Events

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a lecture by H.E. Ambassador Freddy Svane, Ambassador of Denmark to India under the Eminent Persons Lecture Series on “Growing India-Denmark Ties” on 29 May 2024. The interaction was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and attended by the Institute’s scholars.

Executive Summary

The event provided a comprehensive overview of the India-Denmark Green Strategic Partnership. It delved into bilateral ties of the two nations while also analysing the future prospects to further develop this strategic partnership. Ambassador Sujan Chinoy highlighted his shared diplomatic experiences with Ambassador Freddy Svane in Japan and India. He praised Amb. Svane's understanding of India and India’s partnership with Denmark, emphasising the significance of their bilateral ties. Amb. Svane discussed the historical relations between India and Denmark, the 75-year milestone of their partnership, and the importance of strategic autonomy for India. He elaborated on the 5Ss of their partnership: scale, skills, strength, speed, and sustainability, also mentioning the potential for collaboration in areas beyond the green partnership, such as defense and the Arctic. He also highlighted Denmark's defense posture post-Russia-Ukraine crises and expressed willingness to collaborate with India. The Q&A session covered aspects including Denmark's wind energy sector, defence collaboration, the Russia-Ukraine crises, possibility of limestone trade, deep-sea fishing, and the future of data, minerals, and green transitions.

Detailed Report

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA delivered the opening remarks. He began by welcoming Ambassador Freddy Svane to MP-IDSA and fondly recalled their common tenure in Tokyo from 2015-2018 as Ambassador of India to Japan and Ambassador of Denmark to Japan, respectively. Amb. Svane is the only ambassador to have held two tenures as Danish Ambassador to India (2010-2015 and 2019- current) as well as to Japan (2005-2008 and 2015-2019). Amb. Chinoy spoke about Amb Svane’s familiarity with India. He mentioned Indian Prime Minister Modi’s 3S formula and said that skill, scale and speed should define India- Denmark relations.

Amb. Chinoy also highlighted the improvement witnessed in India- Denmark bilateral relations in recent years and requested him to share his views on bilateral ties, Green Strategic Partnership, and emerging scenarios in the Arctic region amongst others. He said that the Green Strategic Partnership has emerged as a crucial aspect in India- Denmark relations and this has been evident from various high level visits in the recent past. The trade and investment statistics seem to suggest that the full potential has yet to be realised. He expressed hope that this would pick up pace in coming times. With this he invited Amb. Svane to deliver the lecture.

 H.E. Amb. Freddy Svane commenced the lecture by mentioning the biggest diplomatic victory- the India Denmark Green Strategic Partnership. He quoted Denmark’s current demographic figures and the advent of Danish people 400 years ago to what is now called Tamil Nadu in November 1620 as traders, not colonisers. He mentioned the historical fabric trade between the two regions and a recent event in Denmark to commemorate that. In 2024 India-Danish partnership has reached the milestone of 75 years, which had started with building strategies to manage trade ties with India.

Amb. Svane recalled his last posting in India when he was invited by a private company to inaugurate an industrial plant in Gujarat and how he met the then Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi in 2011. He credits that particular bilateral meeting as the starting point of India’s green partnership with Denmark. He also highlighted the west’s pattern of dictating to other countries what to do but reiterated that Denmark has no such intentions vis-a-vis India or the west. It does not want to teach or preach to others. He mentioned the increasing investments coming to India and that India is not only the largest market in terms of size but also a democratic country with its own rights and sovereignty. Giving the Danish perspective Amb. Svane said that it is best if India exercises its strategic autonomy rather than join a specific camp and tow that line.

Amb. Svane underscored that the green strategic partnership is based on the 5Ss of scale, skills, strength, speed and sustainability. India has the Scale which is reflected in its capacity and capability; Denmark has the necessary technological Skills; Strength of this partnership comes from affordability and resilience, which are unique to the Indian developmental agenda; Speed is required in achieving the goals laid out for climate change and SDGs; and lastly, Sustainability is crucial, which is why Copenhagen would be willing for joint collaborations beyond the green partnership to include sectors like defence, Arctic and critical minerals. Science is the sixth S which will be added in the next meeting as innovation is the key to Indo-Danish relations.

Amb Svane mentioned what comprises the Kingdom of Denmark- Denmark, Greenland, and Faroe Islands- where foreign policy and defence is managed by the capital seat in Copenhagen. Greenland is approximately ¾ the size of the Indian subcontinent but inhabits a small population of around 60 thousand. It caught global attention when the vast ice sheets across the island began to melt, giving rise to unexplored reserves of resources, critical minerals, and trade routes. Since Denmark is a founding member of the Arctic Council, its vision is greatly defined by the values dear to Danish people. Amb. Svane went on to mention the critical role played by Denmark in ensuring India’s addition as an observer state to the Arctic Council in 2013 and how the then Deputy NSA of India discussed India’s arctic vision with him. The conversation revolved around resources and critical minerals found in Greenland but India was very much interested in scientific engagement at that time.  It was involved in ice cold drilling, R&D and other procedures. Amb. Svane emphasised that Denmark wants to give India as much role in Arctic as possible owing to the reality of climate change.

On the defence front Amb. Svane recognised that historically Denmark has fought many wars and lost them all. Post cold war, it chose to close down the military installation in Greenland. The naval base there was put up for auction and its biggest bidder was an Australian company. This was very surprising as Australia is geographically distant from Greenland but it was later discovered that this firm had some Chinese connections. Similarly, Chinese involvement has recently increased in tenders for building airports and critical infrastructure too.

Concluding his remarks, Amb. Svane commented on Indian interests in Denmark, which are evident from several visits of its new Ambassador to Greenland and Faroe Islands. Deep sea fishing and mining are significant issues that India has to deal with. As of now there are no fish left in the strait separating India from Sri Lanka. Denmark has the required technology for it and Faroe Islands have the experience of dealing with issues like deep sea fishing. Cooperation in such fields could prove useful for both the parties. Democratic dialogue in India is strong. There is no yardstick to measure democracy but each country has its own set of issues and situations.

Q&A Session

Amb. Chinoy thanked Amb. Svane for his insightful remarks and opened the floor for questions. Scholars of MP-IDSA asked diverse questions ranging from Denmark’s promising wind energy sector, India-Denmark defence collaboration, the Ambassador’s views on Russia-Ukraine crises, high limestone reserves in Denmark and its possible trade with trade, and the kind of collaboration possible with India over deep sea fishing.

Amb. Svane answered the questions, commencing with the one on renewable energy. He mentioned the oil crises of 1970s and how the governments were left to fend for alternate sources of energy. Denmark had researchers and scientists working on the R&D needed for this. Denmark had the first mover’s advantage amongst the European nations, especially in wind energy. Today 75 per cent of its electricity comes from renewables. For the critical minerals required in wind turbines, Denmark relies on China, which is known for mining and processing these critical minerals. The current Danish Government having stopped mining as it is environmentally degrading, leaves the question of mineral procurement unanswered. What can be done to access certain minerals if their mining is under the monopoly of one country?  In fact, in India too most of the work related to wind turbines is being done by China and not surprisingly these installations are mostly India’s near critical infrastructure. Last 7 GW of commissioned turbines were given to Chinese companies. What most people do not realise is that those managing the software in these systems also have access to the data that the software constantly collects. This is one of the reasons why US has become vary of China’s inroads in the cyber and technology sector and has put in place certain legislations to minimise that damage.

Answering the question on defence procurement, Amb. Svane said that Denmark is re-arming itself post the Russia Ukraine crises, in accordance to the NATO norms. It would be great to collaborate with allies like India in this regard. Copenhagen is open to all kinds of possibilities to re-build its defence industry. With regard to Russia-Ukraine crises, Amb. Svane reiterated that he does not want to preach or teach anybody. He mentioned that Denmark is sending F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine alongside helping them out in aid and other matters. India’s stand on the crises was a tough one for Amb. Svane to explain to the west but he referred to the 1962 India - China war when India was left to fend for itself as no help from the west arrived when India needed it. According to Amb. Svane, Denmark understands the reasons for Indian dependence on Russian arms and ammunitions and would be happy to help India diversify in this sector. He even praised the recent increase in India-Russia oil trade and how this helped keep market prices of oil under control. The real threat recognised in the region was China. If India could somehow keep China under control, Denmark would do all that it can to help India diversify its supply chains which are currently dependent on China.

Concluding the Q&A round, Amb. Svane responded to the query on limestone trade by mentioning that the top most traded item from Europe to India is waste. It is indeed a sad state of affairs that India buys tonnes of scrap metal and e-waste from Europe but if this can be replaced by other items including limestone, that would be beneficial for both the parties. Lastly the issue of deep sea fishing was addressed. The Danish Ambassador said that Faroe Islands have proven capabilities and knowledge on this matter as well as on the issue of deep sea mining. The future is about data, minerals and green transitions, all of which are sensitive aspects of critical development, especially for certain sectors like defence, cyber, and IT amongst others.

After concluding the Q&A session, Amb Chinoy thanked H.E. Amb. Freddy Svane, Ambassador of Denmark to India and the audience for a fruitful engagement.

Report has been prepared by Ms. Anandita Bhada, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Dr. Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), made a presentation on “Alignments and Realignments in Armenian Foreign Policy since the Velvet Revolution” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 3 June 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Rajorshi Roy, Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director-General, MP-IDSA and other scholars of the Institute attended the session.

Executive Summary

The global arena is in flux due to the conflicts across the Middle East, Europe, and the Caucasus, creating widespread instability. This has revived great power competition and fostered realignments between global and regional actors. The same can be seen in the Eurasian region with the – Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. Owing to these developments, in recent years, Armenia has contemplated various options for alignments and realignments in its foreign policy.

Detailed Report

Dr. Rajorshi Roy, in his opening remarks, provided an overview of the 2018 Velvet Revolution in Armenia, which saw widespread protest against the government, leading to the overthrow of the then President turned Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan and the coming of the current Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan. However, Pashinyan today, faces increasing scrutiny and criticism for his policy decisions taken regarding Armenia’s shared border with Azerbaijan. Dr. Roy stressed the importance of Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia’s history and the formation of its national identity. In the last year, Armenia has lost the entirety of the Nagorno-Karabakh region to Azerbaijan. This has given rise to massive criticisms and protests in Armenia against Pashinyan domestic policies. The ongoing geostrategic contestations in Eurasia have led to new alignments and realignments, Armenia being no exception. It has sought to strengthen its strategic autonomy and multi-vector policy by engaging with regional and extra-regional powers beyond Russia and China.
Dr. Jason Wahlang commenced his presentation giving a brief overview of the recent conflicts in the Eurasian region, namely the Ukrainian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, and how these developments have led countries recalibrating and recalculating their alliances with regional powerhouses, attracting attention from various global powers and organisations. In recent years, Armenia has undergone a profound political transformation – transforming from a presidential system to a parliamentary one. This monumental change, saw former President Serzh Sargsyan assume the role of the Prime Minister leading to widespread protests within Armenia. These protests were led by various civil society groups and the then–opposition member and journalist, Nikol Pashinyan – who later became the Prime Minister. This domestic shift in political leadership, coupled with regional defeats to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from 2020 onwards, has prompted a reassessment of Armenia’s security and foreign policy architecture, underscoring the magnitude of the transition and its implications.

Regarding Armenia’s foreign policy Dr. Wahlang noted, that like most post-Soviet spaces, Armenia follows a multi-vector foreign policy known as the “complementarianism” foreign policy. This complementarianism necessitates pursuing a multi-vector policy, equilibrium-seeking diplomacy, and balancing ties with all regional and international stakeholders. This policy helps Armenia emphasise its partnerships not just with the West but also with Iran and India, while maintaining strong relations with Russia.

Dr. Wahlang emphasised that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been omnipresent in regional geopolitics since the final years of the Soviet Union. Post the Soviet collapse it became a constant deterrent to permanent peace in the region and is deeply connected to Armenia’s foreign policy as well. This influence is visible in Armenia’s policy with its neighbours Azerbaijan and Türkiye, and with regional powers like Russia and European powers like France, and vice versa. One prominent example can be France's recent recognition of the Republic of Artsakh (the Armenian name of Nagorno-Karabakh). The policy has shifted with the current dispensation under Nikol Pashinyan and the recent defeats, especially with the leadership’s attempts to find perpetual peace.

According to Dr. Wahlang, the Armenian diaspora plays an important role in its foreign policy, apart from playing a crucial role in the Armenian quest for genocide recognition. Their presence in major countries such as Russia, France, the USA, and India has been able to push some of the agenda of the Armenian state and also better relations with Yerevan.  One such example is the role of pressure groups such as the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) and Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), present in the United States and France, and how they help shape good relations of the countries with Armenia.
Dr. Wahlang noted that the current leadership’s attempts to find a long-term solution to peace, particularly by delimitating the border, have not been received positively by the Armenian public. Protests against the regime in Armenia have been linked to the government's foreign and neighbourhood policy, i.e., Azerbaijan. The local populace within Armenia is active and has coordinated protests in the past regarding Armenia’s policies, particularly on Azerbaijan. Thus, the domestic situation does relate to foreign policy and impacts the popularity of the leadership.

Dr. Jason further explained Armenia’s foreign policy in four phases. First, the “Rise of Un-Sovietised Nationalistic Foreign Policy after 1991”, under President Levon Ter Petrosyan. This policy was based on the first war of Nagorno-Karabakh, wherein the leadership tried to establish Armenia’s own image by shedding its former Soviet image. However, it still maintained strong relations with Russia. The second phase focused on “Shift in the Nature of Foreign Policy towards Multi-Vectorism”, under President Robert Kocharyan. During this time, there were attempts to create a feeling of diversification which also included trying to improve relations with European nations. The third phase saw “Disconnect between European Aspirations and Security-driven Russian/Eurasian Constraints”, under President Serzh Sargsyan. During this phase Armenia joined Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) instead of furthering improved relations with Europe. The fourth phase is “Diversification due to Rising Geopolitical and Regional Complexities”, under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Under his leadership, Armenia tries to engage with countries of the West, and countries like Iran and India.

Focusing on current developments within the Armenian State, Dr. Jason stated that the current protests against Armenia’s political leadership led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan have gained great prominence. According to Dr. Wahlang, the domestic populace has been more active in this protest as compared to the previous demonstrations. This is because the delimitation process would transfer territory from Armenia to Azerbaijan and is being seen as a compromise on Armenian sovereignty. The Armenian leadership, on the other hand, is attempting to find a solution for perpetual peace in the region. The main effort is based on the Armenian leadership's focus on the Crossroads of Peace Project, which aims to connect the neighbourhood through various connectivity projects and, in return, bring about peace in the region.

As mentioned before, Armenia is trying to diversify its relations with various major powers. Dr. Jason highlighted that the Armenia-Russia relationship is based on three key sectors – security, economy, and natural resources. Russia is the security provider and the main arms importer of Armenia and has long been Armenia’s principal supplier of weapons and ammunition. In recent times, due to Russia’s pre-occupation in Ukraine, there have been certain issues, like Russia’s inability to meet the demands for the supply of arms. Moreover, the presence of the 102nd military base in Gyumri and the presence of Russian troops protecting the borders near adversarial neighbours such as Türkiye and Azerbaijan show the relevance and importance of the security and military aspects in this relationship. Dr. Wahlang pointed out that both nations are economically linked, with about 40 per cent of the Armenian economy being dependent on Russia.       Moreover, Russia dominates the gas distribution outlets in Armenia, with Gazprom Armenia owning all the gas distribution infrastructure. Russia also has a monopoly over grain and petroleum products. In 2023, the trade volume between the two nations reached a record high of USD 4.16 billion, the highest since the Soviet collapse.

However, the two former Soviet Republics’ leaderships have been at loggerheads with one another since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, with the Armenians accusing Russia of not supporting and not providing assistance to them. This clash is due to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation’s (CSTO’s) inability to involve itself in both Nagorno-Karabakh and when Armenian territory was under threat. This has led to Armenia suspending its participation in CSTO and even threatening to leave the organisation altogether. Despite these disagreements, the two leaders have maintained contact and made attempts to bring about solutions.

Dr. Wahlang noted that the European Union (EU) has sought to increase its presence and carve a space of its own in Armenia. There have been significant attempts to strengthen this partnership, like Armenia joining the European Union Eastern Partnership and the signing of the Armenia–EU Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017. There have also been discussions in Armenia about joining the EU, particularly after the War in Karabakh, but these discussions have not moved forward. He also highlighted that the EU is Armenia's second-largest trade partner after Russia. Moreover, in the recent conflict with Azerbaijan, the EU has been proactively trying to forge a peaceful solution. These steps have been seen positively by Armenia.

With regard to Armenia’s relations with France, Dr. Wahlang pointed out that France has been Armenia's second-largest foreign investor since 2016, totalling €229 million. Its investments are primarily in agri-food, water and banking sectors. In recent times, this relationship has been further strengthened by the growing defence cooperation, which includes the sale of air defence systems, radars and sensors. Apart from Defence, Armenia has gained support from France in Nagorno-Karabakh, including aid for looking after the refugees.

Emphasising Armenia's relationship with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, Dr. Wahlang noted that they have a history of conflicts and discontent. Türkiye’s constant and unwavering support for Azerbaijan since the start of the first Nagorno-Karabakh conflict till current times has been seen as further evidence of Armenia's anti-Türkiye stance. Moreover, Türkiye’s military and drone support for Azerbaijan became a decisive factor in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. There has, however, been a change in approach, with attempts at peace-building, including the opening of the Armenian-Türkiye border after thirty years to supply aid to Türkiye during a major earthquake in 2023. The new leadership in Armenia under Pashinyan is attempting to find permanent peace in the region through new avenues of diplomacy and connectivity.

According to Dr. Wahlang, Armenia and Iran are important allies, with both sharing a border and common interests and threats. Iran is important for Armenia in connectivity projects, including assisting and cooperating with India. Armenia, Iran and India have also recently met for trilateral cooperation. Given Armenia’s landlocked status, its terminal in Chabahar Port could help assist Armenia in connecting with the world. He emphasised that with Armenia attempting to diversify its foreign policy and resource allocation, Iran can be a good option. However, Iran's fractured relationship with the West and Armenia's diversification attempts towards the West could become a stumbling block for long-term cooperation.

With regard to Armenia-India relations, Dr. Wahlang stated that the two nations share a historical relationship, with trade being the base for it in the past. Armenia has also long supported India's territorial integrity and sovereignty on the issue of Kashmir. The two nations share a robust defence relationship as well. In recent years, India has decided to appoint its own defence attaché to Yerevan. When it comes to defence trade, India has exported the Swathi weapon-locating radar system and Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, as well as anti-tank munitions and artillery guns. Additionally, the two nations have scope for cooperation in the field of Information Technology and pharmaceuticals.  The only deterrent in the relationship is the lack of connectivity.

Lastly, Dr. Wahlang concluded his presentation by emphasising that Russia is still a prominent player in the region, and it may view the Armenian attempts at diversification towards Europe negatively. He also stressed that considering the gains to both sides, India could emerge as a long-term partner to Armenia.

Comments and Questions

Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, complimented Dr. Wahlang on his comprehensive presentation highlighting the complexity surrounding Armenia’s geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic situation. He pointed out that this is the first time in the history of Azerbaijan that all the territories historically claimed by them are under their control. He stressed that Armenia finds itself in a dilemma as its traditional supporter, Russia, is not able to do much. This raises concerns about Armenia exploring other options and the obstacles involved in it. Regarding relations of Iran and Türkiye, Amb. Chinoy stressed on their influence in the region. He also mentioned the memorial for the Armenian Massacre in Isfahan, highlighting Iran’s sympathy for the Armenians. He noted that it is important to look at Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel and the US, predicated on oil and gas pipelines, and their traditional relations with Türkiye.

Dr. Swasti Rao, enquired about Russia’s weapons supply to Azerbaijan, value of connectivity with countries like Georgia and how Azerbaijan could impact the future of India-Armenia relations.

Gp Capt. (Dr.) RK Narang (Retd.), enquired about the payment process of the weapons trade between India and Armenia.

Dr. Wahlang responded to the comments made by the Director General and the questions raised by MP-IDSA scholars.

Report has been prepared by Ms. Anusua Ganguly, Intern, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA.

On 22 May 2024, the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a lecture by His Excellency Dr. Philipp Ackermann, Ambassador of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, under the Eminent Persons Lecture Series. The topic of the lecture was “Challenges in Europe and Indo-German Partnership”. The event was chaired by the Director General, Ambassador Sujan R Chinoy.

Executive Summary

The conflict in Ukraine has impacted the European continent including Germany. Germany has attempted to diversify its partners, which has ensured a reduction of its dependence on Russia. When it comes to India, Germany's relationship with India has gained prominence, and it will continue to grow in the long term.

Detailed Report

The session began with the opening remarks from the Director General, MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy who underscored the pivotal role of Germany as a critical player in the European Union and one of India’s most important strategic partners. He highlighted the various high-level dialogues that have taken place, including the visits of India’s Prime Minister to Germany in 2022 and the German Chancellor's reciprocal visit in 2023, which have significantly bolstered bilateral ties. There has been a rise in trade and investment between the two nations. Germany's foreign policy towards China was mentioned with a particular focus on the term de-risking, which is the recent focal point of the policy regarding China in Europe. Amb. Chinoy said that Germany is concerned about issues such as climate change, and illegal immigration and asked about the perspectives of the various political parties and ideologies.

Ambassador Dr. Philipp Ackermann began his talk by proposing that he would present a few key messages and five points regarding the topic. The first key point is that Europe faces challenges but in the last couple of years has shown resolve to overcome them. On the migration challenge, he stated that Europe is very popular among migrants, and migration is encouraged, but illegal migration from various nations is an issue. This has led to certain insecurities and ensured that a rise of the far right has become possible, which would be visible in the results of the upcoming European elections. Germany has an ageing population, so there is a need for migration. Germany has also signed a migration partnership with India and with the consent of the state and centre, is recruiting skilled labour for Germany from India. He emphasised the need to legalise and channel legal migration while ensuring that illegal migration is brought down.

The second challenge is the economic shock Germany suffered in the last two years due to the war in Europe. This support has been costly but it is a price that needs to be paid to support Ukraine. Ukraine is close to Germany, and the war has changed the texture of the European security structure and affected the cohesion of the European Union. Germany thought that any security structure in Europe could not be possible without Russia. Various avenues have been set up to deal with Russia, including the Russia-NATO Council. Russia's reactions at present and its approach in 2014 have changed the mindset within Europe, and now the focus is on building a resilient security structure against Russia. The main reason for this is to ensure that Russia does not invade any other countries in Europe. Russia has a clear appetite to have more territory.

The second key point of concern is the Russia-Ukraine war. If Russia is not shown the limits of its actions, it will continue. Russian President Vladimir Putin has an expansionist mentality. NATO's eastern front is not very strong and its deeper integration into the larger security structure is required to prevent any other aggression. Putin has miscalculated the unity of Europe, and Ukraine cannot be left alone, and its territory allowed to be taken away by Russia. The war has impacted the world, particularly in the energy sector. Germany paid the price since 50 per cent of its gas came from Russia, but now, after diversification, no gas comes from Russia.  India has felt the impact of the war on various sectors, including fertilisers, gas, and oil.

The third key point is the India-Germany Partnership. India has gained a new weight in Germany’s foreign policy. India’s position is much higher, and the German Government has seen a need for like-minded partners. India's democratic ethos and non-expansionist character are similar to what Germany feels. India and Germany have a sound strategic partnership, and the two nations can focus on all the areas of cooperation. Certain avenues include start-ups, academic research, and energy (hydrogen); the governments also want to intensify this cooperation. The inter-governmental consultations, which will happen in October 2024, would further strengthen the collaboration. Germany and India have cooperated in the sustainability of smart cities, biodiversity and trade. Already there are 2200 Indo-German companies who have invested in both the countries and there is hope for more investments.

The fourth key point is based on defence cooperation. There has been evident growth and a step forward in this area. Progress has been made in delivering military equipment, systems, arms, and supplying of aircraft. Joint exercises, capacity building, and information sharing have increased. In August 2024, for the first time, fighter jets would be sent by Germany to participate in Tarang Shakti Phase 1 exercise in Coimbatore. In October 2024, a German frigate would come to Goa and exercise with the Indian Navy. The two defence ministries share a strong relationship. This was underscored by the visit of the German Defence Minister in June 2023 and the signing of various tenders during that visit.

The fifth key point is focused on the Indian Ocean. Protecting international borders and oceans for free navigation is essential. We must keep the lines of communication in the open seas as safe as possible. Germany wants to promote a rules-based order protecting free and open trade. Germany and India can try to minimise the security challenges in the Indian Ocean together. China’s aggressive behaviour in the Indian Ocean concerns how China is attempting to expand its influence. For Germany, China is a partner and a competitor; when it comes to politics, it is considered a systemic rival.

Questions and Comments

Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy inquired about Chinese Influence Operations in Europe, including Germany. Secondly, he asked whether Germany sees China as a long-term or immediate threat? Lastly, he asked whether Germany's understanding of the rules-based order collides with their experience with China’s approach to a rules based order.

Ambassador Dr. Phillip Ackermann replied that China has firmly pushed its policy in academic institutions in recent years. This is done to shape and form an understanding of how China functions. In the case of a policymaker influenced by China, he gave an example of an individual who was a Chief of Staff of a Member of Parliament. Therefore, it shows how strongly China has influenced decision-making and policy-making. When it comes to cyberspace, the Russians participate more actively. For Germany, China and Russia are a threat as influence operators.

Dr. Swasti Rao asked if Germany believes in a de-risking policy vis-a-vis China and, if so, what steps should be taken. The Speaker answered that de-risking means encouraging and recommending the private sectors to de-risk. Germany cannot force them to not go to China; this was done with Russia, but it was easier since Russia is not an important economy. German companies have diversified and have begun focusing on the Asian arena, including India. Many German companies want to set up shop in India. German companies see India more as a brain than a muscle; therefore, the focus is more on investing in Rand D, technology and development sector.

Grp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele asked about German investments in the technology and space arena.

The Speaker emphasised that Germany is lagging behind in space, and the French are ahead. India needs to cooperate in this sector.

Dr. Rajorshi Roy asked about the European assessments of a scenario of a defeated Russia and its impact on regional security and stability.

The Speaker focused on the possibility that a period of frozen conflict would arise if the war did end, and he felt it wouldn't end very soon. They would still need to deal with Russia. Russia did attack a sovereign country, and Russia did take 20 per cent of the land; this act cannot be accepted. The history of the First World War shows that humiliation was not a good option for better relations after the war ended. The priority is to support Ukraine in its legitimate fight to protect its territorial integrity.  

Ms. Anandita Bhada enquired about how Germany plans to reduce dependence on China in the renewable energy sector. Secondly, with Germany's attempts at energy diversification, whether Germany is looking at other energy partnerships soon?

The Speaker answered that we are much more diversified in the energy sector in the current period, and Germany is not dependent only on one source of energy. Germany gets its gas from Norway, the Gulf, etc. It has become a mixed basket.

Dr. Jason Wahlang asked how Germany sees the rise of the right-wing in the European Parliament. Secondly, how much influence does the Alternative for Germany party have in the Western side of Germany when it comes to immigration debates?

The Speaker stated that there will be a rise of right-wing parties in the European Parliament for many reasons. The far right is not as powerful as it seems; its percentage is about 15-16 percent. On the immigration question, Germany does not think immigration is a bad thing; they do not want illegal immigration. Twenty percent of German individuals have at least one non-German parent.

Dr. Rajiv Nayan enquired about the different perceptions of terrorism in India and Europe.

On the topic of terrorism, the Speaker explained that India has its own experience and Germany has its own. In this globalised world, there is a need to compare whether, for example, the Khalistan issue is taken more seriously only in India or other nations as well. Intelligence sharing is important, and there is a need to find ways to cooperate.

Ms. Shruti Pandalai asked whether China's relationship with Germany limits its national policy in the Indo-Pacific. Secondly, how could a change in the White House's leadership impact the future of the Trans-Atlantic alliance?

The Speaker opined that Germany was considered the least popular country in Europe in the first tenure of the Trump leadership. With any change in leadership in the United States of America, Germany would still find a way to work and function with this relationship.

Dr. Prashant Singh enquired about the perceived disunity between the United States and Europe regarding trade and investment with China.

The Speaker stated that Europe and Germany are wholly localised economies compared to the United States of America. It would appear that the de-risking has reduced German engagement with China.

Captain Sunil Tyagi, Centre for Air Power Studies, asked whether Russia would shift its attention to Georgia and Moldova after the Ukraine War.

Ambassador Dr. Philip Ackerman stated that Russia has, in a way, played with Georgia and Moldova. He feels that both countries can be seen as candidates for membership in the European Union, but their conflicts are very different.

The report has been prepared by Dr. Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA.

Ms. Sneha M, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar IDSA (MP-IDSA), made a presentation on “Understanding Nepal’s Coalition Shift: Implications for Domestic Governance and India’s Interests” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 6 May 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Ashok Behuria, Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

Dr. Ashok Behuria, in his opening remarks, provided a brief and insightful overview of Nepal’s political landscape, highlighting the frequent changes in the administration and the challenges leading to the failure of the previous coalition governments. He discussed Nepal’s two electoral methods - First Past the Post (FPTP) and Proportional Representation (PR) system. After giving a short overview of the 2022 Parliamentary Elections, he noted that no government has ever lasted in power for a full term, which indicates the instability in the Nepalese political system. He drew attention to the diversity in Nepal with almost 135 spoken languages and high representation level of Members of Parliament (MPs), with one MP representing a population of only one lakh. He further highlighted that with the increase in bilateral engagements between China and Nepal, there are concerns regarding China’s growing influence in the region.

Detailed Report

Ms. Sneha M. commenced her presentation with a comprehensive overview of Nepal’s tumultuous political history, marred by divisions in the successive governments. She traced Nepal’s trajectory towards democracy from the time of Absolute Monarchy in 1846 to the adoption of a new constitution in 2015, highlighting significant events such as the Partyless Panchayat system in 1960 and emergence of multiparty democracy in 1990. She highlighted the challenges posed by the emergence of the Maoist insurgency in 1996 which was largely driven by grievances related to poverty, inequality and corruption, and the subsequent transition to a Federal Democratic Republic in 2006-2008.

While giving an overview of the 2022 Parliamentary Elections, Ms. Sneha noted that the Nepali Congress (NC) emerged as the single largest party. Due to differences among leaders for the post of Prime Minister, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, popularly known as “Prachanda”, of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-MC) broke the coalition and joined hands with the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) resulting in him becoming the Prime Minister. However, the coalition collapsed within two months, causing further instability in the country. Ms. Sneha pointed out the political shift in March 2024, when Prachanda formed a new coalition with “CPN-UML”, Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) and Janata Samajwadi Party (JSP) after terminating the alliance with the Nepali Congress. She also noted that a country with such a small population of almost 3 crores, has 109 registered political parties due to the ease of securing just 3 per cent of the total vote share to achieve a PR seat  and become a national party.

Throwing light on the instability in the government alliances, she assessed some key factors which led to the fall of the coalition including clash of opinions between Prime Minister Dahal and NC Finance Minister, Prakash Sharan Mahat, personal interests of leaders, and external pressures. She emphasised how the coalition dynamics have been impacted by Nepal’s complex electoral system and the proliferation of political parties. She also analysed the implications on domestic governance, citing Nepal’s GDP growth having an average of about 4.2 per cent since 2008 which falls short of 7 per cent to qualify as an emerging economy. She elaborated on the escalation of the trade deficit from 14 per cent to over 50 per cent of the GDP since 2008. As a result, she observed that a significant number of young people have been departing the country in search of better opportunities abroad, citing the limited job prospects within Nepal.

Assessing implications for India, Ms. Sneha acknowledged the robust ties between the two countries across economic, security, cultural and strategic domains. India has always engaged with Nepal over mutual interest irrespective of the party in power. She emphasised that China would any day prefer a left party rule in Nepal for its own political benefits. Highlighting recent developments, she emphasised that Nepal's balance is shifting towards China, which is evident in the increased bilateral exchanges and investments.

Furthermore, she stated that the inclination of the current administration towards China is unlikely to impact the bilateral relationship between Kathmandu and New Delhi given that India is still the largest trade partner of Nepal, comprising two-third of Nepal’s merchandise trade and about one-third of trade in services. India is also the largest source of foreign investments in Nepal. However, she analysed that India might lose smooth cooperation with Nepal and experience delays in implementation of projects that India has invested in and funded, in the near future.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, commended Ms. Sneha for her comprehensive and engaging presentation. He pointed out the significance of the India-Nepal relationship and emphasised on adopting a strategy of aligning with Nepal on issues of mutual interests. Amb. Chinoy stated that allowing local dynamics to shape Nepal’s domestic politics is a better approach for India.  However, he recognised the importance of closely observing regional developments and responding appropriately, as porous borders might be exploited by adversaries to undermine India’s security landscape.

Scholars raised pertinent points such as Nepal's decision to print NPR 100 currency incorporating disputed territories and how it impacts Indo-Nepal relations, the relevance of anti-Indian sentiments propagated by political parties, the role of culture in International Relations. Additionally, concerns related to Nepal’s reconciliation with India’s Agniveer Scheme and the recruitment of Nepalese in the Gorkha regiment were also raised. Commenting on the same, Amb. Chinoy stated that there are enough Indian Gorkhas who could be recruited to continue the legacy of the Gorkha regiment.

Ms. Sneha M. responded to the comments made by the Director General and the questions raised by MP-IDSA scholars.