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# Strategic Digest

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## Australia's Cyber Security Strategy 2020

Australia released the second iteration of its Cyber Security Strategy on 6 August 2020, after the first edition released in 2016 had run its course. The strategy outlines means and mechanisms of strengthening the security and resilience of the country's critical infrastructure, and of securing families and businesses online. Its overall thrust is a more hands-on approach to cybersecurity, to be achieved through legislation designed to “create an enhanced regulatory framework for critical infrastructure and systems of national significance”, and vesting the government with new powers to “actively defend networks and help the private sector”.



In comparison with the first strategy's budget of AUD 230 million, the new strategy has proposed a budget of AUD 1.67 billion spread over 10 years, although many associated initiatives and programmes have already been announced as part of the government's Cyber

Enhanced Situational Awareness and Response package in July 2020.

Other initiatives that have been budgeted include threat-sharing platforms and secure and centralised government hubs as well as efforts to provide small and medium enterprises the means to improve their cyber security capabilities. On the consumer side, the Australian Government has determined to: 1) intensify efforts for raising awareness about cyber security threats; 2) expand 24/7 cyber security advice hotline; 3) increase funding for victim support; and, 4) introduce a voluntary Internet of Things Code of Practice to help consumers make informed purchasing decisions.

The main agencies entrusted with the implementation of the strategy are the Australian Signals Directorate and the Australian Cyber Security Centre, which will also be expanded in terms of manpower and capabilities.

## US Space Force Releases First Doctrine


The United States Space Force released its first space doctrine, titled *Space Power*, on 14 August 2020, less than eight months after it was established as a new military branch to cater for the emergence of space as a warfighting domain.

The doctrine has five chapters. Chapters one to three are conceptual and descriptive, covering various details of the space domain and debates on the importance of space power at the national and military levels. The last two

chapters deal with the employment of the Space Force and the fundamentals guiding the development of military space power.

The doctrine points out that the space system architecture consists of three broad segments: space segment, terrestrial segment, and link segment. All three segments need to be protected to ensure space security. The doctrine also identifies various space-power disciplines including Orbital Warfare, Space Electromagnetic Warfare, Space Battle Management, Space Access and Sustainment, Military Intelligence, Engineering and Acquisition, and Cyber Operations.


All in all, the doctrine recognises that space power is a critical manifestation of the high ground in modern warfare and the US needs to protect, defend and maintain its strategic interests in space, thus ensuring its dominance in the space domain. At the same time, however, it also recognises that space power's greatest potential is best realised when it is combined with other forms of military power. Integration and interdependence with the other military services is thus essential for a Space Force to utilise the full potential of space power.



### **US Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (2020)**

The United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard jointly released a revised version of their foundational doctrine on Naval Warfare in the form of Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP 1) in April 2020. This is the third iteration of NDP 1, which was first issued in 1994 followed by a second edition in 2010.

NDP 1 describes the inherent nature and enduring principles of the employment of naval forces to defend and protect US national interests. As a keystone publication, it provides the doctrinal foundation for the development of operational concepts and ensures the alignment of approaches for effective execution of procedures and tactics.



The periodic review of NDP 1 reflects the changes and continuities in operational concepts governing the employment of US naval forces. One noticeable aspect in the third edition is the unambiguous emphasis on the phrase ‘Control of the Seas’, which has been introduced as “a fundamental strategic pillar”. Whereas the 1994 edition of NDP 1 mentioned the term just once and the 2010 version did not mention it at all, the latest iteration echoes Mahan’s notion of America as an inherently maritime republic whose prosperity rests on attaining command of the sea through sea power and sea control. The significance of this change in emphasis lies in the fact that the unhindered access enjoyed by US naval power since the end of the Cold War is now under challenge from China.

Another noticeable change in NDP 1 (2020) is the reduced emphasis on low end naval operations, that is, Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) and Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions. This is in alignment with the trend of moving away from missions that do not directly support establishing command of the seas. Sea control, power projection, deterrence, maritime security, and sealift have been defined as the core enduring functions of Naval Power in NDP 1 (2020). Finally, the latest edition of NDP 1 has reduced the stress on how naval power nestles within the joint doctrine and instead emphasises the uniqueness of naval power and the naval service.

### **US-South Korea Combined Command Post Training**

The United States and South Korea conducted their annual summer exercise between 18 and 28 August. Named *Combined Command Post Training* (CCPT), the computer-simulated exercise was held on a reduced scale because US military personnel could not travel to South Korea in the usual numbers due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The smaller numbers of troops involved meant that the exercise had to be held in two stages, with the first focusing on the defence of South Korea against a North Korean invasion and the second on a counterattack. The reduced scale of the exercise, in turn, prevented the two countries from carrying out the planned Full Operational Capability (FOC) test, designed to verify the progress South Korea

has made to prepare itself for retaking wartime operational control of its forces from the United States. It is not clear whether the inability to perform this test would delay the transfer of operational control over South Korean forces from the US to South Korea.

Although CCPT is an annual exercise, North Korea has in the past accused South Korea and the United States of carrying out a rehearsal for invading its territory. As recently as June 2020, North Korea had blown up the inter-Korean liaison office building in the border town of Kaesong and threatened military action against the South.



Despite the efforts made by South Korean President Moon Jae-in, the progress witnessed in inter-Korean relations in the wake of the Panmunjom and Pyongyang Declarations of 2018 appears to be waning.

### **PLA Army Aviation Uses Commercial Ships as Flight Decks**

The Chinese media recently highlighted a maritime exercise involving PLA Z-8 transport helicopters and Z-19 scouts flying from the deck of *Zhen Hua 28*, a civilian semi-submersible heavy load carrier.

For decades, the PLA Navy has rented or borrowed commercial ships as an expedient method of expanding its modest-but-growing amphibious fleet. In wartime, the PLA Navy could quickly take up from trade scores or even hundreds of useful vessels, much like the Royal Navy famously did during the 1982 Falklands War.

It appears that the Chinese have drawn inspiration from the American concept of Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD). ESD involves a large auxiliary semi-submersible support ship that can facilitate ‘seabasing’ for either supporting an amphibious landing force or establishing a floating base off a target area. ESD is capable of landing large numbers of troops ashore from its integral Landing Craft Air Cushion or large troop helicopters. The US Navy (USN) has taken this concept further by commissioning two large ships of approximately 80,000 tons each as the Expeditionary Sea Base Vessels (ESB) in 2017 and 2020. These are

USN ships which will serve as Expeditionary Mobile Bases to support a variety of low intensity missions and are likely to operate in the Middle East and Pacific Oceans.



Zhen Hua 28. Fleetmon.com

*Zhen Hua 28*, the Chinese commercial semi-submersible load carrier ship, is 760 feet long, making her roughly the same size as an ESD or ESB. During the helicopter exercise referred to above, *Zhen Hua 28* sported what appeared to be a temporary flight deck, which would enable the PLA Navy to use it as a sea base in wartime.

Accordingly, these ships, taken up from trade, could quickly swell a Chinese amphibious invasion fleet.