India-China Relations

The naval exercise at Qingdao does not detract from the fact that the India-China maritime relationship is essentially an uneasy one. Each side is uncomfortable with the other’s presence in its own theatre of nautical influence, but both recognise the other’s dominance in their respective maritime ‘backyards’.

This work reviews the significance and progress of Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) in India-China relations. But addressing macroeconomic subject matters that concern the two countries’ strategic interests requires methodological deliberations that must be balanced and nuanced. The SED needs to be upgraded to a level of equal deliberation mechanism, where Beijing must address India’s economic and strategic concerns.

Myanmar and India have followed separate political paths only to find it converging in recent times. Myanmar’s other neighbour China has had a much larger footprint in the country. India has to calibrate its engagement with Myanmar to not just effectively implement its Look East policy but also manage the contiguous border regions of Northeast India given the ground realities.

Since China has now become an important location for international sports events, sportspersons from Arunachal Pradesh, who want to participate in such events, are not able to do so because of the Chinese practice of issuing stapled visas. This category of sportspersons should be issued regular Chinese visa to enable them to participate.

Soft border is neither an option nor a means to resolve the India-China border dispute. In Chinese conceptualization where borders are innately strategic frontiers, the idea of soft border is a misnomer. India should keep a distinction between the notions of soft border and boundary resolution.

The long expected Agreement on Border Defence Cooperation (BDCA) was signed between the governments of India and China on 23 October 2013 in Beijing, during the visit of the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh to the People’s Republic of China. The draft of the agreement had been through close-door negotiations by both the governments for about a year prior to its signing. Incidentally, it was also during these negotiations that a three week long face-to-face incident occurred—in April-May 2013—at Depsang located in the Aksai Chin region which is disputed between India and China.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are not necessarily two contending trade liberalising models, but their import and arrival have posed stiff political challenges for many countries, including China and India, Asia’s two heavyweights. With these two initiatives, the regional trade of Asia is entering an interesting phase of liberalisation and integration.

It has been a year of unstable regional security with the endless conflict in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s half-hearted struggle against the remnants of the al Qaeda, Sri Lanka’s inability to find a lasting solution to its ethnic problems and Nepal’s new found inclination to seek neutrality between India and China.

The India-China relations in 2013, in spite Depsang incident, had a more positive than negative tone. Premier Li chose India as his first overseas stop and the pronouncement to deepen ties with India as “strategic choice” along with promise to make “greater efforts” to resolve boundary issue. Equally positive voice came from the Indian leadership for rejecting the relevance of “containment” in favour of “cooperation” that could bring more gains instead.

China’s border intrusions have been bolstered by a steady and committed expansion of its military hardware and infrastructure in Tibet and neighbouring provinces. The improvement of surface transportation near the LAC has resulted in larger military presence and augmented rapid deployment capacities of the PLA and the PLAAF.