Nuclear

India’s Response Options to Pakistani Nuclear First Use

The promise of 'massive' nuclear retaliation may prove inadequate in staying Pakistani nuclear hand in face of Indian offensives. Inflicting 'unacceptable damage' may appear disproportionate to its leadership if in response to lower order nuclear first use. Therefore, nuclear retaliation could well be of quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus levels with damage not amounting to an 'unacceptable' order.

North Korea’s Nuclear Issue: Security Implications for Asia

The security environment of Asia is threatened by the nuclear weapons development programme by North Korea. Threats of economic sanctions by denying economic aid and resolutions by the UN Security Council to punish Kim Jong-il regime have only reinforced Pyongyang's resolve to pursue its chosen path. Not only the future of the Six-Party Talks seems uncertain, there seems to have little hope to bring the recalcitrant country to the negotiating table.

The Political Factor in Nuclear Retaliation

That a nuclear taboo exists indicates the divide between conventional and nuclear war. It is no wonder then that India – though a nuclear weapons power – deems nuclear weapons not for military use but for deterrence purposes. These are, therefore, taken as political weapons. Seeking to deter use of nuclear weapons against India or its forces anywhere, India's nuclear doctrine promises ‘massive’ punitive retaliatory strike in case of nuclear use by its enemy. This is evidence that the Indian leadership is cognizant of the special status of nuclear weapons.