With the death sentence pronounced on Mohammed Morsi, the first democratically elected President in Egypt’s history, it is difficult not to conclude that Egypt is moving away from a democratic destination at an accelerated pace.
After nearly 30 years in power, the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt, considered by many to be the strongest in the Arab world, collapsed suddenly in February 2011 after a mere 18 days of street protests. In this article, we try to explain the puzzling collapse of the Mubarak regime using regime transition theory. We argue that the Mubarak regime’s collapse came about as a result of four key developments, none of which were sufficient to cause the regime’s collapse, but when coalesced together exposed the regime’s lack of coercive and persuasive powers, thereby hastening its demise.
With the conclusion of the parliamentary and presidential elections, based on a constitution that finely balances the country’s Islamic heritage with the need for modernity, Tunisia has done what Egypt has failed to do.
With Egypt’s reversion to military rule, even if it is sanctified through an election process less than free and fair, one can say definitely that the pro-democracy tide in the Arab world is subsiding. The only success story so far is Tunisia where the Ennahda, an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, has shown maturity and superior political navigational skills .
The issue brief analyses the changing patterns of relationship of Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two major players in the Gulf, with Egypt in the backdrop of the removal of Morsi.
The removal of Morsi is a setback to the nascent democratic experiments in the post-Mubarak Egypt. The decision of the army seems to have been influenced more by the popular sentiments on the streets rather than the rule of law.
The Islamic Brotherhood, vastly experienced in handling stress situations, is not going to take the ouster of its nominee and the democratically elected President with any sense of resignation.
All that the western powers have achieved so far with regime change is to propel into powerful positions an assorted lot of Islamists as well as autocrats with medieval beliefs and a penchant for terrorism.
It is only when and if the three authorities – legislature, executive and the judiciary – interact and work in tandem with one another can effective and inclusive governance begin and Egypt’s flailing economy sputter back to life.
