Pakistan

The threat from the Taliban could be in the form of heightened infiltration attempts across the Line of Control or see a new breed of Talibanised Pakistani militants targeting the Indian hinterland or a combination of both.

Terrorism, maritime security and border management are the key challenges in India's neighbourhood

Consequent to the peace deals signed by the Pakistani state with Taliban, the number of terror-related incidents in March came down in regions, which have been afflicted with violence in the recent past such as NWFP, FATA and Balochistan. However, there was an increase in terrorist violence in other parts of Pakistan, thereby indicating a shift of Taliban’s theatre of operations from its traditional conflict zones to the heartland of Pakistan.

Highlight of the month was the peace deal signed by the NWFP government with the founder of Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-e- Mohammadi (TNSM), Sufi Mohammad. The deal did bring some ‘peace’ to the restive region but virtually handed over half the territory of NWFP to the Taliban by accepting Shariat laws for Malkand Division and Kohistan district of Hazara Division. As a result, the number of terror related incidents in Pakistan decreased from 430 in January to 374 in February 2009.

Rise of the Taliban in the frontier provinces of Pakistan portends several challenges to the Pakistan establishment, a fact that has lately raised much alarm and concern amongst the international community and in the region. The speed and vengeance with which several militant groups have rallied under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud and Mullah Falazullah undoubtedly puts Pakistan’s military on an acid test. The Pakistan Army to date has tackled the problem half heartedly in the troubled region.

A decade after the Kargil conflict and over seven years after the major Indian military mobilization along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, both countries were yet again on the verge of a military confrontation following the revelation of Pakistan's complicity in the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. Islamabad's recalcitrance in taking action against groups responsible for this attack forced New Delhi to plan punitive responses against terror camps within Pakistan, prompting the latter to mobilize troops and project a capability to repulse an Indian attack.

Investigations into Mumbai's 26/11 attack made startling revelations about the militant training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The Mumbai perpetrators started from Baitul-Mujahideen in Muzaffarabad, the capital of the so-called ‘Azad Kashmir’, and headed for Mumbai via Karachi. They underwent specialized training in PoK for an extended period before the attack.

In Lahore, in 1999, Pakistan dropped its 'Kashmir first' approach and agreed to discuss it with India along with other issues. Later, under Musharraf, there was an offer to move beyond UN resolutions and adopt a four-step approach to resolve the Kashmir issue. Musharraf's proposals were taken seriously and widely hailed as a sign of flexibility and pragmatism from the Pakistani side. This paper critically analyses these approaches since Lahore and argues that they were occasioned by the changing global political context and that they were more apparent than real.

There is a case for terminating any nuclear exchange at the lowest level possible and the nuclear doctrine needs to reflect this. A review of the doctrine a decade after it was first expounded is in order.

Much as the text of Obama’s new ‘Af-Pak’ plan echoes India’s traditional concerns, it may turn out to be contrary to India’s interest with unseen implications in the longer term. Obama’s outlined strategy has been described as a ‘bold bid’ ‘bottom-up’ ‘comprehensive’ ‘pragmatic’ and even a ‘game changer’ approach.