Both India and Pakistan must immediately review their security practices for the protection of vital and vulnerable national assets, which in Pakistan’s case must also include nuclear weapons.
The elimination of OBL might not accelerate US withdrawal from Afghanistan, but in all probability this marks the beginning of the end of active US military presence in Afghanistan.
The elimination of Osama, though a great feat by the US special forces, will largely be a symbolic event – terrorism is unlikely to end and the situation in Af-Pak is not likely to improve.
The death of Osama bin laden, is not the end of al Qaeda. It may disable it, but will not kill ‘al Qaeda the idea or movement’. We need to remember that bin Laden and al Qaeda articulated a political grievance which will not disappear with his elimination. The 'war of ideas' is still on.
As of now, institutions within Pakistan are strong enough to prevent both the balkanisation of Pakistan as well as the possibility of the state falling into theocratic hands. Pakistan is also unlikely to wind up terror operations against India as it considers the terrorist organisations to be its strategic assets. Internal disturbances within Pakistan allow it to maintain plausible deniability and the shifting of blame on to non-state actors over whom Pakistan claims it has no control. This paper argues that India’s response to terror will have to be well thought out.
Drug trafficking has become a major source of funding for armed groups in the north east and contributes to the continuance of militancy in the region.
Abduction is a Maoist tactic to arm-twist the government and secure the release of imprisoned comrades as well as make some tactical gains by placing demands that could be projected as pro-people.
Countering ideological narratives, effective communication of developmental measures to the people, and adherence to the principle of judicious use of force should form integral elements of India's strategy to counter insurgent and terrorist groups.
