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Title	Date	Author	Time	Event	Body	Research Area	Topics	File attachments	Image
Monday Morning Meeting on The Paradox of South Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons	September 02, 2024			Monday Morning Meeting	Dr. Ranjit Kumar Dhawan, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi spoke on “The Paradox of South Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 2 September 2024. The session was moderated by Mr. Niranjan Oak, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA. MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting. Executive Summary The Korean Peninsula is of strategic importance for the United States in its efforts to balance China as well as Russia. The resurgence of the debate whether South Korea should develop its own nuclear arsenal has gained much attention in the recent times. President Yoon Suk Yeol also made a statement in favour of developing nuclear weapons in 2023, however, retracting the same later. This move has sparked a discussion whether South Korea should go nuclear. The session focused on various aspects regarding concerns about the nuclear development of South Korea, providing a comprehensive analysis of the topic. Detailed Report The session began with opening remarks by Mr. Niranjan Oak, giving an introduction of the topic wherein he shared a brief history of South Korea’s move towards nuclear technology. Further, he discussed drivers that led to the current contemplation of South Korea’s seeming necessity for nuclear weapons. Some of the drivers were the exponential rise in tests by North Korea and its increasing proximity towards China and Russia, its discussion on employment of tactical nuclear weapons, and development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with the ability to reach continental United States. The aforementioned factors have ignited the discussion on the need for owning nuclear weapons in South Korea, wherein numerous surveys have revealed the public opinion in favour of developing the nation’s own nuclear weapons, given its credible civil nuclear industry. Dr. Ranjit Kumar Dhawan began his presentation by explaining that a major reason behind the requirement of nuclear warheads in South Korea is North Korea’s strengthening of its conventional and nuclear weapons capability and its cooperative alliance with Russia in the past few years. Another concern is America’s withdrawal of its armed forces from South Korea. Highlighting the history briefly and the events consequent to the Korean War, he described how geopolitics has evolved over the decades. He focused on nuclear development in North and South Korea, the strength and numbers of the armed forces of both the nations and the consecutive nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Apart from security aspects, political considerations including government policies and public opinion regarding the development of nuclear weapons were discussed. Citing the data in the “KINU Unification Survey 2024: North Korea’s Two-State Claim/US Presidential Election Outlook and ROK-US Relations”, published by Korea Institute for National Unification in June 2024, Dr. Dhawan stated that it showed public demand for South Korea’s own nuclear warheads surpassing the comparative percentage of people wanting US nuclear umbrella. Consequent to the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang, Seoul signed an agreement on the Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula with the US on 11 July 2024. Pyongyang reacted by threatening to increase its nuclear arsenal against the agreement between US and South Korea. Further into his presentation, Dr. Dhawan pointed out challenges that might impact the current situation and further policies of South Korea. He pointed out four possibilities resulting from South Korea’s nuclearisation, on the basis of the existing literature: A domino effect in the East Asian region, specifically in Taiwan and Japan Withdrawal from the Non – Proliferation Treaty, resulting in economic sanctions, making it a costly affair for South Korea South Korea continuing to benefit from the US nuclear umbrella Lack of acceptability of South Korea’s own nuclear weapons program to the US Explaining each of the apprehensions, Dr. Dhawan pointed out that South Koreans are doubtful about the reliance on US for nuclear weapons, thereby fuelling the need for South Korea’s nuclear program. The reason behind it is the apprehension of the US needing to protect its own territories against North Korean ICBMs with nuclear capacity. US might be found at a crossroads while protecting South Korea and that could give strategic advantage to its adversaries. Furthermore, US cannot let its control in East Asia slip away so easily, weakening its presence against China, as the increasing influence of the Chinese in the Peninsula has significantly impacted its diplomatic stronghold in the region. South Korea giving up US protection might prove to be the last nail in the coffin. Another impact might be the trigger effect on the nuclear arms race in the East Asian region. Concluding his presentation, Dr. Dhawan also specified the potential ideas that might benefit Seoul. Having already established a thriving civil nuclear program for technological and industrial purposes, it could be relatively easy to understand and analyse the dynamics and technicalities of the development of nuclear weapons in South Korea according to Dr. Dhawan. He added that the analyses of Project 890 shall also act as a guidebook for future endeavour, which will imperatively arm and strengthen South Korea against North Korea. However, regional political dynamics and the alliance with the US could prevent South Korea from going nuclear. Scholars at MP-IDSA posed a diverse range of questions to which the speaker gave detailed answers. Report was prepared by Ms. Shipra Dwivedi, Intern, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre, MP – IDSA.
Monday Morning on An Overview of China’s Cognitive Warfare Capabilities	August 19, 2024			Monday Morning Meeting	Dr. Abhishek Kumar Darbey, Associate Fellow, spoke on “An Overview of China’s Cognitive Warfare Capabilities” at the Monday Morning Meeting. The session was chaired by Dr. M.S. Prathibha, Associate Fellow and was followed by insightful remarks by the Director General MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and other scholars. Executive Summary Research about cognitive warfare is increasing in China. Through cognitive operations, China aims to control brains of the target population primarily by means of digital platforms, thereby influencing the decision making of the target country. As China aims to increase its diplomatic clout and geopolitical standing, Chinese military scholars are vigorously researching on means and ways to develop cognitive warfare capabilities. Given the increasing applications of non-kinetic warfare in contemporary times, China is building its cognitive operation capabilities considering it as the highest form of non-kinetic warfare. Taiwan and Hong Kong remain two important testing grounds of China’s cognitive warfare capabilities. Detailed Report The session began with brief introductory remarks by Dr. Prathibha. She noted that Chinese researchers and academics for a longtime have been interested in warfare capabilities in the cognitive domain that can be used in warfare and have been closely studying the United States’ (US) cognitive warfare capabilities since the 1990s. Highlighting that cognitive warfare is often confused with information warfare and psychological warfare, she contended that both China and the US make a distinction among these concepts and apply them accordingly. Cognitive warfare is primarily understood as attempts to affect the cognition of the enemy and make them take actions that are not in their interests. Dr. Darbey’s presentation consisted of two parts. In the first part he explained the concept of cognitive warfare. He noted information, cyber, and psychological warfare are subsets of cognitive warfare. For instance, information warfare is the attack and destruction of the adversary’s information system and gaining advantage over the enemy’s information system. On the other hand, cyberwarfare deals with attacks on the physical network of a particular organization to disrupt their activities. However, cognitive warfare targets the brain and combines cyber, information, psychological and social engineering capabilities of mind that alter the adversary’s cognitive process and exploit their mental biases. Elaborating on the difference, Dr. Darbey noted that the key difference between cognitive, information and psychological warfare is that unlike the other forms of warfare, cognitive warfare operates on weaponisation of neuroscience that intends to control the brain through environmental stimulation. Also, cyber and information technologies make cognitive warfare very fast and powerful. He highlighted that subjects such as philosophy, psychology, anthropology, artificial intelligence, nano technology, biotechnology and information technology are part of cognitive science. He observed that the initiator decides the plan and strategy about cognitive warfare according to the interest and goal they want to achieve. Accordingly, there are three kinds of cognitive warfare; First is the strategic cognitive warfare which is a long-term systematic influence operation carried out on the cognition of the targeted group to subvert or control the politico-economic system, military power or ideological orientation of a country. The second is campaign cognitive warfare which is undertaken for a medium time period, targeting the social cognition of the population to primarily disrupt the social solidarity of the enemy country. Finally, there is tactical cognitive warfare which is a short-term attack on the target population to mislead and manipulate political views. Further, the implementation of cognitive warfare is a five-step process; first is intelligence collection, second is target analysis, third is decision-making, fourth is information design and the last is evaluation. Moving to the second part of his presentation, that is, China’s cognitive warfare capabilities, Dr. Darbey contended that this is a new domain for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its capabilities are at a nascent stage compared to that of the other major powers like the US and Russia. He argued that the PLA intends to use cognitive warfare as an invisible hand to control the opponent’s will as Chinese researchers talk about four tactics to control the adversary’s mind, that is, perception manipulation, changing the historical memory and imposing new values on the target population, changing the line of thought and finally deconstructing symbols and challenging identity. Also, it is noteworthy that while earlier writings in PLA focussed on using cognitive warfare capabilities only to affect adversaries’ decision-making during war, present scholarship has turned towards discussing ways to utilise cognitive warfare capabilities in peacetime. With regard to the theoretical basis of China’s cognitive warfare, Dr. Darbey noted that it is based on Sun Tzu’s Art of War and I Ching: Book of Changes. These two texts have been the basis of the ‘Three Warfare Doctrine’ adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2005. Notably, the doctrine mentions cognitive warfare. Further, in 2010 when the document was revisited, the amended version instructed that the PLA members will have to train in three warfares, that is, develop a discursive power where the CCP will have the power to influence the target audience, control narratives and improve one’s own version of facts. Elaborating on PLA’s approach to cognitive warfare, he observed that Chinese military scholars contend that PLA’s offensive potential is greater than originally assessed. At present PLA has been using intimidation and disinformation as part of its cognitive warfare and key PLA units directly under the Central Military Commission including PLA Information Support Force are responsible for cognitive warfare operations. Similarly, within the government, the State Security Department, Taiwan Affairs Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are responsible for cognitive warfare. Dr. Darbey concluded his presentation by stating that China’s cognitive warfare projects are still in the initial stages as Beijing is in the process of developing its ‘Network Information System’ by means of its newly established PLA Information Support Force (PLA ISF) which will be able to acquire, transmit and assess massive amounts of data required to conduct cognitive warfare. Further, as Beijing aims to expand its domain of cognitive warfare, the study of metaverse will play a key role in strengthening China’s cognitive warfare capabilities. Following the presentation, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, Director-General, MP-IDSA, observed that cognitive warfare has been employed for generations and is becoming increasingly relevant in the present era, characterized by a world that has imploded, globalized, and interconnected through unparalleled data flows. As we progress towards artificial intelligence, the complexity will continue to escalate. Referring to Japan's cognitive warfare against its own citizens, he contended that it remains one of the most exemplary instances of cognitive warfare, perpetrated not by an adversary but by one's own system. Amb. Chinoy noted that America also used cognitive warfare against China to bring about change in their political system. He concluded his remarks by highlighting that currently a lot of cognitive warfare is at play, especially as being witnessed in the Ukraine and Gaza War. Q & A Session As the floor was opened for questions scholars queried about the possible parameters that are used to assess the success and failure of cognitive influence operations in Hong Kong and Taiwan; lessons China was adopting from the Ukraine war and how technology controls could affect China’s cognitive warfare capabilities. Scholars also queried about the difference between cognitive and psychological warfare, means to identify cognitive warfare and counter measures that can be used to combat such operations. Report was prepared by Dr. Mayuri Banerjee, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA.
Monday Morning Meeting on “Military Takeover in Bangladesh: What Next?”	August 12, 2024			Monday Morning Meeting	Dr. Smruti Pattanaik, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Military Takeover in Bangladesh: What Next?” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 12 August 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Pushpita Das, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA. The MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting. Executive Summary The session provided a comprehensive analysis of the ongoing crisis in Bangladesh, with a focus on the military's role, the dynamics of the protest movement, and the broader implications for Bangladesh's political future. The discussion underscored the complexities of the situation and the challenges ahead as Bangladesh navigates this period of transition. The meeting concluded with reflections on the potential outcomes and the importance of monitoring the developments closely. Detailed Report In her opening remarks, Dr. Pushpita Das offered an overview of the recent political developments in Bangladesh, particularly the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the formation of an interim government led by Dr. Mohammad Yunus. She highlighted the significance of the ongoing protests in Bangladesh, which originated from discontent over the country's quota system but soon escalated into a broader political movement demanding Sheikh Hasina's resignation. Dr. Smruti Pattanaik, began her presentation by showcasing posters that were widely circulated on social media, which became symbols of the resistance. Dr. Pattanaik informed the audience that the protests began in June 2024 in response to the decision taken by the High Court of Bangladesh reinstating a 30 percent quota for descendants of freedom fighters, reversing the government decision made in response to the 2018 Bangladesh quota reform movement. She assessed that the order made students insecure about getting a government job based on merit. However, these protests soon escalated into a nationwide demand for Sheikh Hasina's resignation. She acknowledged that the situation intensified and Hasina was allegedly forced to resign and flee to India. The interim government, led by Dr. Mohammed Yunus, took charge amidst demands for immediate elections. Dr. Pattanaik highlighted that these protests resulted in the killing of more than 200 people including students and children. Dr. Pattanaik highlighted the military's preference for behind-the-scenes control rather than direct governance, a strategy reminiscent of the 2007 crisis when the military took over in Bangladesh. She pointed out that the military's refusal to fire on protesters and its cautious approach were significant factors in the events that have occurred. Dr. Pattanaik assessed that the protests, initially focused on reservation reforms, gained momentum due to the government's inability to engage constructively with students, civil society and the killing of Abu Saeed, who was the only educated person in his 13 member family who aspired to get a government job and became a symbol that the protesters rallied around. She noted that the killing of student leaders and the police's heavy-handed response further fueled public anger. The protest movement, which saw participation from students, teachers, and various political factions, led to widespread mobilisation against the government. The role of the government-backed student organisation, Chhatra League, in countering the protests with violence along with the police who used brutal methods was also discussed. Dr. Pattanaik acknowledged the increased attacks on minorities, particularly Hindus, in the aftermath of Hasina's ouster. These attacks, driven by both communal and economic motives, were reminiscent of past violence in Bangladesh. She noted that the potential for further violence, especially against minorities, remains a concern as the interim government and military navigate the transition. Dr. Pattanaik drew parallels between the current crisis and previous student-led movements in Bangladesh, such as the 1952 Language Movement, the 1969 anti-government protests, 2013 Shahbagh Movement, 2018 anti-quota movement, and safe road movement which was started by the school students. She emphasised that student activism has historically played a crucial role in Bangladesh's political landscape. Dr. Pattanaik also compared the current situation to the events of 1971 and 2007, highlighting the cyclical nature of political unrest in Bangladesh. The interim government's composition, including student leaders, BNP sympathisers, religious party leaders and one from the minority community was discussed as a new development. However, uncertainties remain regarding the timeline for elections and the interim government's ability to handle the ongoing crisis in the country. Dr. Pattanaik questioned the participation of Jamaat-e-Islami leaders which remains a banned political party and the exclusion of other political parties in the swearing-in ceremony of the interim government. The circumstances surrounding Hasina's resignation and exile to India were also debated. Dr. Pattanaik analysed the impact of Hasina’s departure on her political legacy and the perception of her as a grassroots leader. Comments and Q&A Following the presentation, the moderator, Dr. Pushpita Das opened the floor for questions and comments. Scholars of MP-IDSA emphasised the need to closely monitor the role of other political parties in the evolving situation. They also inquired about the role India should play in the evolving situation, about the upcoming elections in the country and the ability of the interim government to handle the current situation in the country. Scholars also inquired about the role of foreign powers in the current situation that has unfolded in Bangladesh leading to the resignation of Sheikh Hasina and how the foreign media is looking at it. Dr. Pattanaik responded to the comments and questions raised by the scholars of MP-IDSA. Report prepared by Ms. Puspa Kumari, Intern, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.
Monday Morning Meeting on “Saudi Foreign Policy in the Emerging Regional Order in West Asia”	August 05, 2024			Monday Morning Meeting	Dr. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) made a presentation on “Saudi Foreign Policy in the Emerging Regional Order in West Asia,” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 5 August 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Deepika Saraswat, Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA. Scholars of MP-IDSA attended the meeting. Executive Summary The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an important player in the West Asian region. Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has been shaped by a number of factors including its perception of national security, regional stability, geopolitical developments in its neighbourhood and its ambition to play a leadership role in the region. It has established strategic partnerships and alliances with important regional and global powers in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives. As the situation in the West Asian region continues to remain tense, it has adopted a more pragmatic and cautious approach in its foreign policy. Detailed Report In her introductory remarks, Dr. Saraswat observed that the Gulf States are emerging as key power brokers in the Arab world. She reflected on Saudi Arabia’s target of achieving Vision 2030 goals and its navigating through the regional order which saw changes from a ‘militaristic turn’ of intervention against the Houthis in Yemen, and involvement in Syria to a preference for de-escalation with key players including Turkey and Iran, and normalisation efforts with Israel, which have been complicated by the ongoing Israel-Palestine war. Further, Dr. Saraswat also commented on the dynamics of Saudi Arabia’s interactions with external powers and increasing engagement of the Gulf States with China. In his presentation, Dr. Pradhan highlighted that the regional order in West Asia continues to remain fragile. The region suffered significantly during the Arab unrest with protests and regime changes. The region has always remained prone to external intervention. But recently, the Abraham Accords and Saudi-Iran rapprochement have been positive developments with potential for further cooperation. The Israel-Hamas War and the involvement of Houthis and Hezbollah have further complicated the regional situation. The whole region has become even more volatile since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War and its spillover effect in the Red Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, involvement of Iran, Lebanon and the neighbourhood along with significant involvement of Hamas, Houthis and Hezbollah. Dr. Pradhan noted that the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two regional powers has been a pivotal determinant in the regional order in West Asia. After decades of hostility, both the countries signed an agreement in March 2023 that restored their diplomatic ties. However, both states have serious differences when it comes to regional security in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia vouches for a Western security architecture in the Gulf. On the contrary, Iran believes that the regional security framework of the region should be controlled by the regional players only and perceives the American military presence in the West Asian region as a threat. He also stated that Turkiye and Israel, the two other major non-Arab players in the region also have a major influence in the region. Dr. Pradhan outlined that when it came to the Israel-Palestine issue, Riyadh’s position has undergone a significant change over the decades. The Saudi-Israeli talks to explore the normalisation of relations between them is an indication of Saudi Arabia’s changing perception towards Israel. However, since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War, Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed that there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel until an independent Palestinian state is established. Saudi Arabia supports the Arab Peace Initiative which proposes a two-state solution with the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Yemen has always been a major concern for Saudi Arabia since it has a long and porous border and the former has also mostly been a very unstable state with presence of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The Houthi capture of Sana’a was a red line for the Kingdom since Riyadh believes that the group is backed by Iran. Thus, Houthis presence on the Saudi-Yemeni border is an obvious national security threat for the Saudis. Houthis have launched several attacks on Saudi Arabia including sensitive infrastructure such as airports and oil installations. Dr. Pradhan noted that Saudi Arabia’s position towards Bashar Al- Assad in Syria has also undergone a change. There has been a gradual course correction in recent years with the intent of engaging with the Assad regime and bringing Syria back to the Arab world. Saudi Arabia has adopted mediation as a foreign policy tool. The Kingdom has mediated between different factions in Palestine, Yemen, Lebanon, Sudan and for prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine. There has been a significant change in Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy thinking since Mohammed bin Salman became the Crown Prince. The Kingdom has been making efforts to improve its global image by undertaking a number of social reforms including improvement in the human rights situation. Dr. Pradhan argued that when it comes to Saudi-US relations, there have been many ups and downs. Bilateral ties have been interdependent and strategic in nature, with defence and security being given a significant focus. But Biden Administration’s stopping of arms supply to Riyadh at a time when the Kingdom was fighting a war against the Houthis became a major irritant for Saudi Arabia. He outlined that when the oil prices were crashing, in the middle of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries were severely hit by the loss of revenues. The OPEC and non-OPEC oil-producing countries came together to form the OPEC+. As a major non-OPEC oil producer, Russia also played a big role in the oil market and forged close cooperation with Saudi Arabia. This energy cooperation between the Russia and Saudi Arabia was perceived as having the potential to change the global oil market and growing Saudi-Russia cooperation. Saudi Arabia maintains a neutral position in the Russia-Ukraine War. Dr. Pradhan stated that Saudi Arabia’s relationship with China is also growing significantly. Saudi-China ties are mainly propelled by bilateral trade and energy as China is a key importer of Saudi crude. There is a mutual convergence of interests between the two countries, as Saudi Arabia has expressed its support for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China has expressed its support for Saudi Vision 2023. With reference to India-Saudi Arabia bilateral relations, Dr. Pradhan stated that both countries are strategic partners and are moving beyond the traditional buyer-seller relationship. Total bilateral trade between the two stands at approximately US$ 45 billion and Saudi Arabia is also a source of energy for India. West Asia is India’s ‘Extended Neighbourhood’ and Saudi Arabia is an important country in India’s ‘Think West’ policy. Both the countries have a convergence of interests in fighting terrorism, extremism and piracy. The signing of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) has the potential to further enhance connectivity between the two countries. Dr. Pradhan concluded by stating that the regional order in West Asia continues to remain fragile and tense; and thus Saudi Arabia has recalibrated its approach accordingly. It is gradually adopting a more accommodative and pragmatic foreign policy approach in recent years than ever in the past. Questions and Comments Scholars at MP-IDSA engaged in a question and answer session that focused on US-Saudi relations, Russia’s support to the Houthis, China-Saudi Arabia collaboration to produce military drones, prospects of the IMEC project, potential of India-Saudi defence cooperation and the Saudi policy towards the Syrian Crisis. Dr. Pradhan provided insightful responses to the questions and comments from the floor. Report was prepared by Ms. Sandra Sajeev D Costa, Intern, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.
Interaction with Dr. Michael Malley, US Naval Postgraduate School	August 01, 2024			Other	On 1 August 2024, Dr. Michael Malley, Senior Lecturer, Department of National Security Affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, visited MP-IDSA to deliver his remarks on multilateral maritime security cooperation. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director-General MP-IDSA, chaired the meeting, which was attended by scholars from various centres. Amb. Chinoy commenced the proceedings with a brief introduction of Dr. Malley and the circumstances of their acquaintance at the recently-concluded Indian Ocean Defence and Security Conference in Perth, Australia. He then turned the floor over to the Speaker. The Speaker also gave a brief introduction of the Naval Postgraduate School and his own educational background. He cited particularly the NPS' role in training and capacity-building of the militaries of other countries as germane to his remarks. The Speaker informed the audience that his remarks would primarily revolve around the challenges of maritime cooperation in the region and how they create opportunities for allies and partners of the US to work together. He held maritime security cooperation to be the product of the immediate post-Cold War era, when the threat of global nuclear conflict as an expression of superpower confrontation receded. At the same time, he argued, maritime trade boomed as a result of the economic modernisation and integration of China and India, which in turn led to the growing convergence of trade and security agendas on the high seas. These trends led the spotlight to fall on navies, which were now tasked not to manage superpower conflict, but to prevent non-traditional security threats such as pirates, traffickers, terrorists and fishers engaged in Illegal, Unregulated and Unrecognised (IUU) fishing. Dr. Malley noted that the world was now experiencing the 'rapid proliferation of maritime security cooperation initiatives' in which the US was involved to varying degrees. He pointed to some concrete examples in the form of initiatives mounted in the Caribbean against drug trafficking, the Indian Ocean against piracy, and the Southeast Asian region. All these initiatives, he pointed out, have been designed to be flexible in terms of membership and interoperability in light of the desires of several states in the region to preserve their sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Grey zone conflict challenges this model of maritime security cooperation seriously, the Speaker noted. This is because grey zone activities may be present as classical non-traditional security threats, but in actuality are likely to have a state actor pulling the strings in the background. An example offered by him in this regard was the Chinese Coast Guard's recent violent clashes with Philippine law enforcement personnel, where water cannons were used to disperse the latter, vis-à-vis the protection offered by it to the so-called 'maritime militia' which often forms the spearhead of China's intrusions into disputed waters. Broadly speaking, Dr. Malley noted, maritime security cooperation can be divided into three forms. The first form is interdiction or kinetic action cooperation, where the US along with its allies and partners uses its ships to actually interdict vessels conducting illegal actions. The second form is that of information-sharing, where states agree to collect, analyse and disseminate relevant intelligence to improve maritime domain awareness. Finally, the third type of cooperation involves capacity-building, where states such as the US (and increasingly Japan) help smaller countries which are presently incapable of monitoring their vast maritime domains to be able to do so. He concluded his remarks by expressing an interest in understanding how India approaches these forms of security cooperation and the concerns it has relating to them. Amb. Chinoy thanked Dr. Malley for sharing his remarks and presented his view of India's stance on these issues. He noted that while major power contestation is well underway in the modern era, there is a space for like-minded countries to band together. This may involve strengthening the traditional alliance structure in some cases, but goes beyond these to the creation of an 'era of quasi-alliances', which are not predicated on close synchronicity of thought on every count to achieve cooperation. Nevertheless, issues of sovereignty have the potential to create friction and present limits to cooperation. In light of his previous remarks, Amb. Chinoy posed a few questions to the Speaker. Firstly, he invited the Speaker to clarify whether the US commitment to international legal instruments such as the UNCLOS could be relied upon in light of the US’ non-ratification of UNCLOS. Secondly, on the issue of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), he invited the Speaker to remark on whether friendly nations are expected to condone, or at least tolerate, US FONOPS conducted against them in the same manner as when they are conducted against countries such as China. Finally, he urged the Speaker to comment on the reasons behind the US' absence from the International Seabed Authority. Dr. Malley answered the last question first by noting that the US' stance on the ISA and global efforts to codify common norms on seabed mining are rooted in the peculiar worldview of 1980s US politics, as is its stance on UNCLOS. He confessed that there should not be any expectation of a sudden change in the US position on this issue given the vagaries of US domestic politics, though there is ample support within the US armed forces as well as sections of its defence bureaucracy for ratification. He encouraged the audience to think of statements regarding the 'rules-based international order' made by US officials as forms of signalling support of UNCLOS as an element of that order. Similarly, Dr. Malley characterised FONOPS as another 'oddity' of US foreign policy, devised as a legalistic effort to deny any other country in the international system the right to any exclusive national claim to the maritime commons under the belief that silence on such claims-making would be construed as assent. He also argued that there were significant doubts on the deterrence potential of FONOPS in the South China Sea region, where it acts a 'tool with various impacts' on the concerned countries. The Chair then invited questions from the floor. Scholars from the Indian side obliged by asking the visitor a host of questions on topics ranging from particular policy stances adopted by the US government to the modalities of the India-US relationship. He answered most of them fully and frankly, engaging the audience for their views on the issue. On a question from the Indian side regarding backlash to the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) programme from certain countries in Southeast Asia, the Speaker answered that behind such attitudes may lie a perception that existing information-sharing structures operating in Southeast Asia, which these countries happen to host presently, may be supplanted by a broader structure that could cause them to lose their primacy in the information supply chain. To a question on the perception in many Asian countries that the US is steadily losing focus on the Indo-Pacific as it invests gargantuan amounts of aid in Ukraine and Israel, the Speaker answered that this only seemed to be the case. He noted the coming together of the naval chiefs of the United Kingdom, US, Australia and Japan at Perth to set up a mechanism to host a nuclear submarine maintenance base in the region as a promising development. He also offered the analysis that the differing policy preferences of various incumbent Presidents may also be a factor in creating this impression. In response to a question concerning the US Armed Forces' preparation for combatting climate change, the Speaker stated that the US Armed Forces, especially the Navy, are extremely cognisant of the dangers of climate change and have set up varying mechanisms to account for it in their strategic plans, such as appointing an Assistant Secretary on Climate Change at the Pentagon and conducting apolitical studies on the likely impacts of climate change. Another question posed to Dr. Malley concerned the US military's assessment of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)'s exercises around Taiwan Strait. He replied to the question by agreeing that the US was closely monitoring such exercises, and that its conclusion is that the PLAN's capacity to blockade Taiwan is increasing. This is true not only of its maritime interdiction capacity, but also the capacity to mount shore-based attacks. This has ensured that US forces concentrated in Japan and the Republic of Korea are also within range of land-based missiles. As a result, the US military is now preparing to enact a strategy of 'distributed lethality', by which these US forces are being broken up into smaller detachments and distributed across the First Island Chain so as to ensure their survivability. In a second round of questions, the Chair Amb. Chinoy inquired of the Speaker as to what he would consider as a 'red line' for the US military that would trigger intervention by it against China in the SCS. He noted that the lack of a red line is cause for concern on the part of several actors across the region, as it does not encourage confidence in the US' commitments. The Speaker in his response first flagged the criticality of the question posed, but could not reassure the audience that any such 'red line' could be clearly defined at present. He argued that while an attack on the Senkaku Islands would trigger Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, making US intervention inevitable, it is not at all clear whether an attack on Taiwan's offshore islands (such as Jinmen and Matsu) would constitute grounds for intervention. He hypothesised that the trigger for intervention in Taiwan would most likely be legal-political. After Amb. Chinoy delivered his closing remarks, the meeting came to an end. Report was prepared by Dr. Arnab Dasgupta, Research Analyst, East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.
Monday Morning Meeting on “The Revision of Criminal Laws: An Assessment”	July 29, 2024			Monday Morning Meeting	Mr. Shantanu Sinha, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (MP-IDSA), made a presentation on, “The Revision of Criminal Laws: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 29 July 2024. The session was moderated by Mr. Arvind Khare, Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA. The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and other IDSA scholars participated in the discussion. Executive Summary India has undergone a substantial legal transformation with the enactment of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), replacing the IPC, CrPC, and Indian Evidence Act, respectively. These changes aim to modernise and streamline India's criminal justice system. The discussion centred around the potential impact of these laws on various aspects of criminal procedure, investigation, and evidence. Detailed Report Mr. Arvind Khare, Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA, commenced the meeting by providing an overview of the criminal justice administration system and the replacement of the colonial era laws formulated in the 19th and the 20th centuries by the introduction of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which replaced the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023,which replaced The Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, 1898 and 1973, and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which replaced the the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, further discussing whether the current system from the infrastructure point of view and the mindset point of view is adequately equipped according to the new laws for criminal justice administration or not. Mr. Khare also mentioned briefly the changes made to the registration of FIRs with the introduction of e-FIRs and Zero-FIRs. Mr. Shantanu Sinha, in his opening remarks, provided an overview of the new laws that were introduced in India making a major shift from the colonial era. These codes aim to address the shortcomings of the previous laws and adapt to the evolving challenges of the 21st century. The meeting commenced with a discussion on the date of implementation of the new laws i.e. 01.07.2024 to oversee their application and address potential challenges. The Committee for Reforms in Criminal Laws (CRCL), established in 2020 and chaired by Prof (Dr.) Ranbir Singh, reviewed criminal laws in India and their recommendations formed the basis for three new bills introduced in the Indian Parliament in August 2023. The Parliamentary Standing Committee chaired by Mr. Brij Lal reviewed the new bills and suggested revisions and recommendations. However, some committee members criticised the committee for only holding 12 sittings to deliberate on the laws and demanded more time for scrutiny. Before moving to specifics, Mr. Sinha emphasised the focus on ensuring justice to the victim, which is the key feature of the changes made. This is apparent, firstly, in the names themselves—the words “nyaya” (justice) and “nagarik suraksha” (safety and security of the citizen) make this clear and send an unambiguous message. At the same time, the rights of the accused to a fair trial are upheld firmly. The need to punish the actual perpetrators of the crime, by ensuring an honest, fair, scientific investigation; and speedy and efficient justice—so that justice is delivered in a timely manner with adequate deterrent effect for both the offender and others who may take to crime— are both met in these laws. There are also several women-centric changes in these laws; and others that protect the rights of children. For example, the definition of ‘victim’ has been widened by eliminating the need for the accused person to be formally charged of having committed the offence. Though this is not a gender-specific change, it will help all victims (including where they are entitled to compensation) including those who are women. In the IPC, sections relating to offences against woman and child were scattered throughout the text. In the BNS, they have been consolidated in Chapter 5 (Of offences against woman and child). This chapter has also been given precedence as far as the sequence in which chapters are arranged in the Act is concerned (this gives a message, but has no other legal implication, of course). These are only illustrative. The point is that several changes have been made to ensure justice to women, and also to children regardless of their gender, recognising the fact that both boys and girls are vulnerable. According to Mr. Sinha, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) retains most offences from the IPC. It adds community service as a form of punishment. Sedition is no longer an offence. Instead, there is a new offence for acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India. The BNS includes the offence of terrorism in one its sections, whose definition is the same as that provided in the UAPA. Naturally, therefore, a question would arise which law to apply when investigating such an offence. This discretion has been left to the concerned Superintendent of Police. Over time, this aspect will have to be elaborated upon and perhaps guidelines framed to ensure that there is no scope of it being challenged on the grounds of arbitrary exercise of discretion. Mr. Sinha explained that organised crime has been added as an offence in the BNS. The definition is in line with that provided in the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act (MCOCA), which was the model used by other states as well while drafting their own laws to deal with this menace. It includes crimes such as kidnapping, extortion and cyber-crime committed on behalf of a crime syndicate. Petty organised crime is also an offence now. By adding this section to the BNS, there is now a law applicable across the country to deal with organised and petty organised crime—which don’t honour state boundaries and are inter-state as well as transnational— which will go a long way in tackling such criminal activity in an effective manner. Mr. Sinha mentioned murder by a group of five or more persons on grounds of certain identity markers such as caste, language or personal belief will be an offence with penalty of seven years to life imprisonment or death. By providing a separate section for this offence, a strong message has been sent that such offences will be met with strict punitive measures. Mr. Sinha further elucidated that the new legal framework also introduces more precise definitions for certain crimes. For instance, the distinction between snatching and robbery has been clarified, addressing a long-standing issue where cases of snatching were often lodged under the more serious charge of robbery. This refinement in categorising crimes is expected to lead to more accurate data collection and potentially, more effective targeted interventions. Additionally, the laws incorporate provisions for emerging crimes like cyberbullying and online fraud, reflecting the evolving nature of criminal activities in the digital age. Mr. Sinha stated that the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) which was introduced in the Lok Sabha and referred to the standing committee on August 11, 2023 replaces the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). The CrPC provides for the procedure for arrest, prosecution, and bail. BNSS mandates forensic investigation for offences punishable with seven years of imprisonment or more. Forensic experts will visit crime scenes to collect forensic evidence and record the process. By making this process mandatory, and providing for expert collection of evidence, the process of investigation may well be revolutionised. The quality of evidence, and its relevance and value in court, will be significantly enhanced; by ensuring that evidence is of high quality, on the one hand, it will ensure that actual perpetrators of crime will not be able to get away because of deficiencies in collection of vital evidence. On the other hand, by assuring the element of fairness in investigation, it also helps the accused to establish their innocence, if, indeed, they are innocent, which is, of course, as a general rule, the presumption unless contradicted by due process of law. He further emphasised that all trials, inquiries, and proceedings may be held in electronic mode. Production of electronic communication devices, likely to contain digital evidence, will be allowed for investigation, inquiry, or trial. If a proclaimed offender has absconded to evade trial and there is no immediate prospect of arresting him, the trial can be conducted and judgment pronounced in his absence. Along with specimen signatures or handwriting, finger impressions and voice samples may be collected for investigation or proceedings. Samples may be taken from a person who has not been arrested. All these measures and more make the process of investigation and trial that much more efficient. There are some concerns, as well. There are questions of data security, and other such concerns relating to electronic devices and communication. Further, the demeanour of a witness in judicial proceedings is an important aspect of his/her testimony. At times, especially during cross-examination, it is important to assure the Court that the witness is deposing without any fear, and not under any compulsion. Physical presence of witnesses in Court aids this process. When deposing using electronic means, this may not always be the case. Also, for example when recording searches and seizures through audio-visual means, the mere fact that electronic recording has been done should not lend the evidence any more of an imprint of credibility that that desired by law. Investigating officers have to be trained, retrained, and then again trained, to follow the best guidelines, and ensure justice to the victim as well as the accused. Mr. Sinha said that the BNSS allows up to 15 days of police custody, which can be authorised in parts during the initial 40 or 60 days of the 60 or 90 days, respectively, in which investigations are carried out (depending on the punishment attracted by the offence; basically, the gravity of the offence). Concerns have been raised that this may lead to denial of bail for the entire period of 40 or 60 days (as the case may be) as magistrates may be reluctant to grant bail on the ground that the accused may be required to be remanded to police custody to help in the investigation, provided the police has not exhausted the 15 days custody. However, it has been clarified that merely on this ground bail will not be denied. Mr. Sinha critically assessed the new system's preparedness to effectively serve India's needs, exploring the ramifications of e-registration of FIRs, the concept of zero FIRs. The introduction of e-FIRs and zero FIRs is a step towards improving accessibility to justice. The law encourages the use of electronic means for filing and processing FIRs, which within three days of the filing needs to be signed by the informant, which can expedite the process and reduce paperwork. However, the effectiveness of these measures hinges on robust implementation and adequate infrastructure. With reference to the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSB2) Mr. Sinha explained that this replaces the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA). It retains most provisions of the IEA including those on confessions, relevancy of facts, and burden of proof. The IEA provides for two kinds of evidence - documentary and oral. Documentary evidence includes primary (original documents) and secondary (that proves the contents of the original). The BSA retains the distinction. It classifies electronic records as documents. Under the IEA, electronic records are categorised as secondary evidence. The BSA classifies electronic records as primary evidence. It expands such records to include information stored in semiconductor memory or any communication devices (smartphones, laptops). The BSA expands secondary evidence to include: (i) oral and written admissions, and (ii) the testimony of a person who has examined the document and is skilled in the examination of documents. While interacting with MP-IDSA-Scholars regarding instances where citizens have faced difficulties in registering FIRs, particularly in snatching cases, Mr.Sinha emphasised the importance of persistence in such situations. He stated that if a police officer refuses to register an FIR where it relates to a cognisable offence, citizens should utilise remedies that the law provides. The first step would be to write to the Superintendent of Police, and, if there is still no action, then they should make a complaint before the jurisdictional judicial magistrate. With changes in BNSS, such problems have found an effective redressal as citizens can file e-FIRs (to be signed within 3 days), and can file zero FIRs too (i.e. information regarding a cognisable offence can be given in any police station irrespective of whether the offence took place in its jurisdiction.) Mr.Sinha emphasised that under no circumstances should citizens give up on their right to lodge a complaint. Mr. Sinha mentioned that significant amendments to provisions governing complaints against public servants and the role of forensic experts have been made. The controversial expansion of police custody from the previous 15-day limit to 60 and even 90 days, while aimed at complex investigations, it is essential to establish stringent safeguards to prevent misuse. Regular judicial oversight and strict adherence to legal provisions are imperative. The newly mandated 90-day update on investigation status for victims or informants was analysed in depth for its potential to enhance transparency and accountability. Specific provisions such as those related to complaint registration, preliminary inquiries, and the alignment of terrorism-related definitions with the UAPA were scrutinised. Provisions safeguarding the rights of children and women were meticulously examined to assess their congruence with principles of justice and gender equality. Questions and Comments Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA complimented Mr. Shantanu Sinha and appreciated the detailed presentation and further highlighted the absence of provisions related to road rage and the criminalisation of mere bystanding during a crime as significant lacunae in the newly enacted criminal laws. He emphasised the need for specific laws addressing the growing menace of road rage, which has claimed numerous lives. Additionally, he advocated for a remedy for the individuals who witness a crime but choose to remain passive, underscoring the importance of active citizenship and community responsibility in preventing criminal activities. Participants expressed profound concerns regarding the challenges inherent in implementing these sweeping legal reforms and anticipated legal challenges that may arise. Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA inquired about the burden of proof, whether it lies upon the prosecution or the defence, a fundamental aspect of the criminal jurisprudence. He further asked the scope of malicious investigations and their impact on society quoting the Nambi Narayan case. Col. Vivek Chadha(Retd), Senior Fellow made a query regarding the process followed for the formation of these laws and the role played by the citizens in formulating them. Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh (Retd.), Research Fellow asked Mr.Sinha whether the notion of the hefty process of filing an FIR with the police has been simplified with the introduction of the new criminal laws. Report has been prepared by Ms. Navdeep Kaur, Intern, Internal Security Centre, MP-IDSA.
Monday Morning Meeting on Prime Minister Modi’s Visit to Russia: Key Takeaways	July 22, 2024			Monday Morning Meeting	Dr. Rajorshi Roy, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA, made a presentation on Prime Minister Modi’s Visit to Russia: Key Takeaways” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 22 July 2024. The session was moderated by Ms. Anandita Bhada, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA. The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and other IDSA scholars participated in the discussion. Executive Summary The meeting focussed on Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent visit to Russia, his first since the COVID-19 pandemic and the onset of the Russia’s military operation in Ukraine. The visit highlighted the relevance of India-Russia relations amidst shifting global dynamics. The economic agenda was a central focus, with nine economic agreements signed and plans to achieve US$100 billion in bilateral trade by 2030. PM Modi’s visit highlighted India's strategic autonomy and its ability to balance relations with major global powers. The oil trade between the two countries has been particularly beneficial for India while helping stabilise global energy markets. Detailed Report Ms. Anandita Bhada initiated the discussion by highlighting various aspects of the visit including the scope of some of the agreements signed between India and Russia. Dr. Rajorshi Roy informed the audience about Prime Minister Narendra Modi's first visit to Russia since the COVID-19 pandemic and the onset of the Russian military operation in Ukraine. This visit highlighted the relevance of India-Russia relations amidst shifting global dynamics. One of the most significant outcomes of the visit was the ambitious target set by both nations to achieve US$100 billion in bilateral trade by 2030. The economic agenda was a central focus, with nine agreements signed. The Joint Statement outlined the commitment to unlock their economic potential through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), Unified Payments Interface (UPI), and energy initiatives. Plans were also made to open two new consulates in Kazan and Yekaterinburg and introduce e-visas in four days, reflecting a strong commitment to enhance connectivity and people-to-people linkages. In addition to these, joint Research & Development (R&D) and expanded military exchanges in the defence sector were discussed, signalling a deepening of strategic ties. Dr. Roy highlighted Russia’s grand strategy of actively seeking new global partners, particularly the Global South, to withstand Western pressure. Dr. Roy also informed the audience how the visit highlighted India's strategic autonomy and its ability to balance relations with major global powers. The strengthening of India-Russia ties is seen as a way to reinforce India ’s strategic autonomy. The oil trade between the two countries has been particularly beneficial for India while also helping stabilise global energy markets. Challenges remain, such as trade imbalance, the payment mechanism and the overhang of Western sanctions. The "Make in India" initiative and the cost of a drift in India-Russia partnership were also discussed, emphasising the need for adding more pillars to the bilateral relationship. According to Dr. Roy, Prime Minister Modi's visit to Russia was both symbolic and strategically significant. The discussions and agreements have set a solid foundation for navigating ties onto the future. Questions and Comments The presentation was followed by comments from Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy. He stated how Prime Minister Modi's visit was extraordinary, highlighting India's vision for autonomy amid global tensions. Trump's critique of Biden's handling of international affairs underscores the complexity of the situation, wherein the former is suggesting that the U.S. should engage with Russia. Putin's determination in the Ukraine conflict hints at a prolonged war. Although India's role as a mediator seems ambitious, given the proxy nature of the war, its diplomatic efforts remain notable. This was followed by a lively Q&A session. Report was prepared by Mr. Tatsat Pati, Intern, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA.	Europe and Eurasia
Monday Morning Meeting Report: Japan’s Currency Crisis and its Implications	July 15, 2024			Monday Morning Meeting	Dr. Arnab Dasgupta, Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis made a presentation on “Japan’s Currency Crisis and its Implications” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 15 July 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. R. K. Dhawan, Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA. Scholars of MP-IDSA attended the meeting. Executive Summary Japan made a significant transition from exerting hard power to prioritising soft power. The Japanese model was a mix of free market and socialist system. Later on, several Southeast Asian countries also adopted a similar approach to achieve their development goals. Countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia also adopted this economic model, and China and Vietnam have followed the same. This Japanese economic model was referred to as the ‘flying geese’ model. In the early 1990s, the collapse of massive assets led to a crisis in the Japanese currency. Several factors contributed to the devaluation of the Yen, including the interest rate differential between the US and Japan, as well as the huge selling of the yen, resulting in a decline in its value. Detailed Report The session started with remarks by Dr. R.K. Dhawan on how the value of the Yen degraded over a period of time. He talked about the Plaza Accord according to which Japan was pressurised to appreciate the Yen and that led to the downfall of the Japanese economy and what we call lost decades. Japan has not been yet able to recover from it. Dr. Dasgupta commenced his presentation with an introduction to the rise of the Japanese economy after World War II. Japan from the beginning was the preminent economic power in the 1950s and 1960s. The rise was remarkable because it was risen from the ashes of the 1940s and after suffering two nuclear bombs which no country has faced. In his presentation, Dr. Dasgupta explained it all in brief. In his presentation, he talked about the Japanese economy of the post 1940s and 50s era. After the decade when Japan surrendered, the country put into place a revolutionary system of ‘guided capitalism’, that would give a growth rate averaging around 8 to 10 per cent until the 1970s and 7 per cent until the 1990s which led to international economists coining the “Flying Geese” model for Asia and all over the world. He emphasised the role of the US in reviving the Japanese economy during the Japanese economy’s lost decades. The accommodative policies of the US not only opened the market for its domestic manufacturers but also pegged the Yen to a fixed value against the dollar. However, the system that guided Japan to success also contained the roots essentially of its downfall because Japan’s antitrust laws encouraged the formation of giants called keiretsu. He also highlighted the significance of the keiretsu and the impact of the real estate bubble. This economic bubble collapsed between 1991 and 1995, leading to a period of deflation in Japan. Consequently, there was a reduction in the prices of goods and services, accompanied by diminished cash flow and corporate profits. This downturn resulted in decreased production and a decline in employment opportunities, leading to a significant rise in unemployment. Subsequently, consumers began to economise on goods and services, contributing to an overabundance of supply in the market. Further, he explained the effects of deflation in Japan. The main leading banks of Japan were on the verge of collapse. Many companies were red-listed. The wages of the employees were kept stagnant. People started saving which led to depressed consumption. He talked about the Rise of Abenomics where he explained changes in the monetary and fiscal policy and some structural changes that were made. He explained the changes in the monetary policy which led to the crisis in the Japanese economy. The first target of Abenomics was setting an inflation target of 2 par cent so that the prices of goods would rise which would stimulate more production. The second was setting Yen volatility control so that the Yen became stable. Then was the negative interest rates under which banks had to pay the entity that was holding their funds. Next was the public investment by which the government would intend to invest capital directly into the economy. Finally, the quantitative easing (QE) by which the Bank of Japan (BoJ) would buy government and non-government bonds in the open market, and in effect, it could use credit liquidity to buy back its own debt. Besides all these, there was a fiscal policy that used consumption tax hikes to fund spending. They brought in structural reforms to strengthen antitrust laws, boost women’s participation, and increase immigration. When Haruhiko Kuroda was appointed as governor of the BoJ, he came up with some changes and initiated Yield Curve Control (YCC) in 2016, with rates of 0 per cent long-term, -0.1 per cent short and medium-term. Now the Banks had to pay BoJ interest for their deposits. After the implementation of these changes, the Abe government had some success in increasing GDP and inflationary expectations were created. Further, Dr. Dasgupta explained the failures of Abenomics. Some of them are that the real GDP growth declined, consumption rates remained stagnant, the government deficit grew, and labor force participation lowered as structural reforms were never implemented. Dr. Dasgupta explained the ramifications of Abenomics for the Japanese economy, highlighting a fluctuating pattern in comparison to the dollar. This was accompanied by a decline in both productivity and consumption, alongside mild inflation resulting from the aggressive quantitative easing (QE) that bolstered the value of the Yen vis-à-vis the USD. However, with the assumption of Kazuo Ueda as the Governor of the BoJ, the QE was terminated. Consequently, Japan found itself designated as a currency manipulator, rendering it susceptible to potential sanctions. Of note, the US initiated non-cooperation with Japan during the US-Japan-South Korea meeting, emphasising the need for close consultation. He also spoke on the impact on tourism and defense modernisation, stating that Japan has increased its defense modernisation budget, ranking 6th in expenditure. Questions and Comments Scholars at MP-IDSA posed a diverse range of inquiries. Questions were raised about the internal pressure on Japan to strengthen the Yen, the structural changes in the Japanese economy, the potential impact of advancing Chinese technology, the decline of Japanese technology, and the role of the US in reinvigorating the Japanese economy. Dr. Arnab Dasgupta provided insightful answers to the questions. Report was prepared by Mr. Rajnish Kumar, Intern, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre.	East Asia	Japan
Report of Monday Morning Meeting on China’s Nuclear Arsenal: An Assessment	July 08, 2024			Monday Morning Meeting	Mr. Niranjan Oak, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA, made a presentation on “China’s Nuclear Arsenal: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 8 July 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research Associate, MP-IDSA. The scholars of the Institute were in attendance. Executive Summary The growth of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is on account of threat perception coming from the US. China is moving away from a minimum deterrence policy, although the minimum is a subjective term; the sheer number of estimated warheads is huge and is increasing every year. The character of the stockpile is changing, and is getting diversified which in turn is reflected in all three legs of the triad. There is a marked improvement in both conventional and nuclear capabilities in terms of precision, mobility and technology. Detailed Report Before introducing the Speaker, Dr. Rajiv Nayan introduced the topic by providing important background details about the release of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report on the nuclear stockpile in the world. Mr. Niranjan Oak began his presentation by explaining the organisation of the Chinese nuclear force structure. Among the four services of the People’s Liberation Army, PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) is in charge of nuclear and conventional land-based missiles, which in turn is commanded by the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, currently held by President Xi Jinping. Following Xi Jinping’s arrival at the helm of affairs, the name of the Second Artillery Force was changed to PLARF. Subsequently, Mr. Oak explained the expanding capacity of PLARF in terms of its increasing number of bases and brigades, as well as the evolution of China’s land-based missiles, the mainstay of which is the Dongfeng series of missiles. Regarding sea-based missiles, China has fielded six Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Each of these SSBNs can carry up to 12 three-stage solid fuelled JL2 and JL3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM). In addition, China is also developing next-generation Type 096 SSBNs with carrying capacity of up to 24 SLBMs. Mr. Oak also explained China’s aircraft and aircraft delivered missile capabilities, supposedly the weakest link in the Chinese nuclear triad. The H-6N is China’s first nuclear-capable bomber with the capability to be refueled in mid-air. To arm H-6N, China has been developing two new air-launched ballistic missiles. The Chinese bombers can carry CJ-20 air launched cruise missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads. China is said to be developing its first long-range strategic bomber H-20 with an anticipated range of more than 10,000 kilometers and a stealth design. Mr. Oak then touched upon Chinese Hypersonic missile capabilities. There are two types of hypersonic missiles- hypersonic boost glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles. China has been carrying out tests of DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicles since December 2014. It is reported to possess a range of 1600-2400 kilometers. China has deployed a DF-17 medium-range missile system equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles since 2019. According to reports, China has conducted a successful flight test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile DF-27 with hypersonic traits, thus, increasing range and delivery capacity of China. Additionally, China reportedly conducted a test of the Starry Sky 2 Xingkong-2 hypersonic cruise missile. This system is believed to have a range of 700-800 km and a top speed of Mach 6 with a specific feature of wave rider flight vehicle after the launch. Mr. Oak detailed another important military technology, the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). In 2021, China conducted a test of FOBS equipped with a hypersonic boost glide vehicle. Regarding the 2021 revelation of missile silos (through satellite imageries), reports indicates that China has built approximately 350 silos. Considering that China has Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, it can store more than 1000 missiles. As SIPRI data puts it, the Chinese nuclear stockpiles are 500 nuclear warheads. The same report claims that the number of Chinese ICBM's is likely to reach or even exceed the number held either by Russia or US, which is around 400 ICBMs. Subsequently, Mr. Oak talked about the changing Chinese nuclear posture. The emergence and relevance of the Launch on Warning system in Chinese nuclear strategy was explored. The studies by both western and Chinese academia corroborate this development. The Science of Military Strategy 2020 discusses how the US and Russia maintain a state of high alert when it comes to strategic weapons, and therefore, even China should maintain a state of high alert. Mr. Oak, then, elaborated upon the drivers of China’s changing nuclear profile. First and foremost in this category is the US’s improved conventional capability. The collapse of INF Treaty along with development of more advanced missiles like land based Tomahawk missiles and SM-6 missiles is threatening to China. Secondly, a section of experts in China believe that US conventional counter-force capabilities, together with tactical weapons would degrade or even eliminate China’s secure second strike. The third factor is Taiwan. China wants to annex Taiwan, if necessary, by force. Most recently, Xi reiterated his reunification pledge in April 2024. The fourth factor is Great Power status wherein Mr. Oak concluded that China has resources and material wherewithal to go for nuclear modernisation, thus achieving great power status. After describing the drivers of change in China’s nuclear posture, Mr. Oak shared his own assessment. The growth of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is due to the threat perception from the US. China is moving away from the minimum deterrence policy, although minimum is a subjective term; the sheer number of estimated warheads is huge and is increasing every year. The character of the arsenal is changing in all three legs of the triad, and is diversifying. There is a marked improvement in both conventional and nuclear capabilities in terms of precision, mobility and technology. Technological advances are making the PLA develop and deploy hypersonic weapons, MIRVs and FOBS. At the operational level, nuclear forces are on high alert, leading to compressed timelines for decision making. In the end, Mr. Oak explained what the above developments meant for India and what India could do in order to gain a competitive edge. Even if India has numerically fewer nuclear warheads than China, India needs to disperse its nuclear warheads and launchers innovatively throughout the country to survive the first strike. The India-China nuclear dyad has already entered a classic stability-instability paradox. There is less likelihood of nuclear confrontation. But there are increasing chances of conventional confrontation. With nuclear stability at the strategic level; India needs to improve its conventional capabilities. Before opening the floor for questions and comments, Dr. Nayan made pertinent observations with respect to a range of issues related to FOBS, China’s defence modernisation in terms of nuclear advancement, the Chinese ‘no first use’ policy, China-Russia collaboration and growing US-China confrontation essentially pushing up the world’s defence budget. The Report is prepared by Mr. Abhishek Verma, Research Analyst, Internal Security Centre, MP-IDSA.
Lecture by Dr. Samir V. Kamat, DRDO on Technology Vision 2047	July 03, 2024			Eminent Persons' Lecture Series	The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), organised a lecture by Dr. Samir V. Kamat, Secretary, Department of Defence R&D and Chairman, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), under the Eminent Persons Lecture Series on 3 July 2024. The theme of his talk was “Technology Vision 2047”. The event was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute were in attendance. Executive Summary Dr. Samir V. Kamat discussed the transition driven by rapid technological advancements and disruptive technologies that are transforming warfare in the present multipolar world. He highlighted India’s strategic potential to impact the technology landscape and stressed the importance of preparedness for emerging conflicts. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) plays a pivotal role in this, supported by academia and Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). Dr. Kamat outlined progress in various defence sectors, including missile systems, armoured vehicles, and aeronautics, while acknowledging challenges such as semiconductor production and the need for global supply chain integration. He also emphasised initiatives like Atmanirbhar Bharat and Make-in-India to boost self-reliance and technological innovation, with a focus on next-generation platforms and advanced technologies. Despite current R&D spending challenges, efforts are underway to increase private sector involvement and foster a risk-taking culture to drive innovation. Detailed Report The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy delivered his opening remarks by introducing Dr. Samir V. Kamat. Dr. Samir V. Kamat started his lecture by highlighting the significant transformation from a unipolar to a multi-polar world order which is accompanied by an accelerating rate of technological change and the emergence of disruptive technologies, which are reshaping the nature of warfare. Dr. Kamat emphasised that India is strategically positioned to influence the evolving technology landscape, necessitating a focused approach to emerging technological domains. The accelerating rate of evolution of disruptive technologies, particularly in cyber and information domain, are reshaping modern combat, underscoring the need for preparedness before the rise of any major conflicts. The defence research and development (R&D) landscape is primarily driven by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), with significant support from academia and Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). Dr. Kamat highlighted the role of the DRDO and its responsibility to design and development of defence systems, which are subsequently produced by Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) or private industries through Transfer of Technology (ToT) agreements. India’s defence sector encompasses a broad spectrum of systems, including ballistic missiles, armoured vehicles, artillery, small arms, and advancements in aerospace and aeronautics. Significant progress has been made in various technological domains within the defence sector. In missile systems, the development of surface-to-air and cruise missiles, including the Smart Anti-Airfield Weapon (SAAW), alongside advanced anti-tank missile systems and multi-barrel rocket systems, highlight the strides in enhancing defence capabilities. For armoured vehicles and land systems, innovations include the creation of lightweight single-span mountain footbridges (MFB) and 46-meter MLC-70 modular bridges, as well as lightweight advanced infantry floating footbridges and various military bridging systems and land-based platforms In aeronautics, the development of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas Mk-IA has been a key focus, along with DRDO Netra Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AEW&CS). However, challenges remain, particularly in semiconductor device production and the need for investment in critical material processing facilities. Additionally, Dr. Kamat stressed that integrating into the global supply chain is crucial for economic viability and reducing reliance on imports. The infantry weapons segment has seen the development of the JVPC 9mm machine pistol, multi-mode hand grenades, and 40mm Under Barrel Grenade Launcher (UBGL) grenades. Additionally, indigenous replacement programs for existing munitions, including anti-tank and artillery ammunition, are being pursued to enhance self-reliance in defence supplies. In alignment with Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi’s vision of Viksit Bharat 2047 and a leader in defence technology, initiatives such as ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’and ‘Make in India’ are being vigorously pursued. These include enhancing technological capabilities through initiatives like the Defence Production Partner concept and fostering collaboration with industries for design, development, and production. Streamlining technology transfers and modifying policies to alleviate royalty burdens are part of this vision. Efforts to increase capacity through partnerships with educational institutions and promote innovation via contests and funding are underway, with a focus on developing complex systems and disruptive technologies. Dr. Kamat emphasised prioritising next-generation platforms like advanced combat aircraft, high-endurance autonomous underwater vehicles, and future-ready combat vehicles, along with next-gen weapons and sensors such as long-range precision strike capabilities, laser and microwave weapons, and advanced propulsion technologies. Balancing speed and accuracy in new technologies and emphasising space and satellite technologies for defence are key future challenges and opportunities. Overall, the lecture outlined India’s strategic direction in defence technology, highlighting achievements, challenges, and plans for innovation, collaboration, and capacity building. Dr. Kamat mentioned that significant progress has been made in various technological domains, including the development of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and electric propulsion system for ships. Efforts are also focused on enhancing underwater domain awareness and networked systems to bolster maritime security. In addition, there is a concerted push towards improving space situational awareness and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), with particular emphasis on space-based ISR capabilities. Cyber capabilities and secure communication technologies, such as quantum communication, are also being prioritised. Key areas of focus in research and development include Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML), quantum technologies encompassing communication, sensing, and computing, as well as cognitive and anti-stealth technologies. Efforts are also being directed towards hypersonic missile defence and directed energy weapons, alongside advancements in materials and manufacturing processes, including post-quantum cryptography. He further stated that initiatives have been undertaken to establish laboratories for young scientists to foster innovation within a start-up culture. This includes collaboration with academia and industry to develop cutting-edge technologies. Additionally, the establishment of industry-academia centres of excellence aim to advance domain-specific technologies. Projects within these centres are reaching maturity and transitioning to the industry, positioning them for market readiness. A notable achievement has been the significant reduction in the weight of bulletproof jackets while maintaining their protective capabilities. In addition of this, new facilities are being developed for testing hypersonic vehicles, drones, and other advanced systems, ensuring comprehensive evaluation and refinement of these technologies. Despite challenges such as low research and development (R&D) spending (currently at 0.65 percent of GDP) compared to other countries, strategies are being implemented to increase private sector involvement in R&D. There is also a push to cultivate a risk-taking mindset to drive innovation and establish leadership in technology. However, for the private sector to effectively engage in risk-taking, improved government policies are necessary and at present, there is a strong emphasis on shifting mindsets to embrace and learn from failures. While challenges exist, there is an optimistic outlook towards achieving the set goals through the right strategies and support mechanisms. Questions and Comments The main questions posed addressed various aspects of advancing India’s defence sector. Key areas included enhancing education in defence laboratories for better implementation of advanced techniques and identifying primary focus areas for disruption in defence technology, including understanding adversaries’ capabilities. Strategies for becoming a leading defence exporter, like emulating successful countries, were discussed, along with measures to boost private sector participation and fostering investment. Emphasis was placed on offering high-quality or cost-effective solutions, driving innovation, and necessary mindset changes to lead in defence technology. Strategic planning to meet demands, build global competitiveness, and improve collaborations was deemed essential. Also that, leveraging India’s economic status for global defence positioning and focusing on potential disruptions in defence technologies are crucial. Further, enhancing geopolitical influence to boost exports, addressing current production gaps, and improving private sector participation were emphasised. In his concluding remarks, Dr. Samir V. Kamat spoke on issues surrounding hypersonic technology and its distinct challenges. While hypersonic glide vehicles are relatively easier to intercept due to their predictable trajectory, hypersonic cruise missiles, capable of manoeuvrability, pose a greater threat. In the realm of manufacturing, 3D printing is advancing rapidly, with a focus on metal powders, though limitations in component size persist. He also stated that biotechnology, primarily applied to biodefence, has limited relevance in this context. Engine technology has seen improvements with single crystal turbine blades, but integration challenges remain. According to Dr. Kamat, material science necessitates advanced materials for enhanced performance, requiring collaborative efforts. Dr. Kamat emphasised that government support is essential for managing the inherent risks of emerging technologies and fostering innovation within the expanding startup ecosystem. The discussion highlighted the need to advance domestic defence capabilities and emphasised the need to develop advanced platforms, encourage innovation, and increase private sector participation in defence research and development despite current challenges. The report has been prepared by Dr. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed, Research Analyst, Defence Economics and Industry Centre, MP-IDSA.	North America & Strategic Technologies	Defence Technology, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)

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