Both India and Pakistan must immediately review their security practices for the protection of vital and vulnerable national assets, which in Pakistan’s case must also include nuclear weapons.
The Summit was part of Russia’s ongoing initiatives to play a greater role in stabilising the region before the expected withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan.
The elimination of OBL might not accelerate US withdrawal from Afghanistan, but in all probability this marks the beginning of the end of active US military presence in Afghanistan.
The strategic outlook of the political, bureaucratic and military elites in Pakistan was shaped by historical exigencies, geopolitical location, Pakistan's self-perception, and its Islamic credentials. Pakistan's military-dominated leadership formulated strategies towards regional and extra-regional powers based on its threat perceptions. The strategies adopted have not necessarily resulted in fully achieving the objectives for which they were formulated.
As of now, institutions within Pakistan are strong enough to prevent both the balkanisation of Pakistan as well as the possibility of the state falling into theocratic hands. Pakistan is also unlikely to wind up terror operations against India as it considers the terrorist organisations to be its strategic assets. Internal disturbances within Pakistan allow it to maintain plausible deniability and the shifting of blame on to non-state actors over whom Pakistan claims it has no control. This paper argues that India’s response to terror will have to be well thought out.
There is sufficient space for India to wage a limited war against Pakistan. Fears of escalation to the nuclear realm are grossly exaggerated by the critics of limited war, who ignore or misinterpret several factors (such as nuclear deterrence and international pressure) that would prevent conflict expansion in South Asia. While the current level of political-diplomatic-military planning in India lacks the capacity to meet the essential tenets of limited war, this can change and the requisite conditions can be achieved through better synergy and collaboration between different spheres.
Since there is no evidence to suggest that the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile has degraded India’s retaliatory capability, India should retain its no-first-use doctrine.
2011 began on a sombre note for arms control, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament with Pakistan once again blocking negotiations for a FMCT
