Pakistan

The Sunni Muslims of South Asia are divided into two major sub-sects, i.e. Deobandi and Barelvi, named after their places of origin in India in the 19th century. Because of abiding differences between them, these two sub-sects have built up walls of hatred and mistrust between them over time. The faultline between them has erupted violently in Pakistan since the late 1970s. While there are some pioneering works available on their separate worldviews, no study has yet been attempted to critically analyse the nature of their interaction at the political level.

• Ashok K. Behuria
• January 2008
• Strategic Analysis

General Asfaq Pervez Kayani’s elevation as the 14th Pakistan Army Chief of Staff in November has been treated in the Indian media as a relatively low key affair. The General has been projected as a Musharraf ‘loyalist’ positioned primarily to retain Musharraf’s influence and hold on the Army. But transitions, particularly in Pakistan’s military etablishment, have rarely followed any given pattern and it can be expected of Gen Kiyani to initiate some new policy direction.

• Shantanu Chakrabarti
• December 27, 2007
• IDSA Comments

President Pervez Musharraf’s claim that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are safe as long as he is in charge has raised widespread speculation about the safety of Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. Musharraf’s statement comes at a time when Pakistan is going through one of its worst period of domestic instability.

• Reshmi Kazi
• November 29, 2007
• IDSA Comments

Pakistan is getting ready for the next elections amid many uncertainties. Musharraf is caught between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (Qaid-e-Azam) [PML-Q]. Benazir is back in Pakistan without any express assurance that she would have a third term as Prime Minister. Chaudhury Shujaat Hussain is undecided about Musharraf’s reconciliation proposals and is hobnobbing with Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) [PML-N]. Within the PPP, Benazir is soft on Musharraf while veteran party leader Aitzaz Ahsan is baying for the General’s blood.

• Ashok K. Behuria
• October 30, 2007
• IDSA Comments

Pakistan has at present a great many internal and external troubles to cater for. Islamabad is still feeling the after-effects of the Lal Masjid operation, while simultaneously fighting a seemingly uphill battle to rein in support for militancy within the political, defence, and intelligence establishments. In addition, Islamabad is struggling to keep a lid on the instability that plagues its western border regions.

• Ryan Clarke
• October 26, 2007
• IDSA Comments

The traditional Sino-Pakistan friendship of 55 years now has a new objective—to improve the economic content of their relationship, which comprises trade, investment and energy co-operation within a bilateral framework. The result of this determination to implement the new economic agenda is visible in the quantum of Chinese investment in Pakistan.

• Sumita Kumar
• September 2007
• Strategic Analysis

The rise of a militant Islamist group calling itself Pakistani Taliban has drawn wider international attention in recent years. It has appeared as a serious internal security threat for the Pakistani state and as an external challenge for the Afghan government facing a resurgent Taliban in southern Afghanistan. This article seeks to trace the evolution of 'Pakistani Taliban' and to isolate and analyse its ideological moorings and its political aspirations.

• Ashok K. Behuria
• September 2007
• Strategic Analysis

For decades, the dominant sense in the foreign policy establishment of India was that neither the Kashmir question nor the boundary dispute with China was ripe for resolution. Yet, in defiance of this received wisdom, two very different political coalitions have opened and sustained substantive negotiations on Jammu and Kashmir and the boundary dispute with China. Forward movement in both negotiations has also been premised on opening the closed frontiers with China and Pakistan.

• C. Raja Mohan
• January 2007
• Strategic Analysis

The Prime Minister of UK, Tony Blair, visited Pakistan in the third week of November to participate in the third UK-Pakistan bilateral summit. The UK-Pak joint statement of December 6, 2004 institutionalised such bilateral meets at the highest level, to 're-energise' the 'partnership for peace and prosperity in the 21st century'. As these bilateral summits are of a strategic nature and are being pursued without interruption since 2004, it is useful to analyse the scope and extent of such bilateral engagement.

• Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay
• December 01, 2006
• IDSA Comments

Despite the categorical denial by the Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson about a report published by a British newspaper in January 2006, that Islamabad was engaged in talks with China to purchase eight nuclear reactors worth US $7 billion, the Chinese media later disclosed Beijing's plan of signing an agreement to supply six reactors. Speculation in this regard has gained currency now that the two countries are to enter into a nuclear deal during the ongoing visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Pakistan.

• Rajesh Kumar Mishra
• November 23, 2006
• IDSA Comments