India-China Relations

In the Chinese mind the settlement of the border issue with India cannot be divorced from regional, political and larger strategic issues. China has used the threat of intrusions across the LAC, as a part of its coercive diplomacy and it is too valuable an asset to give up.

• Mukul Sanwal
• September 24, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The military gap between Indian and China is growing steadily as the PLA is upgrading the military infrastructure in Tibet to enable rapid deployment. China will stall resolution of the territorial dispute till it is in a much stronger position.

• Gurmeet Kanwal
• September 22, 2014
• IDSA Comments

Modi should talk to Xi and seek an interim boundary solution at least by having some sort of Friendly Pillars, call them Shanti Stupas along the border (almost 500 kilometers) in the Western Sector.

• P. Stobdan
• September 16, 2014
• Issue Brief

President Xi Jinping’s visit to India is a new opportunity for infusing momentum in the bilateral relations. Economic dealings would be one aspect of the talks; but neither country can afford to bypass the sensitive security and strategic issues that dog their efforts to bring peace and stability.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• September 05, 2014
• Issue Brief

On November 7, 1950, Vallabhbhai Patel wrote his celebrated letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on India’s China policy. ‘The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention’, he stated, referring to Beijing’s decision to move troops into Tibet. A new challenge confronted India as a result of the ‘disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates’. ‘Chinese ambitions … not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam.

• Chandrashekhar Dasgupta
• September 2014
• Strategic Analysis

Engaging with a multilateral body requires constructive foreign policy forethought, especially for a country that is not a fully fledged member of that body. China’s overtures to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) exemplify this approach. The Indian Ocean and India are the two most immediate elements in China’s policy approach to the IORA. With 20 member states, extra-territorial major powers as important dialogue partners, and the increasing importance of energy politics in the region, the IORA today is a significant multilateral body in China’s calculus.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• September 2014
• Strategic Analysis

Prime Minister Modi has to think beyond the immediate circle and leverage the Himalayas as a bridge for India reaching out to wider Eurasian space the access to which has blocked by Pakistan. A way out could be to promote a regional market across the border, woven by a web of spiritual and commercial interests.

• P. Stobdan
• August 14, 2014
• IDSA Comments

While India needs to vigorously pursue its endeavour for APEC membership, it is crucial for the policymakers to comprehend the geo-political allusions of this Chinese invitation, which is linked with India-China ties as well as their balance-of-power politics in Asia-Pacific.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• August 05, 2014
• Issue Brief

China’s announcement of a 10 billion Yuan ($1.6 billion) fund to finance the “maritime silk road plan” is a clear sign that it is serious about moving ahead with its stated plans. For India, it is instructive that the sales pitch of shared economic gains does not conceal the MSR’s real purpose: ensuring the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the Indian and Pacific oceans.

• Abhijit Singh
• July 16, 2014
• IDSA Comments

Over the years, the scope of SCO has widened to include the interests of countries beyond the Eurasian space. For India to capitalise on the SCO it must have a clear pro-active policy, otherwise it may risk becoming a focal point of criticism by the Central Asia states like the way India is often targeted by the SAARC members.

• P. Stobdan
• July 14, 2014
• Policy Brief