital of the three countries is a great potential that still remains untapped, it could be looked at as the drivers for future summits.
• The participants noted that unemployment is a major challenge for all the member countries and to address the issue it was suggested that the development of Small and medium Enterprises (SMEs) could help to a great extent. The IBSA member countries can help each other by exchanging their best practices in areas of healthcare, pension and urban growth.
• Since the member countries are keen to cooperate on defence and strategic issues, a joint understanding on the issue of piracy on the eastern and western coast of Africa and joint military exercises among the IBSA countries would be vital. It was pointed out that the member countries could work together in the area of ocean governance as there is a need to ensure secure movement of goods across the seas.
• IBSA membership should be restricted to the current three member countries. They agreed that the desire of other developing countries to join the grouping may be obvious due to several reasons but any expansion of the membership could sideline the purpose of the creation of the grouping.
• It is time for IBSA to introspect and streamline its agenda; it needs to increase interactions on people to people level. The major challenge before IBSA is whether it is viewed as a legitimate group by other developing countries. IBSA’s footprints have been very visible during the last decade and the speakers cautioned against writing the obituary of the group.

Some of the points that came up during the discussion include:

• IBSA countries should look into implementing and operationalising the projects on their own with funds being handled by them rather than through the UNDP.
• Member countries should ensure delivering on their commitments and they need to stick to the grouping’s core competencies.
• An incremental approach is the best way forward for IBSA. There is also a need to harness the soft power of these countries to bring about further cooperation.
• IBSA could explore the possibilities of instituting IBSA fellowships, IBSA Chairs etc. Thus far, the role of academia and think tanks has only been marginally realised. Smilarly, IBSA has not been able to streamline the role of the civil society. It could engage the civil society in its working to enhance its effectiveness.
• Increasingly, IBSA is being taken seriously by the western countries. The declarations of the IBSA summit demonstrate that it is gaining more confidence to pronounce its goals and agenda.
• IBSA and BRICS need not necessarily be seen as opposing to each. They could each preserve their uniqueness and complement one another. IBSA could explore the possibility of a development bank along the lines of BRICS development bank.

Compiled by Keerthi Sampath Kumar and Saurabh Mishra

Chairperson: Dr Arvind Gupta, DG, IDSA

Speakers:
Amb K.V.Rajan, Former Ambassador to Nepal
Maj Gen. Ashok Mehta, Security Analyst
Dr Abanti Bhattacharya, Associate Professor, East Asian Studies, Delhi University
Dr Nihar Nayak, Associate Fellow, IDSA

Event Report

Pushpa Kamal Dahal a.k.a. Prachanda, the chairman of United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), visited India during April 27-30. Before coming to India, he also visited China. During his visits to China and India, Prachanda proposed a trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China without elaborating on the nature of this trilateral cooperation and the issues that need to be discussed within this framework. The Round Table was organised to examine and analyse:

• What does this trilateral arrangement entail?
• Is there consensus in Nepal on India-China-Nepal trilateral?
• What is the purpose behind such a proposal?
• Does it impact India’s security?
• Can India, Nepal and China cooperate in developmental projects?
• What would be the larger geo-political implications of such an engagement? Will this bring strain in India’s Nepal policy?

Following are the major points that emerged during the discussion:

• There existed quadrilateral relationship between India-China-Nepal-Tibet in the pre-independence period. Therefore, it is not a new concept. Prachanda came out with this trilateral cooperation proposal first in October 2010, again in November 2012 and finally in April 2013, after his China visits. Cooperation in its present form seems to be Lumbini centric. Since India has not been very positive on Chinese involvement in Lumibni, Prachanda might have visited India to generate New Delhi’s support.
• While Chinese response to this proposed trilateral arrangement was neither positive nor negative, Nepalese media came out with mixed reactions. There is a strong domestic support to this proposal in Nepal. India’s response to the proposal is lukewarm; it is felt that India should not join the trilateral cooperation and should maintain the status quo for the time being.
• There are two distinct views on India’s response to the proposed trilateral cooperation. While one view considers the possible security implications of the proposed trilateral concept, the other view looked into the economic rationality behind the concept. It was argued that given the porous border between India and Nepal and the close proximity between the two countries, presence of large number of Chinese workers or security personnel to safeguard the Chinese commercial projects in Nepal would have security concerns for India.
• India also needs to identify its strategic concern in Nepal. China’s Nepal policy suggests that principal factor driving its Nepal policy is internal, that is, to quell the Tibetan unrest. The new periphery strategy has mainly been devised to address the domestic security concerns through periphery consolidation. Trilateral cooperation will enable China to expand its influence in South Asia, marginalizing India’s pre-eminent position in the subcontinent. Hence, trilateral cooperation would come at the cost of India’s security, economy and diplomacy.
• Therefore, it was argued that the security concern of this proposed trilateral should not be ignored. India has already fought a war with China and the Chinese intrusions have not sent a positive signal. In this regard, a trilateral co-operation involving China is not possible until and unless there is trust among all the three parties. Therefore, time is still not right to implement the proposal and India needs to wait and Watch.
• On the other hand, the other view argued that instead of focussing too much on the security implications, it is important to acknowledge the economic rationality behind the proposed trilateral concept. Given the strong support in Nepal to the proposed trilateral cooperation, India can consider certain joint ventures especially in the hydropower sector. India cannot stop Chinese engagement in Nepal. Hence, it is better for India to participate in the trilateral arrangement and be a part of the projects, instead of allowing Chinese to be their own. Private sectors, which do not have security implications, should be encouraged to take part.
• India should reconsider its economic engagement with Nepal given the fact that Chinese are already there in Nepal. Yet, China is not contributing much to the Nepalese economy as most of the projects which are financed by them are based on loans than grants. Moreover, Chinese get their own labourers to work on these projects and they do not employ local workers. India can consider all these aspects and provide Nepal those economic benefits which are not provided by China. It was pointed out that there are examples of success stories of India-China joint cooperation in a third country particularly in the energy sector. Although, in case of Nepal it seems difficult, the previous success stories of India-china cooperation in third country situations should be considered.
• It was mentioned that during the China-India-Nepal trilateral meeting in Kathmandu in January, Nepal expressed its desire to be less dependent on India so that it can maintain an independent foreign policy. There was also an undercurrent suggestion to revise the 1950 treaty. In this background, it is argued that discussion on the proposed trilateral cooperation should be encouraged at the track II level, if not at the level of track I.
• This is an idea ahead of its time. It will take some time to take off. Therefore, India should not be too alarmed or too enthusiastic about it. Unless Nepal gets its acts together and both India and Nepal reach certain level of maturity, there is not much to achieve from the trilateral cooperation.
• India needs to revisit its diplomacy. India and China should freely talk to each other about avoiding actions in each other’s neighbourhood. Discussion on trilateral arrangement can provide such platform to both the countries to have frank discussions. India has a problem with Chinese involvement as it has long standing border dispute with china.
• Nepal should realise its limitations. It should not unnecessarily try to play a bigger diplomatic role and hurry into this trilateral cooperation without understanding its implications. Rather, it should concentrate in protecting its own interests.
• Nepal has special relations with India, by engaging China it should not put at stake the unilateral advantage it is currently receiving from India. Both India and China can benefit from prosperous Nepal, but it will take some time. Nepal should also encourage interdependency. If India is dependant on Nepal for energy or other resources it will automatically provide Nepal with leverages over India. This can be converted into mutually beneficial relations.

Report prepared by South Asia Centre

Venue: Room No 107, IDSA

Speaker: Dr. Sanat Kaul, former Deputy Commissioner, Nicobar Islands, and former Chief Secretary, Andaman & Nicobar Islands

Chairperson: Vice Adm.(Retd.) P.S. Das