India-China War

This monograph presents an objective account of a very crucial six-year period (1956-1962) in the histories of India and China (and Tibet) -- the countries directly involved in the conflict.

• Sunil Khatri
• Monograph

This article explores China’s war experiences in the Korean War and the Sino-Indian War and analyses China’s strategic decisions at the time of its national establishment. This article suggests that China pursued the strategic goal of protecting its frontiers and ensuring its territorial integrity in both wars, while executing dissimilar strategies. The article associates the modernisation of People’s Liberation Army after the Korean War with the outcome of the following war with India.

• Jiye Kim
• March 2018
• Strategic Analysis

The title of the book is self-explanatory. And the tone and tenor thereof is an implied challenge to the conventional wisdom, and thesis, propounded in India’s China War, written by British scribe Neville Maxwell in the 1970s. According to Verma, in 1949, ‘China was not a player as far as India’s national security was concerned.’ None, except Sardar Patel, could read, or anticipate, China and its plan of action. Hence, the 1962 India–China conflict is ‘least understood’. Exactly a month before his death, however, Patel wrote a warning letter to the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru.

• Abhijit Bhattacharyya
• April 2016
• Journal of Defence Studies

India should put Pakistan on parole and watch its behaviour for 20 years before even beginning to think of any concessions in Siachen or elsewhere.

• Ramesh Phadke
• November 08, 2012
• IDSA Comments

In the ongoing debate on the 1962 War, two issues have not been adequately addressed: the myth that the Indian Army had not provided viable military options, and the reasons for the non-use of the combat potential of the Indian Air Force.

• Ramesh Phadke
• October 31, 2012
• IDSA Comments

When Nehru wrote to Zhou that China either accept the McMahon Line alignment along the highest watershed or go by the strict coordinates as per the original McMahon map, the Chinese, realising the folly committed by their Premier, demurred.

• R. S. Kalha
• October 28, 2012
• IDSA Comments

The 1962 border conflict moulded our security and strategic thinking into a defensive mindset, and its 50th anniversary is an appropriate time to review those lessons as we seek our place in the new multi-polar world.

• Mukul Sanwal
• October 19, 2012
• IDSA Comments

Let us examine the facts as they are, to see if the Chinese contention of a counter-attack to throw Indian aggressors out has any merit or, as India believes, it was nothing but a premeditated attack by China.

• R. S. Kalha
• October 17, 2012
• IDSA Comments

A global power like China must not hesitate to acknowledge its historical mistakes: it needs to have sufficient self-confidence to withstand the consequent discomfort and embarrassment.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• October 16, 2012
• IDSA Comments

A global power like China must not hesitate to acknowledge its historical mistakes: it needs to have sufficient self-confidence to withstand the consequent discomfort and embarrassment.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• October 16, 2012
• IDSA Comments