Answers to all of Afghan problems can easily be found within the regional context. But the Afghan leadership is not likely to uphold the regional choice now.
President Ghani has extended an open invitation to the US for an open-ended military presence in Afghanistan and has also virtually expressed a readiness to play the role of a ‘frontline state’ for any future American contingency.
The US and other countries, including India, should open the floodgates of military and economic assistance to the Afghan state and help build the capacity and capability of its security forces and administrative machinery.
This article addresses the question of why regional cooperation among Afghanistan’s neighbours has been so difficult despite these countries’ common concerns. To answer this question, Afghanistan is conceptualised as placed at the core of overlapping regions: South Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and, through China’s influence, East Asia. Over the past decade, interactions among different regions ‘through’ Afghanistan have increased, and overlap has intensified.
This book makes a modest attempt to contribute to the ongoing debate on future challenges for Afghanistan as the largest ever coalition of Western forces prepares to withdraw. It seeks to examine key political developments within Afghanistan over the last one decade in response to the US-led Western military and political intervention.
For all the grandstanding by the Pakistan army and the civilian government that Op Zarb-e-Azb was going to be against all kinds of terror groups based in NWA, no such thing seems to be happening. Clearly, this operation has been launched keeping an eye on the post-2014 situation in Afghanistan.
The recently concluded Afghan Presidential election, rather than facilitating crucial political transition, is mired in controversy. An early resolution is crucial both for Afghanistan and the international community. For Afghanistan, a peaceful and non-controversial transition would ensure the legitimacy of the upcoming government and push the twin processes of reconciliation and democratization forward.
As all the votes cast in the run-off election are audited and recounted under international supervision, the final outcome could be a close finish with winning candidate leading by a much narrow margin. The process of constitutional amendment can only be initiated after the new parliament is formed as parliamentary elections are due in 2015.
The Afghan government’s peace and reconciliation overtures to the militants, initially at the unofficial level but later sanctioned officially, have formed a key theme of state security policy from the early days of the post-Taliban administration in Afghanistan. Yet far from producing peace and stability, they seem to have played into the hands of the violent groups intent on overthrowing the country’s internationally supported and legitimate political system in the past decade.
The following commentary argues that the strategic and structural solutions proffered by advocates of ‘hybrid’ governance—encompassing elements from distinctly different ideological backgrounds or schools of thought—ignore or fail to address certain inherent shortcomings in their approach that are counter-productive to the ongoing and long-term statebuilding and peacebuilding projects in Afghanistan. The following study elucidates some of these shortcomings.
