Even as nuclear safety protocols and processes have been strengthened since the 1986 disaster, learning from Chernobyl should be a continuing, ongoing process.
India’s tryst with its destiny for the twenty-first century will greatly depend upon how it prioritises its strategic necessities in the face of current Covid-19-induced economic crisis. While still on course to be the third largest world economy by 2050, India will need to ensure it has the essential tools—economic, military and diplomatic—by then to provide the necessary leverage as a great world power. Great thinkers have stressed and history has shown that maritime power is one such leverage.
On May 8, 2018, President Trump withdrew the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Since the JCPOA is endorsed by a United Nations Security Council Resolution and supported by the international community, Trump has had to justify this controversial decision. Based on data extracted from Trump’s Twitter account and taking advantage of Theo van Leeuwen’s (2008) discursive construction of the legitimation model, this article addresses the following question: How has Donald Trump attempted to delegitimize the JCPOA?
As the focus and priority of the international community in recent years have been on averting nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents, the nuclear experience of synergising safety and security can be highly useful in combating threats like COVID-19.
Even after five decades of its entry-into-force, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is largely seen as a Cold War era instrument that has failed to fulfill the objective of creating a pathway towards a credible disarmament process.
The existing approach to cyber security is heavily tilted towards practising deterrence by denial, essentially by building defences. However, the concept of deterrence needs further tweaking to make it workable in cyberspace.
Apart from the United States, India's nuclear cooperation agreements with Japan and Australia have been the most contentious domestically within those countries. The 'slow embrace' of India's civil nuclear credentials by Japan — given the four years for negotiations to begin (after the December 2006 Joint Statement which talked about discussions regarding such an agreement with India) in addition to the six years it took for negotiations to bear fruit — took place despite the strategic context of increasingly closer economic, political, and security ties.
Nuclear doctrines and postures are dynamic processes that evolve with the security environment. Twenty years after India’s nuclear doctrine was first drafted, the time is ripe for a comprehensive review and suitable revisions.
ince the time of their invention and the first-and-only use on 6 and 9 August 1945 on two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively, nuclear weapons have been seen by the states that possess them, or the ones that seek them, as the ultimate guarantors of their security.1 It is believed that these weapons are key to achieving victory in a war that otherwise may go on for a long time or may end in defeat if fought in conventional ways by a weaker country; in other words, nuclear weapons are believed to act as instruments of deterrence.
