India needs to proactively buttress its broader position by affixing/prefixing the issue of Pakistan occupied Kashmir to the bilateral agenda every time the issue of Kashmir comes up for discussion.
Gilgit Baltistan’s absorption may signal a paradigmatic shift in Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy. However, Pakistan would have to reset the contours of its position on Kashmir including an implied acceptance of the status quo.
While China’s initial reluctance was attributed to the sheer scale of the project, costing tens of billions of dollars, in the changed CPEC-helmed geo-economic-strategic context, its re-calculations cannot be ruled out.
This book collates a wide spectrum of views across South Asia, including Myanmar, and debates the role of media in forging regional understanding and goodwill. The media's role in South Asia is essentially conceived as state-centric, adhering to the standard templates of nationalism. This inherent tendency has, at times, cost neutral and balanced coverage of events and issues. The contributors to this volume acknowledge the potential of the media as an institution which could/should, in addition to its routine reportage, focus on regional issues of common interest and promote regional understanding.
Chinese stakes in Gilgit Baltistan could propel Pakistan to introduce a stop gap provincial arrangement that would contain popular resistance, promote greater stability, and deflate India’s objections to CPEC.
India has to take a call on whether it would like to be a party to the CPEC, sit on the fence, or convey its concerns more emphatically in a bid to discourage China.
Witness to three fully fledged coups, Pakistan’s beleaguered political history has been consistently punctured with prolonged stints of military rule. Although a democratic state in principle, it is the episodic rule by the military that has inflicted Pakistan’s political destiny and shaped its political culture and practices. In May 2013, there was a rather peaceful transition—the first of its kind—from one popularly elected incumbent government to another.
ADB’s yet another deferment of the decision on funding the DBD is a serious setback to Pakistan’s relentless efforts to obtain funds for constructing this mega hydro-power project on River Indus.
The war on terror, often described as ‘the longest war’ or ‘the wrong war’, is approaching its pinnacle. In this context, 2014 has been the centre of gravity while formulating strategies, framing policies and executing actions to ensure an honourable exit for the international forces led by the United States from Afghanistan.
In the run-up to the May 2013 elections, the political scene in Pakistan was absorbed in electoral rhetoric, active campaigning and a hectic poll process. It culminated with an expected set of results—the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) emerged victorious and took the reins of power after a decade and a half. The incumbent Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was nearly decimated and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) marginalised.
Inserting PoK into the Kashmir Conundrum
India needs to proactively buttress its broader position by affixing/prefixing the issue of Pakistan occupied Kashmir to the bilateral agenda every time the issue of Kashmir comes up for discussion.