Terrorism

Is it Endgame for LTTE?

The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) struggle against the Sri Lankan Government has taken different forms at different times since early 1970s. However, developments since 2006 have had an adverse impact on the LTTE and its efforts to seek a solution through violent means. The LTTE's numerical strength has fallen and it is also not doing too well in drafting recruits and procuring arms. The territory under its control is shrinking visibly: from the loss of the East and now with the intrusion of the Sri Lankan troops deep inside Killinochchi.

Problems and Prospects of Combating Terrorist Financing in India

Choking the flow of funds to terrorists is one of the vital aspects of combating terrorism. While its importance has been realized post 9/11 by the international community, counter measures for terrorist financing remain largely ineffective. In India, more resources and effort need to be devoted to launch a financial war against terrorists. In this context, the article attempts to establish the significance of emerging challenges in denying funds to terrorists globally and recommends a focused national response by outlining an integrated strategy.

Lessons from the 9/11 Commission

The unprecedented scale of the terror attacks in Mumbai and the fact that citizens from more than 20-plus countries were killed or injured in the attacks have evoked an international response. This response has been a mixture of sympathy and concern along with muted criticism of what is perceived to be the ham-handed handling of the crisis as well as the inability to take preventive measures. It was reiterated by the visiting US Secretary of State that the Mumbai attacks could have been prevented and cited the example of the United States successfully preventing all attacks after 9/11.

Fishing in Troubled Waters

Investigations into the Mumbai attacks have revealed that the terrorists came in from the sea. It has been reported that in the course of their journey from Karachi they had hijacked an Indian trawler named Kuber with a Porbandar registration in the high seas off the Coast of Gujarat. The trawler, fitted with the latest communication and navigation equipment including a Global Positioning system (GPS), Very High Radio Frequency (VHF) sets, etc., was found abandoned nearly four nautical miles off Cuffe Parade in south Mumbai.

Mumbai Attacks: A Deadly “Performance”

For 62 hours, from the night of November 26 to the morning of November 29, the city of Mumbai was held hostage to terror attacks. A significant element in these attacks was the willingness of the terrorists to engage security forces in a frontal gun battle. Earlier attacks have generally involved simultaneous bomb blasts in crowded market places, hospitals and office complexes. The intensity and meticulous planning that went into the attacks are of an unprecedented nature.

The Need to Refine India’s Response to Terrorist Incidents

The November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai which left more than 170 people killed and close to 300 injured did not conform to the pattern to which Indian security agencies have got accustomed to over a period of time. Except for the suicide attack on the CRPF Group Centre, Rampur (UP) at the beginning of 2008, terrorists had generally resorted to detonating improvised explosive devices in crowded places to cause maximum casualties.

The Post 26/11 Regional Strategic Predicament

Evidence gathered in the aftermath of by far the most deadly terrorist attack in Mumbai indicates conclusively that the attack was planned by the Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Toiba. The attack on Mumbai was executed by a well trained and indoctrinated suicide squad comprising of ten Pakistani terrorists. This testifies to the long gestation planning and preparation that can only have been made possible by the resources of a well established terrorist organization. The recruitment was from Punjab, training was in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and maritime training was conducted in Karachi.