India-China Relations

Excepting in a war-like situation when there is threat to national security, unity and integrity, parliamentarians neither have the time nor the inclination to discuss issues that do not have a direct bearing on their constituency or on electoral politics. Besides considering the sensitive and professional nature of the subject, parliamentarians tend to leave the foreign policy issues to the professional diplomats and the foreign policy establishment. But there have been exceptions to the rule in most democratic countries, including India.

• R N Das
• October 2012
• Journal of Defence Studies

When will states bargain while fighting and when will they evade intrawar negotiations? This article addresses this question with respect to the 1962 Sino-Indian War and provides insight into the question of why talks did not occur for the duration of the war. To do so, I analyse Chinese and Indian strategic thinking regarding the prospects of talks in the lead up and throughout the short war, with information gathered through archival work at the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives, interviews with former Indian political and military leaders as well as scholars and secondary sources.

• Oriana Skylar Mastro
• October 2012
• Journal of Defence Studies

In spring 1962, small numbers of lightly armed Indian troops proactively established presence in the disputed border areas between Chinese Tibet and India, despite intense sabre-rattling in Beijing. What was originally intended as a ‘game of chess and a battle of wits’ in late 1961, eventually ended in war in October 1962. This article discusses the long-term and short-term factors that can help explain why the Government of India opted for the ‘Forward Policy’ in late 1961.

• Johan Skog Jensen
• October 2012
• Journal of Defence Studies

Fifty years since the 1962 war, India and China have moved on to become world powers with engagement and competition characterizing their relationship in keeping with the rules of realpolitik. Both sides argue that the past has been forgotten, yet the border dispute remains unresolved. Despite the rapprochement and robust economic engagement undertaken, the relationship has a constant undercurrent of tension and is often described as fragile.

• Shruti Pandalai
• October 2012
• Journal of Defence Studies

This article will argue that the legacy of the 1962 Sino-Indian War continues to affect China’s policy towards India even today. The three factors that led to China’s decision in 1962 to attack India—the status of Tibet, the militarization of their unresolved border and fears of containment—are present even today, albeit in slightly modified forms. This is not to argue that another Sino-Indian War is imminent because the larger strategic context within which China’s leaders took the decision to attack India in 1962 has changed.

• Manjeet S Pardesi
• October 2012
• Journal of Defence Studies

Episodes in the modern military history of a nation need to assist in deriving lessons. At the same time, due to reasons such as fading public memory, local discourse in the area of conflict, non-availability of archival data, poor recording of history, and over-securitisation leads to the creation of myths. This article discusses tactics of victory employed by the Chinese in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. It then assesses the need to sustain capacity for mobility in the Himalayas. It also highlights the fact that local perceptions have not been understood at the national level.

• P. K. Gautam
• October 2012
• Journal of Defence Studies

How have commentators perceived India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962? What were its underlying reasons? Can the entire blame be cast on China for its surprise attack? Or, were India’s thoughtless actions also responsible? After touching on these questions, this article describes the defence reforms undertaken by India after the border conflict in 1962 in the light of the shortcomings and deficiencies highlighted.

• P. R. Chari
• October 2012
• Journal of Defence Studies

Chinese defence minister’s visit to India assumes special significance in the context of growing Chinese concerns about American rebalancing strategy in the Asia Pacific and growing Indo-US relations. India should take note of Chinese anxieties and put across its views in a candid and uninhibited manner in its engagement with China.

• R. S. Kalha
• September 11, 2012
• IDSA Comments

General Liang’s visit could see the emergence of a fresh agenda in military cooperation, one which can set the course for a more meaningful and positive interaction between the two militaries in the future.

• Mandip Singh
• September 04, 2012
• Issue Brief

China and India are two of the fastest growing economies of the world today. While it may seem like the proverbial hare and tortoise race, with China way ahead, there is no denying the fact that both economies will be looking for additional energy resources, mineral resources, secure lines of communication, higher productivity at lower cost and finally, of course, larger markets to sustain this growth.

• Deepak Kapoor
• July 2012
• Strategic Analysis