Japan’s Strategic Calculations: Constraints and Responses
As the East Asian regional order becomes fragmented, how is Prime Minister Shinzo Abe managing Tokyo’s strategic interests within the US-Japan-China relations?
- Titli Basu
- January 17, 2019
As the East Asian regional order becomes fragmented, how is Prime Minister Shinzo Abe managing Tokyo’s strategic interests within the US-Japan-China relations?
Japan banks heavily on her security alliance with the United States (US) to ensure availability of requisite military capability in the region. China’s economic and military capabilities have grown in the last two decades, closing the gap with the US. With diminishing differential, especially with respect to China, the US’ deterrence power has gradually declined. Under these conditions, Japan has to develop Self-Defense Forces (SDF) capabilities to ensure that it, in combination with its alliance partner, the US, is able to meet national security challenges.
Three key developments unfolded in Japan in August 2018: the Ministry of Defence (MOD) released its annual Defence White Paper; requested a 2.1 per cent increase in the 2019 budget; and instituted an Exploratory Committee on the Future of Self Defence Forces (SDF) with the objective of reviewing the current National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the Mid-Term Defence Program (MTDP). Analysing these developments in the backdrop of Prime Minister Abe’s top priorities—managing the United States (US)-Japan alliance under the Trump Presidency and delivering on the ‘great responsibility’ of redefining Japanese post-war security orientation—unpacks Tokyo’s key challenges. These are, essentially, balancing between sharing greater burden within the alliance framework to ensure regional security on one hand, and weighing regional sensitivities and deeply fractured domestic constituencies on the other.
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