James Hamill, in his book ‘Africa’s Lost Leader: South Africa’s Continental Role Since Apartheid” debunks the perception of South Africa as the undisputed leader of Africa and paints South Africa as nothing more than a fragile hegemon. He supports this by arguing that South Africa has been reluctant to assume a hegemonic role, for a range of historical and contemporary reasons. South Africa has generated significant resentment, suspicion and even outright opposition from other African states. It has been unable to popularise its ideals in Africa or build a consensus around them. Lastly, South Africa has suffered from structural flaws in its economy, along with glaring weaknesses in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) created by chronic underfunding. He elaborates on these reasons through four parts in his book. Chapter one gives insight into the country’s regional policy under its three post-apartheid presidents: Nelson Mandela, Jacob Zuma, and Thabo Mbeki. Chapter two is an analysis of South Africa’s numerous image problems in the continent. Chapter three looks into the country’s need to focus on domestic socio-economic change, at the expense of a deep, sustained engagement with other African states and finally, chapter four examines the shortfalls of the SANDF.
Hamill introduces South Africa as a hegemonic power. He writes about the perception of South Africa as Africa’s natural leader, peace and conflict manager and chief international interlocutor on security and economic development and balances it out with the contrasting reality of the South African government’s lack of strategic vision for a regional role which has led it to engage in dangerous improvisation and ad hoc decision-making. He states that this perception of South Africa as Africa’s “natural leader” comes as a result of using economic power as an instrument of coercion with non-compliance coming at a high cost along with an increasingly militarised South African state.
In the first chapter, he begins by looking into the South African perception under President Nelson Mandela. Under Mandela, South Africa was extremely popular. This can be credited to the personality of Mandela, his dissonance regarding division and demagoguery, and his focus on reconciliation and nation-building. However, despite his popularity, South Africa was viewed with suspicion by some of the continent. There was also resentment which stemmed from the presumptuousness of a newly reconstituted state which was led by a movement which was the recipient of extensive African assistance throughout its liberation struggle. The word ‘hegemony’ had also been strategically replaced by the more diplomatic ‘partnership’. Even so, Hamill opines that Mandela’s foreign-policy interventions were unpredictable to the point of eccentricity. This was viewed by other states as South Africa seeking to dominate the region and impose its values, which was not received well.
Contrarily, under Mbeki, there was a clear shift in the emphasis and tone of South Africa’s strategic priorities, especially in relation to the rest of the continent. Mbeki attempted to recover from the perception of South Africa under Mandela as ‘a white state with a black leader’ by developing partnerships with key African powers such as Nigeria, Ghana, Algeria, Mozambique and Tanzania. Mbeki’s reorientation of South Africa succeeded on two contradictory fronts – South Africa’s credentials among the continent’s elites, as also the country’s role as a regional norm entrepreneur seeking to promote its democratic values as wider African values, which is the behaviour of a classic hegemon. While Mbeki managed to improve South Africa’s political standing within Africa, but his diplomatic strategy risked depleting the moral capital South Africa had accumulated in Western states, even though emergence of China as an important African actor provided an alternative to the Western model of political economy.
While Mandela and Mbeki’s leadership had some successes and limitations, Jacob Zuma’s presidency failed to make a significant impression on South African foreign policy and was unable to articulate the broadest contours of a ‘Zuma Doctrine’. Zuma shifted the focus of South African politics to domestic politics as a contrast to Mbeki who focused more on South Africa’s standing in the rest of the continent. However, Zuma’s achievements have been negligible, and his presidency consistently reflected his near-continuous struggle for political survival.
In his second chapter, Hamill explores the image problem in Africa. Hamill recognises a dissonance in the Western perception of South Africa’s image and the continental perception. While Western states viewed democratic South Africa as one with potential for positive influence on the continent and the state best equipped to lead it, many states within the continent resented Pretoria’s paternalistic role and questioned its legitimacy to act as the leader and chief advocate for the continent. There was great distrust and at times, outright opposition, to South Africa as a leader within the continent. These perceptions led to two-fold outcomes for South Africa. While it offered a certain legitimacy to the state as an international actor, it was viewed as ‘a bully, a self-interested hegemon that acts in bad faith’ within the continent. For instance, while this perception led to South Africa being invited to join the BRICS group, other African states viewed this as the organisation providing an opportunity for South Africa to pursue its national interests to their detriment.
Another factor detrimental to the South African image was the prevalent xenophobia within the state. As Hamill notes, a toxic mixture of deprivation and resentment repeatedly resulted in xenophobic attacks on black communities. Furthermore, the government’s post-apartheid immigration policies tended to be framed in a ‘foreigner as a threat’ discourse which only legitimised and emboldened grassroots prejudice.
Hamill further characterises South African economic expansion within Africa as problematic. He argues that South Africa’s economic growth reinforced historical inequalities. The trade imbalance falls only slightly to a ratio of 5:1 in South Africa’s favour against the rest of Africa. Further, some of South Africa’s trade practices also highlight discrepancy between the state’s ideals and behaviour.
Lastly, Hamill refers to barriers to democracy promotion. He opined that South Africa’s promotion of democracy and human rights has encountered significant practical, if not always public, opposition which has contributed to its flaky image within the continent. Hamill also remarked that while the world looks at South Africa as a key model for resolving intractable conflicts after the experience of the transition from apartheid to democracy, many states within the continent are concerned that South Africa may be promoting a brand of conflict resolution in Africa that is increasingly a caricature of its own peace process. Lastly, Hamill points out that many African states failed to entirely acknowledge South Africa’s experience on the continent and/or the contributions to African progress and wellbeing.
In the third chapter of his book, Hamill compares the African Renaissance vis-a-vis the South African Renaissance. He observes that after two decades into the democratic era, the failure to deliver fundamental socio-economic change began to impose serious political costs on the ruling African National Congress. He points out the lack of acknowledgement of the tension between domestic and foreign-based priorities on the government and ANC’s part. In this chapter, Hamill looks into South Africa’s inability to transform due to the structural weaknesses of its economy, widespread poverty in the country and other crippling socio-economic problems that continued to persist in the post-apartheid era. He remarks that South Africa continues to be one of the world’s most unequal societies, with inequality as high as it was in 1994. Moreover, homelessness was exacerbated by the pace of urbanisation in the country. These challenges were to be addressed in an economy near stagnation, and that generated considerable pessimism across all sectors of business. This failure to transform South Africa hampered the state’s ability to provide African leadership and project its influence across the continent. Hamill opines that the event which symbolised the end of South African dominance came in April 2014, when the Nigerian economy supplanted that of South Africa as the continent’s largest. He subsequently also recognises that whereas South Africa’s disengagement from the rest of Africa is neither possible nor desirable, the challenge is to find a way to meet its African responsibilities and contribute effectively to the continental development while pursuing domestic socio-economic adjectives.
Finally, in his fourth chapter, Hamill looks into the plight of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). He opines that South Africa might be considered a military hegemon within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) zone and an influential power elsewhere on the continent, despite its reluctance to engage in coercive democracy. SANDF is also viewed as relevant due to conflicts in Africa. Given its implications for state fragility, the demand for peace operations on the continent is likely to grow. These problems are likely to become South Africa’s problems due to its reputation as perhaps the most militarily capable African state. Hamill remarks that SANDF’s current crisis in capability and operational effectiveness has been a long time in the making. The practical consequences of the deterioration are such that South Africa increasingly lacks the capacity of effective intervention in other African states, both unilaterally and as part of a multilateral mission. Hamill also recognised the barriers to increasing the defence budget.
In conclusion, Hamill states that South Africa’s material and ideational capabilities to assume the role of a hegemonic power in Africa in the democratic era was deficient during the presidencies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. He also concludes that the African National Congress finds itself in more strained political circumstances due to domestic socio-economic challenges which restrict the country’s ability to help Africa. He also writes that due to tangible constraints on diplomatic interventions and real limitations in terms of material sources, South Africa will have to accept a more modest role within the continent and the actual scope of having a hegemon in Africa in the near future is unlikely. Lastly, he remarks that lack of skilful leadership, intellectual agility and political finesse - especially under Jacob Zuma - is the biggest challenge for South Africa in the new multipolarity emerging in Africa.
Hamill summarises the perception regarding South Africa as a key international and domestic actor under Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. He highlights all the present barriers which limit the role of South Africa as a hegemon within the African continent. However, there are certain gaps within his work. Hamill’s work is perception oriented, focusing on failures of the state. South Africa’s post-conflict reconstruction is the biggest driver towards its recognition globally as the continent’s leader. He has not effectively acknowledged the same. While Hamill’s work is insightful, it leans slightly towards personal bias.
Moreover, since the release of the book, the leadership has shifted from Zuma to Cyril Ramaphosa which has generated hope among the masses for an upward swing for South Africa. There is hope for growth amidst the corruption left by Ramaphosa’s predecessor. This makes Hamill’s work inconclusive as there is possibility for big changes in the near future.
Despite the aforementioned factors, the book provides a much-needed insight into South Africa’s failure to meet its potential, both as an international actor and as a continental player and looks into the measures that can be taken to rectify the same.
*Ms. Aarushi Vikram has been Research Intern, ALACUN Centre, MP-IDSA.
James Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader: South Africa’s Continental Role Since Apartheid
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James Hamill, in his book ‘Africa’s Lost Leader: South Africa’s Continental Role Since Apartheid” debunks the perception of South Africa as the undisputed leader of Africa and paints South Africa as nothing more than a fragile hegemon. He supports this by arguing that South Africa has been reluctant to assume a hegemonic role, for a range of historical and contemporary reasons. South Africa has generated significant resentment, suspicion and even outright opposition from other African states. It has been unable to popularise its ideals in Africa or build a consensus around them. Lastly, South Africa has suffered from structural flaws in its economy, along with glaring weaknesses in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) created by chronic underfunding. He elaborates on these reasons through four parts in his book. Chapter one gives insight into the country’s regional policy under its three post-apartheid presidents: Nelson Mandela, Jacob Zuma, and Thabo Mbeki. Chapter two is an analysis of South Africa’s numerous image problems in the continent. Chapter three looks into the country’s need to focus on domestic socio-economic change, at the expense of a deep, sustained engagement with other African states and finally, chapter four examines the shortfalls of the SANDF.
Hamill introduces South Africa as a hegemonic power. He writes about the perception of South Africa as Africa’s natural leader, peace and conflict manager and chief international interlocutor on security and economic development and balances it out with the contrasting reality of the South African government’s lack of strategic vision for a regional role which has led it to engage in dangerous improvisation and ad hoc decision-making. He states that this perception of South Africa as Africa’s “natural leader” comes as a result of using economic power as an instrument of coercion with non-compliance coming at a high cost along with an increasingly militarised South African state.
In the first chapter, he begins by looking into the South African perception under President Nelson Mandela. Under Mandela, South Africa was extremely popular. This can be credited to the personality of Mandela, his dissonance regarding division and demagoguery, and his focus on reconciliation and nation-building. However, despite his popularity, South Africa was viewed with suspicion by some of the continent. There was also resentment which stemmed from the presumptuousness of a newly reconstituted state which was led by a movement which was the recipient of extensive African assistance throughout its liberation struggle. The word ‘hegemony’ had also been strategically replaced by the more diplomatic ‘partnership’. Even so, Hamill opines that Mandela’s foreign-policy interventions were unpredictable to the point of eccentricity. This was viewed by other states as South Africa seeking to dominate the region and impose its values, which was not received well.
Contrarily, under Mbeki, there was a clear shift in the emphasis and tone of South Africa’s strategic priorities, especially in relation to the rest of the continent. Mbeki attempted to recover from the perception of South Africa under Mandela as ‘a white state with a black leader’ by developing partnerships with key African powers such as Nigeria, Ghana, Algeria, Mozambique and Tanzania. Mbeki’s reorientation of South Africa succeeded on two contradictory fronts – South Africa’s credentials among the continent’s elites, as also the country’s role as a regional norm entrepreneur seeking to promote its democratic values as wider African values, which is the behaviour of a classic hegemon. While Mbeki managed to improve South Africa’s political standing within Africa, but his diplomatic strategy risked depleting the moral capital South Africa had accumulated in Western states, even though emergence of China as an important African actor provided an alternative to the Western model of political economy.
While Mandela and Mbeki’s leadership had some successes and limitations, Jacob Zuma’s presidency failed to make a significant impression on South African foreign policy and was unable to articulate the broadest contours of a ‘Zuma Doctrine’. Zuma shifted the focus of South African politics to domestic politics as a contrast to Mbeki who focused more on South Africa’s standing in the rest of the continent. However, Zuma’s achievements have been negligible, and his presidency consistently reflected his near-continuous struggle for political survival.
In his second chapter, Hamill explores the image problem in Africa. Hamill recognises a dissonance in the Western perception of South Africa’s image and the continental perception. While Western states viewed democratic South Africa as one with potential for positive influence on the continent and the state best equipped to lead it, many states within the continent resented Pretoria’s paternalistic role and questioned its legitimacy to act as the leader and chief advocate for the continent. There was great distrust and at times, outright opposition, to South Africa as a leader within the continent. These perceptions led to two-fold outcomes for South Africa. While it offered a certain legitimacy to the state as an international actor, it was viewed as ‘a bully, a self-interested hegemon that acts in bad faith’ within the continent. For instance, while this perception led to South Africa being invited to join the BRICS group, other African states viewed this as the organisation providing an opportunity for South Africa to pursue its national interests to their detriment.
Another factor detrimental to the South African image was the prevalent xenophobia within the state. As Hamill notes, a toxic mixture of deprivation and resentment repeatedly resulted in xenophobic attacks on black communities. Furthermore, the government’s post-apartheid immigration policies tended to be framed in a ‘foreigner as a threat’ discourse which only legitimised and emboldened grassroots prejudice.
Hamill further characterises South African economic expansion within Africa as problematic. He argues that South Africa’s economic growth reinforced historical inequalities. The trade imbalance falls only slightly to a ratio of 5:1 in South Africa’s favour against the rest of Africa. Further, some of South Africa’s trade practices also highlight discrepancy between the state’s ideals and behaviour.
Lastly, Hamill refers to barriers to democracy promotion. He opined that South Africa’s promotion of democracy and human rights has encountered significant practical, if not always public, opposition which has contributed to its flaky image within the continent. Hamill also remarked that while the world looks at South Africa as a key model for resolving intractable conflicts after the experience of the transition from apartheid to democracy, many states within the continent are concerned that South Africa may be promoting a brand of conflict resolution in Africa that is increasingly a caricature of its own peace process. Lastly, Hamill points out that many African states failed to entirely acknowledge South Africa’s experience on the continent and/or the contributions to African progress and wellbeing.
In the third chapter of his book, Hamill compares the African Renaissance vis-a-vis the South African Renaissance. He observes that after two decades into the democratic era, the failure to deliver fundamental socio-economic change began to impose serious political costs on the ruling African National Congress. He points out the lack of acknowledgement of the tension between domestic and foreign-based priorities on the government and ANC’s part. In this chapter, Hamill looks into South Africa’s inability to transform due to the structural weaknesses of its economy, widespread poverty in the country and other crippling socio-economic problems that continued to persist in the post-apartheid era. He remarks that South Africa continues to be one of the world’s most unequal societies, with inequality as high as it was in 1994. Moreover, homelessness was exacerbated by the pace of urbanisation in the country. These challenges were to be addressed in an economy near stagnation, and that generated considerable pessimism across all sectors of business. This failure to transform South Africa hampered the state’s ability to provide African leadership and project its influence across the continent. Hamill opines that the event which symbolised the end of South African dominance came in April 2014, when the Nigerian economy supplanted that of South Africa as the continent’s largest. He subsequently also recognises that whereas South Africa’s disengagement from the rest of Africa is neither possible nor desirable, the challenge is to find a way to meet its African responsibilities and contribute effectively to the continental development while pursuing domestic socio-economic adjectives.
Finally, in his fourth chapter, Hamill looks into the plight of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). He opines that South Africa might be considered a military hegemon within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) zone and an influential power elsewhere on the continent, despite its reluctance to engage in coercive democracy. SANDF is also viewed as relevant due to conflicts in Africa. Given its implications for state fragility, the demand for peace operations on the continent is likely to grow. These problems are likely to become South Africa’s problems due to its reputation as perhaps the most militarily capable African state. Hamill remarks that SANDF’s current crisis in capability and operational effectiveness has been a long time in the making. The practical consequences of the deterioration are such that South Africa increasingly lacks the capacity of effective intervention in other African states, both unilaterally and as part of a multilateral mission. Hamill also recognised the barriers to increasing the defence budget.
In conclusion, Hamill states that South Africa’s material and ideational capabilities to assume the role of a hegemonic power in Africa in the democratic era was deficient during the presidencies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. He also concludes that the African National Congress finds itself in more strained political circumstances due to domestic socio-economic challenges which restrict the country’s ability to help Africa. He also writes that due to tangible constraints on diplomatic interventions and real limitations in terms of material sources, South Africa will have to accept a more modest role within the continent and the actual scope of having a hegemon in Africa in the near future is unlikely. Lastly, he remarks that lack of skilful leadership, intellectual agility and political finesse - especially under Jacob Zuma - is the biggest challenge for South Africa in the new multipolarity emerging in Africa.
Hamill summarises the perception regarding South Africa as a key international and domestic actor under Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. He highlights all the present barriers which limit the role of South Africa as a hegemon within the African continent. However, there are certain gaps within his work. Hamill’s work is perception oriented, focusing on failures of the state. South Africa’s post-conflict reconstruction is the biggest driver towards its recognition globally as the continent’s leader. He has not effectively acknowledged the same. While Hamill’s work is insightful, it leans slightly towards personal bias.
Moreover, since the release of the book, the leadership has shifted from Zuma to Cyril Ramaphosa which has generated hope among the masses for an upward swing for South Africa. There is hope for growth amidst the corruption left by Ramaphosa’s predecessor. This makes Hamill’s work inconclusive as there is possibility for big changes in the near future.
Despite the aforementioned factors, the book provides a much-needed insight into South Africa’s failure to meet its potential, both as an international actor and as a continental player and looks into the measures that can be taken to rectify the same.
*Ms. Aarushi Vikram has been Research Intern, ALACUN Centre, MP-IDSA.
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