Some ongoing conflicts in Africa are taking a new turn. Essentially local Islamist extremist groups such as the Boko Haram, which thrive on the domestic social and economic deprivations, seem to be moving towards collaboration with international Islamist groups. This phenomenon is not new, considering the links of Somali groups with the Al-Qaeda. However, it is important to bear in mind the similarities and differences among these local and international groups so that we can understand the nature and degree of their threat and respond accordingly.
‘Boko Haram’ (Jama’atu Ahlus Sunna Lidda’ Awati wal Jihad) in West Africa and the ‘Islamic State’ (IS), also known as al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fil-Iraq wal-Sham (Da’ish), in West Asia have earned their notoriety for being the two most destructive and violent groups with political ambitions inspired by extremist medieval and wahabi-salafi version of Islam. Both the groups have been recognised as terror organisations that have utter disregard for dissent, difference and human life and dignity. They have been responsible for the death of thousands and displacement of millions as refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDP). Both the groups, currently, control certain areas in their regions.11 Although at first sight they appear to be very similar in their inspirations and employ brutal tactics to maintain control, there are differences in their orientations, scales of funding, leadership, resources and their roles in the larger interests of other regional and external powers.
Orientations: Boko Haram is active in the northeastern Nigeria near the borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The forested area is underdeveloped and people are very poor. As the majority in the area is Muslim, the Boko Haram group began as a purist movement against modern western education from a mosque in Maiduguri town of Nigeria. The literal meaning of ‘Boko Haram’ is ‘western education is forbidden.’ It later turned into a violent terrorist movement with linkages with the terrorist groups in the Sahel region of West Africa, especially with the Al-Qaeda in Maghrib (AQIM). It also developed some relations with the salafi sympathisers in Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. The organisation currently has grown potent and aspires for implementing sharia’ in the areas it controls and influences. The attacks by the group on government establishments as well as civilians have been frequent and increasingly brutal. The Nigerian government has failed to curb the activities of Boko Haram on its own and its army has received several setbacks at the hands of the terrorists. Many have questioned the institutional capabilities of the Nigerian army to combat the terror and threat of the group. Boko Haram has a following only in the West African countries, although it has attempted to connect itself with the larger Islamic terrorist groups in other parts of Africa and the world, including the IS. The group is trying to carve out a safe haven in the region where it can exploit its resources and experiment with its extremist beliefs.
The IS, since its inception, has been very clear about its orientation. It emerged with the ‘Arab Spring’ in its background. Some Al-Qaeda dissidents and various groups fighting against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria formed the group with an aim to establish a Sunni Islamic Caliphate in the region and subsequently also claim the leadership of the Islamic world. Currently, they have captured large territory in Syria as well as Iraq. They are exploiting both anti-western and traditional sectarian (Shia-Sunni) sentiments against their opponents, primarily Syrian and Iraqi Governments. Mass executions, beheadings, public display of brutality are some of their common terror methods.
Leadership: The nature of the Boko Haram leadership is different from that of the Islamic State. Little is known about the leaders of Boko Haram while many of the leaders of the Islamic State, including the current self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, have been known to the US and international security agencies for quite some time. Baghdadi himself had been detained by the US security forces in Iraq where, according to reports, he was even more radicalised. 22 Details about the life of Abu Bakr Shekou, the Emir of Boko Haram, cannot be confirmed authoritatively. However, one important difference in the public personality of both the leaders is their temperament. Shekou appears to be crude and rustic while Baghdadi is messianic in his demeanour and use of language. 33 Both of them claim to be scholars in Islam. Baghdadi himself and his associates have more and better experience in international and worldwide operations as they have once been affiliates of the Al-Qaeda and its global network; while Shekou’s experience and connections have been mostly restricted across the borders of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, or in the Sahel region.
Financial Resources: Boko Haram’s resources are very limited in comparison to the Islamic State. Besides some suspected funds from the Arab and the Gulf regions, their major sources of finances are extortions, ransom in lieu of high profile kidnappings, funds from regional political and religious sympathisers and other illegal activities. 44 The Islamic State allegedly started with huge funds from within the rich states of Saudi Arabia and Qatar to topple the Assad Government in Syria. 55 Its composite groups had received aid from the western countries also (the US, France, the UK) in kind. Later, when it captured some regions from the Syrian Government and turned towards Iraq, it started collecting taxes in the areas it controlled. The IS also earns from ransoms, extortions, other illegal activities including funds from sympathisers mainly from the Arab and West Asian region. IS’s control over large oil rich areas and its efforts to behave like a state providing some basic services also adds to its coffers. 66
Military Aspects: Although Boko Haram claims to have sophisticated weapons and some armoured vehicles captured mainly from the escaped Nigerian Army during their attacks, they are not as sophisticated and as large in numbers as that of the IS. Some of their weapons are suspected to be looted and brought from Libya. 77 The IS has the advantage of using the large number of American armoured vehicles, both light and heavy automatic weapons, captured from the runaway Iraqi forces. 88 Many of the weapons were allegedly directly supplied to the component groups of the IS even before its formation. 99 As far as the war/battle techniques are concerned, Boko Haram mainly relies on guerilla attacks and suicide bombings on military as well as civilian installations. It may or may not focus on capturing territory as they are not sure if they can hold it for long. The IS primarily opts for direct combat and focuses on capturing more territory to realise its larger claims. However, it also employs suicide bombings and guerilla warfare as auxiliary tools. Another important difference between the two groups is that Boko Haram has not attracted many Islamic extremist youths and cadres from outside the area of its control and influence for its membership; whereas the IS has an appeal to attract Islamist extremists from throughout the globe. Extremists are pouring in from Central Asia, Pakistan, Arab and West Asian countries and from others regions of the world as well; including the Western countries (US, UK, France etc.) to fight for the IS. 1010
Regional and International Interests: The settings of Boko Haram do not invoke as much interest of the great powers as those of the IS. The Boko Haram, atmost, invokes the interest of the affected countries in the region (Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin); and in the African Union (AU) and UNSC for humanitarian reasons as there has been a global uproar against the group after they kidnapped and enslaved about 300 school girls in a single incident and burnt the Baga town and its residents in Borno state of northeastern Nigeria. The US, France, the UK and the EU are involved in the talks to deal with the Boko Haram due to their hegemonic and colonial legacies as well. Local politicians with some vested interests in the activities of Boko Haram and possible political gains from them have also nurtured them. But, in any case, the group, leaving aside a couple of incidents of kidnappings, has not directly affected the great world powers, or external powers.
On the other hand, the problem of IS has become global as it invokes the sectarian Shia-Sunni divide which is directly linked to the regional power struggles; primarily between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Several smaller struggles for prominence and influence in the region involve the Sunni majority Arab states and a couple of Shia majority states. The world has already witnessed IS’s persecution, execution and proselytisation of the Shias, women, and the people of other faiths within the territory of its control. As Iran is a potential nuclear power and currently is being persuaded by the West to limit its nuclear programme, the sectarian card being played by the IS becomes more dangerous and global in its influence. The IS, a Sunni organisation, has subsequently challenged all (Shia as well as Sunni majority countries) including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, Iraq as well as the western powers, citing different reasons. Hence, a coalition of regional countries, with the help of the western powers, is acting against the IS.
Conclusion: A comparison of Boko Haram and the IS reveal that although they have attained unprecedented notoriety almost at the same time, they are different and unequal entities. Boko Haram has not yet been able to break the regional shackles while the IS has emerged as a truly global threat. Hence the difference in response by the western and other world powers towards them. Although Boko Haram, in the light of the joint action by the West African countries and the AU, has attempted to strengthen itself by connecting with the IS, there are glitches in the process due to their different geographical and regional requirements; as well as the pressures on them. The IS itself is facing coalition strikes by the regional countries and the West. Therefore, the Boko Haram and the IS connect at the moment seems to be minimal and difficult. However, nobody can rule out the possibility of increased ideological and operational connect in case of lack of proper regional and international responses against the groups in future. Boko Haram may cooperate increasingly with the IS in two circumstances: first, the IS gets stronger and wealthier so that it aspires for expansion in other vulnerable regions; second, it loses the territory it controls, in which case it may increasingly adapt Al-Qaeda like modus operandi by patronising local Islamist groups. This in turn will depend on the Al-Qaeda’s reaction to the IS. The governments and the international community need to be watchful and act accordingly in time.
4. “This is how Boko Haram fund its evil”, Washington Post, June 6, 2014, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/06/this-is-how-boko-haram-funds-its-evil/ (Accessed on November 20, 2014); “How Boko Haram is beating US efforts to choke its financing”, Reuters, July 1, 2014, at http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/07/01/us-usa-nigeria-bokoharam-insight-idUSKBN0F636920140701 (Accessed on November 20, 2014); A special report by Andrew Walker for the United States Institute for Peace titled “What is Boko Haram?”, available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf (Accessed on December 5, 2014).
5. “Qatar and Saudi Arabia ‘have ignited time bomb by funding global spread of radical Islam’”, The Telegraph, October 4, 2014, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11140860/Qatar...(Accessed on November 20, 2014); “Islamic State: Where does jihadist group get its support?”, BBC News, September 1, 2014, at http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-29004253 (Accessed on November 18, 2014); “The ‘State Sponsors’ of ISIS, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey: Why are they No Subject to Sanctions?”, Center for Research on Globalization, September 14, 2014, at http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-state-sponsors-of-isis-saudi-arabia-qat... (Accessed on November 20, 2014).
6. “Islamic State crisis: US hits IS oil targets in Syria’, BBC News, September 25, 2014, at http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-29357934 (Accessed on December 5, 2014).
7. “Boko Haram looting our armoury- DHQ”, Punch, September 30, 2014, at http://www.punchng.com/i-punch/ boko-haram-looting-our-armoury-dhq/ (Accessed on December 12, 2014); “Arms from Libya could reach Boko Haram, al-Qaeda: UN”, Reuters, January 26, 2012, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/us-libya-un- Africa Trends Volume 3, Issue 4, October-December 2014 16 arms-idUSTRE80P1QS20120126 (Accessed on December 12, 2014); “Nigerian soldiers flee as Boko Haram captures more territory in Adamawa”, Premium Times, November 11, 2014, at http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/ headlines/170914-nigerian-soldiers-flee-as-boko-haram-captures-more-territory-in-adamawa.html (Accessed on November 18, 2014); “Boko Haram seizes town after soldiers ‘flee’”, Al Jazeera, August 26, 2014, at http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/08/boko-haram-seizes-town-after-soldi... 2014826181311739107.html (Accessed on December 11, 2014).
8. “Insurgents in Iraq seizing advanced weaponry”, The Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2014, at http://www.wsj.com/ articles/insurgents-in-iraq-seizing-advanced-weaponry-1404684313 (Accessed on November 18, 2014).
9. “Who is supplying weapons to the warring sides in Syria?”, BBC News, June 14, 2013, at http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-22906965 (Accessed on November 20, 2014); “US supplies arms to Syrian opposition as Geneva peace talks falter”, The Telegraph, January 14, 2014, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ middleeast/syria/10603270/US-supplies-arms-to-Syrian-opposition-as-Geneva-peace-talks-falter.html (Accessed on November 20, 2014).
Comparing 'Boko Haram' and the 'Islamic State'
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Some ongoing conflicts in Africa are taking a new turn. Essentially local Islamist extremist groups such as the Boko Haram, which thrive on the domestic social and economic deprivations, seem to be moving towards collaboration with international Islamist groups. This phenomenon is not new, considering the links of Somali groups with the Al-Qaeda. However, it is important to bear in mind the similarities and differences among these local and international groups so that we can understand the nature and degree of their threat and respond accordingly.
‘Boko Haram’ (Jama’atu Ahlus Sunna Lidda’ Awati wal Jihad) in West Africa and the ‘Islamic State’ (IS), also known as al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fil-Iraq wal-Sham (Da’ish), in West Asia have earned their notoriety for being the two most destructive and violent groups with political ambitions inspired by extremist medieval and wahabi-salafi version of Islam. Both the groups have been recognised as terror organisations that have utter disregard for dissent, difference and human life and dignity. They have been responsible for the death of thousands and displacement of millions as refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDP). Both the groups, currently, control certain areas in their regions.11 Although at first sight they appear to be very similar in their inspirations and employ brutal tactics to maintain control, there are differences in their orientations, scales of funding, leadership, resources and their roles in the larger interests of other regional and external powers.
Orientations: Boko Haram is active in the northeastern Nigeria near the borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The forested area is underdeveloped and people are very poor. As the majority in the area is Muslim, the Boko Haram group began as a purist movement against modern western education from a mosque in Maiduguri town of Nigeria. The literal meaning of ‘Boko Haram’ is ‘western education is forbidden.’ It later turned into a violent terrorist movement with linkages with the terrorist groups in the Sahel region of West Africa, especially with the Al-Qaeda in Maghrib (AQIM). It also developed some relations with the salafi sympathisers in Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. The organisation currently has grown potent and aspires for implementing sharia’ in the areas it controls and influences. The attacks by the group on government establishments as well as civilians have been frequent and increasingly brutal. The Nigerian government has failed to curb the activities of Boko Haram on its own and its army has received several setbacks at the hands of the terrorists. Many have questioned the institutional capabilities of the Nigerian army to combat the terror and threat of the group. Boko Haram has a following only in the West African countries, although it has attempted to connect itself with the larger Islamic terrorist groups in other parts of Africa and the world, including the IS. The group is trying to carve out a safe haven in the region where it can exploit its resources and experiment with its extremist beliefs.
The IS, since its inception, has been very clear about its orientation. It emerged with the ‘Arab Spring’ in its background. Some Al-Qaeda dissidents and various groups fighting against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria formed the group with an aim to establish a Sunni Islamic Caliphate in the region and subsequently also claim the leadership of the Islamic world. Currently, they have captured large territory in Syria as well as Iraq. They are exploiting both anti-western and traditional sectarian (Shia-Sunni) sentiments against their opponents, primarily Syrian and Iraqi Governments. Mass executions, beheadings, public display of brutality are some of their common terror methods.
Leadership: The nature of the Boko Haram leadership is different from that of the Islamic State. Little is known about the leaders of Boko Haram while many of the leaders of the Islamic State, including the current self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, have been known to the US and international security agencies for quite some time. Baghdadi himself had been detained by the US security forces in Iraq where, according to reports, he was even more radicalised. 22 Details about the life of Abu Bakr Shekou, the Emir of Boko Haram, cannot be confirmed authoritatively. However, one important difference in the public personality of both the leaders is their temperament. Shekou appears to be crude and rustic while Baghdadi is messianic in his demeanour and use of language. 33 Both of them claim to be scholars in Islam. Baghdadi himself and his associates have more and better experience in international and worldwide operations as they have once been affiliates of the Al-Qaeda and its global network; while Shekou’s experience and connections have been mostly restricted across the borders of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, or in the Sahel region.
Financial Resources: Boko Haram’s resources are very limited in comparison to the Islamic State. Besides some suspected funds from the Arab and the Gulf regions, their major sources of finances are extortions, ransom in lieu of high profile kidnappings, funds from regional political and religious sympathisers and other illegal activities. 44 The Islamic State allegedly started with huge funds from within the rich states of Saudi Arabia and Qatar to topple the Assad Government in Syria. 55 Its composite groups had received aid from the western countries also (the US, France, the UK) in kind. Later, when it captured some regions from the Syrian Government and turned towards Iraq, it started collecting taxes in the areas it controlled. The IS also earns from ransoms, extortions, other illegal activities including funds from sympathisers mainly from the Arab and West Asian region. IS’s control over large oil rich areas and its efforts to behave like a state providing some basic services also adds to its coffers. 66
Military Aspects: Although Boko Haram claims to have sophisticated weapons and some armoured vehicles captured mainly from the escaped Nigerian Army during their attacks, they are not as sophisticated and as large in numbers as that of the IS. Some of their weapons are suspected to be looted and brought from Libya. 77 The IS has the advantage of using the large number of American armoured vehicles, both light and heavy automatic weapons, captured from the runaway Iraqi forces. 88 Many of the weapons were allegedly directly supplied to the component groups of the IS even before its formation. 99 As far as the war/battle techniques are concerned, Boko Haram mainly relies on guerilla attacks and suicide bombings on military as well as civilian installations. It may or may not focus on capturing territory as they are not sure if they can hold it for long. The IS primarily opts for direct combat and focuses on capturing more territory to realise its larger claims. However, it also employs suicide bombings and guerilla warfare as auxiliary tools. Another important difference between the two groups is that Boko Haram has not attracted many Islamic extremist youths and cadres from outside the area of its control and influence for its membership; whereas the IS has an appeal to attract Islamist extremists from throughout the globe. Extremists are pouring in from Central Asia, Pakistan, Arab and West Asian countries and from others regions of the world as well; including the Western countries (US, UK, France etc.) to fight for the IS. 1010
Regional and International Interests: The settings of Boko Haram do not invoke as much interest of the great powers as those of the IS. The Boko Haram, atmost, invokes the interest of the affected countries in the region (Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin); and in the African Union (AU) and UNSC for humanitarian reasons as there has been a global uproar against the group after they kidnapped and enslaved about 300 school girls in a single incident and burnt the Baga town and its residents in Borno state of northeastern Nigeria. The US, France, the UK and the EU are involved in the talks to deal with the Boko Haram due to their hegemonic and colonial legacies as well. Local politicians with some vested interests in the activities of Boko Haram and possible political gains from them have also nurtured them. But, in any case, the group, leaving aside a couple of incidents of kidnappings, has not directly affected the great world powers, or external powers.
On the other hand, the problem of IS has become global as it invokes the sectarian Shia-Sunni divide which is directly linked to the regional power struggles; primarily between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Several smaller struggles for prominence and influence in the region involve the Sunni majority Arab states and a couple of Shia majority states. The world has already witnessed IS’s persecution, execution and proselytisation of the Shias, women, and the people of other faiths within the territory of its control. As Iran is a potential nuclear power and currently is being persuaded by the West to limit its nuclear programme, the sectarian card being played by the IS becomes more dangerous and global in its influence. The IS, a Sunni organisation, has subsequently challenged all (Shia as well as Sunni majority countries) including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, Iraq as well as the western powers, citing different reasons. Hence, a coalition of regional countries, with the help of the western powers, is acting against the IS.
Conclusion: A comparison of Boko Haram and the IS reveal that although they have attained unprecedented notoriety almost at the same time, they are different and unequal entities. Boko Haram has not yet been able to break the regional shackles while the IS has emerged as a truly global threat. Hence the difference in response by the western and other world powers towards them. Although Boko Haram, in the light of the joint action by the West African countries and the AU, has attempted to strengthen itself by connecting with the IS, there are glitches in the process due to their different geographical and regional requirements; as well as the pressures on them. The IS itself is facing coalition strikes by the regional countries and the West. Therefore, the Boko Haram and the IS connect at the moment seems to be minimal and difficult. However, nobody can rule out the possibility of increased ideological and operational connect in case of lack of proper regional and international responses against the groups in future. Boko Haram may cooperate increasingly with the IS in two circumstances: first, the IS gets stronger and wealthier so that it aspires for expansion in other vulnerable regions; second, it loses the territory it controls, in which case it may increasingly adapt Al-Qaeda like modus operandi by patronising local Islamist groups. This in turn will depend on the Al-Qaeda’s reaction to the IS. The governments and the international community need to be watchful and act accordingly in time.
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