Nuclear

Riyadh anticipates that in the long run a nuclear Iran will be challenging Saudi’s proxy conflicts with Iran in states like Palestine, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. Amidst such concerns, Riyadh’s rejection of a UN Security Council seat in October 2013 followed by the revelation of the BBC news about possible nuclear weapons cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in November 2013 has raised questions whether Riyadh aspires to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

• Reshmi Kazi
• January 07, 2014
• Issue Brief

Disarmament and non-proliferation are rightfully viewed as two sides of the same coin: the two imperatives that need to be met if the prospect of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is to be realised. Although the existence of a link between the two concepts is obvious, the exact nature of this connection is perhaps not as clear. The central question here is whether it is politics or strategic realities that shape states’ nuclear options and by implication, the two-fold road to global zero.

• Dimitrios Machairas
• January 2014
• Strategic Analysis

The November 24, 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and its P5+1 interlocutors is the first agreement since November 2004 that contains Iran’s acceptance of certain short-term limitations on its nuclear programme.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv , G. Balachandran
• December 09, 2013
• Issue Brief

The interim deal was signed by seven foreign ministers of US, UK , France, Russia, China, Germany and Iran but the deal was not negotiated mainly in Geneva, but in Muscat and other locations where the US and Iran met secretly for months. Essentially, it is a deal between US and Iran and the rest were there to serve a choreographic purpose.

• K. P. Fabian
• November 28, 2013
• IDSA Comments

The reported offer of China to sell 1000 MWe reactors to Pakistan has raised a number of issues. China applied for NSG membership in 2004 only after being satisfied that it can safeguard its nuclear commerce with Pakistan even after joining NSG. It must be clearly understood that China’s application for joining NSG was at the repeated appeals of NSG and not the other way around.

• G. Balachandran , Kapil Patil
• November 15, 2013
• Issue Brief

If Chinese companies eventually end up bidding for Urenco, there is no reason why Indian companies should not do so. India can form a joint-venture with counterparts in Brazil, South Africa and, if needed, China (even Russia) using common interests envisioned through forums like the IBSA or BRICS to enter this race.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• November 13, 2013
• Issue Brief

On 11 May 1998, two events took place:

(1)India carried out nuclear tests; and
(2)India declared itself to be a state with nuclear weapons.1

• Jasjit Singh
• November 2013
• Strategic Analysis

After wining the elections, Hassan Rouhani has insisted that Iran is ‘ready to show more transparency’ over its nuclear programme, but has also affirmed that it has ‘inalienable rights’ to enrich uranium as a member of the NPT.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv , G. Balachandran
• August 06, 2013
• Issue Brief

The Koondankulam plant has finally attained criticality but doubts will continue to be raised about the safety of the reactors. What do nuclear risk assessment methods tell us about the possibility of future accidents at KKNPP?

• G. Balachandran , Kapil Patil
• August 02, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Fifteen years after the nuclear tests, it is relevant to examine if deterrence remains weak in South Asia or has consolidated towards greater stability.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• June 10, 2013
• IDSA Comments