Africa’s continental aspirations are well documented in ‘Agenda 2063’. With a laid-out implementation plan for well-articulated goals to meet the aspirations, Africa is moving in the right direction, albeit a little slowly. The main reasons are intertwined and interrelated—conflicts and slow economic growth. To top this, African governments are splurging on building military capabilities without clearly defined strategic goals.
The only unfettered use of air power in India’s wars was in 1971, and it produced disproportionate and decisive outcomes. IAF’s air strategy, the extent of its role in contributing to the failure of Pakistan’s strategy in the west, and the vast range of operations carried out towards the surface war on both fronts simultaneously, are relatively unknown.
This article deliberates on some ‘disruptive’ issues that will affect employment, doctrine, force development and the very future of exclusive manned air power. Currently, causing asymmetry on the battlefield is considered a virtue rather than a weaker adversary’s option. Pakistan’s strategy against India and Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) are examples of cheaper but effective means. Driven by rapid advances in technology and confluence of emerging scientific capabilities, warfighting’s character is changing.
The proposal to create an Air Defence Command is a bold move. Rather than resorting to less contentious issues to commence the integration process, the CDS has selected a very pertinent and significant operational issue. However, the way the proposed Air Defence Command is structured will be crucial as it will set the tone for further integration of all three services.
Considering the wide expanse to be covered on both sides of the Indian Peninsula, and the possibility of concurrent operations on either side, it is imperative that India maintains an operational carrier battle group on both sides, and at all times.
For the first time in the history of military aviation in India, helicopters have surpassed fighter aircraft in terms of sheer numbers. Are the Indian Armed Forces reorienting for helicopter dominated air operations?
The Civilian Aviation Requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, though fairly well drafted, constitute only a stop gap measure for regulating drone operations in the civil sector.
How different will the USAF look after the proposed restructuring with 74 additional squadrons? Will there be a trade-off between quality and quantity?
