Indian Navy

The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) is a small but positive sign towards better communication channels between navies to reduce tension in the seas. But for CUES to become a reality many issues need to be resolved including the time frame for implementation.

The naval exercise at Qingdao does not detract from the fact that the India-China maritime relationship is essentially an uneasy one. Each side is uncomfortable with the other’s presence in its own theatre of nautical influence, but both recognise the other’s dominance in their respective maritime ‘backyards’.

With the INS Vikramaditya’s arrival in India, it is time to undertake a dispassionate assessment of the ship’s possible uses and deployment options. The Indian navy would be well served if it considered employing the ship in a ‘soft power projection’ role – as a versatile asset to be used in diplomacy and regional outreach, disaster relief and humanitarian missions.

Though the general elections are due this year, the need of the hour is to build a political consensus on the issue without further delay. It will be to the credit of the government if it is able to generate political consensus and appoint a Permanent Chairman CoSC or CDS.

All major democracies have opted for the CDS and India cannot ignore it any further. In the prevailing battlefield milieu of joint operations, combined operations and even coalition operations, modern armed forces cannot be successful without a well-developed and deeply ingrained culture of jointmanship.

Vikramaditya’s commissioning has re-ignited an old debate on the relevance of aircraft carriers. Proponents argue that it must play a central role in ‘blue-water’ plans while opponents posit that the carrier’s vulnerability and inadequate logistical sustainability render it an obsolete asset.

Since antiquity the Indian Ocean has been the centre of human progress, a great arena in which many civilizations have mingled, fought, and traded on important trade routes criss-crossing the waters around India for thousands of years. The entry and exit is to this vast water body is through four ‘gates’ or choke points: the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb; around South Africa’s Cape Agulhas; the Strait of Malacca; and past Australia’s Cape West Howe.

The Indian navy has long aspired for a true blue water capability and the aircraft carrier project is a critical part of safeguarding India’s maritime interest that includes providing security along the sea lanes of communication.

‘Energy’ is a key enabler of military combat power and it should be considered a strategic resource for the Indian Navy (IN). This article justifies the necessity of ensuring energy security for the IN in the backdrop of emerging energy challenges. It also discusses certain recent developments that point to the growing relevance of an energy policy for the IN. The article then discusses the contours and the scope of an integrated energy policy and proposes a roadmap for implementing an energy strategy for the IN.

The Indian Army remains rooted in an outdated, British-inherited system that is struggling to cope with the combination of challenges posed by demands of modern warfare and a society that is undergoing a great churn. The greatest challenge has been to the famous officer–men relationship in the Indian armed forces. In the past decade, the armed forces have faced a new problem: increasing incidents of indiscipline, suicides and fratricide. Are these incidents happening because the traditional bond between officers and men, the bedrock on which the military functions, is fraying at the edges?