India’s Nuclear Policy: The Year After
On 11 May 1998, two events took place:
(1)India carried out nuclear tests; and
(2)India declared itself to be a state with nuclear weapons.1
- Jasjit Singh
- November 2013
On 11 May 1998, two events took place:
(1)India carried out nuclear tests; and
(2)India declared itself to be a state with nuclear weapons.1
After wining the elections, Hassan Rouhani has insisted that Iran is ‘ready to show more transparency’ over its nuclear programme, but has also affirmed that it has ‘inalienable rights’ to enrich uranium as a member of the NPT.
The Koondankulam plant has finally attained criticality but doubts will continue to be raised about the safety of the reactors. What do nuclear risk assessment methods tell us about the possibility of future accidents at KKNPP?
Fifteen years after the nuclear tests, it is relevant to examine if deterrence remains weak in South Asia or has consolidated towards greater stability.
India’s admission to the NSG has, as on the previous times when the India-US Nuclear Deal and the NSG exemption of 2008 were under discussion, caused many of those opposed to the Indian nuclear programme to come out with various policy suggestions on how to get India to agree on additional conditionalities. In addition there is a move by many to use the Indian admission for membership as a means to legitimize the illegitimate nuclear commerce between China and Pakistan. All these are predicated on the assumption that India is desperate to join the NSG. India should reject any move by the nonproliferation lobby to devise a criterion-based admission procedure.
In the aftermath of recent North Korean actions and threats, there has been in recent times some open debates and discussions about the prospects of South Korea “going nuclear” i.e. developing its own nuclear weapons. This brief argues that short of abrogating all its bilateral and multilateral treaties and obligations with heavy costs, the prospects of it doing so in the short/medium term are not that easy and may not be cost effective.
There is a lot of inaccuracy and assumption in reporting Chasma 3 nuclear cooperation between China-Pakistan. It is not conceivable in engineering terms as to how a 300 MWe Chasma 3 can be transformed into a 1,000 MWe project.
China and Pakistan reached a formal agreement in February 2013 to construct a third nuclear reactor in Chashma. This has caused widespread nervousness while making the NSG look weak-kneed.
Nuclear force development is at present an attractive means for Pakistan to attract international political and financial assistance, while salving the paranoias of its security establishment. Improvement in the state-society relationship could reduce the domestic appeal of endless nuclear expansion as other, more sustainable, resources become available to the state for building economic growth and security.
The second Chinese BMD test has a message for India: propel the development of long-range (exo-atmospheric) interception capabilities to mitigate the possibility of further asymmetry on strategic forces.