India-China Relations

For better operational cooperation, India and China need to go beyond rudimentary agreements on combating piracy and crime in the Western Indian Ocean. They need to work out an acceptable framework for functional collaboration and create positive momentum in favour of greater strategic interaction.

• Abhijit Singh
• May 11, 2015
• IDSA Comments

Will India and China resolve their boundary dispute during the tenure of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping? The strategic communities in both countries are optimistic, particularly after the high tension prevailing along the border during President Xi Jinping’s tour of India in September 2014. Both Prime Minister Modi and President Xi are seen as decisive leaders.1 Both are expected to hold power in their respective countries for a few years to come. Personalities and personas matter greatly for scoring political brownie points. The boundary dispute, quintessentially, is political in nature.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• May 2015
• Strategic Analysis

Nepal shares an open border of 1,868 km with five Indian states (Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Sikkim) and 1,415 km with Tibet. Under the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India, Nepali citizens enjoy ‘national’ treatment and Nepali businesses unhindered rights of trade, transit and movement. An estimated six million Nepalese live and work in India and contribute to their inward remittances. Social intercourse along the Gangetic plane is described by people as ‘roti-beti ka sambandh’ (a relationship based on sharing of hearth and marriage).

• Arun Kumar Sahu
• March 2015
• Strategic Analysis

The US will continue to do what it can for blocking rapprochement between India and China or Japan and China for it knows the danger of its loss of a dominant role in Asia. Despite all the distortions of time and space, the hard geographic reality of Asia will triumph just as it happened in Europe.

• P. Stobdan
• February 04, 2015
• IDSA Comments

Prime Minister Modi’s visit to China must take place in extremely well prepared and ‘ripened’ circumstances, after there is clarity on China’s response on vital Indian strategic concerns.

• Saurabh Kumar
• December 22, 2014
• Policy Brief

The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) idea is part of this wider attempt by China to construct multiple lines of communication to its economic heartland in eastern China since the early 2000s. The underlying aim of such a geostrategy is to also develop inner Chinese provinces and shape China’s regional periphery by exercising economic, political and cultural Influence.

• Zorawar Daulet Singh
• October 2014
• Journal of Defence Studies

Widespread problems have made the operating environment ‘dysfunctional and inefficient’. Some of this is on account of inscrutable issues like ‘integration of the services with the MoD’ or ‘civil-military relations’ but, in large part, the immediate problem lies with MoD’s inability to resolve more mundane issues.

• Rupak Bhattacharjee
• October 14, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The response from the Indian side during the recent border incident was much more robust. However, it is important to examine the likely motives that drive the Chinese to raise the ante before the high-level visits to India.

• Rumel Dahiya
• September 29, 2014
• IDSA Comments

It all appears that the Indian army this time got clear orders to hold the ground and undo what the previous UPA government did – dismantled huts, bunkers and observation posts in exchange of PLA moving back from the Indian territory.

• P. Stobdan
• September 25, 2014
• IDSA Comments

In the Chinese mind the settlement of the border issue with India cannot be divorced from regional, political and larger strategic issues. China has used the threat of intrusions across the LAC, as a part of its coercive diplomacy and it is too valuable an asset to give up.

• Mukul Sanwal
• September 24, 2014
• IDSA Comments