India-Pakistan Relations

Like in the 1950s, the word ‘riparian’ is back again in the India–Pakistan lexicon, becoming this time intensely political, emotional and divisive. This development is both instructive and unsettling. It is instructive to note how the current water realties of the two countries, which have changed significantly since the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960, will now determine the treaty's future. With growing populations, inadequate water management techniques and the impact of global warming, water resources are under pressure.

Because the Pakistan Army appears to be gearing itself up for large-scale counter-terrorism operations in Punjab and parts of Sindh, India is being engaged diplomatically even as attempts are afoot to bring the situation in Kashmir to a boil.

A military to military engagement between India and Pakistan could help pave the way for greater understanding and opening up in the troubled relationship.

Engaging Pakistan would reduce tension between the two countries, deflect international pressure on India to resume the dialogue, and ensure that Pakistan does not have an excuse to divert its troops from the Western border.

Cold Start is a good doctrine from India’s point of view, but one that could adversely impact strategic stability given since Pakistan’s nuclear strategy is premised on countering Indian conventional military superiority with a nuclear shield.

Even though the respective military exercise held by Pakistan and India are about handling of respective offensive reserves, the message that emerges is that their employment is best avoided.

Under the deal that was worked out in the back channel, the LoC would have remained a de facto and not a de jure border, something that would keep alive Pakistan's irredentist claims over Jammu and Kashmir.

The promise of 'massive' nuclear retaliation may prove inadequate in staying Pakistani nuclear hand in face of Indian offensives. Inflicting 'unacceptable damage' may appear disproportionate to its leadership if in response to lower order nuclear first use. Therefore, nuclear retaliation could well be of quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus levels with damage not amounting to an 'unacceptable' order.

Though the Indus Water Treaty apportions 80 per cent of the waters of the Indus River Basin to Pakistan and only 20 per cent to India, Pakistan is engaged in baseless allegations to inflame public opinion and project India as its number one threat.

The resumption of India-Pakistan dialogue is closely linked with US moves in Afghanistan in the context of Obama’s publicly declared intent to begin the process of US military withdrawal from Afghanistan from 2011.