Tokyo looks at energy security differently than does Washington, or other major global capitals. This persistent and deepening reality—so incongruously at odds with the continual affirmations of solidarity and alliance in the US–Japan bilateral relationship—has substantial grounding in economics. Yet, the contrast in mindset between Japan and the broader world is sharply amplified by differences in domestic institutions and politics. This perceptual gap has major implications for East Asia's energy future and for global geopolitics as well.
Economic globalisation, coupled with geopolitical instability and international terrorism, has made it impossible for any single country to secure its energy supply entirely on its own. The urgent energy security issue has resulted in brisk energy diplomacy with aspirations for cooperation running high among both producing and consuming countries. The concept of energy security needs to be expanded, however, because the real risks are not 'below ground' (a lack of resources) but 'above ground' (political instability). We need a new energy security concept to ensure global energy security.
As the world's fastest growing energy consumer, China has attracted enormous attention over the last few years. This paper looks at the factors influencing China's policies and strategies in its search for energy security and examines whether China can be persuaded to adopt a more integrative stance with respect to energy. It argues that China's pursuit of a policy to secure preferential access to oil and gas resources in politically unstable states could lead to heightened competition with other major importing states and to geopolitical tensions.
Thomas Friedman noted that "the price of oil and pace of freedom always move in opposite directions." This trend, which he cited in the case of Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, can be equally applied to Myanmar as well. Though pro-democratic forces have been active in Myanmar earlier as well, the public display of dissent in recent days is unprecedented and demonstrates the increasing disenchantment against almost two decades of military rule. Since the junta came to power, economic conditions have deteriorated and poverty has increased.
Energy security has become a major component of India's national security thinking and policy as its economy has begun to record high rates of growth. The criticality of ensuring access to foreign oil and gas resources will only increase with time as the gap between its demand and its domestic production widens. Furthermore, India's dependence on the seas is particularly overwhelming for its energy 'logistics' in terms of both its domestic supplies and overseas imports.
A new great game is under way in Myanmar. The huge offshore gas findings stretching from the borders of Bangladesh down to Thailand have resulted in a flurry of diplomatic manoeuvring with China, Thailand and other ASEAN countries as well as United States, India, the European Union, Australia and Russia all playing key roles. The equations are bound to change and many countries, for fear of losing influence with Yangon, are seeking a more 'pragmatic' approach.
With 14.1 per cent growth (2007) in the manufacturing sector, 14 per cent (2006) in the service sector, and an agriculture sector that is beginning to finally look up, the Indian economy needs all the energy it can get to sustain the growth momentum. However, enshrouded in the figures of the galloping Indian economy is the precarious energy situation that the country faces.
Russia's evolving 'energy ideology' and its approach to defining its role in the global energy markets with the particular focus on the interests in and intentions for Asia have drawn considerable attention. Russia's claim for the role of 'global energy security provider', advanced with much aplomb in the context of the G8 chairmanship, is, however, undermined by the stagnation in the oil and gas production and increasing shortages of electricity.
