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Exploring the Roots of India's Strategic Culture October 05, 2017 Conference

Concept Note

Despite a debate about its relevance, strategic culture has become a commonly used and acknowledged term in the sense of a “shaping context” for strategic behaviour. The sources of the strategic culture of a nation-state are its geography, history, national culture, politics, economics, technology, etc. The nation-states may have distinct strategic cultures pertaining to the differences in the material and ideational dimensions of these factors. However, strategy is essentially linked with national policy and goal. It has an operational value as means to implement a policy and achieve a goal, both long-term and short-term, that are shaped and defined by collectively shared values, experiences, attitudes, habits and the needs of a nation.

The strategic can be understood in many ways as it has become a multidisciplinary term due to its importance for achieving a goal. But, strategic in its traditional meaning in International Politics/Relations has been primarily related to the military goals of a nation-state. Therefore, strategy, in this realm, is specifically understood as the set of identification, acquisition, allocation and mobilisation of various components of the comprehensive national power and their alignment towards achieving the military goals set by the state. A nation-state’s strategic affairs have three dimensions – securing its existence (kśema), achievement (yoga) and promotion (vivardhana) of its national goals pertaining to various cultural and politico-economic factors.

Culture is the set of behaviour, belief, values and symbols that have been developed retained and handed over to the next generations in history. Strategic culture, therefore, is the set of the same in the context of the state behaviour in the matters considered as strategic. Although we note that there is an ongoing debate about the deterministic and explanatory value of strategic culture regarding state behaviour and decision-making, we cannot ignore the scholarly agreement on the influence of strategic culture in the background of decision-making (strategic culture as context). Scholars agree on the fact that there is a need of exploring the strategic cultures of various states so that we could build a pool of data and literature useful for further research.

India, as a nation-state, has a long civilisational history and experience of complex cultural exchanges that has contributed to the development of its national identity and behaviour, including the ideational and material (geographical) conceptualisation of the state. The nation as a geocultural space and a 70 years old independent state has a history of seeing many empires and wars that compelled it to remain in a perpetual strategic engagement (both thought and action). Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate the nuances of the strategic culture acting as a context to its strategic behaviour.

As regards the debate about the existence of strategic culture in India, views are often rudimentary and impulsive rather than based on an objective definition and understanding. The main reason for this is a lack of research and availability of literature on these dimensions. Thus, this is important to lead the debate in an objective and useful direction basing it on rigorous research. An awareness of the distinction and essential relationship between strategic thinking (philosophical and intellectual discourse) and strategic culture (experience, action, attitude and habit) is also important in the process of this investigation.

It is in this context that the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses intends to explore the roots of India’s Strategic Culture, elements that have been influential in shaping Indian attitude towards perceiving threats, use of force, diplomacy, war, understanding and acquisition of power, etc.

Some Important Questions:

  1. What are the root of India’s identification of its strategic geographical-self?
  2. What are the roots of India’s national and political self?
  3. What has been the relevance of strategy in Indian political thinking?
  4. Does India’s current strategic behaviour and positioning talk to its pre-independence and pre-colonial strategic thinking and execution?
  5. What are the roots of the Indian understanding on the use of force and military by the state?
  6. What has been the role of various pre-Independence (ancient and medieval) sub-regional military traditions in the Indian strategic thinking and culture?

Programme

0930 - 1000h Tea & Registration

Session I: Inauguration

Chair: Prof Charan Wadhwa
1000 - 1010h Introduction by Maj Gen Alok Deb, DDG, IDSA
1010 - 1030h Special Address by Dr Arvind Gupta, Former Deputy NSA & DG IDSA

1030 - 1045h Tea Break

Session II: Roots in Language, Culture and Philosophy [1045 - 1230h]

Chair: Amb A.N.D. Haksar
1. Mr Vishnu Saksena, ‘Brāhmi Script and the Roots of Pan-Indian Culture’
2. Dr Adil Rasheed ‘The Vedantist and Islamic Theological Schools on the Unity of Godhead (Brāhman and Tawheed)’
3. Mr Nazir Ahmad Mir, ‘Cultural Explanation of Statecraft: Aśoka and Akbar’

1230 - 1330h Lunch

Session III: Intelligence and Strategic Culture [1330 - 1500h]

Chair: Prof S.D. Muni
1. Dr Michael Liebig, ‘The Kautilyan Roots of Intelligence Culture in South Asia – A Historical Perspective’
2. Prof Subrata K. Mitra, ‘Ministry of Home Affairs and Intelligence in India’
3. Mrs Kajari Kamal, ‘Indian Strategic Culture’

1500 - 1515h Tea Break

Session IV: War – Practice and Theory [1515 - 1715 h]

Chair: Sqn Ldr R.T.S. Chinna
1. Dr Saurabh Mishra, ‘The Use of Force and War in the Arthaśāstra’
2. Col Vikrant Deshpande, ‘Hybrid Warfare: The Kautilyan Construct’
3. Col P.K. Gautam (Retd), ‘Comparing Kāmandakī, Nītisāra and Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra’
4. Dr Arpita Anant ‘Maratha Tradition of Statecraft and Warfare as Reflected in Ājñapatra’

1715 - 1720h Vote of Thanks by Col P.K. Gautam (Retd)

About IDSA's Project - Indigenous Historical Knowledge

Military Affairs Strategic Thinking
Partial Accommodation without Conflict: India as a Rising Link Power August 25, 2017 Aseema Sinha 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Venue: Seminar Hall I , IDSA

South Asia
Turkey as a 'Model' for Arab World: Myth or Reality? August 18, 2017 Md. Muddassir Quamar 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Venue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor)

Chairperson: Shri Talmiz Ahmad
External Discussants: Shri Sanjay Singh and Prof A K Mohapatra
Internal Discussants: Dr Smruti S Pattanaik and Dr Adil Rasheed

Eurasia & West Asia
India’s Strategic Security Cooperation with Israel: Scope and Analysis July 13, 2017 Amit Mukherjee 1100 hrs Fellows' Seminar Eurasia & West Asia
India-Israel Relations at 25 July 03, 2017 1100 hrs Other

IDSA is organising a discussion on ‘India-Israel Relations at 25’ on Monday, July 3, 2017 at 11 AM at Seminar Hall 1.

The event will be chaired by Amb. Shyam Saran and will preview the agenda and possible outcomes of Prime Minister Mr. Modi’s upcoming visit to Israel. We hope you can join in the discussions and enrich the proceedings.

Programme

Opening remarks: Shri Jayant Prasad, DG, IDSA

Introductory remarks: Amb. Shyam Saran

Remarks by panelists (5-10 minutes each)

  • 1. Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne (Retd), CAS, IAF, July 2011-December 2013
  • Prof. Kumaraswamy, JNU (via Skype)
  • Prof. Efraim Inbar, Bar Ilan University, Tel Aviv (via Skype)
  • Dr. Nicolas Blarel, Leiden University, The Netherlands (via Skype)
  • Cdr. Prakash Gopal, Research Fellow, NMF (tbc)
  • S. Samuel C. Rajiv, Associate Fellow, IDSA

Q and A (30-40 minutes)

Closing remarks: Amb. Shyam Saran

Press Release

Eurasia & West Asia
Why China Supports Pakistan on Terrorism? June 23, 2017 Rajneesh Verma 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Venue: Seminar Hall I, IDSA

East Asia, South Asia
Securing Peace? Regime Types and Security Sector Reform in the Patani and Bangsamoro Peace Processes, 2011-2016 June 09, 2017 Dr. Janjira Sombatpoonsiri 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Venue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor)

Peace Process in Nepal: Differences, Dialogue and Digression June 01, 2017 Nihar R. Nayak 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Venue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor)

Regional Outlook in the Horn of Africa May 22, 2017 Andeab Ghebremeskel 1030 to 1300 hrs Round Table

Chair: Shri Jayant Prasad, DG, IDSA

Dr. Andeab Ghebremeskel, Director General of the Eritrean Centre for Strategic Studies (ECSS) visited IDSA on May 22, 2017.

The ECSS is a small government funded think tank based in Asmara, Eritrea. They have a staff of around 12 researchers and are mostly involved in tracking and analyzing Eritrea’s foreign policy, the developments of the Horn of Africa and to a limited extent, the domestic developments in the country. The main purpose of Dr. Ghebremeskel’s visit to the institute was to speak on the topic Regional Outlook in the Horn of Africa, interact with IDSA scholars, and understand India’s perspective on China’s Belt-and-Road initiative (BRI).

During the interaction the following issues were discussed:

Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa consists of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. The Greater Horn of Africa also includes Uganda, Kenya and Democratic Republic of Congo. The region is strategically important since it is close to the oil producing region of Middle East. Approximately 40 per cent of oil produced in Middle East crosses through the shipping lanes of Red Sea. Djibouti is the choke point on this shipping route. It is due to this reason that countries like United States, France and China have a military base in Djibouti. Saudi Arabia and Germany have also shown interest in establishing bases in the region.

Countries in the Horn of Africa have similarities in terms of ethnicity and culture. The region is rich in minerals Gold, Zinc and Hydrocarbons. However, its mineral wealth has not been a blessing, rather it has been a curse since the oppressive regimes in the region have not utilised the wealth for the welfare of the citizens. The region has witnessed many famines.

There is a lack of unity among the countries of the Horn of Africa. Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which consists of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda, has been a weak sub-regional organisation due to disagreements among member-states. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia has been an enduring problem in the region. In 2000, there was a war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the effects of which are being felt even now and constrained regional co-operation and development. Peace was brokered between Eritrea and Ethiopia by Algeria and a peace agreement was signed in presence of Algeria, Britain and Germany. While Eritrea has been following the terms of the agreement, Ethiopia has been violating them thereby escalating the conflict in the region. The other main conflict in the region is the dispute over the waters of Nile River among the riparian states of Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia and Djibouti. This conflict has the potential of bringing the region to war.

Horn of Africa and extra-regional powers

Being strategically located on one of the busiest shipping routes, the Horn of Africa has seen the interest and interference by many external powers. The United States, France and China each have a military base in Djibouti. China had offered to establish a base in Eritrea but the Eritrean government rejected the offer. Due to its proximity to the Middle East, any conflict in the Middle East has an impact on the Horn of Africa region. Most recently, the civil war in Yemen has had an impact on the region with many GCC countries showing an interest in establishing bases in the region. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has established a base in Eritrea. UAE has long term commercial interests in the region and its military base is also a means of countering Chinese presence in the region.

Al-Shabaab and ISIS

Al-Shabaab’s influence has been curtailed by the presence of the forces under AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia). The Al-Shabaab has resurfaced in some parts as a result of Ethiopia withdrawing its forces from Somalia. The ISIS is also prevalent in the region and there is a breakaway group of Al-Shabaab that has sought allegiance with ISIS.

China’s Belt-and-Road initiative and Africa

It is still too early for Africa to make up its mind on BRI. Due to the FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation), Africa knows what China expects from Africa. Africa needs not only hard infrastructure, but also soft infrastructure.

Piracy in the Horn

The piracy in the Horn is unlikely to thrive again. The presence of multi-national naval force in the region will keep a check on piracy.

India’s perspective on Belt-and-Road initiative

India was not opposed to Belt-and-Road initiative (BRI), its opposition is to the aspect of BRI that impacts the sovereignty of India. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) impinges on India’s sovereignty. OBOR is a Sino-Centric initiative specifically targeted towards the development of China’s western provinces, to pull Chinese economy from the middle-income trap and to shift from low-tech to high-tech production. Belt-and-Road circumvents India and only touches its periphery. The Belt-and-Road is not only about geo-economics but it aims to transform the geopolitical balance by connecting Xinjian to Persian Gulf by Gwadar port and thereby giving China an ability to have two ocean navy. This dimension of BRI has to be carefully accessed.

(Prepared by Nachiket Khadkiwala, Research Assistant)

Round Table on Developments in POK: Choices for India February 22, 2016 Round Table

A roundtable discussion on “Developments in Pakistan occupied Kashmir: Choices for India” was held at IDSA on February 22, 2016. Eminent experts from cross section including former diplomats, academics and journalists were invited to share their views on the subject. Following experts participated in the discussion: Ambassador Satish Chandra, Ambassador Satinder K Lambah, Ambassador Virendra Gupta, Ambassador T. C. A Raghavan, Ambassador P. Stobdan, Shri Rana Banerji, Professor K. Warikoo, Professor Navnita Chadha Behera, Professor Mathew Joseph C.,

Dr Ashok K. Behuria and Shri Sushant Sareen. The meeting was attended by Shri Gopal Baglay (JS PAI), Ministry of External Affairs, two other officials from the PAI (Pakistan Afghanistan Iran) division and two officers serving at the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). The session was moderated by Shri Jayant Prasad, Director General, IDSA. Deputy Director General Brigadier Rumel Dahiya (retd.) and scholars within IDSA with expertise and interest in PoK also participated in the roundtable.

Points for Discussion

The roundtable was held in the backdrop of growing demand for Gilgit Baltistan’s (GB) constitutional upgradation as a separate province of Pakistan. The demand for absorption of GB into Pakistan as the fifth province has been doing the rounds since September 2012, when the GB Legislative Assembly passed a resolution to this effect. Following are some of the pertinent questions, which the participants in the roundtable discussion sought answers to.

  • What are the local demands in PoK (both ‘AJK’ and GB)? How is the federal government responding to these demands?
  • What could be the fall-out of the continuing political disaffection in the PoK?
  • What are the domestic or external compulsions behind Pakistan’s move to consider change in the political status of GB?
  • What are the legal and political implications of GB’s constitutional absorption into Pakistan for India?
  • What should be India’s position if the proposal to make GB a province fructifies in near future?

Significant Takeaways & Recommendations

  • There was near unanimity amongst the participants that India’s position is defined and bound by the Parliament Resolution of 1994 which delineated India’s claim on the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir including PoK, and also urged Pakistan to vacate areas belonging to former princely state which have been under its control since 1947. Therefore, it wass suggested that the policy makers in India should stick to the mandate under the 1994 resolution while discussing PoK.
  • Most of the participants appreciated IDSA’s work on PoK and held that the institute was playing a key role in spreading awareness on the subject among the members of the strategic community within India. It was suggested, therefore, that concerted efforts should be made to extend IDSA’s reach and write about issues and developments in PoK, in the mainstream media. The participants agreed that there was an urgent need to keep sensitizing people within India on the developments in PoKGiven the fact that overall public awareness about PoK is rather poor, the particiants held that the onus is on the government to initiate measures to highlight the plight of the people of PoK and also Chitral, which was also a part of the erstwhile princely state of Kashmir. . Relevant literature focussing on developments in PoK must be compiled and circulated with special emphasis on vernacular literature in the form of memoirs and comments in the media.
  • One of the recommendations from a 2010 IDSA PoK Project Report that India should offer citizenship to people from PoK- both residents and members from PoK diaspora, settled mostly in the United Kingdom and the United States, was taken up for discussion in the round table. It was suggested that this proposition was impracticable and and, hence, should be  dropped as a policy option. However, India could consider providing scholarships in education sector to students from PoK.
  • There was a consensus that India should bring out a white paper on PoK (in sync with the concept note prepared by IDSA) where the sufferings inflicted on the people of PoK should be highlighted/articulated in greater detail. There is a need to draw international attention towards human rights violations in PoK.
  • It was suggested that India needed to vociferously oppose the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). There is a need to rake up India’s concerns/opposition on the project not only within India but at all relevant forums.
  • India must offer stiff resistance to Pakistan’s attempt to turn Gilgit-Baltistan into its fifth province. Such a move by Pakistan militates against the 1994 resolution that whole of PoK belonged to India.
  • There was a view that Pakistan should be encouraged to make mistakes in PoK. India must try to harness and use the prevalent discontent and disaffection amongst Shias and the followers of Aga Khanis, including other communities in PoK towards the establishment. The Aga Khan family is very influential in PoK and much of the development work in the region is funded by the family foundation. The Aga Khan foundation had been quite active till 2007 and investing heavily in the education sector in the G-B region. However, after targeted attacks on them by groups belonging to Sunni sect, they have largely gone into hiding suspension mode. Now they  have shifted their focus from education to tourism.
  • India should engage with the ‘Nationalist’ groups in PoK in an innovative way. At the same time, it is necessary to constantly review the state of politics amongst several ethno-nationalist groups operating in G-B for quite some time. For example, there are differences in approach between the Balwaristan and Baltistan nationalist fronts, and the local leaders have misgivings about, and distrustful of, one another. This has to be factored into any effort to work with them.
  • It was noted that that a fair amount of communication should be sustained between the people on both sides of LoC. The number of travellers coming into Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir from the other side has decreased during the last few years and this is not a positive sign. Although there are security-related issues, the positive outcomes of an enhanced level of contact and communication cannot be neglected, especially because it involves exposure of the people from the other side to the ground reality on the Indian side and contributes to their disillusionment with the system of governance granted to them by Pakistan. Of course, during height of turmoil in Kashmir, the government has to be cautious about such exchanges.  
  • India should be more assertive on PoK by continually claiming the entire Jammu and Kashmir, including Gilgit-Baltistan and the so called Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). This is important because it would enhance our negotiating capability in case the issue of give and take on Kashmir arises in future. India should not develop a sense of apathy and resignation towards PoK. At the very least, such posture needs to be avoided as=t all costs. Politically, India’s position with regard to Pok has been rather defensive since the 1950s and the discourse on Kashmir, particularly at international level, is one-sided and valley-centric. Through constant reiteration of Indian sovereignty over PoK, India should hope to change the existing lopsided narrative of J&K, which has virtually granted Pakistan’s hold over PoK as a given, while India’s legitimate territorial claim over the truncated J&K State on the Indian side of LoC is being thrown open for debate and resolution.
  • There is a need to encourage more organizations and scholars talking and writing about PoK within India. The example of Kashmir Study Group headed by Ghulam Nabi Fai was taken up during the discussion In this regard. This organization used to be very well funded, well connected, well-plugged into international organisational circuits and had, to a great extent, successfully churned out and disseminated a pro-Pakistan narrative on Kashmir. The counter-narrative, which is historically correct and pro-India, however, is missing. For instance, the view of US State Department as well as that of the strategic community in the European capitals on the Kashmir issue is quite narrow and unsympathetic towards the Indian viewpoint. There are not much resources (literature) on PoK available either in MEA or at the IDSA and there is a need to bring out informative and analytical volumes on PoK.
  • It is absolutely essential to generate interest within the people of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir over the issue of PoK. There should be more scholars, belonging to that region, working on the issue, through whom information and awareness about PoK could be disseminated. The body of information generated by Kashmiris themselves is likely to be considered more authentic and credible. There should be more conferences specifically dealing with PoK should be held in India to generate awareness about the region long neglected in our official as well as unofficial discourses on Jammu and Kashmir. It may not necessarily be organized by IDSA alone but could be held collaboratively with other institutions or organizations.
  • The issue of water is completely missing from the Kashmir discourse, which otherwise is the key, given the resentment in Mirpur over the Mangla dam royalty and the growing demand for people in the state of Jammu and Kashmir for more rights to harness and use water which flows through their territory. There is a strong view emerging from J&K that Indus Water Treaty has sacrificed the genuine interests of the people and bartered away their right to use the water flowing through their territory for the sake of improving relations with Pakistan. Such views need to come to the fore to buttress the Indian case over IWT, at a time when Pakistan is raising false alarms and baseless allegations over ‘stealing’ of water by India. An assertive and indigenous Kashmiri voice over the issue will certainly have a deterring impact on Pakistan’s belligerent approach to the water issue.
  • On the issue of Pakistan taking a decision to declare Gilgit-Baltistan as its fifth province, it was noted that for India, it could serve as a double-edged sword. While it can be publicly contested by India, the proposition could widen the gulf between Pakistan and the Hurriyat and wider separatist constituency in the Kashmir valley. Moreover,  not meeting the demands of the people of the region for G-B’s status equivalent to the provinces of Pakistan, would lead to greater alienation of the people with Islamabad. The study of the whole issue of absorbing the region as a province reveals that Pakistan is highly tentative over the issue and even set up a committee to look at various alternatives to satisfy the people of the region without undermining Pakistan’s stated position on Kashmir. However, if it decides to bring about necessary constitutional revision and declare G-B as a province, under reported pressure from China to alter the ‘disputed’ status of PoK to facilitate implementation the CPEC project, it would signal a significant departure from the well-known Pakistani position on the Kashmir issue.
  • Some of the participants believed that India should sternly oppose any change of status of Gilgit Baltistan by Pakistan.  It was suggested that the voices of the nationalists and the left-wing activists in G-B were being drowned in the over-advertised clamour for fifth province, needs to be gleaned and given adequate space in media. Besides this, the overarching concerns of the local Shias about growing state-sponsored intrusion of the Sunnis into the area need to be monitored regularly and this can be utilized to serve India’s interests in the region. 
  • It was argued that with regard to Kashmir, Pakistan has its military and intellectual fronts always ready for use, while India has neither of these. There is episodic interest in India in the Kashmir issue, especially limited to the time of turmoil in the valley. However, the diplomatic and intellectual capital being invested by Pakistan has made the discourse on Kashmir skewed  against India and, hence, there is a greater need to change this situation. Instead of referring to the region as “Pakistan occupied Kashmir”, which lends a negative dimension to the issue and indirect legitimacy to Pakistani hold over the terrain, India could think in terms of altering the nomenclature and reclaim the region by calling it “West Kashmir” or something similar having a geographical connotation.
  • While it is important that we evolve a clear set of objectives on PoK, before we set out delineating a roadmap, freewheeling discussions would be always helpful- to weigh available options for Idnia on PoK, and proceed with the most suitable objective in mind. We cannot have a static PoK policy and it has to be dynamic to respond to changing local and geo-political situation in the region.  It may not also be a bad idea to hold on to our claims and shape the international narrative in such a manner that it accommodates the legitimate position of India over the issue. At the same time, in the face of stiff, inflexible and maximalist position adopted by Pakistan, India should focus on strengthening its economic and military power and make it easier for the next generation to deal with the issue in future. India needs to be both cautious and proactive on PoK. It has to be understood, nevertheless, that putting pressure on the military of Pakistan by exploiting its faultlines and engaging the civilian government for normalization of relations are not mutually exclusive propositions.

(Report prepared by Priyanka Singh and Manzoor Turabi)

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