The biggest lesson that India can borrow is France’s integrated and centralised procurement structure, which has the dual responsibility of arms acquisition and defence industrial development.
The United States, once the dominant influence over the armed forces of the region, is now in danger of losing that position to China and has already lost it in countries like Bolivia and Venezuela.
The Task Force has not extended the principle of Strategic Partnership to the whole gamut of big contracts in which the private sector is supposed to play a major role. And it visualises strategic partners as poor cousins of state-owned entities.
Introduction of the ‘Buy (Indian-IDDM)’ procurement category, the revamped ‘Make’ procedure, structural change in AAP, and higher and flexible indigenous content requirement in certain procurement categories are all likely to deepen the involvement of domestic industry in defence production.
Defence planning has had a troubled history since its inception, in spite of several experiments with the structures and processes of planning. It will, therefore, be in the fitness of things to re-evaluate the existing architecture of planning.
The best of policies and procedures can come to naught because of indecisiveness in decision-making. There is little in DPP 2016 that addresses the problems which beset decision-making in the MoD.
While taking stock of the acquisition proposals and projects is critical for bringing in efficiency in defence procurements, the focus on statistics dissembles some important issues.
The Defence Acquisition Council has decided to introduce a new category of Indian Designed, Developed and Manufactured equipment. This will be the most preferred category, ahead of ‘Buy (Indian)’, which presently occupies the pride of place.
The MoD guidelines on handling of complaints do not seem to be free from potentially crippling afflictions. Conceptual ambiguity can easily defeat the purpose of the guidelines.