Even if solutions are known the Government does not implement them due to lack of political will, resource crunch, turf wars, apathy, and general inertia.
Countering ideological narratives, effective communication of developmental measures to the people, and adherence to the principle of judicious use of force should form integral elements of India's strategy to counter insurgent and terrorist groups.
The continuing spiral of violence in Karachi signals the slow but gradual melting of a nuclear-armed State controlled by a military allied with global terrorist networks.
Indonesia, which has been taking significant measures to curb terrorism, scored another success with the arrest of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir aka ABB, suspected of having funded and ideologically motivated Al Qaeda Aceh, in early August 2010. The arrest is just one of the steps in a long, consistent and protracted fight to maintain Indonesia’s secular, democratic and republican credentials.
Terrorism in the Indian hinterland is the result of a complex set of inter-related factors. The development of a jihad culture in Pakistan during the course of the Afghan conflict in the 1980s led to the subsequent Pakistani decision to employ jihad against India as a strategy. The mobilisation of the Hindu Right in India and ensuing communal violence led to the radicalisation of Muslim youth and the resort to terrorism by both Indian Islamists and Muslim criminal networks with help from Pakistan.
There is a view that India's approach to national security is largely ad hoc and marked by incompetence. Indians as well as foreign commentators on the country's security policies seem to share this perception. However, India does have a security approach that has a discernible pattern and arguably has been a success. This comment focuses on how India has dealt with internal security since independence.
This commentary attempts to answer the question as to why the flow of jihadis is unending despite tough measures being undertaken by Jakarta, on its own or in collaboration with its regional and international partners.
The ISI threat assessment may be received with great enthusiasm in Western capitals and policy circles, but for observers from the subcontinent it is neither ‘fundamental’ nor a ‘shift’.
A clean-up operation by the Pakistan Army could actually end up sharpening the ethnic polarisation in the city, which in turn could lead to the conflagration that everyone in Karachi fears.
If India is indeed interested in being a ‘rule-maker’ in a multilateral world, alternative approaches to persisting problems is the basic component of it.
