An amicable resolution of issues between America and Europe on addressing the Afghan quagmire is unlikely given that the end state is not clearly defined.
The raging Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan underlines the limits of the use of military force. The lack of visible progress on the reconstruction activity and prevailing insecurity has alienated the Afghan populace in the remote villages of South and East Afghanistan. Given that the military option alone has limited utility in Counter-insurgency (COIN), there is a need to exercise an 'out-of-the-box' option to address the present stalemate.
Since 2001, Islamic terrorists have struck India with frightening frequency and ferocity. The most disturbing aspect of these attacks is that they have spread into the hinterland from Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) which was the main focus of the terrorists in the late 80s and the following decade.
It has been widely noted that the US has not suffered a terrorist attack since 9/11. This is because it undertook major reform of its homeland security structures following the 9/11 attacks. India could learn from the wide ranging CT reform in the US after 9/11 and adopt measures suitable in the Indian context.
A fundamental principle of humanitarian law, non-combatant immunity, has been virtually consigned to history during the Bush years. To a large extent this can be considered a ‘success’ for terrorists. That terrorists do not respect the principle of non-combatant immunity is central to the definition of terrorism. The aim of terrorists is substantially achieved when states also adopt their language and grammar. This has been done to an extent by the US in its militarily aggressive response to 9/11 in Iraq and Afghanistan.
